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The Embedded Mobilization in Environmental Protection 
of China 
Party-state-societal Interactions, Informal Politics and Issue-oriented 
Political Development 
 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
From the late 1990s, we have seen the gradual rise of the environmental protection 
(EP) in ranks of China’s political agendas, and, the rapid rise of environmental social 
movements and green public sphere. Not only for environmental activists with clear 
stance, even in most authoritative official statement, the EP agenda has made a main 
factor to maintain the political legitimacy of the leading Communist Party, and a main 
criterion of “good governance”. With the consensus across political and social sphere, it 
may be very interesting to explore the Party-state-societal interactions which have 
brought positive environmental policies and active civil society in China, especially when 
the political restrictions and the mandatory objectives of industrialization are concerned.  
Researchers have found in China’s EP realm the active public participation, and, the 
findings have linked EP issues with civil societal growth and democratization, and further, 
an important breakthrough point of political development in China, because, the appeals 
of public participation in solving certain EP problems have always contained contents of 
political change, such as the construction of pluralistic policy-making regime, the 
improvement of people’s right of knowing and pariticipation, strengthening the authority 
of law, and so on. All the appeals, in theory, are taken to accordingly weaken the 
Party-state authority. And, a more radical idea expects that – with the enigmatic gap 
between the rapid growth of economy and the political system without fundamental 
change on the contrary China during the more-than-30-years reform – EP-related public 
participation demonstrates the dissatisfaction of educated middle-class who may bring 
broad social movements to topple down the government and establish a new political 
system which resembles, at least in theory, what had happened in some transforming 
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countries, like those ex-communist countries in East Europe and Soviet Union territory.  
According to this interpretation framework, we are demonstrated the prospect that: 
with shortage of resources, Party-state reduces its control on problem realms which are 
not so politically sensitive on one hand, and on the other hand, modernized social factors 
filled in the “power vacuum” left with habituating and finally institutionalizing new 
regimes of public participation. This interpretation may be not perfect without paying 
enough attention to initiatives of Party-state, to speak specifically, the strong and clear 
national willingness and initiative orientation of social mobilization with regard to EP 
according to its substantial importance for the rapidly industrializing country with the 
largest population and their poor per-capita quantity of natural resources.  
With the consciousness of the researching deficiency, this research tries to 
change the point view from “Party-state withdrawal and public entry” to the 
integration of both political and social initiatives and takes an area study in 
environmental realm in its theorizing efforts on Post-Reform China’s 
Party-state-societal relations in aspect of political development. It focuses on 
the interaction between the Party-state system and the growing civil society in the 
environmental policy process. And in addition, this research notices, under the strict 
restrictions to formal pluralistic participation regimes, China’s special mass media system 
has played a key role in integrating the political and civil activism, through its unique 
duality of Party-line and mass-line. 
From the very beginning of the research on China’s modern civil society growth and 
its political implications, its “interaction <hu dong>” with the Party-state has been a most 
important topic. And, in this research, the “interaction” is framed as “embedded 
mobilization” in accordance with the environmental issue-oriented “political 
mobilization (which literally called “social motivation” <she hui dong yuan> but totally 
different from the concept in Western countries)” process. Rather than the point view of 
taking environmental activism as the chance of bottom-up democratization movements, 
the focus on integration of institutional resources and informal politics in environmental 
activism bring this research originality. To speak specifically, in first place, despite of the 
succession of a traditional measure for the Party-state to implement the national 
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willingness, today’s “political mobilization” in dealing with environmental problems has 
gradually been deprived of its totalitarian color and been more embedded in the 
increasingly complex and pluralistic social structure. Secondly, the environmental 
activism at the civil-society-level has been also beneficial from the political measures, 
utilizing the institutional resources to achieve their certain purposes, especially through 
the network among political and intellectual elites. And lastly, the national willingness 
and civil targets achieve the integration through the mass media issue framing, to 
influence the environmental policymaking, and further, bring a gradual change to the 
political system in accordance with pluralism, democracy and modern 
institutionalization.  
 
1. Research Questions and Research Background 
This research started by raising the questions that: is there any interpretation 
framework to integrate the initiatives of both political and social sphere? 
Does Party-state “withdraw” from the EP domain or just be changing the 
mode of implementing its authority, with mobilizing both institutional and 
non-institutional resources through positively changing certain methods or 
even the state system? What is the power source of the great activeness of 
green civil society? And, may it be possible to link the activeness to some 
special factors of Chinese politics, besides only framing it as a natural 
reflection of social modernization according to the paradigm of green 
politics in those developed democracies? And, there are three main factors leading 
to them as the research background.  
1.1 Environmental Protection as An Important Political Agenda 
The first factor is the special position of the EP issue in China’s political agenda ranks. 
To speak specifically, the Party-state initiated even most strict green 
standards throughout the world, with the official environmental 
consciousness getting ahead of the public. As we know, the environmental concern 
had been kept in the sub-political sphere until the 1980s, and the “green politics” arose 
along with the emergence of green parties throughout the developed democracies in West 
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Europe. This new form of political movement didn’t only mean the upgrade of 
environmental issues in political agendas, but also meant the challenge to the existing 
political organization and governance. In other words, the emergence of green politics 
has generally been observed as indicating the well-developed democracy and the mature 
civil society1. However, in China, the concern of natural ecology and resources has 
become an important political agenda and actually influenced the governance, despite of 
the even outmoded political system without enough institutionalization or growth of civil 
society.  
Like in all the advanced countries, the massive industrialization has brought 
corresponding ecological environmental deterioration to today’s China. In fact, to catch 
up with or even surpass advanced world industry levels, the impressively rapid economic 
increase in China is based on an extensive growth mode2 at the expense of severe 
environmental pollution and waste of natural resources. According to the Environmental 
Sustainability Index (ESI) and its precedent, the Environmental Performance Index (EPI), 
made by the collaborative research of Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy and 
Columbia Center for International Earth Science Information Network from 2001 to 2010, 
China ranks 108th out of 122 countries in 2001, 129th out of 144 countries in 2002, 133rd 
out of 146 countries in 2005, 94th out of 133 countries in 2006, 105th out of 131 countries 
in 2008, and 121st out of 163 countries in the newest 2010 index3. Today’s China has 
grown more and more stressed by natural resources shortage and ecological 
environmental deterioration resulted from massive industrialization and wealth 
accumulation for a population of more than 1.3 billion.  
However, different from “green politics”, China’s Party-state, without enough 
                                                        
1 See for example: Michael O’Neill, Green Parties and Political Change in Contemporary Europe, 
Ashgate, 1997; John Barry, Rethinking Green Politics: Nature, Virtue and Progress, Sage, 1999; Jon 
Burchell, The Evolution of Green Politics: Development and Change Within Europe, Earthscan, 2002; 
and James Radcliffe, Green Politics: Dictatorship or Democracy? Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.  
2 Extensive growth is an economic development mode. It refers to the increase of overall wealth, coming 
from the expansion of ordinary inputs of labor, reproducible capital and natural resources. There is also 
a concept on the contrary called intensive growth, referring to increase of per capita wealth driven by 
productivity growth and technological progress. Commonly, pre-industrialization economy grows 
extensively and, modern economy relatively grows intensively.  
3 Among the developing countries with the large territory and population, China has been ranked in the 
middle, worse than Brazil and Indonesia but better than India and Nigeria, and it was the poor air 
quality and sustainable energy among 25 indicators to make the main factors leading to the low ranking. 
See more details of the Index in: http://epi.yale.edu/ and http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/  
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effective democratic mechanisms, has been strongly pushing forward its strict green 
policies. The initiative can be understood from two respects. On one hand, the destructive 
influence of environmental problems is more severe to not only China, but all the 
developing countries than the developed ones. Judged from the history, most of the 
industrialized countries attained their development without severe anxiety of natural 
resources shortage and ecological stress, as World’s undeveloped “virgin soil” had seemed 
very vast before the 20th Century and there were only minimum number of competitors. 
But on the contrary, China, like all the other developing countries established after the 
World War Ⅱ, would be more suffering from competition for limited natural resources 
and more vulnerable to ecological deterioration. On the other hand, in the Post-Mao 
Zedong era, economic growth has become an, possibly the most, important resource for 
the Party-state to maintain the political legitimacy, but this rapid increase brought 
possibility that it might exceed the environmental capacity and ruin the sustainability of 
economic development. In that situation, CCP will fail in achieving national 
industrialization, which means losing the basis for solving problems like wealth 
distribution, insurance system, further political reform and maintenance of political and 
social stability. The management of environmental problems, being a most prominent 
public issue, has been testing the governance capability of the Party-state and its 
achievements of the announced political modernization and institutionalization, and 
further, the accumulating environmental justice, growing voices of the green civil society 
and the pressure from the international environmentalist regimes has been demanding 
for the political response in relation to a more fair distribution system of power and 
resources1. In the next chapter, the political importance of the EP agenda will be 
discussed through more detailed data, with regard to the development sustainability 
and social stability.  
1.2 The Rise of Environmental Grass Root NGOs and Social Movements 
The rise of environmental NGOs has made a figure in China’s public environmental 
                                                        
1 Just according to the four dimensions of Robert Dahl’s theory to interpret “politics” as “the art of 
government”, “public affairs”, “compromise and consensus”, “power and the distribution of resources”; 
the respects of “public affairs” and “power and the distribution of resources” may mostly indicate the 
political implications of China’s environmental agendas. See: Robert Alan Dahl and Bruce Stinebrickner, 
Modern Politics Analysis (6th Edition), Prentice Hall, 2002.   
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issues and caught the eyes of researchers. However, there is also an enigma that, in 
contrast to the restrictive political ecology without any fundamental systematic change, 
how could the young environmental NGOs play such an active role in a wide range of 
“environmental education, nature conservation, species protection, policy advocacy and 
other activities”1? Or, to think about it from another aspect, doesn’t it the entanglement 
with the political system promote, to some extent, the achievements of environmental 
NGOs? And, what does it mean for the prospect of environmental NGO development and 
China’s environmental democratization? These questions make the second factor leading 
to this thesis. 
Along with the process of economic reform, especially from the early 1990s after the 
failure of political revolution-oriented campaign in the late 1980s, it has been believed 
that there had formed the modern civil society figured mainly by the rise of NGOs 
focusing on various event domains. It’s just different from the civil society composed of 
the industrial associations or fellow provincial associations in the late Qing dynasty and 
Republic of China2, or that before Tian’anmen Movement based on the networks in 
intellectual circles3. It seemed to be that the NGOs had the potential to fill the social 
space that the Party-state and profit-oriented sector couldn’t or wouldn’t fill, offering the 
public services or even, taking the role as an independent and subjective component to 
limit the political intervention in the social autonomy4. Within the surprisingly rapid 
increase of NGO quantity5, the first local environmental NGO in China was registered on 
                                                        
1 Guobin Yang, “Environmental NGOs and Institutional Dynamics in China,” The China Quarterly, 
2005, pp. 46-66. p. 46.  
2 See: Timothy Brook and Michel B. Frolic, (ed.), Civil Society in China, Armonk, N. Y.: Me. Sharpe, 
1997. 
3 See for example: Thomas B. Gold, “The Resurgence of Civil Society in China,” Journal of Democracy, 
Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter, 1990, pp. 18-31; Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, State and Society in China: The 
Consequences of Reform, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992; and Yijiang Ding, “The Conceptual 
Evolution of Democracy in Intellectual Circles’ Rethinking of State and Society,” in Suisheng Zhao, (ed.), 
China and Democracy, NY: Routledge, 2000, pp. 115-129.  
4 See in reference to: Rosenbaum, State and Society in China: The Consequences of Reform; Zhenglai 
Deng and J. C. Alexander (ed.), State and Civil Society, Beijing: Central Compilation and Translation 
Press, 1998; and Yimin Lin and Zhaoqing Tu (ed.), Reform and Opening Up and Chinese Society, Hong 
Kong: Oxford University, 1999.  
5 According to the statistics of Ministry of Civil Affair’s statistics, the number of registered NGOs had 
been increased from 4,544 by 1989 to more than 354,000 by 2006. And moreover, a 2005 report even 
radically judged that 90 per cent of NGOs operating in China were not registered. See: Clement Chu S. 
Lau, “The Roles of NGOs in China,” Quarterly Journal of Ideology, Vol. 31, 
2009[http://www.lsus.edu/Documents/Offices%20and%20Services/CommunityOutreach/JournalOfId
eology/NGOsinChinaarticle.pdf]. And, a moderate number was believed to be near 410,000 by 2008. 
See: Ying Xu and Litao Zhao, “China’s Rapidly Growing Non-Governmental Organizations,” EIA 
Background Brief No. 514, March 25, 2010. [http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/BB514.pdf] 
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March 31, 1994, commonly known as the Friends of Nature (FON) by now1. By 2005, 
there had been 2768 registered environmental NGOs in China, with 224,000 members2. 
At the early stage, different from the environmental NGOs in industrialized democracies 
mainly fighting with industrial pollutions, China’s environmental NGOs pioneered in the 
domain of wildlife protection, which had less political risk without conflicting with the 
mainstream political agendas of industrialization. However, the attempt of the new-born 
weak social activism only supported by underprivileged intellectuals and university 
students quickly produced unexpected effects according to its first larger-scale campaign 
to protect the Yunnan snub-nosed monkey, the national-level protection species, which 
will be discussed in details in the third chapter. This campaign was then clearly welcomed 
by the political leadership. In 1996, at the Fourth National Conference on Environmental 
Protection, the State Councilor and current head of the State Environmental Commission 
(SEPC), Song Jian, stated, “As for various environmental protection mass organizations 
which are concerned with environmental protection undertakings, we should actively 
support them, strengthen leadership, and guide their healthy development”3. And, the 
statement was echoed, in a more formal occasion as the fifteenth CCP Congress, by the 
current Party general secretary, Jiang Zemin, highlighting the necessity of “cultivating 
and developing social intermediary organizations”4.  
Into the 21st century, environmental NGOs had gradually changed their role of, from 
the passive actor to fill the space where the state had “intentionally abandoned its 
commitment to the ‘iron rice bowl’, in which the state provided for all the basic needs of 
the society”5, to the active actor to promote the “de-politicalized politics”6 in China. To 
speak specifically, the NGO activists, through the issue-oriented movements in the 
                                                        
1 It was originally named as the Academy for Green Culture to emphasis the color of “intellectual study” 
rather than “social movement”. 
2 All-China Environment Federation (ACEF): China environmental protection NGO status report, 
published on April 22, 2006. p. 61. 
3 Qing Dai and Eduard B. Vermeer, “Do Good Work, But Do Not Offend the ‘Old Communists’,” in 
Robert Ash and Werner Draguhn (ed.), China’s Economic Security, NY: St. Martins, 1999. p. 144.  
4 Tony Saich, “Negotiating the Sate: The Development of Social Organizations in China,” The China 
Quarterly, Vol. 161, March, 2000. p. 128.  
5 Elizabeth C. Economy, The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China's Future, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2004. p. 130.  
6 See: Peter Ho, “Self-Imposed Censorship and De-Politicalized Politics in China,” in Peter Ho and 
Richard Louis. Edmons (ed.), China's Embedded Activism: Opportunities and Constraints of A Social 
Movement, London; New York : Routledge, 2008. p. 20.  
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environmental fields permitted by the Party-state, caught the political opportunities to 
open the political access in favor of their independent appealings, such as public 
participation, related legislation, human rights protection, and so on. This change would 
not be surprising even according to the global view. Generally, while social activists in 
industrialized democracies have tended to address environmental degradation and 
human rights as separate, even conflicting problems, activists in less developed countries 
have rarely dwelt on such distinctions, but commonly linked the environmental issues to 
human rights, public accountability, and civic justice1. And further, the lessons that 
environmental movements had factually triggered the color revolutions in ex-socialist 
nations ranged from East Europe to former Soviet Union Territory had encouraged the 
environmental activists in China. All the environmental movements in such countries 
resembled on the point that environmental protests appeared as a relatively safe outlet 
for expression of more general discontent with the whole existing system2, and activists 
who started by fighting pollution then became leaders in a more general battle for a wide 
range of cultural, economic and political independence3. However, the growth of the new 
generation of environmental activists had been also important for the change. In 
comparison with the pioneers who had contained the more unsophiscated “love to the 
nature” and, which was more crucial, been sensitive to the political bombs according to 
the sad memories of Tian’anmen movement, the new generation who were better 
educated in aspect of the environmental democratization paradigm had greater dynamics 
to express their political appeal and interact with the international civil society. Therefore, 
the first several years of the 21st century witnessed the social movements such as the 
Yuanmingyuan anti-seepage membrane controversy, the Anti-dam movement, the urban 
movement of anti-chemical plant construction in Xiamen, and so on. Those 
environmental movements were all featured that: a) the appeals focused on the public 
right to know, public participation and environmental justice, beyond the simple 
                                                        
1 Judith Shapiro, “The Political Roots of China’s Environmental degradation,” in Lionel M. Jensen and 
Timothy B Weston (ed.), China’s Transformations: the Stories Beyond the Headlines, Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2007. pp. 50-67. p. 53.  
2 Susan Baker and Petr Jehlicka, Dilemmas of Transition: The Environment, Democracy, and 
Economic Reform in East Central Europe, Frank Cass, 1998. p. 9.  
3 Murray Feshbach and Alfred Friendly Jr., Ecocide in the USSR, NY: Basic Books, 1992, p. 22.  
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environmental priority; b) the event were mainly promoted by environmental NGOs 
located in economically advanced cities – like Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen 
and Xiamen, along the east coast – backed by the participation of university students, 
young white-colors, urban bourgeoisie, journalist, and other intellectuals; c) the 
movements shaped the green public sphere and linked to the global attention in a wide 
range.  
However, when observers are excited by the surprising activeness and achievements 
of environmental NGOs in contrast to the annoying stability of the fundamental political 
system despite of the economic metamorphosis, the more attention paid and more 
related research resources spent have led to a somehow pessimistic conclusion. Factually, 
the living conditions of environmental NGOs cannot be judged as good. It’s no doubt that 
the political restrictions to limit the NGO effectiveness, especially according to the strict 
registration limitation to prevent many NGOs from attaining the legal status. The 
“Provisional Regulations on Civil Non-enterprise Institutions Registration Management 
<minban fei qiye danwei dengji guanli zanxing tiaoli>,” published in 1999 is the main 
legal principle for NGO registration, however, the complicated registration procedures, 
high standards for applicants and the strict examination rules have made it inoperable for 
most NGOs1. According to one of China’s liberal media stand-bearers, South Weekend,  
in 2002, some NGOs might have been denied even with several years of application 
efforts only due to that they couldn’t find a “responsible department <zhuguan bumen>” 
in accordance with the regulations 2 , with nobody being willing to assume this 
responsibility for the fear of any problems they might be taking on3. Therefore, until the 
end of 2005, only 23.3% of NGOs completed their registration procedures in various 
levels of Civil Affair Departments, and 63.9% of them registered as branches of existing 
institution, enterprises and student associations, with the rest having undergone no 
                                                        
1 Even though, as mentioned before, thousands of “illegal” NGOs are still working today, it means more 
limitations to and vulnerabilities of their actions if they don’t have some other measures to keep contact 
with political power.  
2 According to the provisions, the establishment of an NGO needs to be examined by a “responsible 
department <zhuguan bumen>” (article 3, 8) – responsible departments should be “relevant 
departments of the State council and governments at or above the county level; and other authorized 
organizations of the State council and governments at or above the county level” (article 5) – and, a 
“responsible department” need take supervision on the daily activism of the NGO (article 20).  
3 Wu Chengguang, “China’s environmental NGOs,” South Weekend, July 13, 2002.  
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formal procedure1. And, even among the registered 2768 environmental NGOs by 2005, 
49.9% of them were sponsored and directly controlled by the government (GNGO), 
40.3% were students associations, and 2.5% were branches of International NGOs2. In 
other words, the data implied only 8 per cent of the environmental NGOs were actually 
meaningful for the active “social movements”. And moreover, environmental NGOs are 
also faced with financial problem. A comprehensive investigative report published in 
2005 indicated that the most common fund source of environmental NGOs was member 
fees, followed by the volunteer contribution, appropriation from government or 
sponsoring department, and corporate donations. Only 23.9% of environmental NGOs 
had stable fund source, and, the percentage for true grass-root NGOs was even only 20%. 
In the whole year of 2005, 81.5% of environmental NGOs each couldn’t raise funds more 
than 50,000 yuan RMB (about 6,000 US dollars at that time3.  
However, the problem of China’s grass-root environmental NGOs also comes from 
themselves, or, we may say, the surprising activeness of environmental NGOs had been 
formed at the expense of their own soundness. On one hand, as that will be discussed in 
details in next chapters, their fabulous effectiveness might largely rely on the key 
members, who were mainly well-known public intellectuals, celebrities and popular 
representatives or governmental consultants. Different from the social activists in general 
according to the western democratic paradigm, these key members had the mature 
network in the elite circle and even special links to the leadership. Therefore, they took 
the responsibility of channeling the Party-state-societal exchange. The irreplaceable 
position of the key members further strenghened the reliance on them in NGO operation. 
The same 2005 report showed the personal element in the decision-making of Chinese 
environmental NGOs: with regard to making main decisions, 38% of the environmental 
NGOs depended on council of organized key members, 34.5% on the key members, 13.5% 
on the plenary session, 8.3% on the leading leaders, and 5.7% on the full-time staff4. The 
                                                        
1 All-China Environment Federation (ACEF): China environmental protection NGO status report, 
published on April 22, 2006. p. 62.  
2 ACEF, China environmental protection NGO status report, pp. 61-63. However, some influential 
environmental NGOs with effective achievements hadn’t registered. For example, the Green Earth 
Village (GEV), who had been among the most active in anti-dam movements. 
3 ACEF, China environmental protection NGO status report, p. 62.  
4 ACEF, China environmental protection NGO status report, p. 62. 
 11
personal element inclination not only brought the potential instability of a certain NGO’s 
development, but also unconsciously reduced its independence from the Party-state, and 
in addition, obstructed the NGO institutionalization. On the other hand, we may observe 
a phenomenon that environmental NGOs in China can draw the most attention according 
to their success in expressing the appeal of democratization or pluralization and taking 
the political opportunity to open the political access through the environmental activism, 
rather than the gradual and invisible improvement of environmental quality. Factually, 
there have already been evidences to indicate the alienation of environmental NGOs, 
located in advanced cities, from the really interested local community, especially those in 
less developed areas1. And, in certain issues, NGOs even “conflicted” with the local 
community to enforce their ideal of environmental priority and the standing point to 
disobey the governmental decision2. In the next chapters, the thesis will further, with 
specific case analysis, cover the NGO-community relations, to see whether the alienation 
only happened in special cases or commonly indicated a potential risk of environmental 
NGOs to deviate from the fundamental meaning of the concept of “civil society”.  
1.3 The Mass Media and the Green Speak 
Like the activeness of NGOs, the prominent role of mass media is taken as an 
indicator of civil societal growth and democratization prospect. Especially when NGOs 
publicly praise the mass media contribution to their achievements, their collaboration 
seems to strengthen civil independence from Party-state. Thus, like to NGOs, this thesis 
has the question what regimes of the Party-state-societal relation have formed the 
prominence of mass media in environmental issues. 
The mass media attention to environmental issues demonstrated a remarkable shift 
in the late 1990s, reflected in respects of reporting quantity and reporting contents. The 
leading environmental NGO, Friends of Nature, took an independent survey in 1999 to 
investigate the reporting quantities of China’s main print media with regard to 
environmental issues during the latter half of the 1990s, in order to reflect the general 
                                                        
1 See: Chuanjin Tao, “Solving Environmental Problems and the Ideal Structure of a Civil Society,” in 
Dayong Hong (ed.), Environmental Sociology: An Academic Discipline under Construction, Beijing: 
Social Sciences Academic Press, 2007, pp. 326-341. 
2 Tao, “Solving Environmental Problems and the Ideal Structure of a Civil Society,” p. 338. 
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environmental awareness of the mainstream media. According to the annual results 
integrated in Figure 1-1 and 1-2 with the total quantities of all the newspapers and 
magazines surveyed from 1997 to 1999 and the average quantities of each one surveyed 
from 1994 to 1999, although the data of 1998 was hard to define, it’s quite clear that the 
quantities of related reports had kept increasing during the several years, and the 
quantities had twice doubled respectively from 1995 to 1996 and between 1997 to 1999. 
And especially, the average number of 512.2 reports for one print media surveyed means 
that there had been, on average, nearly two environmental reports, indicating the fact 
that there were several concentrated reporting climaxes during this year. And the real 
meaning may be that the environmental topic had already become a main focus of the 
mass media.  
 
Figure 1-1 Quantity of newspaper reports with regard to environmental issues from 1996 to 1999. 
Source: Friend of Nature:1999 Newspaper Environmental Awareness Survey 
*sample No.=70(1996), 76(1997), 75(1999) 
Notes: no data of 1998. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-2: Average reporting quantity with regard to environmental issues for per newspaper 
investigated 
Source: Friend of Nature:1999 Newspaper Environmental Awareness Survey 
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The other aspect of the media shift was the reporting contents, from the simple 
coverage of objective information to the vehicle of subjective advocacies. According to a 
investigation conducted in 1996 by an official English weekly, Beijing Review, only 10.3% 
of the current environmental reports contained the criticism, with the rest being objective 
circulations of happenings, policies, and official propaganda of environmental awareness1. 
However, only until 1998, the mass media attitudes had already made Liang Congjie, the 
leader of the leading FON to announce that “China has the greenest media in the world”2, 
to indicate their unequivocal stand to take the environmental priority, and also, the 
NGOs’ pride of having many media professionals to stand with them to pursue the 
environmental democratization. From the late 1990s, it seems that the potential energy of 
Chinese mass media to framing the environmental issue and influence the agenda-setting 
have been excited, according to the observation of the objective outcomes – let us 
suspend the analysis of causes. It has been believed that Chinese media, deviating from 
its role as the simple mouthpiece of Party-state, shaped the green public sphere. The 
public sphere, with mass media being the vehicle, was defined by Guobin Yang and Craig 
Calhoum to have the characteristics as3,  
 
In the first place, the public debate addressed policy. By contrast to the more 
common pattern, it was not simply the exposure of corruption or the 
suggestion that local official deviated from the goals of the Central Party and 
government. Second, a broad range of participants was involved in public 
discourse. This differentiated from the “reportage” literature through which 
criticism flourished in the 1980s, for example, which typically required a 
strong individual personality. 
 
However, like NGOs, the developing role of mass media is still influenced by the 
political restrictions and self-defects. Even though the economic reform have freed the 
                                                        
1 Yuezhi Zhao, Media, Market, and Democracy in China: Between the Party Line and the Bottom Line, 
Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998, pp. 152-153. 
2 Friends of Nature Newsletter, No. 3 (1998). 
3 Guobin Yang and Craig Calhoun, “Media, civil society, and the rise of a green public sphere in China,” 
in Ho and Edmons, China's Embedded Activism, pp. 69-88. p. 69. 
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mass media from the financial dependence on Party and government according to the 
commercialization, the process was factually initiated by the Party-state on the purpose of 
reduce financial burden. The Party-state never had the willingness to loose the control, as 
mass media is the indispensable element for the Chinese political system to channeling 
the official orthodoxy (Party line) and the general mass demands (Mass line)1, and, it has 
been exactly that Chinese journalists, with their institutional identity to be part of the 
political system, are also authorized to criticize wrongdoings of officials. In other words, 
on one hand, the mass media, as a whole, may be “restricted” and vulnerable to the 
general political system, but on the other hand, individual journalists can rely on the 
Party-state as their power source. Thus, mass media in environmental issues has the 
similar paradox to NGOs: the duality of pursuit for independence from and entanglement 
with the political system.  
Not only the media entanglement with political system complicates its role in public 
environmental issues, its exceptional prominence in comparison with their counterparts 
in developed democracies and ex-socialist countries in Europe may also remind us of 
re-thinking about the application of the environmental democratization paradigm. It 
should be admitted that the significance of mass media may be the common international 
experiences as it can “voice the opinions” of public and is indispensable for the modern 
environmental protection movements of the informational age2. And, it may not be 
strange for “almost all the NGOs” to “give media interviews and provide environmental 
information to the media in order to draw public attention to environmental problems”3. 
                                                        
1 According to the journalistic consciousness succeeded from Soviet Union system, journalists are also a 
kind of “politicians” and part of the whole political system. Mass media transferred political orthodoxy 
(Party line) to common people, so as to frame their awareness of a wide range from self interests to 
national policies in accordance with the Party-state’s directives. That would be a great assistance to the 
compellent power for a communist Party-state’s transformation of social structure and implementation 
of certain policies. However, the media system would not be a uni-directional channel. It also took the 
responsibility of informing the leadership of common people’s appeals, in order to make directives more 
adaptative to influence individuals. That’s the “mass line”. See more details in: Yuezhi Zhao, Media, 
Market, and Democracy in China: Between the Party Line and the Bottom Line, Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1998. 
2 Chatham House investigation project: Strengthening the Cooperation between Chinese 
Environmental NGOs and the Media, implemented by Green Earth Volunteers, December, 2006, p. 5. 
3 Ibid. And, for more details on the media strategy of western environmental NGO, we may see in 
reference to the research on the typical case of the Greenpeace in: Alison Anderson, “Environment 
activism and news media”, in Simon Cottle ed., News, Public Relationships and Power, Sage 
Publications Ltd., 2003. pp. 117-132. Anderson Hansen, “Claims-making and framing in the British 
newspaper coverage of the Brent Spar controversy”, in Allan Stuart, Barbara Adam and Cynthia Carter, 
ed., Environmental Risks and the Media, London: Routledge, 2000. pp.55-72. 
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However, the Chinese phenomenon still seems quite theatrical according to media’s 
exceptionally close relations with NGOs. Mainstream academic explanations attributed 
the relations to NGOs’ initiative “greening” of mass media – we will discuss it more in the 
literature review – because it was an effective tool to deal with political restrictions and 
public shortage of environmental awareness. Therefore, it’s not difficult to find that the 
media coverage just inclines in favor of those NGOs taking more active media strategies. 
And, the inclination, conversely, has oriented NGOs to emphasis more on the media 
communication, for example, providing the exaggerative information to externalize 
negative environmental effects in certain issues, or exhausting their limited resources to 
hold press conference. However, NGOs’ possibly excessive attention to media strategies 
may also bring the worry about strengthening their alienation from interest-related 
community, and, weaken media’s ability of voicing public opinion.  
 
2. Literature Review 
What kind of Party-state-societal relations can be reflected according to the three 
prominent phenomena in China’s environmental politics? Exising researches bring us a 
one-direction process of social movements challenging existing political organization and 
governance. This process is judged to be targeted at a prospect of environmental 
democratization. The orthodox paradigm of European green politics offers a framework 
of well-developed democracy and mature civil society1, in aspects of political moral 
promotion2, development approach choice3, pluralization of policy entrepreneurs4, and 
changing the implication of democracy5. However, this prospect may be linked more to 
the “color revolution” in ex-communist countries partly influenced by the civil 
environmental movements6. And further, it’s generally believed that globalization of civil 
                                                        
1 See for example: Michael O’Neill, Green Parties and Political Change in Contemporary Europe, 
Ashgate, 1997; Jon Burchell, The Evolution of Green Politics: Development and Change Within Europe, 
Earthscan, 2002; and James Radcliffe,  
2 See for example: John Barry, Rethinking Green Politics: Nature, Virtue and Progress, Sage, 1999; 
Michael Maniates, Encountering Global Environmental Politics: Teaching, Learning and Empowering 
Knowledge, Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.  
3 See: Sumi Krishna, Environmental Politics: People’s Lives and Development Choices, Sage 
Publications, 1996.  
4 See: Norman Miller, Environmental Politics: Stakeholders, Interests and Policymaking, Taylor and 
Francis, 2009.  
5 See: Green Politics: Dictatorship or Democracy? Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 
6 See details of the pattern in: John David Nagle, Alison Mahr, Democracy and Democratization: 
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activism will bring consciousness of citizenship to people under an authoritarian regime, 
ultimately making the shift to a pluralistic, liberal-democratic polity1. Environmental 
NGOs in China are at the vanguard of nongovernmental activity, and therefore, the 
question is not only whether nongovernmental actors can shape the future of 
environmental protection in China but also whether they may play a role in effecting 
broader political change in the context of the ongoing transformation of 
Party-state-societal relations 2 . Exising literatures indicates this bottom-up process 
supported by multiple dimensions as: the utilization of “grey zone <huise didai>”3 for 
the grass root to participate in less politically sensitive agendas; social movements as 
“political opportunities”to get political access; and, the reciprocity between NGOs and 
mass media to shape the green public sphere. 
2.1 “Grey Zone”: Room for Civil Growth 
An obstacle to applying ex-communist experiences into China’s practice may be that 
environmental movements in those countries had made part of the whole fundamental 
transformation, social and political. On the contrary, China’s environmental movements 
seem to have developed separately. To explain this paradox, researchers utilize the 
concept of “grey zone”, according to which, initiatives of the Party-state to loosen its 
restrictions to some sub-political agendas are paid attention. Along with the failure and 
decay of totalitarian system, “central and local institutions have been privatized or 
disbanded altogether, opening up social spaces for voluntary civic action that were 
formerly in state hands”4. It makes the important background for NGOs’ rise and their 
                                                                                                                                                               
Post-communist Europe in Comparative Perspective, Sage, 1999; Adam Fagan, Environment and 
Democracy in the Czech Republic, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004; and Pavol Demes and Joerg Forbrig 
(eds.). Reclaiming Democracy: Civil Society and Electoral Change in Central and Eastern Europe. 
German Marshall Fund, 2007.  
1 See for example: Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1998; John A. Guidry, Michael D. Kennedy and Mayer N. Zald (ed.), Globalizations 
and Social Movements: Culture, Power and the Transnational Public Sphere, Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2000.  
2 Economy, The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China's Future, p.131. 
3 The concept of “grey zone” can be found in Chinese discourses with regard to various social realms. It 
generally refers to that, along with economic reform and the decay of totalitarian system, China’s 
political authority has drawn from social problem realms less political sensitive. Such problem realms 
get very poor financial support due to the cost retrenchment from state to society, and moreover, there 
rarely is modern governance mechanism established to fill in the space left by decay of totalitarian 
system. Thus, such realms may demonstrate some kind of “power vacuum” and provide room for civil 
activism. That’s the point of “grey”: not completely politically controlled (black) because the power has 
initiatively withdrawn, while not completely to be filled by civil society (white) because the political 
power still maintains supervision.  
4 Peter Ho and Richard Louis. Edmons (ed.), China's Embedded Activism: Opportunities and 
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strategy formulation and implementation. 
“Grey zone” depends on realistic considerations of China’s leadership during the 
1990s. Elizabeth Economy believes they have been “forced”, for they have comprehended 
that “failure to protect the environmental incurs significant social and economic costs”1 
beyond national financial ability, but they never wanted to give up their “eager to find a 
means to reconcile their desire to achieve both unimpeded economic growth and 
improved environmental protection”2. This change, “represents a much more widespread 
phenomenon in state-societal relations” as, “the emergence of nongovernmental 
associations and organizations to fill roles previously occupied by national or local 
governments and state-owned enterprises”3, indicating shift of some social welfare 
burden to nongovernmental sectors. Jonathan Schwatz notices another dynamics that 
decentralization process during the reform era has forced the central authority to 
initiatively encouraged NGO activism. Schwatz pays attention to the dilemma of central 
environmental policies at sub-national level4, which makes the central authority turn to 
NGO assitance as an alternative to direct state intervention, especially, to represent the 
“attentive public” to strengthen pressure on local officials and draw international 
financial support5. 
However, not only the leadership’s considerations alone, but some kinds of 
institutional factors have also supported the “grey zone”. Andrew Mertha, according to its 
analysis of China’s hydropower policymaking, utilizes the “fragmented authoritarianism” 
model of Kenneth Lieberthal6 to indicate that, the weak position of environmental 
                                                                                                                                                               
Constraints of A Social Movement,London; New York : Routledge, 2008. p. 3.  
1 Elizabeth C. Economy, The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China's Future, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2004. p. 129.  
2 Economy, The River Runs Black, p. 129.  
3 Economy, The River Runs Black, p. 130. 
4 And Schwatz attributes it to the more attractive economic dynamics of local officials rather than the 
costly environmental responsibilities. See: Jonathan Schwatz, “Environmental NGOs in China: Roles 
and Limits,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1, Spring, 2004, pp. 28-49. 
5 Schwatz, “Environmental NGOs in China: Roles and Limits,” 
6 The fragmented authoritarianism model bases on the recognization that the political system in China 
consists of many vertical lines ("tiao") and horizontal pieces ("kuai"), and, focuses attention on the 
effects of the interactive process among the constitutent elements of the Chinese polity. According to this 
model, the three dimensions of China’s structural centralization and decentralization –value integration, 
structural elements, and policy process – makes China’s decision making/implementation require 
negotiations, bargaining, exchange, and consensus building in order to link the top and the bottom of 
the system, which is different from an “authoritarianism” model with overwhelming centralism. See: 
Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution through Reform, New York: W.W. Norton & 
Co., 1995; and also Kenneth Lieberthal and David Lampton (ed.), Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision 
Making in Post-Mao China, University of California Press, 1992.  
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department as “veto player” inside bureaucracy has become its incentives to squeeze 
room in the policymaking process for civil activism by leaking information to 
environmentalists, holding public hearing, sponsoring academic symposium, and so on1. 
Besides the bureaucratic fragmentation at the central level, the central-local relations 
may also be crucial. According to Benjamin van Rooij, the central authority and 
environmentalists often find themselves partners in the same struggle against local 
stakeholders with regard to enforcing certain laws or policies. In cases he analyzes, 
political motivation of campaigns may be more effective than environmental laws which 
are short of local legitimacy2.  
These institutional factors indicate that the “grey zone” may not be a seperate space 
from but embedded exactly in the political system, highly reducing political risks. And, a 
crucial point is the elite network among social activists and reformist officials. Despite of 
a dearth of formal political participation, through environmental activists’ informal ties 
such like personal networking, social structures can develop that a re capable of 
effectively mobilizing resources, appealing to citizens’ newly perceived or desired 
identities, and building up a modest level of counter-expertise against state-dominated 
information and social cleavages and problems3. And further, this phenomenon may also 
means that leadership’s expedient measures is possible to triger an unconscious political 
transformation, like Arthur Mol argues that this process is “providing more room for 
citizens to organize themselves, express their environmental concerns and set new public 
agendas for environmental reform”4. The local scholar, Jia Xijin of Tsinghua University 
NGO Research Center even judges withdraw from certain social realms to be beyond an 
expedient measure of the Party-state to temporarily reduce burden, but a great step of the 
long-term reform, which even can be called “the third reform” as important as the 
marketization of economic reform and political restructuring5.  
                                                        
1 See: Andrew C. Mertha, China's Water Warriors: Citizen Action and Policy Change, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2008. pp. 155-159.  
2 Benjamin van Rooij , “Implementation of Chinese Environmental Law: Regular Enforcement and 
Political Campaigns,” Development and Change, Vol. 37, no. 1 (2006), pp. 57-74.  
3 See more details in Ho and Edmons (ed.), China's Embedded Activism. And, the elite networking in 
environmental realms will be talked more in next chapters.  
4 Arthur PJ Mol, “Urban Environmental Governance Innovations in China,” Current Opinion in 
Environmental Sustainability, No. 1, 2009, pp. 96-100. p. 98.  
5 Xijin Jia, The Third Reform: Nongovernmental Sector Strategy Research in China, Beijing: Tsinghua 
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The analysis of “grey zone” to make space for grass root environmental activeness 
may indicate observers an optimistic prospect of the “social movements” development; 
however, the “grey zone” also implies that the grass root activeness cannot develop 
without the Party-state priority gives their environmental activism the certain legitimacy. 
As Merle Goldman points, “political rights (granted by the Party-state) are to enable 
citizens to contribute to the state rather than to enable individuals to protect themselves 
against the state”1. In comparison with the decay of existing system according to social 
movements in other ex-communist countries, China’s political authority doesn’t seem to 
lose the control on environmental policies and related institutional reform. On the 
contrary, environmental activists, who take the cooperation with national willingness a 
shortcut to realize their effects on certain policies, initiatively adapt themselves into the 
existing system. Then, we may say existing researches leave us a critical question that 
whether the active environmental movements in China can really be meaningful for 
China’s political development, as the utilization of “grey zone” seems to deviate from the 
traditional paradigm. 
2.2 “Social Movements” and “Civil Society” with Political Opportunities 
With the “grey zone”, fabulous growth of civil society and social movements becomes 
more understandable. As the two crucial concepts to frame the bottom-up initiatives in 
the Party-state-societal relations, “civil society”2 emphasizes the objective conditions of 
movements, and “social movements”3 emphasizes the actions of a grown civil society. 
Since the innovationist came into power in the late 1970s, observers on China’s political 
                                                                                                                                                               
University, 2005.  
1 Merle Goldman, “The Reassertion of Political Citizenship in the Post-Mao Era: The Democracy Wall 
Movement,” in Merle Goldman and Elizabeth J. Perry (ed.), Changing Meanings of Citizenship in 
Modern China, Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2002, p. 159.  
2 This thesis uses the definition of Larry Diamond that “civil society” is “the realm of organized social 
life that is open, voluntary, self- generating, at least partially self-supporting, autonomous from the state, 
and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules”. It is distinct from “society” in general in that it 
involves “acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, preferences, and ideas, 
to exchange information, to achieve collective goals, to make demands on the state, to improve the 
structure and functioning of the state, and to hold state officials accountable”. See: Larry Jay Diamond, 
Developing Democracy: toward Consolidation, JHU press, 1999. p. 221. 
3 The definition of social movement in this thesis is sourced from Donatella and Diani as: “social 
movement, especially those involved political content, (1) Informal interaction networks, (2) based on 
shared beliefs and solidarity, (3) which mobilized due to some conflicting issues, through (4) the 
frequent use of various forms of protest. ...Moreover, participants of such event must feel a sense of 
belonging and linkage with the supporters of similar movements. From a local protest with specific aim, 
gradually developed into a national social movement with collective force, concern the relationships 
between the nature and society and contains delicate cultural content”. See: Della Porta Donatella and 
Mario Diani, Social Movements: An Introduction, NYSE: John Wiley & Sons, 1999, pp. 16-19. 
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democratization have been depressed by the several failures of streets movements with 
obvious political appeals, making they turn to other profound changes in China’s polity 
and society1. And, social movements during economic reform, as a bottom-up political 
change, have gradually got increasing concern. With regard to the social movements, 
environmental NGOs activism might be the earliest and most active2.  
With regard to characteristics of environmental movements and civil society, 
Shui-Yan Tang and Xueyong Zhan, pays special attention to the participants, in general, 
the “urban middle class”: many are government officials, company managers, business 
owners, intellectuals/technicians, and employees of government-sponsored service 
organizations. The weakened citizenship consciousness, liberal thinking and practical 
interests are judged to bring urban middle class dynamics of breaking political 
restrictions through environmental participation3. However, linking the rise of middle 
class to social activism may rather be a theoretic reasoning4, thus, more practical studies 
have been taken on NGOs, the obviously active players whose specific actions have 
influenced practical political operations and policymaking process. Especially, the success 
of NGOs’ anti-dam activism in reversing an established hydropower policy in 2005 has 
                                                        
1 Such as the People’s Congress [see for example: Kevin J. O'Brien and Laura M. Luehrmann, 
“Institutionalizing Chinese legislatures: trade-offs between autonomy and capacity,” Legislative Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1998), pp. 91-108. Roderick MacFarquhar, “Provincial people's congresses”, 
The China Quarterly, No. 155 (1998), pp. 656-667. Melanie Manion, “Chinese Democratization in 
Perspective: Electorates and Selectorates at the Town-ship Level,” The China Quarterly, No. 163 
(September 2000), pp. 764-782.]; the village democracy [see for example: Zhenyao Wang (ed.), The 
Frontier of Chinese Village Self-Governance <Zhongguo Cunmin Zizhi Qianyan>, Beijing: Zhongguo 
shehui chubanshe, 2000, pp. 90-97; Björn Alpermann, “ Institutionalizing Village Governance in 
China, ” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 18, No. 60, May 2009; Kevin J. O’Brien and Rongbin 
Han, “Path to Democracy? Assessing Village Elections in China,“ Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 
18, No. 60, May 2009.]; and the identity and perception increase of citizenship [see for example: Merle 
Goldman and Elizabeth J. Perry (ed.), Changing Meanings of Citizenship in Modern China, Harvard: 
Harvard University Press, 2002. Edward Gu and Merle Goldman (ed.), Chinese Intellectuals between 
State and Market, London: Routledge Curzon; New York: Routledge, 2004.]. 
2 Environmental practices in western and northern Europe demonstrated how the environmental 
movements with non-institutional nature and grass root constituencies played a critical role in 
promoting better governance in existing developed democracies. See for example: Andrew Jamison, Ron 
Eyerman, Jacqueline Cramer and Jeppe Laessøe, The Making of the New Environmental Consciousness: 
A Comparative Study of the Environmental Movements in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990; Albert Weale, The New Politics of Pollution, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1992; Timothy Doyle and Dough McEachern, Environment and Politics, 
London: Routledge, 1998.  
3 Shui-Yan Tang, and Xueyong Zhan, “Civic Environmental NGOs, Civil Society and Democratization in 
China,” Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 44, Issue 3, 2008. pp. 425-448.  
4 It may be commonly accepted by scholars to link rise of middle class to democratization, see for 
example: Lucian W. Pye, “Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism,” American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 1, 1991, pp. 3-19; Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave, Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991; Gordon White, Jude Howell, and Xiaoyuan Shang, In Search of 
Civil Society: Market Reform and Social Change in Contemporary China. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1996; and Ronald Inglehart,, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political 
Change in 43 Societies, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.  
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incurred the climax of related researches. To interpret the great success in boycotting the 
dam construction over Nu River in Yunnan Province, Kim-man Chan and Yan Zhou 
utilized the concept of “political opportunity structure”1. With examining the factors to 
influence the anti-dam movements according to this analytic framework, Chan and Zhou 
point that the successful activism was not accidental, but owing to the elite allies between 
the environmental department and environmental NGOs. The allies then formed the 
political opportunities of environmental NGOs to open up the political access with regard 
to their green appealing under an authoritarian system2. With similar consciousness to 
Chan and Zhou, Andrew C. Metha ranges his research view from the independent event 
of Nu River to all the hydropower controversies and anti-dam activism in China during 
the recent years, taking the empirical study to analyze how and to what extent the civil 
society has exerted effects in various policymaking processes. The fight of environmental 
NGOs, mass media and other intellectuals with political obstructions set by local 
governments and electricity departments is highly emphasized in the research. And 
finally, the comparative study of anti-dam cases leads to the conclusion as, Chinese 
hydropower politics is a type of pluralism in which very real and substantive participation 
by actors hitherto forbidden to enter the policymaking process – NGOs, the media, an 
disgruntled opponents inside and outside of the government – are now increasingly able 
to do so3.  
Rather than simply examining the growth of civil society and the quality of 
environmental movements in China in accordance with the criteria in developed 
                                                        
1 Here, the concept of “political opportunity” is not an all-encompassing fudge factor for all the 
conditions and circumstances that form the context for social movements, but specifies the degree of 
openness of a political system on how it facilitates or constrains the emergence of social movement or 
other forms of insurgency in the four-dimension structure as: a) the relative openness or closure of the 
institutionalized political system; b) the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that 
typically undergird a polity; c) the presence or absence of elite allies; d) the state’s capacity and 
propensity for repression. For more details on the concept, see: Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and 
Mayer N. Zald (ed.), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, 
Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 27. 
2 See: Kim-man Chan and Yan Zhou, “Political Opportunities and Anti-dam Movement in China,” paper 
presented in the International Conference on Non-profit sector in Asia-Pacific Region organized by 
National Central University o Taiwan on 16th and 17th November, 2007 
[http://www.istr.org/conferences/barcelona/WPVolume/Chan.Zhou.pdf]; and also see: Kim-man Chan, 
“The Development of NGOs under a Post-Totalitarian Regime: The Case of China”, in Robert Wellner 
(ed.), Civil Life, Globalization, and Political Change in Asia: Organizing Between Family and State, NY: 
Routledge, 2005. pp. 20-41.  
3 Andrew C. Metha, China's Water Warriors: Citizen Action and Policy Change, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2008, 
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democracies – for example, written legal provisions, NGOs’ development, middle class 
situation, campaign scale and so on – the framework of “political opportunity” may be 
significant to explain the dissymmetry between the small scale of NGOs and their 
activism and the actually visible effects on polity. To speak specifically, the traditional 
picture of “social movements” naturally brings the decay of authoritarian system, 
however, the researches on “political opportunity”, with admitting the powerful network 
among social and political elites, just implies the mutual embeddedness between grass 
root activism and the existing political system. In other words, the prospect of “social 
movements” in China’s environmental realm may deviate from the democratization 
paradigm illustrated in other ex-communist countries. And, this implication can be made 
clearer according to the researches on environmental NGOs’ utilization of the “grey zone” 
left by political authority during reform era, which further indicate the profound 
connections between the success of Chinese environmental movements and the existing 
political system.  
2.3 Reciprocity between NGOs and Mass Media: Shaping Green Public 
Sphere 
Even though China’s NGO-mass media relation is part of NGOs’ specific actions to 
create “political opportunity”, it also seems to have an independent position in the 
literatures. Mass media may generally play an indispensable part in green civil society 
globally for the necessity to proliferate and construct the environmental discourse or 
green speak1, but especially for China’s environmental NGOs – faced with great political 
obstacles and resource shortage2 – it may be a most important “social movement” to 
shape a “green public sphere” with assistance of mass media.  
To speak frankly, the utilization of “public sphere” is too popular in various 
                                                        
1 As a post-modern consciousness, the environmental value and its discourse are quite different from 
the “increase ethics” rooted in industrial society. Therefore, mass media is important to proliferate and 
construct the subjective status of “ecology”, rather than simply taking it an object which should only be 
“conquest” by human beings according to the “development”. See more details of environmental ethics 
and the discourses, see: Rom, Harré and Brockmeie, Jens and Mulhausler, Peter. Greenspeak: A Study 
of Environmental Discourse, Thousands Oaks, CA: Sage, 1999; and John S. Dryzek, The Politics of the 
Earth: Environmental Discourses, Oxford University Press, 2005; and Takis Fotopoulos, The 
Multidimensional Crisis and Inclusive Democracy, English translation published on: The International 
Journal of Inclusive Democracy, Vol. 1.5, Special Issue, August, 2005. 
2 It should be mentioned that NGOs’ actions are restricted by not only political obstacles, but also the 
intellectual identity of activists, which limits their entry into directly-interested local community. 
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researches, media discourses and NGO announcement, that it doesn’t seem to be 
academically precise, far beyond its original implication defined by Jürgen Habermas1. 
With regard to the “green public sphere”, Guobin Yang and Craig Calhoun re-interpret 
the definition by removing the bourgeois color of Habermas2. It consists of “discourse, 
publics engaged in communication, and the media of communication”, including the 
basic elements of “an environmental discourse or greenspeak”, “publics that produce or 
consume greenspeak”, and “media used for producing and circulating greenspeak”3. It’s 
quite clear that, although the “green public sphere” doesn’t seems to exclude any citizens 
in principle, the “publics” in reality “refer specifically to individual citizens and 
environmental NGOs directly engaged in the production and consumption of 
greenspeak” 4 . With this recognition, Yang and Calhoun found that the ability of 
environmental NGOs to creat dominant discourse highly depended on their capability of 
launching campaigns which were media-attentive enough5. That further specifies the 
“public”, and, demonstrates the outline of NGO-media alliance in China’s environmental 
issues.  
However, the campaign, despite of many successful cases, is after all the “tactic”. 
Accidental success in making attractive news is not enough to explain the reality of close 
and profound NGO-media relations in China. In 2006, Chatham House6 published a 
special report to analyze the cooperation between Chinese environmental NGOs and the 
                                                        
1 Habermas defines “public sphere” as a domain mediating between “private sphere” and “sphere of 
public authority” [see: Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An 
Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, Thomas Burger, Cambridge Massachusetts: The MIT 
Press, English Translation 1989, p. 305.], in which “such a thing as public opinion can be formed” with 
all citizens assembling and publicizing their opinions “freely” [see: Jürgen Habermas, “The Public 
Sphere”, in Steven Seidman (ed.), Jürgen Habermas on Society and Politics: A Reader, Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1989, p. 231.]. However, the opinion expression is not optional but oriented to “discuss matters of 
mutual interest…to reach a common judgment” [see: Gerard Hauser, "Vernacular Dialogue and the 
Rhetoricality of Public Opinion", Communication Monographs, Vol. 65, No. 2, June 1998, pp. 83–107, p. 
86.]. And further, the “medium talk” in the public sphere is generally linked to political participation 
being enacted in modern societies [see: Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to 
the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy", in Nancy Fraser (ed.), Rethinking the Public Sphere: A 
Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy, Habermas, and the Public Sphere, 
Cambridge Mass.: MIT press, 1992, pp. 109–142.].  
2 According to Yang’s comprehension, the “public sphere” of Habermas is a bourgeois sphere that in 
reality excluded certain categories of people and was fraught with problems of social, economic, cultural, 
even linguistic inequality”. See: Yang and Calhoun, “Media, civil society, and the rise of a green public 
sphere in China,” pp. 70-71. 
3 Yang and Calhoun, “Media, civil society, and the rise of a green public sphere in China,” p. 71.  
4 Yang and Calhoun, “Media, civil society, and the rise of a green public sphere in China,” p. 71.  
5 Yang and Calhoun, “Media, civil society, and the rise of a green public sphere in China,” pp. 73-76.  
6 It’s also known as the Royal Institute of International Affairs, located in London and regarded as one 
of the world's leading organizations in this area. 
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media, especially their reciprocal exchange of actual necessaries, so as to bind them 
together. On one hand, the report points the greater importance of mass media to 
environmental NGOs than in other countries, as a main and or even the only effective 
method for social mobilization, assistance for NGOs’ access into political process, and the 
channel for them to reach social resources and legitimacy1. On the other hand, besides 
being a good choice of information source for journalists2, reporting NGOs can make 
mass media seem to be neutral and balanced, according to that “the media often needs to 
present a ‘people’s view’, and environmental NGOs represent the views of the common 
people”3.  
Chatham House report judges China’s authoritarian system as the solid foundation 
for the mutual necessaries rather than tactics of media campaigns. And, Guobin Yang 
attributes them to an element rooted in the Party-state-societal relations, defined as the 
“structural homology” of both NGOs and mass media to “please and serve two masters”: 
“the Party supervisors who have political authority over the press and the market which 
puts economic constraints on it”4. The structural homology implies that, NGO-mass 
madia reciprocity is not just the exchange of specific interests, but the reflection of their 
real nature. Environmental realm, as a “grey zone” for social movements, also provides 
opportunities for mass media to get freedom from strict political censorship, as long as 
                                                        
1 In details, the importance is summed up as in the four aspects: a) Chinese environmental NGOs have 
few social mobilization tools at their disposal, making mass media the main or even the only effective 
method; b) mass media, according to the communist system, has administrative ranks, which can help 
NGOs channel related information or petition to the governmental leaders, as the shortcut to achieve 
environmental problem solution; c) mass media can publicize the NGOs’ work to increase their influence 
especially at their early development stage, and, as the result, secure financial and other resources; d) 
environmental NGOs needs mass media to send out their opinions and messages, which has better 
effects than NGOs themselves transmitted it directly, so as to establish the legitimacy of NGOs. See: 
Chatham House investigation project: Strengthening the Cooperation between Chinese Environmental 
NGOs and the Media, p.10, 12, 14, 17. 
2 Journalists need sources of information to deal with the intense competition in the media market, and, 
besides the governmental agencies whose information resources are usually monopolized by the few 
powerful and privileged media organizations, environmental NGOs can be a good choice. See: 
Strengthening the Cooperation between Chinese Environmental NGOs and the Media, Ibid, p. 11.  
3 Strengthening the Cooperation between Chinese Environmental NGOs and the Media, p. 11. And, 
according to Hu Kanping, an influential journalist and well-known activist, participation in 
environmental activities has enhanced media’s reputation and attracted more readers, while NGOs with 
which they collaborated benefites from better linking to the public. See: Hu Kanping, “Harmony in 
Diversity: the Relationships between Enviornmental Journalism and Environmental NGOs in China,” in 
Jennifer Turner and Fengshi Wu, (ed.), Environmental NGO and Environmental Journalist Forum: A 
Meeting of Environmentalists from Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Washington, D.C.: 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2001, pp. 30-31. 
4 Guobin Yang, “Environmental NGOs and Institutional Dynamics in China,” p. 56.  
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environmental protection seeming as one of the least sensitive in political agendas1. The 
“structural homology” is further strengthened by that NGOs and journalists share a 
similar elite identity2. Researchers utilize the U.S. critical paradigm of “environmental 
journalism”3 to interpret journalists’ clear bias to NGOs and environmental priority4. 
The elite identity brings journalists a pioneer consciousness to “be greatly influencing the 
modernization of China”5, according to the belief that, “China’s rise should be started 
from the rise of people’s right to know; and, to elementarily avoid break of environmental 
hazard incidents needs to control public authorities”6. In 2007, Liu Jianqiang, a most 
active environmental journalist, published the article “China’s Environmental Crisis 
                                                        
1 Practical study demonstrates some kind of development of governmental transparency from the late 
1990s, at least in the advanced cities. See: Qingjie Wang, “Transparency in the Grey Box of China's 
Environmental Governance: A Case Study of Print Media Coverage of An Environmental Controversy 
from the Pearl River Delta Region,” Journal of Environment and Development, Vol.4, No. 2, 2005, pp. 
278-232; and Lili Wang, Green Media: Environmental Communication in China <lv meiti: zhongguo 
huanbao chuanbo yanjiu>, Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 2005. 
2 It may be possible that journalists in less developed countries are generally respected as social elites 
for their better education in contrast to the common mass and ability to frame public issues, rather than 
being taken as a profession to meet the needs of a mature market. And, in China, the elite identity of 
journalists is more special according to their direct influence on policymaking through administrative 
ranks, the history of journalists to be crucial for the “enlightenment” in China’s modernization from the 
beginning of 20th century, and the Chinese cultural tradition to value knowledge from the ancient era. 
Therefore, a Chinese journalist is expected to, with the traditional sense of worth, take the elite position 
and value his/her social responsibility. And moreover, the secretism of China’s policymaking procedures 
and shortage of authority-control leverages make the investigative efforts of journalists pursuing 
information transparency usually be faced with risks, which commonly incurs the public sympathy and 
strengthens the image of social pioneers. See in reference to: Hugo de Burgh, The Chinese Journalists: 
Mediating Information in the World's most Populous Country, London; New York, NY: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. And see also: Michel Bonnin and Yves Chevrier, “The intellectual and the state: 
social dynamics of intellectual autonomy during the post-Mao era”, in Brian Hook(ed.), The Individual 
and The State in China, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, pp. 149-174; Geoffrey A. Fowler and Jason Dean, 
“China’s reporters face a back lash over investigations”, Wall Street Journal, December 21, 2006. Page 
A1; and, Jingrong Tong, “Guerrilla Tactics of Investigative Journalists in China,” Journalism, Vol. 8(5), 
October, 2007, pp. 530–535. 
3 Environmental journalism believes environmental movements to be a public justice to protect 
common people from industrial makers’ profit-oriented interests, and therefore, the reporting “bias” 
and “purpose” in order to awaken the unconscious mass should be crutial. In a masterpieced of 
environmental journalism, Michael Frome wrote as, “I define environmental journalism as writing with 
a purpose, designed to present the public with sound, accurate data as the basis of informed 
participation in the process of decision making on environmental issues. It requires an understanding of 
the nature and purpose of mass communication, an ability to research and to report findings with 
accuracy, and a love of language that facilitates expression with clarity. It requires more than learning 
“how to write”, but learning the power of emotion and imagery, to think not simply of Who, What, When, 
Where, and Why—but to think Whole, with breath and perspective”. See: Michael Frome, Green Ink: An 
Introduction to Environmental Journalism, Salt Lake City, Utah: University of Utah Press, 1998. p. 
ⅸ-ⅹ. 
4 The elitism of “environmental journalism” paradigm promotes China’s researchers to never grudge 
their high praise to environmental journalists as they were active pioneers to advocate the 
environmental ideals, enlighten the mass of environmental awareness. See: Lili Wang, Green Media: 
Environmental Communication in China. 
5 Wei Zhang, “Environmental Journalism and Rise of Environmental Journalists in China <lvse xinwen 
yu zhongguo huanjing jizhe qun zhi jueqi>,” The Journalist Monthly, May 2007, pp. 13-17. 
6 Liben Qiu, “Civil Explosive Force in Anti-pollution <fan gonghai de minjian baofa li>,” Asia Weekly, 
Vo. 21, June 17, 2007. Such argument was also resonated by environmental activists. See: Bo Wen, 
“Greening the Chinese Media,” Chinese Environmental Series, Issue 2, 1998, pp. 39-44. 
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Catalyzes New Democracy Movement <zhongguo de huanjing weiji cuisheng xin minzhu 
yundong>” as a summary of achievements of him and his co-workers, in which, the 
pioneer consciousness is  “resisting special interest groups and opposing the 
government’s environmentally ‘unfriendly’ behaviors”, while “more 
significantly…(indicating) a push toward greater democracy in the country, with the 
public fighting for its civil rights through protecting the environment”1. This analytical 
report was awarded by The Society of Publishers in Asia (SOAP) the Excellence in 
Reporting on the Environment, and the jury gave the assessment as, “Provocative topic 
and various angles to cover the issue, careful analysis. The environment report has gone 
beyond the usual scope within the environment. By elevating the angle to political, the 
report is able to present a comprehensive coverage on the inter-connectivity of 
environment, economy and politics”2. This comment may be summing up the expectation 
of international civil society with regard to the environmental journalism in China.  
However, either the interpretation of mutual necessaries or structural homology may 
ignore the political identity of mass media, besides its part of voicing the “public”. As 
generally known, the commercialization of media organizations and the growth of 
journalists’ liberalistic bias have been still under the supervison of the Party-state. The 
saying of “politicians managing newspapers (and also other media forms) business 
<zhengzhijia ban bao>” may outline their profound identity synthesized by political 
censorship and market orientation3. However, the political censorship may not only be 
suppression of expression, but the Party-state also encourages mass media to inform 
political authority of common needs, take scrutiny on or even sharp critics of the 
government4 with regard to less sensitive agendas1, taking mass media an effective tool 
                                                        
1 Jianqiang Liu, “China’s Environmental Crisis Catalyzes New Democracy Movement”, Asia Weekly, Vol. 
21 (14), April 15, 2007. 
2 See: SOPA official web: http://www.sopasia.com/awards/2008-winners-c.asp  
3 Zhao Yuezhi, according to its review on the PRC journalism history, makes a clear point of the “dual 
identity” synthesized by the communist principle of “Party line/mass line” and marketization with 
liberalistic bias of intellectuals during economic reform. To speak specifically, on one hand, the 
communist “Party line” and “mass line” demands journalists to keep close with both Party orthodoxy 
and mass opinion, in order to well socialize political policies and transfer demands of mass to political 
authority. On the other hand, along with the marketization and growth of liberalistic inclination among 
intellectuals, journalists generally became to strengthen the social identity similar to their counterparts 
in western democracies. Then, without apparently challenging the “Party line”, China’s mass media 
obtains their legitimacy of “representing people” by adapting to the discourse of “mass line”. See: Zhao, 
Media, Market, and Democracy in China. 
4 Hugo de Burgh summarizes the integration of politial censorship and marketization as the principles 
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to adapt national ability to changing society2. That’s to say, the dynamics of political 
encouragement make an important power source for media critics, as well as its public 
responsibility. And further, journalists’ elite consciousness doesn’t naturally lead to 
“citizenship”, but possibly leads to co-option with the Party-state3, to serve the “higher 
calling”4. Thus, we may conclude that further researches on “green performance” of 
Chinese mass media needs to pay more attention to the positive dynamics from the 
existing Party-state system, as well as its restrictive conditions, which also lead to, a more 
comprehensive understanding of the interaction between social and political actors 
according to their practical influence on environmental public sphere.  
 
3. Hypothesis, Originality, Methodology, and Framework of Chapters 
3.1 Hypothesis 
At the beginning of section 1, this chapter raised the original questions leading to the 
research; all those concerns may be summarized into – after illuminating the research 
background and reviewing on literatures with the limitations – the core questions as, 
what makes the Party-state-societal interaction leading to the exceptionally 
active green civil society in China under the visibly restrictive political 
ecology? & what does it mean for political development? The core question is 
based on the originality of this research to observe China’s public environmental issues 
from both the subjectivity of the Party-state and society, in stead of judging public 
environmental democratization in China a one-direction bottom-top process.  
                                                                                                                                                               
of “three proximities”, as proximity to the public, proximity to reality, proximity to day-to-day life. See: 
The Chinese Journalist, pp40-43.  
1 Such agendas include those like environmental problems, accidents, disasters, crimes, price rises, 
inflation, and so on. See: The Chinese Journalist, p. 34. 
2 Evidences even show that sometimes the government is happy to promote policies assisted by skilled 
communicators rather than their own official propagandists. See: Zhao Yuezhi, ‘Watchdogs on Party 
leashes? Contexts and implications of investigative journalism in post-Deng China’, Journalism Studies, 
2000, 1:4(November, 2000), pp. 577-98, November. And even further, by seemingly allowing people to 
articulate their problems themselves and allowing journalists to counsel and sympathize, the Party also 
reduces pressure upon itself. See: The Chinese Journalist , p41. 
3 Chinese intellectuals, from the ancient era, vigorously hope to show his or her “usefulness <jingshi 
zhiyong>” in pointing out problems, sketching possible futures and providing the ideas of which the 
ruling officials are so bereft. See in reference to: Geremie Barmé, In the Red, On Temporary Chinese 
Culture, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. 
4 The “higher calling” can be interpreted as some kind of ideal, long-term target, or ideology, which 
makes journalists somehow identical with elite bureaucrats. See: The Chinese Journalist, pp179-80. And, 
this thesis will later show the reality that how a senior journalist can exert pressure on bureaucrats 
according to their administrative ranks. 
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To this question, this research takes the concept of “embedded mobilization” to 
indicate the Party-state-societal interaction in dealing with environmental problems. It’s 
the indication of a kind of informal politics, when the political authority 
initiatively realizes its power through the activism of certain social units 
(environmental NGOs), in order to mobilize social resources for promoting 
certain policies (environmental management) or legalizing certain 
institutional reforms (“rule by law” and “orderly public participation), 
rather than simple utilization of politically coercive power. This interpretation 
of the Party-state-societal relations is composed of four parts.  
In first place, this informal politics depends on the motivations of the 
Party-state to change the form of power implementation from “power over 
society” to “power through society (embeddedness)”. Under the authoritarian 
system, the environmental agenda setting of central top authority goes ahead of the 
institutional capability of the existing political system. The Party-state is faced with 
environmental threat to development sustainability and social stability, which makes 
environmental agendas meaningful for its political legitimacy, however, decentralization 
and governmental fragmentation legalized by the existing system just limit the national 
ability of environmental problem solution, when local leaders generally prefer economic 
increase orientation, with profit-oriented departments having the strong position in 
various levels of governments. “Embedded mobilization” is just practically necessary to 
deal with the dilemma. Political mobilization (also literally known as “social 
mobilization” in Chinese discourse) – the traditional communist approach to socialize 
political orthodoxy, that we’ll discuss more in the next section – is combined with 
increasingly social pluralization and civil societal growth, helping the central authority 
steer bureaucratic and local obstacles to environmental protection. The new form of 
“mobilization” is differentiated from the old one according to that political willingness is 
not simply enforced by coercive power, but greatly depends on certain social units trusted 
by the political authority for not chanllenging its elementary legitimacy.  
Secondly, as the selected social units, NGOs act as the vehicle of power 
embeddeness, according to their “dual identity” as both “representing 
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common people” and having special ties with politics. On one hand, the NGOs 
are aimed at promoting green priority and environmental democratization. However, self 
deficiencies and external institutional restrictions limit their independent activism, which 
provides them the practical needs of cooperation with the Party-state. On the other hand, 
There special ties with politics shouldn’t be ignored according to, a) the formal identity of 
leading activists1, allowing them to legally participate in political process and, making 
them harder to be independent from the Party-state; b) the personal networking among 
individual activists and officials of the environmental department who are fed up with 
disadvantages in front of profit-oriented departments; c) the counsciousness shared 
among NGO activists and environmental officials of both environmental priority and 
political reform; d) the gradual normalization of cooperation between NGOs and the 
environmental department.  
The third part is about the mass media issue framing as the leverage to 
integrate political and social motivations, institutional and non-institutional 
resources, and, social activism and political embeddedness. In last sections (1.3 
and 2.3), we’ve discussed the profound identity of China’s mass media to cross over 
political and public sphere. For journalists, market-orientation is combined with political 
censorship; personal liberalistic thinking is combined some kind of “higher calling”; and, 
duty of “voicing public” is combined with political encouragement (or even priviledges, 
especially of senior journalist at central-level) for them to scrutinize on and criticize 
power abuse, and political systematic deficiencies. And therefore, we may find another 
aspect of the “green public sphere”: on the front stage, environmental NGOs launch 
media campaigns, make news, and provide scoops to orient media framing in favor of 
environmental priority and politically democratization discourses; on the back stage, the 
environmental department utilizes administrative resources to encourage NGOs to speak 
out and sometimes clear institutional obstructions from them, while the central authority 
utilizes and encourages the “public opinion” to exert pressure on local leaders and senior 
bureaucrats who used to take their institutional advantage to disobey the central 
                                                        
1 Like governmental officials, members of people’s congress or political consultative committee, 
governmental think-tankers, senior journalists, and so on.  
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environmental priority1. Thus, the final media framing not only represents the “public 
sphere”, but also reflect political orthodoxy which get “though” the society rather than 
juts “over” it.  
The last point is the political meaning implied trough the embedded 
mobilization in practice. The orientation of embedded mobilization is not only 
limited to better environmental governance. According to the issue-oriented informal 
politics, we may see that the “environmental democratization” in China is not simply a 
one-direction bottom-up process. On one hand, certain NGOs’ activeness in certain issues 
depends on the initiative “choice” by the political authority who is selectively distributing 
public resources to “proper” social units. That means, active social activism doesn’t 
certainly mean the Party-state is losing control on society or just positively respond to 
public protest. On the other hand, since environmental NGOs have their own clear status 
on environmental priority and liberalistic reform, according to the Party-state-societal 
interaction, the status will also promote these ethics in reforming the authoritarian 
system, as to institutional modernization and democratization.  
3.2 Originality and Limitations 
Based on the systematic review of existing researches, this thesis takes an empirical 
study on comparative cases for theorizing the Party-state-societal relations in 
environmental realm, rather than pure theoretical reasoning according to established 
paradigms. Related theoretical concepts of political science are reconstructed to observe 
and interpret the profound nature of China’s environmental politics. In general, I believe 
that social activism in China and its political meanings are different from the model in 
                                                        
1 The concept “public opinion <qunzhong yijian>” has the most authoritative rank in China’s political 
discourses, which is difficult to be simply judeged as a prop to defend the willingness of the Party. We 
may notice that, from the ancient times, all of the “allowable” targets of China’s empire would be 
elaborated to be in accordance with “public opinion <min yi>”, and further, according to orthodox 
confucious thoughts, limited participation in and even withstanding with the empire authority, if they 
had been judeged to reflect the “min yi”. Such concerns on “public opinion” make China’s totalitarian 
regimes seem different from their counterparts. For example, if a monarch had launched a war only for 
his/her own glory and even achieved very great success, such like the Alexandria, there generally would 
be very bad comments on he/her in China’s history [see: Tongdong Bai, New Mission of an Old State: 
Classical Confucian Political Philosopy in a Contemporary and Comparative Relevance Context 
<jiubang xinming: gujin zhongxi canzhao xia de rujia zhengzhi zhexue>”, Beijing: Peking University 
Press, 2009. And further, the long-time revolutionary experiences of the CCP also have left the lesson of 
paying attention to what common people want and how to effectively socialize Party’s directives. 
Factually, to understand the complex implication of “min yi” in China’s political discources will help 
scholars seize China’s political development more comprehensively.  
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developed democracies, and also from the lessons of ex-communist communities in East 
Europe and Soviet Union territory. I attempt to find new elements to frame the good 
interaction between Party state and society in the country with the biggest population, 
when China is exactly at the time that traditional agendas of industrialization and 
modernization hasn’t been unfinished, but new post-modern agendas like environmental 
problem inevitably appears. The originality can be as following, in aspects of normative 
study and empirical study.  
In the first place, and the most important, this thesis pays careful 
attention to the subjectivity of Party-state side during environmental 
democratization, as well as social actors; and, this thesis takes the “strong 
state – strong society <qiang guojia qiang shehui>” pattern to interpret 
their relations. This pattern indicates that, neither the development of state capability 
nor the increase of social autonomy is realized on the basis of limiting the other, and 
further, the transformation of political power – from “power over society” to “power 
through society” – and the formation of mature civil society are both depending on the 
development of each other, which are integrated in the national modernization progress1. 
On one hand, for environmental democratization, the role of Party-state needs to be 
reexamined; political initiatives are important as China is still on his way to construct a 
modern political and social system, in aspects of governmental structure, legal system，
central-local relations, and governance mode. On the other hand, the independence and 
actual capability of social actors need to be valued more carefully; according to unfinished 
industrialization, although increasing power of urban middle class has seemed to be 
providing conditions for civil society, the main population of large agriculture population 
cannot be judged as “modern”. Thus, the reality is, Party-state is still taking the main 
responsibility to supply public goods and services and integrate social resources for 
industrialization and modernization. In other words, increasing social actors can attempt 
to influence policymaking by “demanding what to do”, while Party-state is taking the 
                                                        
1 See for example: Shiqi Tang, Sate-society Relationships: Comparative Study on Socialist Theory and 
Practice <guojia yu shehui guanxi: shehui zhuyi lilun yu shijian de bijiao yanjiu>. Beijing University 
Press, 1998; and Shaoguang Wang, “Chongqing Experience and Socialism ver. 3.0 <Chongqing jingyan 
yu shehui zhuyi 3.0 banben>,” Social Science Weekly, July 8, 2010.  
 32
initiatives of “what factually to do”. And therefore, in the environmental realm, increasing 
effectiveness of NGO activism indeed reflects the self-improvement of the political state.  
Secondly, this thesis links environmental issues to political legitimacy of 
the Party-state, in order to interpret the upgrade of environmental concern 
in core political agendas, and further to define its connection with 
issue-oriented political change. This originality is formed based on the 
comprehension that existing researches may underestimate the importance of 
environmental issues for the Party-state. It’s undoubted that the seriousness of 
environmental deterioration has been fully recognized, and, researchers all agree with its 
urgency for social governance. However, the serious problems are only taken to bring the 
Party-state welfare burden at the social-level. Thus, it’ll be natural for observers to think 
the Party-state inclines to “leave” the social space to nongovernmental sectors who can 
supplement the governmental incapability. But, this thesis will analyze more about the 
important position of environmental concern in China’s core agendas, and, with this 
consciousness, we may have a more comprehensive understanding of the Party-state’s 
initiative scrutiny on and even active intervention in environmental issues, rather than 
“creating social space”.  
Thirdly, this thesis notices the dual identity of environmental NGOs in 
China. Existing researches mention that NGOs can get encouragement and material 
resources from Party-state, but the explanation focuses on their compensation to national 
ability, with the premise that NGO is the player to “represent common people”. However, 
as this thesis notices, the NGO identity of representing common people in social 
dimension may be more a symbol than the fact. As mentioned in section 1.2 and will be 
discussed more in the third and fifth chapter, NGO actions generally reflect orientation of 
their elite members1, and the elite members are mainly public intellectuals who have 
networks across political sphere and society, further, some of them are formal officials or 
consultants to Party of government. In other words, the sphere of NGOs, with its 
                                                        
1 An object investigation shows the personal element in the decision-making of Chinese environmental 
NGOs: with regard to making main decisions, 38% of the environmental NGOs depended on council of 
organized key members, 34.5% on the key members, 13.5% on the plenary session, 8.3% on the leading 
leaders, and 5.7% on the full-time staff. See: ACEF, China environmental protection NGO status report, 
p. 61. 
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elitism, is on the very close position, or even overlapped with political sphere. 
On the contrary, according to certain empirical researches, we can find the alienation of 
NGOs from interest-related local community, with sticking to the elite sense1.  
Lastly, the originality is also reflected in the contents of case study. 
Although this thesis chooses cases which have been well studied, the difference is that, 
besides analyzing “what players did during the whole case” to make the “final outcomes”, 
I also emphasize players’ actions in different stages, especially the “what action by which 
player did” to make the turning points of the cases. According to the specific analysis, we 
may make clearer of the decisive factors in each case, and further to, through comparison, 
estimate effects of each factor in the embedded mobilization.  
Besides the originalities, this thesis also has its limitations. The first point is the 
case selection. Even though cases are selected according to their high extent of being paid 
attention, and cases cover different problem domains, there still maintains the possibility 
that the thesis cannot cover all the particular issues. Secondly, this thesis focuses on the 
environmental realm to theorize Party-state-societal relation, but there have been civic 
activism ranged in various social fields, such as peasants’ protests, urban conservations, 
women’s right movements, anti-household-removal movements, and so on. The research 
on environmental realm may reflect some typical aspects of the nature of 
Party-state-societal relation, but it should be admitted that it cannot reflect the whole 
conditions. Lastly, I try my best to be value free, but the study may still be stained with 
personal feelings and values. However, to farthest reduce the influence of self-values on 
date collection and analysis, I will conduct the research with clearly-noted scientific 
evidences, empirical and reliable data. 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 The Synthesis of “embedded” and “mobilization” 
The research is conducted on the basis of a combination of theories from different 
disciplines. The study utilizes multi-field method and theory, mainly political science, and 
sometimes links to sociology and journalism. The utilization of a compound concept, 
embedded mobilization, is targeted at interpreting the development of “relationship 
                                                        
1 See: Tao, “Solving Environmental Problems and the Ideal Structure of a Civil Society,” 
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between strong state and strong society” in China1, and, is also edified by the framework 
of “governed interdependence” raised by Linda Weiss to frame state-societal relations 
and reconstraction of national ability in developed democracies. Governed 
interdependence indicates an institutionalized relationship of negotiation between the 
state and societal actors expecially sectorally coherent business organizations. In this 
relationship, the two sides take political exchange while maintaining respective 
authonomy by: the state sets broad developmental goals and monitor actions of business 
organizations according to achievement of those goals; the societal organizations provide 
information to and cooperation with the state; and, in reture, the state legitimates such 
organizations, reduce their social risks of investment, and plays the role of intermediator 
to resovle struggles among societal actors. Weiss argues that such state-societal structure 
leads to the enhancement of state capacity in front of the globalization which seems to 
bring the risk of “powerless state”2.  
Although the “governed interdependence” model of Weiss is supported by empirical 
study mainly on developed democracies 3 , its emphasis on the political power 
enforcement “through” certain social units (embeddedness) may seem somehow suitable 
to the “strong state – strong society” orientation of China’s Party-state-societal 
relationship. However, in reality, China’s “society” is not as well-developed as that in 
developed democracies to support a kind of equal “interdependence” with the Party-state, 
and therefore, the initiatives of the Party-state need to be paid special attention. To be 
                                                        
1 Considering the strong centralism of the Party-state system and the vulnerability of developing society, 
researchers on China’s Party-state-societal relationship incline to play down the liberalistic color of 
State-societal binary opposition, but turn to exploring some kind of “good interaction <liangxing 
hudong>” between the Party-state and social actors. The “strong state – strong society” model takes the 
independent “civil society” alienated from the state as just a short-lived historical phenomenon in the 
rudimentary stage of early capitalism; and, it argues that the expansion of modern state functions 
inevitably leads to the “permeation” of state power into civil society. And further, the good interaction 
implies there is no absolutely static line between the two sides, but they take power exchange and then 
change the power boundary in practice, making some kind of win-win relationship. For a developing 
country like China in the contemporary era, the interaction between state and civil society is expected to 
focus on activating initiatives of both state and society sides. See for example: Shiqi Tang, Sate-society 
Relationships: Comparative Study on Socialist Theory and Practice <guojia yu shehui guanxi: shehui 
zhuyi lilun yu shijian de bijiao yanjiu>. Beijing University Press, 1998; Xiaoguang Kang, Power Shift: 
China’s Power Structural Change in Transformation <quanli de zhuanyi: zhuanxing qi zhongguo 
quanli geju de bianqian>, Zhejiang: Zhejiang People’s Press, 1999; and also, Yiyu Li, Relationship and 
Trust: Empirical Study on Rural Nongovernmental Organizations of Contemporary China <guanxi yu 
xinren: dangdai zhongguo xiangcun minjian zuzhi shizheng yanjiu>, Beijing: China Books Press, 2004. 
2 See: Linda Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.  
3 Especially, similar institutions and processes in Deutshland, Weden and Japan are paid attention in 
detailed case study. See: The Myth of the Powerless State. 
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specific, the existing institutional approaches of the Party-state to mobilize social 
resources have the potential to deal with modernity issues and build state capacity.  
Mobilization 
The concept of “mobilization” has the complicated implications for modern China’s 
political practice, and, especially when it is combined with the concepts of “political” or 
“mass” in Chinese study, it indicated the strong organizational and ideological ability and 
approach to mobilize the participation in serving certain political purposes, as under the 
communist system1. The political mobilization of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
proved its great success during the revolution era2. And, after 1949, the communist party 
played its role to “mobilize the mass” as politicizing the apolitical population to bring the 
people “into direct and continuing contact with higher levels of government” and 
“organizing them “for active support of national objectives”, so as to “replace loyalties to 
the family and other particularistic units with loyal to the political community”3. That 
means, the political mobilization had been greatly relied by the leading communists to 
change both the current political consciousness of people and the social structure4, which 
was lagged behind the standards of a modernized country. In other words, the early 
political mobilization of PRC actually had some kind of meaning of political development 
as the institutionalization of political organization and procedures 5 . However, the 
mobilization still emphasized the willingness of the top leadership as “pioneers” to 
educate “mass” according to the hand-in-hand communication6. And therefore, the 
                                                        
1 See: James R. Townsend, and Brantly Womack. Politics in China, (3d ed.) (Series in Comparative 
Politics: A Country Study), Boston: Little, Brown, 1986. p. 173.  
2 According to the directives of Mao Zedong to inspire the revolution energy of peasants – through the 
effective propaganda and the favorable benefits distribution – and integrate the mass power. See in 
reference to: Edward E. Rice, Mao's Way. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Un iversity of California Press, 
1972; IIpyong J. Kim, The Politics of Chinese Communism: Kiangsi under the Soviets, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1973; Richard Baum, Prelude to Revolution: Mao, the Party, 
and the Peasant Question, New York: Columbia University Press, 1975; Ralph Thaxton, "On Peasant 
Revolution and National Resistance: Toward a Theory of Peasant Mobilization and Revolutionary War 
with Special Reference to Modern China," World Politics, 30, No. 1, October 1977, pp. 24-57; and 
Yung-fa Chen, Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 
1937-1945. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986. 
3 James R. Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China, Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1972. p. 211.  
4 See: Richard H. Solomon, Mao’s Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1971, pp. 171-178. 
5 See the definition of political development in: Samuel P. Huntington, “Political Development and 
Political Decay,” World Politics, No. 3, Vol. 17, April, 1965. pp. 393-394.  
6 See: Ezra Vogel, “From Friendship to Comradeship: The Change in Personal Relationshipss in China,” 
The China Quarterly, No. 21, January-March, 1965; Townsend, Political Participation in Communist 
China, pp. 212-214; Alan P. L. Liu, Communications and National Integration in Communist China, 
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“mobilization” always overwhelms the constitutional regimes of electoral and 
representative institutions1, and, the emphasis on ideological integration of mass had led 
the mobilization to deviate from originally established constitutional institutions to mass 
campaigns, as “the most reflective of the Communist Party’s strategy of national 
development”2. Thus, the “mobilization” is generally taken as a most important indicator 
of China’s totalitarian system.  
As the symbol of Mao’s revolution era – also judged as depending on and 
strengthening the totalitarian system – mass mobilization (or specifically, mass 
campaigns) seems to have been consciously avoided by following generations of 
leadership3. However, the “mobilization” is still mained in official discources, as the 
“mass mobilization” is replaced by the “social mobilization”, and, more essentially, 
practical national needs takes the place of highly politicalized agendas to orient the 
“mobilization”. The more realistic necessaries, of mobilizing common people to 
participate in promoting national development, deprive the negative ideological and 
totalitarian color of the mobilization, but make it practical for a developing country’s 
mobilization: on one hand, it implies the premise that when the leadership strongly feels 
urgently necessary of a certain agenda, but common people don’t have such 
consciousness and the social structure doesn’t spontaneously promote the process or 
                                                                                                                                                               
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971; and Xianglin Xu, Party, Government and 
Society in Evolutionary Reform <jianjin gaige zhong de zhengdang, zhengfu yu shehui>, Beijing: 
Zhongxin Press, 2004, pp. 57-58.  
1 At the same time the people was mobilized to participate into the constitutional regimes –  like the 
People’s Congress at various levels and the root-level political practice – the mobilization also played the 
part to orient the political attitudes of the mass into what the Party elites wished to. 
2 Liu, Communications and National Integration in Communist China, p. 87. For example, just until 
the late 1950s, the Party-state had mobilized the “three mass campaigns” as the Agrarian Revolution 
<tudi gaige>, the War to Resist U.S. and Aid Korea <kangmei yuanchao>, and the Suppression 
Movement on the Anti-revolutionary <zhenfan yundong>. These campaigns might have been truly 
helpful for the young sovereignty to achieve the national integration and social structure change. 
However, they had been only succeeded by the more radical movements as the Great Leap <da yuejin> 
setting the impossible industrialization goals to “overtake British and U.S. in 15 years <shiwu nian nei 
gan ying chao mei>, the Anti-Rightist Struggle <fanyou douzheng> to eliminate the ideological dissent, 
and finally – to the peak of the political mobilization – the Great Cultural Revolution <wenhua da 
geming>. That means, the approach of “mobilization” had deviated from its original directives and 
ultimately served the leadership at the expense of the population, especially when the mobilization of the 
mass was entangled with the political conflict among the leadership. See in reference to: Lowell Dittmer, 
Liu Shao-ch'i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The politics of mass criticism, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1974. 
3 There have also been some exception in some fields least politically sensitive, such as eliminating 
pornography and illegal publications, keep the peace of local community, mobilizing volunteers for 
celebration activities, and so on, which only seemed to be close to people’s daily life. See: Xu, Party, 
Government and Society in Evolutionary Reform, pp. 58-62. 
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even obstruct it1; on the other hand, mobilization of commom people implies the mistrust 
of leadership on established institutions to help achieve certain agendas 2 . Thus, 
“mobilization” means some kind of non-institutional leverage to build the direct bridge to 
connect central orthodoxy with common people for the sake of: a) reconstructing people’s 
certain awareness and social structure in favor of certain national objectives; b) reducing 
hindering factors of established institutions, like localism and bureaucracy; and c) 
integrating social resources to supplement the less capability of Party-state. It’s practical 
for dealing with China’s environmental predicaments.  
Embeddedness 
Along with the social pluralization making it impossible to directly mobilize common 
people through the hand-to-hand approach as in Mao’s revolutionary era, combination 
with “embeddedness” is the critical point to prevent the “mobilization” from disobeying 
its practical needs, and further, to maintain political and social stability. As a concept 
firstly raised by economists3, the “embeddedness” is then widely utilized in other fields of 
social science, indicating a certain identification of a subjective sphere with an object 
sphere according to ties of long-term establishing network. With such ties, some elements 
or actions which seem to belong to the object sphere factually equals to the corresponding 
elements or actions of the subject sphere, only in another form.  
                                                        
1 In Mao’s era, the agenda was industrialization, but the traditional culture and structure of an 
agricultural society wouldn’t be naturally adapted to the necessity. And, with regard to today’s 
environmental agendas, the whole social regimes has been established to meet the target of economic 
increase, with the common profit-orientation of common people, in contrast to the Party and 
governmental concern on environmental deterioration which critically influenced the nation’s future in 
development sustainability and social instability.  
2 For environmental agendas, it means especially that of bureaucrats and local authorities who were 
doubted to distort the central orthodoxy. However, of course, today’s China will not replay such deviant 
behavior of nationwide attack to established institutions that, at the climax of Cultural Revolution, when 
the institutional and legal processes were broken and most bureaucrats were replaced by young people 
absolutely “loyal” to their leader. 
3 The concept of “embeddeness” was firstly raised to interpret the modern market economy and society 
in the early 1940s. Karl Polanyi judges economic actions to be embedded in the long-term social 
relationshipss with trust, so as to reduce the contrariety nature of economic actions [see: Karl Polanyi, 
The Great Transformation, Beacon Press, 1971 version; and also Jens Beckert, The Great 
Transformation of Embeddedness: Karl Ploanyi and the New Economic Sociology, 
Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, 2007]. And then, Mark Granovetter applies the concept 
to a broader field that all social factors linked to modern market had even decisive effects on economic 
activities, and all economic actions embedded in certain networks [see: Mark Granovetter, “Economic 
Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,” The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 
91, No. 3, November, 1985, pp. 481-510]. And moreover, Brian Uzzi further pointed the special functions 
the “embeddedness” could offer – for social ties to affect economic outcomes – as the trust, transition of 
effective information and promotion of mutual problem solution [see: Brian Uzzi, “The Sources and 
Consequences of Embeddedness for the Economic Performance of Organizations: the Network Effect,” 
American Sociological Review, Vol. 61, No. 4, August 1996, pp. 674-698]. 
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The “embeddedness” used in this thesis to analyze China’s Party-state-societal 
relations is targeted at the social actions which reflect the political orthodoxy, according 
to special organizations, bias, culture and non-institutional ties between political and 
social players. During the economic reform1, the Party-state has generally loosened the 
totalitarian control, and further, the elimination of “unit system <danwei tizhi>” in the 
late 1990s finally broke the traditional structural ties inherited from Mao’s era. In 
addition, the accumulation of private wealth and the tendency of social pluralization have 
brought the image that the political power had withdrawn from the society – or even 
being forced to be – and, some kind of public sphere like that in developed democracies 
was expected to replace the political factors. However, there may be a confused 
comprehension of the “political power”. According to Michael Mann, the state power can 
be distinguished in two types: the despotic power and infra-structural power according to 
the state-society relations. The former is also called “power over society”, requiring that 
only elite class can impose its willingness on society without any legal or institutional 
communication. And, on the contrary, the latter is also known as “power through society”, 
entailing a cooperative relations between citizens and their government, in other words, 
political decisions can be smoothly implemented in the society according to certain laws 
and institutional arrangement embedded in the society, despite of the visible power form2. 
Thus, from the aspect of China’s Party-state, the withdrawing of visible despotic power 
during reform era is also very likely to be accompanied with the growth of infra-structural 
power. And in addition, when we mention the phenomenon of civil society, we can see 
that, civil society in China has appeared according to the Party-state power 
transformation during marketization reform to construct social space, which has made 
                                                        
1 Factually, some researches have even mentioned some kind of “embeddedness” in the mass campaigns 
of Mao’s revolutionary era. As announcing to construct the “people’s nation” and modernize the ancient 
culture as quickly as possible, the mass mobilization of Mao’s revolutionary era might have constructed 
structural ties between political and social sphere to make individuals and social organizations 
spontaneously reflected the leadership authority and central orthodoxy, which can be seen as a “strong 
embeddedness” with absolute political control over social sphere. See for example: Arthur Dosk Barnett 
and Ezra Vogel, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1967; Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist in China, 
University of California Press, 1968; Lowell Dittmer, China’s Continuous Revolution: the Post-liberation 
Epoch, 1949-1981, University of California Press, 1987; and Lawrence R. Sullivan, “Leadership and 
Authority in the Chinese Communist Party: Perspectives from the 1980s,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 4, 
1986-1987, pp. 605-633. 
2 See: Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results,” 
European Journal of Sociology, Vol. 25, No. 01 November 1984, pp 185-213. 
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China’s civil society naturally weak and vulnerable to the Party-state1. In other words, 
both the process of the Party-state’s power transformation, and the nature of China’s civil 
society indicates the necessity of “embeddeness” of political authority in society. And, the 
embeddedness of political authority and orthodoxy has been paid academic attention, 
whether researchers choose to use the concept of “embeddedness” or not2.  
3.3.2 Research Methods 
The specific research methods include:  
a) Case Study: this research chooses several most well-known environmental public 
issues from 1998 until recent years respectively in different problem domains. 
The case choice is owing to several considerations: these cases have drawn great 
academic concern to prove the importance; hypothetic factors are all visible for 
observing; characteristics of different problem domains leave space for 
comparison; each case has its emphasis of respective factors to complete the 
jigsaw of “embedded mobilization”.  
b) Text study: text data for this research comes from newspaper reports, 
governmental documents, public letters and unpublished documents. The 
analysis on text is from the aspects of both quantity and quality. The observation 
on mass media focuses on mainstream print media. Comparing with 
broadcasting media, information searched from print media is more complete 
and concentrated, providing us more credibility of result; and, comparing with 
internet media, with much more information from uncertain sources and 
personal expressions, print media is more beneficial for analyzing the political 
                                                        
1 Zhenglai, Deng. State and Society: Study on China’s Civil Society, Sichuan: Sichuan People’s Press, 
1997, pp. 129-130. 
2 For example, Kang Xiaoguang, in his writing Power shift, indicates the fact that how certain political 
agendas are applied into actions of social organizations [see: Xiaoguang Kang, Power Shift: China’s 
Power Structural Change in Transformation <quanli de zhuanyi: zhuanxing qi zhongguo quanli geju 
de bianqian>, Zhejiang: Zhejiang People’s Press, 1999]; Chen Mingming tries to use the framework of 
“orienting Party-state-society cooperation” to interpret the new function of CCP’s traditional approaches 
of propaganda, root organizations, education, modeling and hand-with-hand communication in today’s 
China [see: Mingming Chen, Politics and Modernization in Post-revolutionary Society <hou geming 
shehui de zhengzhi yu xiandaihua>, Shanghai: Dictionary Press, 2002]; and, Luo Feng, clearly utilizes 
the concept “embeddeness” to frame the ongoing reform of CCP’s power transformation and leading 
strategy [see: Feng Luo, Embeddedness, Integration and the Reconstruction of Party Authority: A 
Survey on the Relationships of China’s Ruling Party, State and Society <qianru, zhenghe yu 
zhengdang quanwei de chongshu: dui zhongguo zhizhengdang, guojia he shehui guanxi de kaocha>, 
Shanghai: People’s Press, 2009].  
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influence on media contents. And, among the mainstream media, analysis is 
mostly based on authoritative Party papers (like People’s Daily, Central 
Television Station, newsletters of Xinhua News Agency, and local Party papers 
according to cases), local best sellers (like Yangtze Evening, Xiandai Kuaibao, 
Beijing News, etc.), and those as opinion leaders for certain view fields (like 
South Weekend, Nanfang Dushibao, Liaowang, etc.) 
c) Interview and participant observation: I have been a volunteer and experienced 
internship in several environmental NGOs, and had formal and informal 
communication with many activists, related officials and journalists. According 
to the communication, I’m able to apply more comprehensive knowledge to the 
research. Especially, to observe closely and participate in the circle, I can more 
understand the combination of the factors to frame embedded mobilization, 
because it’s the informal politics, which more depends on practice but cannot 
only be judged through theoretical frameworks. For example, the self deficiencies 
of environmental NGOs, especially some radical views and action map to 
obstruct their further development, would not be easy to pay enough attention, 
because – if the comprehension is only based on literature review – formal 
academic writings inclined to emphasize more on the political pressure as 
obstacles.  
3.4 Framework of Chapters 
This thesis is composed of seven chapters. The first chapter is the introduction to 
research background, research questions, literature review, core hypothesis and 
methodology.  
The second chapter focused on analysis of the upgrade of environmental issues in 
China’s political agendas and the institutional predicaments to obstruct related policy 
enforcement, which indicate the inherent dynamics of the Party-state to take 
mobilization – the informal dynamics – in environmental realm1. The upgrade of 
environmental agendas has followed the developing trace of orientating environmental 
                                                        
1 The setting of a seperate chapter is targeted to make more clear of the subjectivity of political authority 
in environmental realm, for strengthening the originality of this thesis. 
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problems as: from the side effects of economic increase to the necessary dimension of 
comprehensive “sustainable development <ke chixu fazhan>” and “scientific 
development <kexue fazhan>”. And therefore, directives on environmental management 
has been upgraded from “pollute-firstly-manage-later <xian wuran hou zhili>” to 
applying environmental standards into economic development measures. However, the 
national directive has been obstructed by established institutions – being developed 
during reform era in favor of rapid economic increase – especially the decentralization 
emphasizing local economic autonomy and economic achievements of local leaders, and 
the strong position of profit-oriented departments in bureaucratic fragmentation. In this 
case, to speak specifically, it’s the central leadership and non-profit environmental 
departments to practically need the informal mobilization. 
From chapter three to chapter six, four well-known cases in typical problem domains 
were analyzed from the point of embedded mobilization. These cases are selected both for 
comparison and for indicating different factors to support “embedded mobilization”. The 
third chapter frames characteristics of China’s environmental NGOs through study on 
their early activities of wild life conservation, with focus on their initiatives to utilize mass 
media and their special ties with political actors, and try to make clear that why and 
how Chinese environmental NGOs make the “social units” for the 
embeddedness of political power. Three factors are important. In the first place, the 
identity of earlier activists demonstrated their elitism and political aspiration of 
promoting event-oriented democracy in environmental realm, in other words, the 
de-politicalized politics. Secondly, environmental activists had been willing to utilize 
institutional resources as shortcut to influence policies. And lastly, activists’ efforts to 
pursue subjectivity in policymaking, with clear opposition to political orthodoxy, failed 
and taught NGOs to shift to more cooperative attitudes with the Party-state. Then, 
further study on cases in following chapters will indicate us the shift in reality according 
to their development.  
After analyzing the “social units” and Chinese NGOs’ special ties with politics, this 
thesis turn to certain political actors in response to NGOs’ cooperative 
attitudes, who also have their own initiatives to promote environmental 
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priority and pluralistic participation. The case we study in the forth chapter – the 
Yuanmingyuan anti-seepage membrane project <yuanmingyuan fangshen gongcheng>, 
a water management project within the relics of China’s one old imperial garden, which 
was questioned of environmental influence and procedural legitimacy – demonstrates 
that reformative officials of State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), the 
top environmental watchdog, exactly play the role. The case study focuses on two aspects 
to shape their interaction. On one hand, environmental officials and NGOs shared the 
same targets of upgrading environmental concern in policymaking, and they also 
preferred to democratizing policymaking procedures as well as strengthening legal 
leverages to withstand profit-oriented departments. On the other hand, although 
environmental officials seemed to act just in response to the “public question to the 
project” framed by NGOs and mass media, this chapter will tell us how they initiatively 
utilize their institutional resources to orient the event process which create great 
convenience for the expression of activists and journalists, who were keeping close 
communication with the officials. In other words, the opinion and power of SEPA was 
embedded in civil activism, which mobilized social resources to support SEPA’s decision 
to change the original policymaking which ignored SEPA’s legal authority.  
After the two chapters of focuses on initiatives of NGOs and environmental 
department respectively to set up the “ties” for embedded mobilization, the fifth chapter 
further analyzes their combination to outline rounded form of the embedded 
mobilization according to “Nu River defense battle”, the best-known anti-dam activism. 
And moreover, this chapter emphasizes on the situation when embedded mobilization 
was faced with really powerful confrontation and when the “selected social units” were 
challenged by non-official intellectuals. In this case, SEPA initiatively opened the political 
access to environmental NGOs and mass media, in order to strengthen effects of 
environmental consideration in hydropower policymaking. And, environmental NGOs 
and mass media, being in correspondence with SEPA and utilizing the institutional 
resources, brought the social movement and finally influence the policymaking through 
drawing attention of top leadership. However, the famous story had its subsequence that 
along with the dam plan was suspended for further environmental impact assessment 
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under the authority of SEPA, the ties between NGOs and SEPA were broken, and NGOs 
were left into the dilemma: they were challenged by both local governments, with 
profit-oriented departments, and other public intellectuals who preferred industrial 
ethics rather than environmental priority. The dilemma reduces NGOs’ social legitimacy 
as “representing common people”, indicates the indispensability of political players in 
environmental protection.  
The sixth chapter adds the last piece to the jigsaw of “embedded mobilization”, that is, 
to define effects of the central orthodoxy. In last cases, the central leadership hadn’t 
seem to initiatively gone up to the front stage, except their response to petition from 
NGOs and SEPA according to the “public opinion”. However, it shouldn’t be ignored that 
NGOs and SEPA depended on the central orthodoxy, which valued the environmental 
quality, in order to dwarf their rivals. This chapter makes clear the initiatives of central 
leadership, according to their active intervention in the Tai Lake water crisis in 2007. The 
water crisis fully exposed the deficiency of China’s extensive economic increase pattern, 
but had been attempted to concealed and framed as an inevitable natural disaster by the 
local government. The counteraction between the center and local government was 
reflected by the contradictory issue framing respectively of local mass media and central 
mass media with remote mass media. The public opinion was mobilized by central 
leadership to criticize the local government and promote environmental management 
system reform.  
The last chapter is the conclusion, divided into two parts. The former part analyzes 
the main factors to construct the embedded mobilization process and influence the effects 
limited to environmental realm, including: a) “sustainable development” as the 
orthodoxy of central authority; b) coalition of SEPA and NGOs as the channel for 
embedding institutional resources in social activism; c) nedia framing as the approach to 
mobilization of social resources; and d) external interventions to weaken the effects of 
mobilization. The latter part extends to more deep-seated political meanings of the 
nature of institutionalization and democratization in China. The embedded mobilization 
demonstrated in environmental realm, with combining existing institutional resources 
and informal politics applying limited pluralistic participation, can be taken as a balanced 
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according to the dilemma of dealing with industrialization and post-industrialization 
problems during the same period, and in addition, reflect the priority of modern 
institutionalization to democratization in political development. 
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Chapter Two 
Environmental Agendas and the Institutional Predicaments 
 
1. Environmental Agendas: for Development Sustainability and Social Stability 
A series of data may illuminate the serious negative effects of environmental 
degradation on development sustainability, human health and even the social equity and 
justice. World Bank used to estimate that during the 1990s, only the air and water 
pollution had cost between 3.5 to 8 percent of the country’s whole Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP)1. According to the special report on China’s environmental governance by 
the UN Development Programme (UNDP), until the beginning of the 21st century, there 
had “been a serious toll of environmental damage, mainly due to under-priced natural 
resources”, which was “costly in terms of health problems” and “reduced productivity of 
labour and land” in “one of the poorest and most polluted countries in the world”2. The 
survey pointed that early in 1993, the water pollution by industrial chemicals during the 
beginning of China’s policies to develop Township-and Village Enterprises (TVEs) could 
cause an agricultural loss of at least one million tons. And the report believed that there 
had been “premature deaths of 178,000 people in major cities each year due to 
pollution…and the 7.4 million working days that are lost to health problems related to air 
pollution”, and, “only 6 of China’s 27 largest cities” had drinking water quality “meet state 
standards”3. And, along with the top political authority had paid a special attention to the 
environmental degradation from the beginning of 21st century, the State Environmental 
Protection Administration (SEPA), the top environmental protection and the National 
Bureau of Statistics jointly issued an accounting report on China’s “national green 
economic” to admit that only in 2004, the environmental pollution directly caused a loss 
of 511.8 billion RMB yuan, equaling to 3.05% of that year’s GDP, among which, the water 
pollution led to the loss of 286.2 billion yuan as 55.9% of the total, air pollution led to 
219.8 billion yuan as 42.9%, and the solid waste and urgent incidents led to 5.7 billion 
                                                        
1 Johnson Todd, Liu Feng and Richard S. Newfarmer, Clear Water, Blue Skies: China’s Environment in 
the New Century, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997.  
2 UNDP, China Human Development Report 2002, p. 34. 
3 UNDP: China Human Development Report 2002: Making Green Development to a Choice, p. 33-34. 
[http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/asiathepacific/china/china_2002_en.pdf] 
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yuan as 1.2%, with the rest being the virtual governance cost1. And Pan Yue, the deputy 
general of SEPA at that time even pointed that one quarter of Chinese people had been 
drinking the water without meeting the quality standard and one third had been suffering 
from the seriously polluted air2. 
And moreover, the general negative effects on development sustainability and human 
health are compounded with the accumulating social inequity such like rural-urban 
disparity, inter-regional disparity in income, educational level, medical services, life 
expectancy and other social insurances, and so on. Environmental problems had 
strengthened the existing inequity of deteriorating wealth gap. For example, A research of 
the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) pointed that according to the 
market-orientation of the resource distribution without effective regulatory regimes, the 
natural resources — under the communist State-owned system, the natural resources 
belong to all the people of the nation theoretically — had been gradually concentrated to 
the economically or politically powerful groups, but on the contrary, the disadvantaged 
groups, especially the rural and urban poor, had been much more vulnerable to the 
environmental deterioration brought by the abuse of natural resources 3 . Another 
phenomenon of the environmental inequity to draw attention is the special problem 
derived from the ecological resettlement <shengtai yimin> according to the loss of 
historical agricultural environment caused by construction projects or sudden natural 
disasters. There is also evidence to demonstrate that the ecological migrants 
unaccustomed to the new life in a strange area, especially those young people difficult to 
find jobs, have made the potential instability of the society, and even factually led to the 
conflict incident with the native inhabitants4. The environmental problem has already 
                                                        
1 SEPA and National Bureau of Statistics, “China’s Green GDP Account and Research Report 2004 
<zhongguo lvse guomin jingji hesuan yanjiu baogao 2004>,” published on September, 2006. pp. 8-9. 
[http://www.mep.gov.cn/plan/gongwen/200609/P020060908545859361774.pdf] 
2 Pan Yue, “The environmental friendly society according to the orientation of harmonious society 
construction <hexie shehui mubiao xia de huanjing youhao shehui>,” People’s Daily online, July 15, 
2006. [http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/1037/4594021.html] 
3 Zhang Shiqiu, “Analyzing the Phenomena of Inefficient Resource Allocation and Natural Asset Capture 
by Powerful Groups <huanjing ziyuan peizhi di xiaolv ji ziran ziben “jufu” xianxiang pouxi>, in 
Evironment and Development Research Center: China Environment and Development Review, Vol.3, 
Beijing: China Academy of Social Science Press, 2007. pp. 285-294.  
4 Elizabeth C. Economy, The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China's Future, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2004. pp. 18-19, 81-84. 
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become “the new incentive of social riots <qunti xing shijian>”1. And in addition, the 
resource shortage along with both the national sponsored urbanization and the 
spontaneous economic-oriented population flow from rural to urban areas, or from 
under-developed west to the advanced east, have been a factor to intensify the pressure 
on the social stability2.  
And further, the environmental quality has become an indicator to influence people’s 
satisfaction degree, and, to improve environmental quality has gradually become a key 
criterion to measure the governance ability. According to the special sector of SEPA to 
receive environmental complaints3, there had been a obvious jump of the number of 
complaints from the late 1990s and to the beginning of the 21st century (Table 2-1). It may 
be more critical that the increasing complaints not only indicated the increasing 
frequency of environmental incidents, but also reflected that there had been very limited 
institutional resources to protect the equity for environmentally vulnerable groups, 
mostly rural and poor. One point is that, poverty had forced the rural people to depend on 
TVEs which were the double-edged sword to provide jobs and create environmental 
deterioration4, without multiple choices unless the government could afford them. And 
the other point is, legal approaches to maintain the environmental justice were absent, in 
consistence with China’s whole governance system lacking “ruling by law”. Generally in 
China, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, the concentration of natural resources 
has always made people benefit significantly from activities that cause ecological damage 
more advantaged than those who are subjected to the environmental costs of the damage. 
Usually, it’s hard to depend on formal administrative approaches in the local territory, 
since that local administration is difficult to make the decision of strict punishment on 
enterprises with illegal pollution emission, for the temptations of tax, profit and job 
                                                        
1 Tong Zhifeng, “Reflection on Mass Disturbance Derived from Environmental Pollution,” in Yang 
Dongping (ed.), FON Green Paper Book 2008: Crisis and Turning of China’s Environment, Beijing: 
Social Science Academic Press, 2008.  
2 See: UNDP, China Human Development Report 2002, p. 40-41.  
3 The complaint system, including that through letters <xinfang> or that through direct visits 
<shangfang>, is a special institutional regime of China to guide the people, who feels a certain problem 
to be difficult to solve under the local administration, to complain directly to a higher-level authority, so 
as to push the progress of solution according to the intervention of the higher administration. See: Anna 
Brettell, “Channeling Dissent: The Institutionalization of Environmental Complaint Resolution,” in 
Peter Ho and Richard Louis Edmons, ed., China's Embedded Activism: Opportunities and Constraints 
of A Social Movement, London; New York : Routledge, 2008, pp. 69-88. 
4 See: UNDP, China Human Development Report 2002, p. 45.  
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creation. But on the contrary, “it is very difficult to correct things through enacting 
environmental justice”1. Wang Canfa, a pundit on environmental law interpreted the 
pessimistic justice enaction situation as “compound difficulties in suing, taking evidence, 
winning and enforcement of judgment” leading to “（even until 2011） less than 20 per 
cent of the victims willing to safeguard their interests through legal means”2. Thus, 
appealing to the higher or directly the highest administration becomes the preferring 
choice. According to the comparative investigation on people’s tolerance of inequality by 
UNDP in 2005, people in China and the former socialist countries were judged to be have 
“a lower tolerance for inequality”, with more than 90 percent of people believing income 
inequality to be too great and about 80 percent taking their governments to have “the 
responsibility to reduce income inequality”3. Thus, the increasing complaints have 
resulted in more serious challenges to the governance ability, along with the better 
expectation of and greater trust on the administration. And further, the leading Party’s 
has announced the “governance mode transformation <zhuanbian zhizheng fangshi>”, 
turning to emphasize on the “service-oriented government <fuwuxing zhengfu> rather 
than ideological legitimacy4. Thus, governments at various levels have been forced to 
engaged itself in achieving the compound goals, covering political, economic, and social 
fields, to achieve the common prosperity of all members of the country <gong fu> with 
balanced development between urban and rural areas, between regions, and between 
people and nature. To speak generally, the dynamics of environmental management in 
China have not only been from the domestic public opinion or the modern 
environmentalist regimes of the international society, but also from the initiatives of the 
national willingness. And, the next part will discuss the upgrade of environmental issues 
in the ranks of China’s political agendas, to demonstrate that it has been exactly the 
national policies to head the environmental management progress.  
                                                        
1 See: UNDP, China Human Development Report 2002, p. 47. 
2 See: “The mystery and truth of environmental lawsuit <huanjing susong de fuyun yu zhenxiang>,” 
Liaowang, May 23, 2011.  
3 UNDP and China Development Research Fundation, China Human Development 2005: Development 
of Equity, p. 16. [http://www.undp.org.cn/downloads/nhdr2005/NHDR2005_complete.pdf] 
4 See: Wang Changjiang, Construction of Leading Party Governance Ability in the Prospective of 
China’s Political Civilization <zhongguo zhengzhi wenming shiye xia de dang de zhizheng nengli 
jianshe>, Shanghai People’s Press, 2005; and Lin Shangli (ed.), Political Construction and Nation 
Growth <zhengzhi jieshe yu guojia chengzhang>, Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 2008. 
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Table 2-1 Increasing environmental complaints through “shangfang” channels from the 
middle 1990s to 2006 
Year Number of 
environmenta
l incidents 
Number of 
complaint 
letters 
Statistics of direct visits 
1995 1966 58678 94798 persons-times 
1996 — 67268 47714 batches 
1997 — 106210 71528persons-times/29677 batches 
1998 — 147630 93791 persons-times/40151 batches 
1999 — 230346 89872 persons-times/38246 batches 
2000 — 247741 139424 persons-times/62059 batches 
2001 1842 367402 80329 batches 
2002 1921 435020 90746 batches 
2003 1843 525988 85028 batches 
2004 1441 595852 86414 batches 
2005 1406 608245 142360 persons-times/88237 batches 
2006 842 616122 71287 batches 
Source: Tong Zhifeng, “Reflection on Mass Disturbance Derived from Environmental Pollution,” in Yang 
Dongping (ed.), FON Green Paper Book 2008: Crisis and Turning of China’s Environment, Beijing: 
Social Science Academic Press, 2008. p. 151, table 1. 
 
2. Upgrading Environmental Concern in Political Agendas: the Sate-led 
Progress 
The last section exactly demonstrates the connection of environmental problem with 
political interests and will help us to comprehend its upgrade in political agendas. 
However, it’s also to be noticed that the “upgrade” doesn’t mean the concern on 
environmental deterioration prevails over industrialization and life modernization which 
exactly lead to it. This common dilemma of a developing country, compounded with 
nationalism which greatly cares “the right of development” in the global inequity, directly 
leads to the orthodoxy of “sustainable development” in China1. This orthodoxy then 
makes a paradox in the “upgrade” of environmental agendas: political authority vests 
legitimacy to environmental agendas on one hand; but it maintains the institutional 
setting beneficial for economic-increase-orientation. The dilemma is also the point to 
help us comprehend the importance of paying more attention to “informal politics”. 
                                                        
1 Yisheng Zheng, “On China’s Environment and Economism <lun zhongugo de huanjing yu jingji 
zhishang zhuyi>,” 21st Century (Net Journal, Hong Kong University), Vo. 87, No. 2, 2005. 
[http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ics/21c/issue/articles/0411038.pdf] 
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2.1 Until Early 1990s: Marginalized Agendas to Serve the Economic Increase 
Until the early 1970s, China’s ruling Communist Party and the government had little 
concern on environmental problems. It would be easily understood that China was at the 
beginning for large scale of modern industrialization, which was absolutely prior to 
environment issues in both governmental and social agendas, and in addition, the 
political leadership had been satisfied withthe “vast land and rich resources <dida 
wubo>”, which had brought the ancient power the absolute advantage in the agricultural 
civilization, and also made it underestimated the resource pressure in the large-scale 
industrialization. However, we may also find that during a very short time, from the 
middle 1950s, some statues for dealing with sporadic environmental problems had been 
formulated1. And, in the same year, the political directive of “comprehensive utilization” 
<zonghe liyong> was introduced2. The early environmental concerns had derived from 
two crucial aspects. On one hand, the negative results of modern industry3 on 
environment and human health had begun to be acknowledged by the political authority. 
On the other hand, in the commanding economics period, how to rationally utilize limited 
resources was an important governmental duty. Thus, the early environmental policies 
had been nothing but to serve the state’s general economic development under the 
directive view of “beating the nature <ren ding sheng tian>”4, and been designed to 
either reduce side negative impacts of industrialization as the passive means or adapt 
environmental factors to make a more comprehensive economic plan. In other words, the 
environmental issue hadn’t been taken as an independent factor in the political agendas.  
However, the early environmental normatives met the continuing pan-political 
                                                        
1 Among them the comparatively important were the 1956 Regulations of Protecting 
Mineral Resources and the 1956 Regulations on Factory Safety. The former involved a 
stipulation to forbidden local water pollution through exploitation of mineral resources, 
and the latter paid attention to the waste materials and liquids to endanger the health of 
workers or local inhabitant. 
2 Under the directive, some national-level administrative regulations, including 1957 
State Council Provisional Program on Water and Soil Protection, 1962 State Council 
Directive Concerning the Active Protection and Rational Use of Wildlife and Natural 
Resources, and the State Council Instructions on Strengthening the Work of Purchase 
and Utilization of Waste Products in the middle 1960s. 
3 Especially the “three wastes” <san fei> of gaseous emission, water discharges and 
industrial residue, which began to be formally introduced in State Council Directive on 
Strengthening the Work of Purchase and Utilization of Waste Products. 
4 See details in: Judith Shapiro, Mao’s War against Nature: Politics and Environment in 
Revolutionary China, Cambridge University Press, 2001.  
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movement peak during the Great Leap and Cultural Revolution, when the new 
constructed legal system of China had been completely broken down, and totalitarianism 
through the period had completely eliminated the existence of society. During that period, 
the rapid industrialization and economic increase had been taken not only the natural 
necessity of any developing countries but also a proof of the “socialist superiority <shehui 
zhuyi youyuexing>” for the political legitimacy. Thus, under the leading slogan of 
“human power can defeat nature <ren ding shengtian>”, “exceed Britain and America 
<ganyin chaomei>” and some other concepts similarly emphasizing the high speed 
economic increase and utopian ideal, immoderate extracting of natural resources without 
any environmental considerations had been greatly encouraged1. Even after the Great 
Leap, new development policies in 1960s and early 1970s had paid little attention to basic 
natural conditions2. In the official perception of that time, environmental pollution was 
“the vicious consequences” of capitalist societies in their drive to achieve wealth and, 
according to the propaganda, would not become a problem in China. In accordance with 
the line, the call to preserve environmental qualities and natural resources had been kept 
mute3. 
However, during the domestic irrational industrial production, there had also been 
domestic and international dynamics to push the environmental agendas. In 1972, two 
serious environmental issues4 forced the Premier Zhou Enlai himself to direct the 
investigation and treatment, which made “the first top-level state acknowledgment of 
widespread pollution problems”5. And in addition, the reaction to the progressing 
international environmental protection regimes of the Chinese government had become 
                                                        
1 For example, a large scale of disafforestation had been implemented during the Great 
Leap period for fueling the great steel making <dalian gangtie>, which had seemed like 
an insanity. 
2 such as extension of wet rice in area where water was scarce, excessively disforest, 
integration of industries with high contamination in residential and agricultural areas, 
and irrigation with polluted, often toxic industrial wastewater leading to severe pollution 
of water sources and soils. See: UNDP: China Human Development Report 2002: Making Green 
Development to a Choice, p. 11. 
[http://hdr.UNDP.org/en/reports/nationalreports/asiathepacific/china/china_2002_en.pdf] 
3 Changqun Duan and XueQing Yang and Fayuan Gao, “Fifty Years of Political Ecology in Mainland 
China,” Sinosphere, vol. 3 (1), 2000, pp. 6-13 
4 In 1972, a red tide in the Bay of Dalian caused substantial shellfish and aquatic production losses, and 
in the same year, fish sold to the capital city of Beijing from Guantian reservoir, were found to have high 
levels of toxic chemicals in their flesh because of massive industrial pollution of the reservoir. 
5 Joshua Muldavin, “The Paradoxes of Environmental Policy and Resources Management in 
Reform-Era China,” Economic Geography, Vol. 76, No. 3, (Jul., 2000), pp. 244-271. p. 252.  
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another dynamics to push environmental issues into the political agendas. From the early 
1970s, along with the efforts of Chinese government to enter the United Nations, the 
compliance with the international norms had become an important process in China’s 
environmental protection history1. Especially, there had been the argument that the 1972 
United Nations Conference on the Health and Environment (UNCHE) in Stockholm had 
been the decisive factor to develop China’s environmental protection dependent on the 
global trend of modern environmentalism, because that was one of the earliest important 
international conferences with the globally broad representation to accept the People’s 
Republic of China, thus it was naturally expected by the Chinese government to be a 
channel to demonstrate their will of taking responsibility for the international society, to 
change the image of a stubborn and uncooperative power2. The Chinese delegation to the 
UNCHE “returned from the conference with concrete recommendations for the 
leadership, and the State Council responded with a series of decrees”3. In 1973, the next 
year after UNCHE, the first National Conference on Environmental Protection was held 
in Beijing by the State Council. In the same year, the draft of Several Rules on 
Environmental Protection and Improvement <guanyu huanjing baohu yu gaishan de 
ruogan guiding zanxing caoan> was decreed, which marked the revival of legal system 
for environmental issues in China. And, along with the calming down of the utopian 
pan-political movement, the Party-state had begun to plan a set of governmental 
configurations for practical implement of the law rules. In 1974, the Environmental 
Protection Leading Group of State Council <guowuyuan huanjing baohu lingdao 
xiaozu> to make general policies with State Council Environmental Protection Office 
<guowuyuan huanjing baohu bangongshi> under its leadership to take implementation 
was established with its membership from a wide range of governmental departments 
and special commissions at the national-level. This organizational configuration had been 
in charge of environmental protection, having introducing a number of correlative 
                                                        
1 Lester Ross, “China: Environmental Protection, Domestic Policy Trends, Patterns of Participation in 
Regimes and Compliance with International Norms”, The China Quarterly, No. 156, Special Issue: 
China’s Environment. (Dec., 1998), p. 809-835. 
2 Michael Palmer, “Environmental Regulation in the People's Republic of China: The Face of Domestic 
Law”, The China Quarterly, No. 156, Special Issue: China's Environment. (Dec., 1998), pp. 788-808. 
3  “The Paradoxes of Environmental Policy and Resources Management in Reform-Era China,” p. 252.  
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regulations1, before its promotion to Environmental Protection Bureau in 1982.  
But still, the policy change in early 1970s cannot be taken as the upgrade but only the 
revival of environmental protection in the political agendas. On one hand, in the UNCHE, 
regarded as the origin of international environmentalist diplomacy, China was still taken 
as a laggard participant, who demanded principal responsibility for pollution control to 
the advanced industrialized countries and insisted on the right of independent 
exploitation of internal resources without external interference2. On the other hand, the 
domestic dynamics had derived from the change in the central leadership, rather than an 
initiative awareness of the environmental pressure3. In fact, we may find the regulations 
and practice in early 1970s seemed to have no difference with the existing policies in 
1950s. At that time, the whole propaganda was still showing such a crazy emotion for 
political movement that the policy change in economic development, including 
environment improvement, had not been well interpreted to the public, until the 
pan-political wave faded with the end of the Cultural Revolution in the 1970s.  
From 1978, when Deng Xiaoping basically excluded the dogmatists sticking to the 
pan-political movement from the leadership and launched the economic reform, the 
possible environmental degradation sided by economic development had been expected. 
In accordance with the consideration, the state responsibility to protect environment and 
natural resources, with preventing pollution and other dangers to the public was clearly 
expressed in the 1978 Constitution4. And further in the 1982 Constitution, the concepts of 
“environment” and “natural resources” were improved to “environment for people to live 
and ecological environment”, and added by more details as pollution control, 
afforestation, rare animals and plants, and so on5. But the importance of environmental 
issues had still been reflected only in the written rules without the substantial effects 
during the whole 1990s, for the environmental concern had got to yield to the urgent 
                                                        
1 They included 1974 Provisional Regulations on the Prevention of Pollution of Coastal Waters, and a 
number of environmental standards for such objects as industrial emissions drinking water and food. 
Michael Palmer, 1998, pp. 790-791. 
2 Lester Ross, 1998, pp. 810-811. 
3 Along with the fall of Lin Biao, both the vice Chairman at that time and one of the greatest sponsors of 
Cultural Revolution, a new plan for economic recovery was started by Premier Zhou Enlai and his 
assistants. 
4 Article 11, PRC Constitution, 1978. 
5 Article 9, Article 26, PRC Constitution, 1982. 
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economic increase, since the negative effects of the pan-political movement during Mao’s 
era had weakened the power of the political belief to integrate the nation which had 
forced the Party-state to upgrade the economic development-oriented value in 
policymaking, in order to maintain the political legitimacy through improving people’s 
material living quality. As Karl Hallding interpreted as below1, 
 
“China is a developing country. Its financial resources are limited in the face 
of the heavy task of full-scale economic reconstruction. Therefore the state 
cannot afford to make lavish appropriations for environmental protection for 
some time to come.” This 1988 statement from Qu Geping, then head of 
China’s National Environmental Protection Agency speaks tellingly to the 
level of ambition of Chinese environmental policy-makers—it should be done, 
somehow, but it must not cost anything, at least not now. Throughout the 
reform period a tendency has prevailed among Chinese leaders at different 
levels to see environmental problems as an unpleasant side effect of economic 
development, a necessary evil that one has to live through as the nation grows 
rich, and only then can start thinking about cleaning up.  
 
During the 1980s, the Chinese government hadn’t demonstrated its willingness to go 
beyond the model of “increase-firstly—clean-up-later” which had been experienced in 
most industrialized countries, thus, the environmental concerns had got to maintained 
the marginalized political agenda, greatly depending on the demand of the economic 
growth2. 
2.2 “Sustainable Development”: Official Change in Valuing Environmental 
Issues 
Into the 1990s, there had been new domestic and external dynamics to upgrade the 
                                                        
1 Karl Hallding, Water Resource Problems in China. Stockholm University: Department of East Asian 
Studies, 1991. Referenced in UNDP: China Human Development Report 2002: Making Green 
Development to a Choice, p. 42.  
2 State environmental protection plan must be brought into the whole economic and social development 
plans; State takes economic and technological policies and measures favor environmental protection in 
order to co-ordinate it with economic construction and social development. See: Environmental 
Protection Law of China, 1989 version.  
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rank of environmental issues in the political agendas. In the early 1990s, the concept of 
“sustainable development (SD)” had been introduced to China, promoting the 
environmental issues to be reconsidered, beyond its traditional meaning as only a 
dimension of economic development1. In 1992, the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development was held in Rio de Janeiro, and as the outcome, the global action plan 
“Agenda 21”2 signed in the conference adapted the SD concept to the areas in which 
human actions would directly affect the environment. For this concept commonly 
familiar to today’s Chinese people, the most widely recognized definition may be the 1987 
Brundtland Report released by UN as3: 
 
(S)ustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs. It contains within it two key concepts: 
 the concept of 'needs', in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, 
to which overriding priority should be given; and  
 the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social 
organization on the environment's ability to meet present and future 
needs. 
 
Factually, it’s not difficult to understand that the concept of SD had been purposed on 
the compromise between the developed countries exceeding the industrialization where 
the modern environmentalism had been derived, and the developing countries who had 
been appealing for their right of the development with the inevitable environmental 
degradation and resources waste. The concept both emphasized the necessity of 
environmental and social care as well as the economic increase, and didn’t clearly limit 
the development right without strict rules or punishment regimes for mandatory 
environmental protection responsibilities. The concept even can be taken to frame the 
field in which interest groups with totally different purposes can set their own agendas 
                                                        
1 Palmer, “Environmental Regulation in the People's Republic of China.” p. 791.  
2 See the full text in: http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21toc.htm  
3 See the full text in: http://worldinbalance.net/intagreements/1987-brundtland.php 
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according to the different needs, and further the concept itself can be framed by different 
players in their favorable styles1. According to David Pearce, the SD concept has at least 
four policy forms according to technique-oriented and ecology-oriented as scientific and 
technical optimism, environmental and technical coordination practice, local autonomy 
practice and deep green ecological practice2. And in political and social practice, the 
governmental and civil society has also chosen the focus dimensions according to their 
own preferences to set the special action agendas.  
After signing the Agenda 21, in 1992, the Chinese government formulated the “Ten 
Countermeasures to Environment and Development” to support the international 
regimes. On March 25 1994, China’s State Council passed the “China Agenda 21 
<zhongguo 21 shiji yicheng>” also named “White Paper Book on Population, 
Environment and Development for China’s 21st Century <zhongguo 21 shiji renkou, 
huanjing yu fazhan baipishu>”, which marked the formal adaptation of SD concept into 
the official discourses as the “highest-level ideology”3 in respect of development. It might 
have been the passive reaction to the international environmentalist pressure, because 
China had been urgent on its way to be accepted by the broad international regimes after 
the temporary block according to 1989’s political movement, especially while the national 
plan to enter the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) and its precedent World 
Trade Organization (WTO) had forced China to meet the environmental protection 
provisions4. It would be unreasonable to ignore the active efforts of Chinese central 
authority according to the domestic demand of upgrading environmental agendas. 
Besides the accumulating negative effects of economic increase, along with the fading 
out of the charismatic politicians, the new generation of authoritarian leaders5 had been 
more impressed by the “intensification of the environmental degradation found in 
                                                        
1 John S. Dryzek, The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses, Oxford University Press, 2005. 
p. 165.  
2 David Pearce, Blueprint 3: Measuring Sustainable Development, London: Earthscan, 1993. pp. 18-19. 
3 Guang Xia, “Judge the national willingness of environmental protection from the State Council 
‘decision’,” China Environment News, February 20, 2006.  
4 See: Palmer, “Environmental Regulation in the People's Republic of China.” and also Petra 
Christmann and Glen Taylor, Globalization and the Environment: Determinants of Firm Self-Regulation 
in China, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3. (3rd Qtr, 2001), pp. 439-458.  
5 The President Jiang Zeming and other top officials during the 1990s were generally 
known as “the third generation of core leadership <di san dai lingdao hexin> to 
distinguish from the charisma leaders of Mao Zedong as “the first generation” and Deng 
Xiaoping as the second. 
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prerevolutionary and Maoist China”1 led by the policies of decollectivization, 
decentralization and privatization. That’s not only because privatization have encouraged 
individuals to pursue maximum profit at the expense of environmental degradation, but 
also because decollectivization and decentralization have weakened the actual 
effectiveness of Central policies or guidelines on environmental issues. Since that the 
authoritarian leaders depended more on the institutional system than the charisma 
leaders like Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping to implement the national plan through the 
vast land with great regional differences. Thus, the poor practical management in dealing 
with environmental problems had made an indicator to demonstrate that the central 
authority had “little control” over the social relations and conflicts associated with 
different “local actors”, including peasant farmers, forest officials, entrepreneurs, local 
officials, and so on, who all had their own agendas, along with the rapid social 
transformation and political change2. In other words, the central authority had been 
faced with the dilemma that they couldn’t abandon the economic increase-oriented 
national strategy and the corresponding regimes of decollectivization, decentralization 
and privatization to encourage economic achievements of the local government or 
individuals, but the intensification of ecology and resources pressure challenging both the 
long-term national plan and the central capability of governance. Thus, we may conclude 
that the SD concept, which had been expected by the international society to apply into 
the national policies of populous country in a rapid economic increase, had also provided 
the Chinese central authority with the idea to balance the economic increase-orientation 
and the environmental concern, since the SD concept had left a great flexibility for 
agenda setting. And further, we can also judge from the adaptation of SD concept that the 
environmental concern of the government had led the public, which had been different 
from that in the developed democracies.  
Along with legislation of environmental agendas — during the 1990s, the general 
Environmental Law and several special laws on dealing with the water pollution, air 
                                                        
1 Joshua Muldavin, “The Paradoxes of Environmental Policy and Resources Management in Reform-Era 
China”, Economic Geography, Vol. 76, No. 3, (Jul., 2000), pp. 244-271. p. 244. 
2 Muldavin, “The Paradoxes of Environmental Policy and Resources Management in Reform-Era China”, 
p. 245. 
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quality, toxic chemicals, species conservation and so on had been formulated in China1 — 
the central authority had been also playing a active role in cultivating a capable special 
watchdog to integrate the environmental governance throughout the country, as part of 
the personnel reform and recentralization to strengthen the central control both launched 
in 19982. During the great central personnel reform of that year, the Environmental 
Protection Bureau (EPB) established in the early 1980s had been promoted into the State 
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA <guojia huanbao zongju>) as a 
semi-ministry sector to take the duties of “covering brown and green issues, policy 
making and monitoring, and co-ordination of environmental affairs across ministries3. 
SEPA then became the first sector to have “a clear mandate and incentive to protect the 
environment”4, according to the first director and vice director of SEPA. And further, a 
dialogue mechanism was established in 1999 to make the President, Premier, and other 
cabinet members to sit down annually to discuss the nation’s sustainability strategy, 
which clearly demonstrated the political support from the central authority, and implied 
the fundamental change in the position of environmental issues in the political agendas.  
2.3 “Scientific Development” and “Harmonious Society” Strategy 
During the 1990s, we had been demonstrated the change of environmental quality 
into a independent indicator of China’s development beyond purely a dimension of the 
economic growth, through the official adaptation of “sustainable development” into the 
national long-term plan, but it was still not enough to say the national willingness had 
really preferred to the “balance” between economic growth an environmental 
improvement. Because along with the economic reform of adapting some capitalist 
regimes for economic growth and the official reflection on past political movements, the 
Communist ideology which used to be the solid foundation for the legitimacy of the 
                                                        
1 See details in: Chinese State Council: “The White Paper Book on Chinese Environmental Protection,” 
published in June 2006. [http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2006-06/05/content_300288.htm] 
2 The recentralization had been taken in respect of both normative reform of the intergovernmental 
fiscal system to increase the central share in tax distribution, and the practice to weaken the deep-rooted 
local political gangs. See for example: Zheng Yongnian, De Facto Federalism in China: Reform and 
Dynamics of Central-Local, Singapore; Hackensack, N.J.: World Scientific, 2007. pp. 229-230, 258-263. 
and Ehtisham Ahmad, Li Keping, Thomas Richardson, and Raju Singh: “Rcentralization in China?” IMF 
Working Paper of the Fiscal Affairs Department, IMF, October, 2002. 
[http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp02168.pdf] 
3 UNDP: China Human Development Report 2002: Making Green Development to a Choice, pp. 75-76. 
4 Xie Zhenhua and Song Ruixiang, Speech at the Working Conference of the 1999 National 
Environmental Protection Affairs, document HF, no. 79. Beijing: SEPA. 1999.  
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Party-state had obviously become vulnerable from the late 1970s, thus, the second and 
the third generation of leadership had got to depend greatly on economic growth to 
upgrade people’s material life. And further, the economic growth had been believed to be 
the only “hard truth <ying daoli>” with the expectation that, so long as the continuing 
growth, all problems and public issues could be solved automatically1.   
Being faced with the wide range of problems from the systematic risks like the wealth 
gap, rural governance, poor social insurance or environmental degradation, to the 
complaints about slow improvement of living quality most by the urban people, like 
traffic, public security or residential conditions, the forth generation of leadership headed 
by Hu Jintao have set the concepts of “scientific development” and “harmonious society” 
to symbolize the new direction. The concepts had been prepared and formed during the 
first five years of the 21st century. In July 2003, Hu Jintao for the first time interpreted 
his view of development as “people-oriented <yiren weiben>” and “comprehensive, 
coordinating and sustainable <quanmian, xietiao, ke chixu>”. Fourteen months later, in 
the Third Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee of CCP, Hu formally used 
the concept of “scientific development” to interpret the policy platform of the forth 
generation leadership as insisting on: a) development as the first prerequisite for the 
Party’s career of governing and rejuvenating the nation-state; b) the people orientation; c) 
comprehensive, sustainable and coordinating developing mode; d) the integration of 
development and other social interests. And, on February 2005, at the Central Party 
School of the CCP Central Committee, Hu firstly elaborated on another concept to make 
the whole policy frameworks of “harmonious society”. From then, the importance to build 
the “harmonious society” had been paid great attention on the Chinese National People’s 
Congress (NPC) at the same year. The concept of “harmonious society” has been taken as 
an extension of “scientific development”, “in contrast to the ‘economics growth in 
                                                        
1 See: Chen Weixing, “Statecraft in an Era of Change: Building a Harmonious Society,” in in Hua 
Shiping and Guo Sujian ed., China in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges and Opportunities, 
Association of Chinese Political Studies. Meeting (19th: 2006: University of Louisville), 2007, pp. 13-24. 
And also see: Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993; Chen Weixing, “The performance Criteria of Legitimacy: the Transformation of 
the Chinese Communist Party from Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao,” Cross-Strait and International 
Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2004; Sun Yan, “Harmonious Society and the Approbation of the 
Legitimacy of the CPC’s Political Authority,” Journal of Huaihai University, Vo. 3, 2008; and Yang 
Kaihuang, New Deal: Political Change in the Hu Jintao Era <xinzheng: hujintao shidai de zhengzhi 
bianqian>, Haixia Xueshu Press, 2007.  
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command’ of the Jiang Zemin era”, and placing “emphasis on social justice and 
development for people”, as “a response” to the “eroded social solidarity and lack of 
harmony between the government and people, between the central government and local 
government, between the rich and the poor, between urban and rural residents, and 
between money-making institutions/organizations and consumers”1. It has been targeted 
at building the “democratic and law-based, fair and just, honest and fraternal, full of vigor 
and vitality, secure and orderly, and in which man and nature co-exist in harmony”2. In 
2007, “scientific development” and “harmonious society” was written into the CCP 
Consitution, formally making a crucial criterion to standardize behaviors of political 
elites.  
Environmental issues have been, as a critical factor, applied in the interpretation of 
“scientific” and “harmonious” owing to the terrible degradation situation and its wide 
influence on not only the economic sustainability but also the people’s welfare and social 
justice, which may lead to a social instability even to challenge the political legitimacy. 
Under the direction of “scientific and harmonious”, the leadership even established the 
special concepts of “resource-saving society <ziyuan jieyue xing shehui>” and 
“environment-friendly society <huanjign youhao xing shehui>”, to frame the 
environmental agendas as a “strategic” task of the long-term planning on national 
economic and social development.  
Under the set agenda framework, material measures have also been taken. The 
investment of the environmental protection has got a gradual increase — although the 
increase has been still slight to catch up with the degradation speed — during period of 
the Tenth Five Year National Plan on Economic and Social Development (2001-2005), 
the investment had firstly exceed 1% of GDP, in comparison with 0.93% of GDP during 
the Ninth Five Year Plan, and, it had grown to more than 1.5% during the Eleventh 
(2006-2010)3, especially, the investment of the central government had tripled that of the 
                                                        
1 Weixing Chen, “Statecraft in an Era of Change: Building a Harmonious Society,” p. 14. 
2 See the interpretations of “scientific development” and “harmonious society” in reference to: 
Zhongyang Wenxian Research Center: Selection of Important Literatures from the Sixteenth Central 
Committee <shiliuda yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian> Ⅰ,Ⅱ, Ⅲ,” Zhongyang Wenxian Express, 2005, 
2006, 2008. 
3 See: the answer of Zhang Lijun, Ministry of Environmental Protection, to the reporter on the press 
conference of the Forth session of the Eleventh NPC. [http://www.zijing.org/2011lh/html/126207.html] 
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Tenth to achieve the historically best record1. And further, mandatory administrative 
approaches had been taken to decrease the energy consumption per unit of GDP, to both 
save the insufficient natural resources and reduce the greenhouse gas emissions. At the 
same time, China has put special efforts to develop the potential of multiple clean and 
renewable energies, and, actively applied energy-saving and emission-reducing 
techniques. With the strong national will, coherent policies and little system cost to 
exclude the short-term market-orientation, China has made a high-speed increase in new 
energy development especially on wind, solar and new energy vehicles, while being a 
most active player of taking use of related international regimes to reduce emissions and 
update the technology. For example, China has been with the most accepted applications 
for the Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) programs—it is one of the "flexibility" 
mechanisms defined in the Kyoto Protocol to make developed countries to exchange the 
emission right from developing countries with the clean technology transfer—for 
greenhouse gas emission reduction and taken as the most beneficiary according to the 
strict government-led procedures2. 
And moreover, more radical measures have been included to imply the consistency of 
the environmental management with the political change. In 2008, SEPA, the 
quasi-ministry sector, was formally upgraded to the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection (MEP) to be entitled with more authority. And, in addition to the 
institutionalization of the environmental watchdog, another main modern element of 
“ruling by law” has been also applied into the environmental agendas. One of the most 
influential legislation might be the 2003 Environmental Impact Access Law (EIA Law), 
which has armed the environmental watchdog with the power to approve construction 
projects, as the weapon to counteract with profit-oriented departments and the local 
government3. And in addition, the Chinese government even took steps radical than 
developed countries, such like the pilot adaptation of green GDP to assess the 
                                                        
1 “Central governmental investment on environmental protection had achieved 156.4 billion yuan RMB 
during the Eleventh Five Year Plan <shiyiwu qijian zhongyang huanbao touru da 1564 yi yuan>,” 
People’s Daily, January 14, 2011. 
2 See details in: Chen Gang, Politics of China's environmental protection: problems and progress, 
World Scientific, 2009, pp. 110-112. 
3 This law has also been the trigger of several influential public issues, which will be discussed in details 
in next chapters. 
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achievements of local officials, in some counties and municipalities of the advanced east 
areas like Guangdong Province and Zhejiang Province1. Another even challengeable 
practice is the “Great Western Development Strategy” (xibu da kaifa zhanlue), the central 
development activity taking market-oriented approach to develop the underdeveloped 
western provinces, which has planned to offer the balanced merging growth and 
environmental protection beyond the pollute-firstly-clean-later development mode.  
 
3. Systematic Predicaments: Paradox between Consciousness and 
Institutional Guarantee 
However, the high-key announcement of “sustainable development” cannot hide the 
factual unbalance between the degree of concerns on “development” and “sustainability. 
It’s critical to be point that, although the history of the upgrade of the environmental 
agendas have been in accordance with China’s adaptation of the modern 
environmentalist frameworks derived in the developed democracies, it shouldn’t be 
over-interpreted that China’s has agreed to free the space of the economic growth to 
environmental concern. Early in the 1992 Rio de Janeiro UN Conference, China already 
strongly demonstrated its status of an “inflexible obstructionists” to the interpretation 
and policy frameworks of SD of the developed countries as sacrificing economic growth 
for the sake of environmental priority and insist that environmental protection only be 
effective under the attainment of development2. And, 17 years later, in the 2009 
Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change, China, allaying the developing counties, 
continued to boycott the advanced industrialized countries’ policy frameworks of put the 
mandatory emission reduction responsibility on both developed and developing countries, 
which was taken as equaling to deprive the developing countries of the possibility to 
achieve the same development achievements as the developed nations. It’s clear that, as 
long as China announces to be still in the “primary stage of socialism <shehui zhuyi chuji 
jieduan>” until the nation indentifies itself to achieve “the level of medium developed 
                                                        
1 See: Xu Hongwei, “Green GDP: What It Can Do and Can’t Do <lvse GDP, neng zuodao de he buneng 
zuodao de>,” in Wang Yongchen (ed.), Change: Investigation Report of Chinese Environmental 
Journalists <gaibian zhongguo huanjing jizhe diaocha baogao>, Beijing: Sanlian Sac, 2007. pp. 6-38.  
2 See: Elizabeth C. Economy, The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China's Future, 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004, pp. 98-99.  
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countries <zhongdeng fada guojia shuiping>”, the economic development is the core the 
whole political agendas. In other words, the upgrade of any political agendas has been 
limited under this principle. 
As demonstrated in figure-1, apart from the strong national willingness of EP at the 
central level, the eventual responsibilities are devoluted to different governmental 
departments and local officials, thus the decentralization and bureaucratic fragmentation 
have made the most serious institutional predicaments of China’s environmental 
governance, especially when the institutional mechanisms to obstruct EP career are 
originally designed to promote the economic growth. On one hand, with the 
decentralization, the degree of the law enforcement and central EP policy implement 
have been highly depending on the proclivities of individual officials according to the 
political culture of “rule by man <ren zhi>” and the resources the local government 
wishes to or can devote to1. On the other hand, the environmental department, as the 
non-profit sector, just lacked both administrative and legal leverages to coordinate with 
or counteract to the powerful development-oriented agencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 See for example, Economy, The River Runs Black, 2004, pp. 117-121; and Chen, Politics of China's 
environmental protection, 2009, pp. 22-28. However, there are also researches trying to find the 
positive meaning of decentralization in environmental governance in the respect of democratization, but 
it should be pointed that, according to the fact, under the existing political system, the decentralization 
has been playing a negative role, in comparison with the central activity, in protecting the environment. 
The efforts on pursuing the positive meaning can be seen in: Jesse Craig Ribot, Anne Jarson, European 
Association of Development Research and Training Institute, Democratic decentralization through a 
natural resource lense, Routledge, 2005; and Wu Changhua and Wang Hua, “China: Seeking 
Meaningful Decentralization to Achieve Sustainability,” in Albert Breton (ed.), Environmental 
governance and decentralization, pp. 397-435.  
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Figure 2-1: Vertical and Horizontal Institutional Settings of China’s Environmental Management System 
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3.1 Decentralization and the National Willingness of Anti-means 
3.1.1 Decentralization for the Sake of Economic Growth and Recentralization  
The policy implement of local officials may be the weakest link in the chain of China’s 
environmental protection according to the vested autonomy to local Party and 
government during economic reform, or decentralization. As Qi Ye, professor of Beijing 
Normal University, points out that the local Party and government, as a “reason 
behavior”, chooses to prefer economic increase to environmental benefits, because their 
political career depends greatly on it. And further, decentralization also means the local 
responsibility to deal with increasing burden of providing public services, which is 
challenging their financial ability. Thus, non-profit career, like environmental protection, 
is easy to be excluded from local important planning1. 
Different from the separation of warlords in ancient dynasties, Republic of China and 
even today’s many developing countries, the decentralization in contemporary China had 
been not derived from the powerlessness of the central authority, but was initiatively 
selected—at least approved and accepted—and even encouraged during certain periods by 
the central government, for the sake of economic growth. During Mao Zedong’s era, the 
feudal separation as the remains of ancient agricultural society was replaced, through the 
radical political approaches, by a wide network of hierarchically organized institutions, 
with centering on unchallenged power of several core leaders of both the Party and 
government, and strict limitation to the local freedom. This high-level centralization had 
brought the surprisingly development of heavy industry and modern infrastructure to 
China, but after completing its historical responsibility, the central planning, command 
economy and bureaucratic control had not only become a heavy burden for the center, 
but also repressed the economic and social vitality for further development. Thus, the 
decentralization “became the breaking point of China’s economic reform”2. Thus, the 
decentralization began in the area of fiscal system, special development zones especially 
the foreign trade system, real estate, land purchases and so on, which, to speak generally, 
                                                        
1 Ye Qi, Research on Environmental Supervision and Management System in China, Shanghai: Sanlian 
Bookshop Press, 2008. pp. 131-146.  
2 Jia Hao and Lin Zhimin, Changing Central-Local Relationships in China: Reform and State Capacity, 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1994. p. 3.  
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were all the factors for the sake of the “socialist market economy system construction 
<shehui zhuyi changchang jingji tizhi jianshe>”. Such reform actions, presented from the 
1980s to the middle 1990s, had shifted part of the control over resources to the local 
government and other local players, allowed the local government to share more of the 
economic growth fruits with the reduction of central intervenes in policy details, and 
strengthened the local financial capability1, making the decentralization process go far 
beyond the original economic intent into the political field with the decline of central 
authority on rule-making, policy enforcement and bureaucratic management. Until the 
middle 1990s, not only the increase of revenue sharing of the local government had been 
gradually changing the balance of central-local power 2 , but also the decline of 
comprehensive central control on the local political entity had been embedded in the 
political system beyond only incidental issue-oriented problems in certain places3.  
To stop the power decline and consolidate the central authority, the third generation 
of leadership headed by Jiang Zemin launched the recentralization means in Post-Deng 
era. As we mentioned in the section to look back the evolution of the national EP 
willingness, the application of “sustainable development” had been purposed on calm 
down the extensive form of economic exploitation of local governments, which used to be 
encouraged through decentralization during the initial stage of reform. It seemed very 
difficult because it was impossible for the central leadership to take the revolutionary 
approaches of Mao Zedong to centralize the authority, neither, the CCP, at that time, was 
                                                        
1 See more details in: David Bachman, “Implementing Chinese Tax Policy,” in David M. Lampton (ed.), 
Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China, Berkley: University of California Press, 1987; Shang Hong, 
“Tuidong Woguo Zhengzai JIngli zhedi Tizhi Bianqian <Promoting the On-going Institutional 
Changes>,” Jingji Yanjiu <Research on Economics>, No. 5. 1992; Jiang Xiaojun, “Shichang Yunzhuan 
Yu Zhengfu Zhineng Zhuanhuan <The Operational Efficiency of the Market and The Changes of 
Governmental Functions>,” Gaige <Reform>, No. 1. 1993, pp. 62-67; Wang Shaoguang, “The State, 
Market Economy, and Transition,” [http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/gpa/wang_files/state.pdf]; Jean C. Oi, 
“Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China,” World Politics, Vol. 
45, No. 1. October, 1992, pp. 99-126; Jia and Lin, Changing Central-Local Relationships in China, 1994; 
Zhang Leyin, “Chinese Central-Provincial Fiscal Relationshipss, Budgetary Decline and the Impact of 
the 1994 Fiscal Reform: An Evaluation,” The China Quarterly, No. 157. March, 1999, pp. 115-141; and 
Amako Satoshi, Structural Change of Modern China Ⅳ: Political Map of Central-Local relationships, 
Tokyo University Press, 2000, pp. 78-92.  
2 See for example: Wang Shaoguang, “The Rise of the Second Budget and the Decline of State Capacity: 
The Case of China,” in Andrew G. Walder (ed.), The Political Consequences of Departures from Central 
Planning: Economics Reform and Political Change in Communist States, Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1995; and Barry Naughton, “The Decline of Central Control over Investment in 
Post-Mao China,” in Lampton (ed.), Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China. 
3 Amako Satoshi, Structural Change of Modern China Ⅳ: Political Map of Central-Local relationships, 
Tokyo University Press, 2000. p. 89.  
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unable to reconcile the growing localist tendency through “rule by law”, but China was 
still a unitary country, with its institutional hierarchy of the government and the 
Communist Party, making the approval of the central authority ranked the highest in a 
political elite’s career. Thus, the recentralization had been an institutional paradox, 
especially with regard to the consolidation of central personnel management on 
provincial leaders—as Bo Zhiyue mentioned, the public localism of provincial leaders had 
been rarely tolerated in comparison with that of lower-level officials identified with their 
birthplaces1—according to the elite politics of China and the growing importance of 
provincial leaders for the constant concern with regional economic development and 
coping with daunting challenges such as unemployment, economic issues, political 
instability and social welfare needs2. 
During the Jiang era, the fight with corruption used to be taken as the punishment to 
strike the localist and factionist tendency3, however, the approval of achievements had 
been the main point of the recentralization. On one hand, the avenues for various 
provinces to influence national policies in their favor had been legitimized by the 
representation in the Central Committee (CC) of CCP. The representation ratio of 
provincial leaders in the CC and its core organization, the Politburo, had increased along 
with the decentralization4, and, in the 16th CC in 2002, the last one of Jiang’s era, all 62 
provincial chiefs—Party secretaries and governors or mayors—secured full membership, 
with the Politburo including 20 members who have currently or previously served as top 
provincial leaders5. And further, the representation in Politburo demonstrated a sharp 
rise of the provincial share from 55 percent in 1992, to 68 percent in 1997, and then, to 82 
percent in 20026.  
                                                        
1 Zhiyue Bo, Chinese Provincial Leaders: Economic Performance and Political Mobility since 1949, 
Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2002. pp. 7-9.  
2 See: Cheng Li, “After Hu, Who? Provincial Leaders Await Promotion,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 
1. Winter 2002, pp. 1-20.  
3 See: Lowell Dittmer, “Leadership Change and Chinese Political Development,” Chu Yun-han, Lo 
Chih-cheng and Ramon H Myers (ed.), The New Chinese Leadership: Challenges and Opportunities 
after the 16th Party Congress, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 10-32. 
4 See: Bo, Chinese Provincial Leaders, 2002, pp. 19-27; and, Li Cheng and Lynn White, “The Sixteenth 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Hu Gets What?” Asian Survey, Vol. 43, 
July/August, 2003, pp. 572-573.  
5 Cheng Li, “Political Localism Versus Institutional Restraints: Elite Recruitment in the Jiang Era,” in 
Barry J. Naughton, and Yang Dali (ed.), Holding China together: diversity and national integration in 
the post-Deng era, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 29-69. p. 32.  
6 Ibid.  
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But, the recentralization indicated an imbalanced distribution of political power 
between rich and less advanced provinces, which had also institutionalized the 
development orientation. As Bo Zhiyue pointed, when the CC representation had showed 
the gradual growth of even distribution among all provinces, the provincial political 
power in the Politburo classified into elite and non elite provincial units, according to the 
economic resources, leading to the phenomenon that the larger and richer were more 
likely to have representation in the Politburo with a limited number of members, as well 
as they tended to produce more members of the CC1. And further, the economic condition 
diversity was compounded with the concrete economic performance — indicated by, for 
example, GDP growth, infrastructure construction, income level, debt ratio, and so on — 
of individual provincial leaders, to determine the revenue contributions of provinces to 
the centre, and have the close relations with provincial leaders’ political mobility2. 
Factually, the recentralized institution could be taken as the variant form of the cadre 
evaluation system on political achievements <ganbu zhengji kaohe>. Having been 
carried out from the revolutionary ear to determine the political career of CCP cadres, the 
evaluation system had turned its focus from the ideological and political loyalty to the 
economic indicators. Besides the evaluation on provincial leaders, there have also been 
abundant researches on the application of this system in controlling the lower and 
grass-root level officials, with the institutional promise for them to share economic 
benefits and to maintain the stability of their bureaucratic position3.  
This paradoxical institutional design of central-local relations and cadre 
achievements evaluation system led to — from the behavioral prospective rather than the 
constitutional respect — the characteristic of “de facto feudalism”4, or, we may say that 
                                                        
1 Bo, Chinese Provincial Leaders, 2002, pp. 11-12, pp. 24-27.   
2 Ibid, pp. 136-143. And also see: Li Hongbin and Zhou li-an, “Political Turnover and Economic 
Performance: the Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China,” Journal of Public Economics, 2005, vol. 
89, issue 9-10, pp. 1743-1762; and Zhang Xiaobo, "Fiscal decentralization and political centralization in 
China: Implications for growth and inequality," Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 34(4), 
December 2006, pp. 713-726. 
3 Susan H. Whiting, “The Cadre Evaluation System at the Grass Roots: The Paradox of Party Rule,” in 
Naughton and Yang, Holding China together, pp. 101-119.  
4 See: Zheng, Yongnian: De Facto Federalism in China: Reforms and Dynamics of Central-Local, 
Singapore; Hackensack, N.J.: World Scientific, 2007. pp. 32-72. And, for international comparison, see: 
Pranab Bardhan, “Decentralization of Governance and Development,” The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 16, No. 4. Autumn 2002, pp. 185-205; and Jonathan Rodden, “Comparative 
Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and Measurement,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4. 
July, 2004, pp. 481-500.  
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was like the central-local factual privities of fiscal recentralization and political 
centralization. It implied that according to the passes of huge mass mobilization and 
ideological stimulation of Mao’s era for industrialization, the successors seriously 
depended on the initiative efforts of local officials, instead of the “people’s power 
<renmin de liliang> of Mao’s ideal. The local officials had been allowed to have 
substantial influence over the local economy by not only controlling key economic 
resources, but also the high freedom of making economic policies such as taxation, 
government spending and so on. And moreover, for the sake of economic growth, the 
centre even, as the case might be, tolerated the wrongdoings such as rent-seeking, 
corruption, crazy resource exploitation without considerations of consequences, and so 
on. However, when the central government considered it necessary to upgrade the rank 
of non-profit-oriented problem domains in the political agendas, the contradiction 
between the centre and the local government would certainly be given highlights.  
3.1.2 Reform of Cadre Evaluation System for the Environmental Protection 
Into the late 1990s, with the growing national willingness of EP, SEPA was 
established, but its factual capability to enforce policies and take effective supervision had 
been greatly limited according to the decentralization. And, SEPA officials have seemed 
not to be willing to hide their complaints. In an interview with a most active 
environmental journalist, the deputy general of SEPA, Pan Yue, clearly pointed the “main 
reason for the durative environmental deterioration” as the result of “the corruptive deal 
between some officials and enterprises” in accordance with “local officials’ wrong hunger 
for economic development as achievements to help their political career”1. In details, as 
Pan Yue Judged, the “corruptive deal” meant that2, 
 
On one hand, some local governments have viewed the crazy construction of 
large-scale heavy industrial projects as the easiest approach to obtain 
political benefits in the short term, and on the other hand, some enterprises, 
                                                        
1 Jianqiang Liu, “The ‘special interests’ destroying China’s environment,” Dialogue (Net Journal), 
January, 2007. 
[http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/ch/715-The-special-interests-destroying-China-s-e
nvironment] 
2 Liu, “The ‘special interests’ destroying China’s environment,” 
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with the approval of the officials, have occupied the resources and 
environment belonging to the public for their selfish interests, in the rude 
mode of exploitation without the consideration of bad consequences. This 
phenomena not only has interference with the exercise of the national macro 
adjustment and control of policies, but also infringe the public rights, which 
may lead to the social instability”.  
 
But no matter how the “deal” was disgust by SEPA officials, it was hardly possible, 
only within the ability of the environmental watchdog, to bring any changes. Because, 
besides the poor institutional resources of SEPA to influence the local policies—it will be 
discussed in the next section—it had to be admitted that although the decentralization 
and privatization encouraging individuals to pursue maximum profit at the 
environmental expense had led to the “intensification of the environmental degradation 
found in prerevolutionary and Maoist China”1, it had been commonly recognized as the 
“necessary badness” for rapid economic growth. That means, the non-profit-oriented 
environmental priority of SEPA couldn’t get enough legitimacy until the central 
government made the decision to break the traditional privities between the center and 
the local government based on economic growth, in other words, to reform the contents 
of the recentralization regimes.  
The years from 1999 to 2005 had witnessed the national efforts to improve the cadre 
evaluation system, which used to mainly encourage the local economic achievements 
during the reform era, with the addition of environmental indicators into the evaluation 
criteria to influence the political career of local officials, in order to integrate the national 
will and local enforcement. After the long-time preparation and examination from 1999, 
the State Council, in December 2005, published the “Decision on Carrying out Scientific 
Development Concept and Promote Environmental Protection <guanyu luoshi kexue 
                                                        
1 Joshua Muldavin, “The Paradoxes of Environmental Policy and Resources Management in Reform-Era 
China”, Economic Geography, Vol. 76, No. 3, (Jul., 2000), pp. 244-271. p. 244.  
This article also pointed central policies had “little control” over the social relationships and conflicts 
associated with different “local actors”, including peasant farmers, forest officials, entrepreneurs, local 
officials, and so on, who all have their own agendas. Thus, The social transformation has been too 
profound, rapid and contradictory that it’s quite difficult to identify the root structural causes of 
environmental vulnerability.  
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fazhan guan jiaqiang huanjing baohu de jueding>,” to emphasize the EP achievement 
indicator as1, 
 
To adapt environmental protection into the important contents of 
achievement assessment on local leaders, as a foundation for the choice, 
appointment, rewards and punishments of cadres. To stick to and improve the 
responsibility system for EP accomplishments at various governmental levels 
and establish the regular system for annual EP goal setting, assessment and 
the transparency of assessment result. To make EP accomplishment the 
indispensable requirement in choosing the excellent. To offer special 
commendation and rewards to those individuals or units with prominent 
contributions to EP, to set up the system of EP accountability so as to manage 
the obstacle to environmental law enforcement derived from regional 
protectionism, and call to the account of the cadres and officials who are 
responsible for heavy environmental accidents according to decision-making 
errors, or have the serious interference with valid law enforcement.  
 
This reform was placed high hopes at its birth, for the contents, at the least, created 
the possibility that an official’s political career would be vetoed by the one note of EP 
effects. Thus, it was even described by the Central Party Paper as “a milestone in China's 
environmental protection history” 2. Even though, according to the Premier Wen Jiabao 
in a high-level government meeting on April 17, to actually force the EP efforts to be 
factored into the performance assessment of governmental officials would still be in 
“future”3, we can also see the environmental indicators have already been accepted by 
local governments who are economically advanced and without seriously-polluted 
industries. For example, the Shenzhen Municipal Government, who has abundant 
                                                        
1 State Council Document No. 39 (2005), “Decision on Carrying out Scientific Development Concept 
and Promote Environmental Protection <guanyu luoshi kexue fazhan guan jiaqiang huanjing baohu de 
jueding>,” Article 31. [http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2005-12/13/content_125680.htm] 
2 “Wen Jiabao says the environmental protection should be place as a more important strategy 
<wenjiabao: ba huanjing baohu ba zai geng zhongyao de zhanlue weizhi>,” People’s Daily, April 19, 
2006.  
3 Ibid.  
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economic resources to manage environmental problems with the will to share the EP 
criteria and experiences of developed countries and areas1, or cities depending on the 
tourism resources, like Hangzhou Municipality2.  
3.2 Bureaucratic Fragmentation and the Predicaments of Environmental 
Watchdog 
The environmental department has been much late given the formal status of the 
political system, and its rise within the bureaucratic hierarchy “mirrors the rise in the 
importance of environmental protection within the Chinese government”3. In 1973, the 
State Council set the environmental protection leading team and the office firstly to 
specialize the EP concern. Despite of its being directly guided by Premier Zhou Enlai, it 
was only a temporary institution out of formal establishment. The institution was 
replaced, in 1982, by the formal Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) under the 
Ministry of Urban-rural Construction. Two years later, the State Council added another 
ad hoc committee for EP, with the members of a vice Premier in charge and the relevant 
ministers. In 1988, EPB was separated from the Ministry of Construction to become a 
vice-ministerial department directly under the State Council supervision. And, after a 
decade in 1998, with the disestablishment of the State Council EP committee, EPB was 
upgraded to a semi-ministerial department named State Environmental Protection 
Administration. The SEPA had experienced the decade of fighting for factual influence, 
and in 2008, was given the ministerial status to be Ministry of Environmental Protection 
(MEP). 
According to the evolution of the environmental department, we may find that as in 
charge of the non-profit area of EP, either the establishment of formal status or the 
upgrade progress had always been posterior to the evolution steps of 
Development-oriented departments, making its lower rank and weak power in the 
bureaucratic hierarchy. The establishment of SEPA might be the turning point, for 
                                                        
1 The details of the adaptation of EP achievements evaluation in Shenzhen, see in reference to: Report of 
ASH Center, Harvard University, “Environment Protection Performance Evaluation in Shenzhen, 
China,” [http://www.innovations.harvard.edu/cache/documents/17522/1752207.pdf] 
2 Dai Guoqing and Teng Weili, “Performance Evaluation at Local Government Department Level in 
china: A Case of People’s Municipal Government of Hangzhou,” 
[http://www.ceauk.org.uk/2008-conference-papers/Weili-Teng-China-government-performance.doc]  
3 Economy, The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China's Future, p. 106. 
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entitling the environmental watchdog political legitimacy, as a semi-ministry, to 
coordinate the fragmented environmental governance system and compound interests 
among governmental departments between the center and the locality1. But it doesn’t 
mean the environmental department had obtained the factual capability to counteract 
with the economic orientation for several institutional factors. Since the eventual effects 
of “Ministry of Environmental Protection” only established in 2008 are still to be 
examined, what we can make sure is that during the decade from 1998 to 2008, there had 
been a number of institutional factors, especially the poor staffing and policy instruments, 
to limit SEPA’s capability. 
3.2.1 SEPA as Newcomer without full fledge 
Apart from the administrative upgrade of EP department, the environmental 
responsibility was still shared by relevant agencies and players according to the 
fragmentation, depending on the issue. In other words, the setting duty of SEPA was 
mainly the “coordination” in accordance with the initiative cooperation of the others, 
rather than the authority to force environmental priority. For example, under the 
pressure of WTO membership negotiation including questions regarding China’s 
environmental protection and related legal system for the international trade 
surrounding, not only the legislation of EP regimes had been accelerated, but also the 
development-oriented agencies, such as the State Economic Trade Commission (SETC), 
Ministry of Commerce and other special industrial agencies, had initiatively, while 
cooperating with SEPA, contributed to setting strict industrial standards, supervision on 
local enforcement and promotion of cleaner technologies2. In contrast, there were also 
failure instances. From 2004 to 2006, according to the directive of central leaders, SEPA 
and the National Bureau of Statistics held a joint research on “Green GDP Accounts” and 
published the Chinese Green GDP Account Report 2004 <zhongguo lvse guomin jingji 
                                                        
1 See: Abigail R. Jahiel, “The contradictory impact of reform on environmental protection in China,” The 
China Quarterly, No. 149, (Mar., 1997), pp. 81-103. and also see in reference to: Qi, Research on 
Environmental Supervision and Management System in China. 
2 See details in: Ross, “China: Environmental Protection, Domestic Policy Trends, Patterns of 
Participation in Regimes and Compliance with International Norms,”; Richard J. Ferris Jr. and Zhang 
Hongjun, “The Challeges of Reforming an Environmental Legal Culture: Assessing the Status Quo and 
Looking at Post-WTO Admission Challenges fro the People’s Republic of China,” a paper presented at 
PACE, 2000; Richard J. Ferris Jr., Wu Changhua and John Barlow Weiner, “Environmental 
Implications of China’s Accession to the WTO: Preliminary Policy and Law Considerations,” Bridges 
Between Trade and Sustainable, December 3, 2000; and also Economy, The River Runs Black, p. 106. 
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hesuan yanjiu baogao> in September 2006. But the two agencies conflicted “in 
antagonistic interests” 1  in the further adaptation of this indication to evaluate 
environmental cost and development quality. SEPA demonstrated much greater 
activeness, rather than the Bureau of Statistics who took SEPA as “ignoring the 
complexity (of factual enforcement)2. As a result, although some advanced prefectures in 
Guangdong and Zhejiang Provinces had some tests of the pilot indicators, it finally hadn’t 
developed into the government mandate. Besides the “technically immaturity” even 
admitted by SEPA — there even hadn’t been precedents of wide applications in 
industrialized democracies — the difficult coordination among the bureaucracy was also 
an impressive factor. As an administer of the Bureau of Statistics complained to mass 
media, he though it “unfair” to take promoting the green GDP indicator only as “the 
achievement of one department (SEPA)”, but ignore its characteristic of “comprehensive 
program” to involve the “cooperative efforts” of “relevant agencies including statistics, 
agriculture, forestry, water resources, EP and so on”3. The statement clearly implied the 
failure of bureaucratic coordination, which SEPA was designed to achieve in the system.  
3.2.2 Shortage of Administrative Leverages as an Understaffed Department 
Another factor to limit SEPA capability is the poor staffing and the shortage of 
administrative leverages at both central and local level. At the central level, as the cost for 
the administrative upgrade, the 1998 organization reform reduced half of the staff of 
SEPA, from 600 to 3004, with only 240 being stationary5, in comparison with the 6000 
employees of U.S. EPA headquarters during the same period6. And in addition, the 
disestablishment of the State Council EP committee deprived the environmental 
department of an important channel for regular communication among political leaders 
and ministers, although a dialogue mechanism among the leaders was established in 
                                                        
1 Hongwei Xu, “Green GDP: What Can Do and What Cannot,” in Yongchen Wang (ed.), Change: Chinese 
Environmental Journalists Investigation Report 2006 <zhongguo huanjing jizhe diaocha baogao 
2006>, Beijing: Sanlian Shudian Press, 2007. pp. 6-38. p. 23.  
2 Xu, “Green GDP: What Can Do and What Cannot,” p. 23.  
3 Xu, “Green GDP: What Can Do and What Cannot,” pp. 24-25. 
4 Economy, The River Runs Black, p. 107. 
5 UNDP: China Human Development Report 2002: Making Green Development to a Choice, 76. 
6 Zhang Hongjun and Richard J. Ferris Jr., Shaping an Environmental Protection Regime for the New 
Century: Environmental Law and Policy in the People’s Republic of China,” Asian Journal of 
Management, Hong Kong University, May 1998. 
[http://www.sageontheweb.com/protected/documents/china_RT_english/Publications/Shaping_Envi
ronmental_Protection_Regime_Asian_Journal_Mgmt_05.1998.pdf] 
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1999 to compensate for the defect.  
On the other hand, at the local level, to deal with the decentralization and devolution 
of environmental governance, as mentioned in the last section, there were Environmental 
Protection Bureaus ranged from provincial level governments to county/district-level 
governments to implement SEPA directives according to the national integration and 
coordinate relevant local agencies. But SEPA hadn’t had effective control over its local 
branches, because it was not SEPA but the local government to provide the EPBs with 
their “annual budget funds”, approve “institutional advancements in rank”, determine 
“increases in personnel” and allocate “resources such as cars, office buildings, and 
employee housing”1, among which, the lack of personnel decision power—SEPA was only 
permitted with limited participation in the selection of EPB heads2—had been judged as 
the most critical obstacle3. Thus, as the environmental priority was originally not 
welcome by development-oriented local officials and the SEPA even had been criticized 
ironically as “an environmental policeman”4 trying to limit economic growth, when a certain 
EP directive contradicted with local development policies or other federal interests, it 
would be natural for EPB officials to suspend or even abandon the enforcement.  
3.2.3 Difficult Promotion of Legal Leverages 
Finally, when SEPA tried to break the bureaucratic limitation which obstructed its 
medium-and-long-term plans and even implement of routine duties with the under 
staffing, especially to take the “ruling by law” beyond weak administrative approaches, it 
was then confronted with strong resistance from the development-oriented agencies. A 
very clear instance may be the legislation and implement of “Law of the People's Republic 
of China on the Environmental Impact Assessment” (EIA Law). This bill draft was 
submitted to National People’s Congress for consideration, on the purpose of mandatory 
assessment on the environmental impact of industrial development and natural resource 
utilization through legal leverages, and further to evaluate the “general policies and 
                                                        
1 Chen, Politics of China's environmental protection, 2009. p. 22.  
2 UNDP: China Human Development Report 2002: Making Green Development to a Choice, p. 76. 
3 See: “As SEPA deputy general Pan Yue pointed, environmental problems will be solved when the 
problem of bureaucracy being solved <panyue: guan de wenti jiejue le, huanbao wenti jiu dou jiejue 
le>,” News Morning, July 4, 2007.  
4 China Human Development Report 2002, p. 77. 
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planning having environmental impacts”1. In other words, this law, if with the full 
implement, would legalize the determination power of the environmental sector in the 
program policymaking, limiting the power of economic development-oriented 
departments, and in addition, change the position of SEPA from defense to initiative 
attack. Thus, as expected, except the support from two departments, all the other relevant 
ministries and committees of the State Council demonstrated the clear opposition, who 
insisted it “too radical in China to take environmental impact assessments on developing 
land, river and sea, on urban construction, on tourism, and on utilizing natural resources, 
even with undergoing the (complex) public hearing procedure” 2. The strong opposition 
from economic-oriented departments had “forced the draft consideration to be 
interrupted even for 20 months”3 until the great pressure of the national will intervened. 
However, the formal enforcement in September 1st 2003 didn’t naturally bring reversal, 
and SEPA then had to take great efforts, with both institutional and informal resources to 
realize its effectiveness, which will be discussed in details in later chapters.  
 
4. Demands of Informal Politics: Mobilization and Encouragement of 
Multiple Participations 
In accordance with the disadvantaged position in the bureaucratic system, it would be 
natural for SEPA to become a most active advocator of absorbing the mature 
participation regimes of developed democracies into China’s policymaking procedures, 
partly in order to dilute the power of profit-orientation. The deputy general, Pan Yue, 
who was both the power-holder and the representative innovationist, used to write an 
article in a most important academic journal of CCP to discuss and strengthen the 
ideological orthodox to say4,  
 
                                                        
1 The interpretation of the Vice director of Environment and Resource Protection Committee, NPC, on 
the Environmental Impact Assessment Law (draft), in “Environmental Impact Assessment Law (draft) 
is submitted for deliberation <huanjing yingxiang pingjia fa (cao’an) tiqing shenyi>,” China 
Environment News, November 23, 2000.  
2  “Environmental Impact Assessment Law (draft) is submitted for deliberation,” 
3 Shixin Liu, “Qu Geping says, Public hearing for environmental protection is to limit unscrupulous 
abuse of power sectors <qu qe ping: huanbao tingzheng jiu shi yao xianzhi quanli bumen 
weisuoyuwei>,” China Youth Daily, April 13, 2005.  
4 Yue Pan, “Public Participation in Environmental Protection,” Theory Front, No. 13, 2004, pp. 12-13. 
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The insufficiency of public participation and supervision regimes is a main 
cause of the disobedience to and the bad enforcement of EP laws…The 
government has the responsibility to promote the public participation through 
taking steps on the disclosure of environmental information to the public, the 
democratization of environmental policymaking, the construction of 
environmental litigation mechanisms, and the cooperation with 
non-governmental organizations.  
 
Coincidentally, pan’s superior, the SEPA leader, Zhou Shengxian, also expressed the 
similar opinion to the Party’s paper, People’s Daily that1, 
 
The governmental supervision on environmental protection must be combined 
with the public participation…The information on environmental quality, 
environmental management and environmental-related actions of enterprises 
should be publicized to protect citizens’ right to know. With regard to the 
development planning and the construction program which may influence the 
public environmental interests, it’s the governmental duty to hold the hearing 
and the public notification, in order to listen to the citizens’ views and accept the 
supervision of public opinion.  
 
The power structure of the reform era has become greatly different from that of Mao’s 
totalitarian system (Table 2-2 and 2-3), and the result is the formation of the “market 
society”. The political monopoly of resources has been replaced by the gradually 
formalized political control and the market-oriented resource distribution.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 Shengxian Zhou, “To actively construct ecological civilization <jiji jianshe shengtai wenming>,” 
People’s Daily, December 14, 2007. 
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TABLE 2-2: China’s Power Structure before 1978 
Objects of power Political realms Economic realms Public realms 
Subjects of power 
Political realms +++ +++ +++ 
Economic realms — — — 
Public realms — — — 
TABLE 2-3: China’s Power Structure of the transformed society in reform era 
Objects of power Political realms Economic realms Public realms 
Subjects of power 
Political realms +++ + ++ 
Economic realms — ++ + 
Public realms — — — 
Source: Kang Xiaoguang, Power Shift: Change of China’s Power Structure During the Transformation 
Period <quanli de zhuanyi: zhuanxing shiqi zhongguo quanli geju de bianqian>, Zhejiang People’s 
Press, 1999.  
 
Since the adaptation of public participation had been not only the general demand of 
the modern environmental governance, but also the special requirement of breaking 
through China’s institutional dilemma, it’s then necessary for us to analyze the practical 
conditions with regard to whether the society has contributed enough dynamics to 
improve the governance. Table 2-4 includes the national surveys sponsored by SEPA of 
the public awareness and participation practices with regard to the environmental 
protection respectively on 1999 and 2007, during the period of SEPA’s existence and 
continuous upgrade of governmental EP willingness, which implied the extent of the 
potential social support for SEPA.  
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Table 2-4 Main indicators of public environmental awareness in 1998 and 2007. 
Source:  SEPA, Ministry of Education, China Public Awareness Survey 1998 <zhongguo 
gongzhong huanjing yishi diaocha 1999>, Beijing: China Environmental Science Press, 
1999; and China Environmental Awareness Program, “2007 China Public Awareness 
Survey Report <2007 gongzhong huanjing yishi diaocha>,” sponsored by SEPA and 
practiced by Institute of Sociology, CASS, published on April 3, 2008. 
[http://www.chinaceap.org/download/8.pdf] 
 1999 Public Awareness Survey 
(7879 samples covering 31 provincial 
regions) 
2007 Public Awareness Survey 
(3001 samples covering 20 provincial 
regions) 
Environmental 
Awareness 
 56.7% of the interviewees took the 
environmental deterioration as “very 
serious” or “quite serious”.  
 But besides the feeling of the general 
environmental deterioration, only 
24.9% of the interviewees took the local 
environment conditions as being worse 
during the last five years, and only 
11.6% thought the conditions would get 
even worse. 
 The environmental deterioration was 
ranked in the fifth among 10 social 
problems of China, below social order, 
education, population control, and 
employment. 
 The most serious problems to draw 
interviewees’ attention were water 
pollution and air pollution. And, even 
34.8% of interviewees simply took the 
“environmental pollution 
management” as the “maintenance of 
clean and health environment”.  
 45% of interviewees disagreed with the 
argument of “slowing down the 
economic growth for environmental 
protection”, and 46% thought 
environmental deterioration was 
inevitable according to economic 
development.  
 77.4% of the interviewees took the 
environmental deterioration as “very 
serious” or “quite serious”, and 63.9% 
consider the environmental 
deterioration to have become the 
serious obstruction to influence China’s 
further development.  
 41.8% of the interviewees took the local 
environment conditions as “very” or 
“quite” serious. 
 The environmental deterioration was 
ranked in the forth among 13 social 
problems of China, below medical care 
system, employment, and income gap.  
 81.5% of interviewees indicated their 
concern on at least one environmental 
indicator, including water pollution, air 
quality, chemical rest, forest 
degeneration, and so on, while showing 
little awareness of concepts seemingly 
without the direct relations with the 
daily life of public, like greenhouse gas 
emission or biodiversity.  
 56.8% of interviewees considered 
environmental deterioration as 
inevitable according to economic 
development, 50% disagreed to lower 
the public living standards for 
environmental concern, and 32.7% 
took the upgrade of living standards 
prior to environmental protection.  
Willingness of 
participation in 
EP 
 As the “passive participation” of 
information reception, 79.2% of the 
interviewees mentioned watching 
 As the “passive participation” of 
information reception, 82% of the 
interviewees mentioned watching 
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related TV shows and radios, 41.4% 
mentioned the print media, 42.1% 
mentioned the channel of 
governmental propaganda (such as 
leaflets, public billboards, and so on), 
and 27.8% mentioned the propaganda 
in working units (mostly in accordance 
with the governmental orders).  
 In comparison with the low “active 
participation” ratio of only 8.3%, most 
of the interviewees considered the EP 
career simply as the governmental 
responsibility. And among them, as 
many as 64% of interviewees had very 
few information of the governmental 
EP measures. 86% of interviewees 
considered the main cause of pollution 
as the lax law enforcement, and 66% 
mentioned the responsibilities of 
enterprises. However, 49% felt satisfied 
with governmental EP measures. 
 In comparison with the complaints 
about law enforcement, fewer than 4% 
of the interviewees expressed the 
willingness of directly complaining to 
the government or appealing to 
juridical procedurals. However, 44% 
chose to directly negotiate with the 
polluters.  
 Only 25% of interviewees had thought 
about EP factors in shopping, 35% 
agreed to accept the higher prices for 
the environmental concern, and, 30% 
had consider the environmental moral 
in the waste disposal.  
related TV shows and document films, 
47.3 mentioned the print media, 25.3% 
mentioned listening to the radio, and 
17.9% mentioned the acceptance of EP 
leaflets.  
 As the “active participation”, only 
18.1% of interviewees had experiences 
of participating in related public service 
activities, 4.2% had experiences of EP 
propaganda, and 2.1% was or had used 
to be NGO members at that time.  
 When the EP responsibility was 
mentioned, interviewees ranked, from 
high to low, as local governments, 
enterprises, the central government, 
individuals, mass media and NGOs. 
59.9% felt satisfied with the central 
governmental measures, in comparison 
with the 66.3% feeling unsatisfied with 
the local governmental measure and 
the 67.3% unsatisfied with the 
enterprises’ legal offenses leading to 
pollution. 
 The environmental protection had also 
become a concern of interviewees’ daily 
life. And, the daily EP actions were 
mainly those with the direct relations 
with the decrease of living expenses 
and the health, included saving 
water/natural gas/electricity (89.6%), 
abandoning the use of paper festival 
cards (84.1%) and smoking cessation in 
public places (53.4%). On the other 
hand, those without the direct relations 
had drawn less attention, such as 
abandoning the use of plastic shopping 
bags  (22.1%), abandoning the use of 
disposable tableware (32.8%), use of 
recycle paper (37.2%), putting used 
batteries into special recovery 
containers (38.6%), choosing the 
organic food despite of the higher 
prices ( 39.3%), and so on. 
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According to the comparison of several similar indicators of the two surveys, we can 
see the obvious upgrade of the public environmental awareness. Firstly, the ratio of 
interviewees who recognized the serious environmental deterioration had jumped from 
56.7% to 77.4%, with an approximate multiplication of those who worried about the local 
conditions. Secondly, the environmental problem had maintained as an important factor 
for the public to judge the quality of governance. And moreover, the surveys 
demonstrated the public’s growing knowledge of environmental protection. from the 
limitation to “environmental pollution management” as the “maintenance of clean and health 
environment” to covering the extensive indicators of water pollution, air quality, chemical 
rest, forest degeneration, and so on, while showing little awareness of concepts seemingly 
without the direct relations with the daily life of public, like greenhouse gas emission or 
biodiversity. But under the general economic orientation of the market society, the public 
commonly disagreed with the priority of environmental protection to economic growth, and 
the attitudes hadn’t changed during the decade. It might imply that neither the state nor the 
society had found the better industrialization approach rather than the 
“pollute-firstly-manage-secondly” mode.  
On the contrary to the promoting environmental awareness, the surveys showed us the 
insufficiency of the public’s participation in environmental protection. While passively 
receiving the relative information mainly through the mass media, most of the interviewees 
had been willing to judge the environmental protection as mainly the governmental 
responsibility, and the 2007 survey, with more detailed survey indicators, showed more public 
complaints to the local governmental rather than the central government. On one hand, the 
surveys showed a great leap of people’s actions in caring about the environmental factors 
directly related to the family health and daily living surroundings, such as saving 
water/natural gas/electricity, abandoning the use of paper festival cards and smoking 
cessation in public places, with paying less attention to those having fewer direct relations. 
But on the other hand, the positive actions to defend people’s environmental rights—such as 
juridical procedures, affording public services, participating in NGO activities, and so on—had 
been quite rare.  
Judged from the two aspects — the upgrade of public concern on environmental 
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quality and the shortage of participation willingness and practice — of the analysis, there 
are two crucial points for this study. On one hand, the increasing environmental demands 
of the public led to increasing pressure on the government, but also constructed the 
validity of strengthening policymaking and enforcement. Especially, the specialized 
design of the 2007 survey—it divided the “public satisfaction with the government” 
indicator into that with “the central government” and “the local 
government”—demonstrated the majority of satisfaction with the center, in comparison 
with the 66.3% ratio of interviewees unsatisfied with the local government, which 
corresponded the strong EP willingness of the centre and the relatively poor enforcement 
of most local governments. Such result undoubtedly confirmed the justice of the 
environmental department to fight the economic orientation, according to the orthodox 
of the Party-state to “serve the people”. On the other hand, the surveys indicated that 
common people had rarely taken EP actions mainly for the private life rather than 
participating into the public sphere, and preferred to leave the main responsibility to the 
government. It means, the political structural change, as the unconscious effects of the 
marketization, hadn’t naturally led the people to get aware of their real power and 
responsibility to reconstruct the reality, and more important, led the Party-state to timely 
develop and formalize the public participation channels for the problem resolution. In 
other words, the resources of the public realms hadn’t been fully developed for 
environmental governance. Thus, it would be both the challenge and opportunity for the 
environmental department to mobilize the resources for the environmental priority. 
However, the political structural change had made it impossible for the direct mass 
mobilization—for example, the campaign against four pests <si hai> launched in the 
1950s to eliminate rats, bedbugs, flies and mosquitoes seriously troubling people’s health 
and the agricultural industry at that time—through large-scale campaigns based on the 
political organizations from top to bottom. As the substitute, the mobilization of the 
modern state to integrate social resources should be “embedded” in social factors, and, as 
will be discussed in the next chapter, the growing civil society, with the special 
characteristics different from its counterparts in developed democracies, will become 
another piece of the “embedded mobilization” jigsaw, when they are trying to take their 
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political ties as the shortcut to apply environmental priority and democratic ethics into 
policymaking while they are “selected” by political authority as the “social units” to 
embed power.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 84
Chapter Three 
“Social Units” for Embeddedness: 
Environmental NGO Activism and the Case of Wild Conservation 
 
During the 1990s, although the environmental degradation had already made a big 
problem of China, it hadn’t been given a high rank in the political agendas, as introduced 
in last chapter. The direct financial investment in environmental governance had only 
been 0.69% to 1% of the annual GDP, in comparison with the 1.5% average in developed 
countries1. And, the gap between the serious environmental pressure and the absence of 
effective governmental measures had then created the space for the new-born 
environmental NGOs, who attempted to invoke the social mobilization just as the 
non-governmental entities had been doing in the developed democracies. Of Course, the 
great efforts of these weak NGOs, with little resources under the authoritarian political 
system to play the active role as policy entrepreneurs in environmental issues, can be 
interpreted as the fabulous growth of China’s civil society to challenge the control of the 
political authority. However, we may also see that, although the environmental NGOs had 
taken foot into fringe agendas where the governmental ability was not enough, they 
hadn’t set their purpose beyond the general line of the Party-state, and further, the 
practical effects of their activities on related policies had greatly depended on the 
attitudes of the government, or even benefited from their formal identity in the political 
system. And, on the other side, the governmental attitudes had depended on what the 
environmental NGOs could have done to supplement the governmental insufficiency in 
dealing with environmental problems, for example, the financial difficulty and the 
shortage of supervision on the local governmental misdoings. Thus, the formation of 
environmental NGOs had also made the windows of opportunity for the “embedded 
mobilization” by the political authority and the environmental watchdog. 
1. Fringe NGOs participate in fringe political agendas 
1.1 New-Born environmental NGOs and Their Discovery 
It was commonly accepted that the first environmental NGO of China is Friends of 
                                                        
1 Huansheng Lu and Honggui Gao, “The Status of Quo and Analysis of Environmental Protection in 
China <zhongguo huanbao touzi xianzhuang ji fenxi>,” Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics 
and Law, 2004 (6).  
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Nature (FON)1, started in 1993 (some argued in 1994). The organization was established 
by Liang Congjie, both a historian and member of Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC), with his parents, Liang Sicheng and Lin Huiyin, being well-known 
architects of great consequences and grandfather, Liang Qichao, a most famous 
innovationist and thinker in the end of Qing Dynasty. Liang and his comrades, Yang 
Dongping, Liang Xiaoyan and Wang Lixiong, made the first core group of FON. Among 
them, Yang Dongping is an experts on education and social culture; Liang Xiaoyan used 
to be a college teacher but lost the job after participating in the Tian’anmen movement in 
1989 and then became active in press and mass media; and, Wang Lixiong is a radical 
free-lancer whose ideas, especially those on the central government-Tibet relations, are 
difficult to be accepted by the main stream opinion of China.  
By judging from the establishers of the first and most influential environmental NGO, 
we may find the differences of their identity from that of their counterparts’ in developed 
democracies. On one hand, quite before the establishment of FON, they all had early been 
political dissidents with liberalistic thinking under totalitarian and the following 
authoritarian system, rather than specific environmentalists. Liang Congjie, who carried 
the literary family tradition by becoming a historian, had suffered like other intelligentsia 
during the long political movement from the 1950s to the 1970s, and he, like his 
well-known father, had always sorrowed for damages on historic relics caused by the 
rapid industrialization in China. Yang Dongping, with his numerous social titles, was an 
active critic of China’s existing educational system, arguing it to be obstacles to 
independent thinking. Liang Xiaoyan’s democratic consciousness was a sufferer of 1989 
Tian’anmen tragedy, only 4 years before the establishment of FON. Among them, Wang 
had been the one to go the farthest beyond environmental protection from then on. 
According to his books banned in the mainland of China, his interest in environmental 
protection might be closely related with his desire to keep Tibet—for the environmental 
surroundings, for the religion or for the people’s original living style—far from 
modernization. His stubborn attachment to “Tibetan independence” had made him 
                                                        
1 Another green NGO, Larussaundersi Protection Association, located in Liaoning Province, also 
claimed to be the first green NGO in China (established in 1991), but, for the comparison of influence, 
FON is commonly accepted as the first one.  
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ranked in the most radical and unacceptable dissidents of China. And in addition, before 
the establishment of FNO, none of the founders had set foot in environmental protection 
area. According to Liang Congjie, who is respected of the “spirit guider” of China’s public 
environmental protection, all his related knowledge had been learnt since FON was put 
into work1. But what had made them transform into environmentalists? The answer 
might be, also according to Liang Congjie, because in China, the public was forced to 
accept “policies and ruled well done by the government only”, but “the experience of 
democracies (on environmental problems)” would be “pushing governmental policies by 
the public” 2 . Thus, FON was expected to, by utilizing the experiences of social 
environmental movement in developed democracies, “to promote governmental policies 
and supervise them outside the system”3. We may read from his implication that, after 
the radical liberalistic conflicts with the political system from the late 1970s, especially 
after the Tian’anmen tragedy, some dissidents had turn to more moderate and 
self-possessed approaches, by promoting public participation in some fringe policy 
agendas like environmental protection, to achieve their set target of democratization and 
liberalization. However, their target had also become mature, from emphasizing severe 
change limited in political sphere to advocating an integration of “small government and 
big society”. The unconscious change of dissidents might also indicate that the 
Party-system had gradually loosened its control on society4.  
On the other hand, leading persons of the early root NGO were not so “root” as their 
counterparts in developed democracies. Despite of the injury in the political struggles, the 
liberalistic dissidents fringed or banished by the political system could still be respected 
as social elites for their identity of intelligentsia, especially in the early 1990s when even 
college students were rarity. Early NGOs’ works had commonly depended on the 
capability of leading elites. That’s because, from one aspect, in the early 1990s, China was 
far less than a competitive country, the few educated people playing the important role 
                                                        
1 Record of the interview by a TV series, “City Online,” Guangzhou Television Station. 
[http://news.dayoo.com/dszx/200802/27/73758_3313890.htm]  
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 When Liang and his comrades held a conference to discuss the establishment in 1993, he still worried 
that the “assembly” would be interrupted by sensitive police, but fortunately, it resulted to be smooth. 
According to Liang Congjie in an interview, reference to: Wang Lili, Environmental Communication in 
China, Beijing: Tsinghua University press, 2005. p. 231.  
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inside or outside the system had their close networks, such as that among teachers and 
students, college mates, or comrades in arms, and so on. Thus, under a shortage of 
institutional resources for the public participation, only a leading social elite could find a 
way to achieve political or social resources for their personal relations. And, from another 
aspect, although early NGOs had just set foot in fringe policy agendas in which 
governmental policies might have failed, they still needed the governmental acquiesce to 
weaken the political risk1. As in FON, Liang Congjie was the member of Chinese People’ 
Political Consultative Committee (CPPCC). The organization is China’s highest political 
advisory body consisting of delegates from political parties who had cooperated with CCP 
through the establishment of People’s Republic of China, a range of governmental-set 
social organizations and the independent members having high social reputation. 
According to the Chinese Constitution and the political practice, proposals raised by 
CPPCC members should be respected, although it usually doesn’t influence material 
policies directly. In other words, as a CPPCC member, the FON leader had been on the 
fringe of the system, but not factually outside the system. In addition, his respectable 
wisdom of a well-known historian, and the networks made by him and the intelligentsia 
family also made FON led by Liang Congjie achieve a higher starting point.  
In accordance with the special quality of earliest environmental NGO core members 
and elite-led operation, the rudiment of its action mode was made on this basis. We may 
get an outline of it by simply analyzing FON’s first influential movement, to save black 
snub-nosed monkeys, an endangered species endemic to China’s Yunnan Province. As 
living in one of the most extreme environments of any nonhuman primate in high 
altitudes, the species was almost completely unknown until the 1990s. In 1995, 40 square 
miles of virgin rainforest in Deqin county of Yunnan Province, was sold to timber 
companies whose environmental impact studies failed to even mention the monkeys. But 
the fact was, of the 1,000 black snub-nosed monkeys that remain in the wild, about 200 
                                                        
1 Jia Xijin, “Civil Society in China and the Development and Current Situation of NGOs <zhongguo 
gongmin shehui he NGO de fazhan yu xianzhuang>,” in Li Fan (ed.), Report on the Development of 
China’s Grassroot-level Democracy <zhongguo jiceng minzhu fazhan baogao>, Xi’an: Northwest 
University Press, 2003. pp. 92-131, p. 102. And also see: Sun Liping, “The Evolution of the Interactive 
Relationships Among the State, Civil Elites and the Common Citizens in Chinese Mainland <gaige 
qianhou zhongguo dalu guojia, minjian tongzhi jingyi ji minzhong jian hudong guanxi de yanbian>,” 
China Social Science Quarterly, No. 1, 1994, pp. 37-53.  
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of them live in the Deqin forest. The deal between companies and local government 
angered a wild animal photographer named Xi Zhinong, and he immediately wrote a 
letter to FON to report the dangerous situation in December.  
FON immediately took positive actions which had not been unusual for their 
counterparts in developed democracies: they launched social campaigns like organizing 
university students into candle-light “Save the Monkey” demonstrations, and got touch 
with media professionals—editors and journalists—who were also included in the 
intelligentsia network, utilizing detailed and lasing reports to arouse public attention. 
However, the most effective approach of FON was their characteristic direct reaching to 
governmental officials, especially those ranked high in the bureaucratic hierarchy. By 
interpersonal relations of a member, FON conveyed Xi’s letter to Song Jian, State 
Councilor at that time. And further, Liang Congjie wrote a petition letter to Jiang 
Chunyun, Vice Premier at that time, which transferred a demand for supporting Xi’s 
actions to protect primeval forest and the biodiversity in Southwest area. At the same 
time, FON sent 80 copies of this letter to mass media. As reaction the petition of Liang 
Congjie, 16 officials above minister-level made hand-writing instruction (pi shi) on the 
letter to support the species protection. And, the Central governmental decision was 
transferred to Yunnan Province, making the local officials to halt the timber business.  
After more than one year’s small-scale bird observation and voluntary trash collecting, 
the Yunnan black snub-nosed monkey case was FON’s first successful attempt to 
influence the policy making of a specific public issue 1 . The success obviously 
demonstrated an action mode with both adaptation to political restriction and utilization 
of state controlled resources. This case proved the importance of the leading NGO 
members, who were also “social elites” with the position, although at the fringe, of the 
political system, because they had the institutional channel as the nearest road to 
participate in policy-making process.  
The success, which hadn’t seemed to experience much difficulty, brought 
environmental NGOs more confidence. And, it also established the reputation for FON, 
helping the organization achieve aid resource from Chinese public and even international 
                                                        
1 Environmental Communication in China, p. 226. 
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civil society, making it possible for FON to pursue greater career. As a result, it had come 
a most influential public issue of China’s environmental protection history, the Tibetan 
antelope protection which had lasted from 1998 to 2001. In this case, FON and other 
smaller environmental NGOs which had been established later, with the assistance from 
the international social civil society such as World Wide Fund for Nature (WWFN) and 
International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), had done their utmost to utilize the 
media and other institutional resources to influence the policy making and to develop the 
civil society. But, different from the famous victory of Yunnan monkey protection, the last 
result became the complex of achievements and cruel lessons, and indicated the limit of 
Chinese root NGOs’ capability of the radical actions and the natural dependence on 
institutional resources, to make them to reconsider the role they needed to play in the 
comprehensive modernization of China.  
1.2. National Predicaments of Protecting Tibetan Antelope 
Tibetan antelope (chiru, in local accent) are sole species in the genus pantholops, 
native to the Tibetan plateau including China’s Tibet Autonomous Region, Qinghai 
province, and Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region; India near Ladakh, and, formerly 
western Nepal, spreading mainly on the high mountain steppes and semi-desert areas of 
the Tibetan plateau, mostly concentrated in Kekexili of China’s Qinghai Province, where 
they feed on various forb and grass species. Tibetan antelope are listed as the endangered 
species by the World Conservation Union and the United States Fish and Wildlife 
Service—its numbers have dropped accordingly from nearly a million at the turn of the 
20th century to less than 75,000 in the later 1990s, and the numbers continue to drop 
yearly1—mostly due to serious poaching for their underwool, known as shahtoosh, warm, 
soft and fine2. Although, according to the 1979 Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (CITES), the poaching was to be fined 100 thousand US dollars or 
sentenced one year in jail, and, in China, as Tibetan antelope is the first class national 
protect animal, according to the 1988 State Wildlife Protection Law, poaching on more 
                                                        
1 See: Tibetan Environmental Watch: “Bloody shawls exterminating chiru,” 
[www.tew.org/archived/antelope.trade.html] 
2 The ccompetition with local domesticated herds, and the development of their rangeland for gold 
mining were also the reasons—writer.  
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than three is to be a specially important criminal case, leading to at least life 
imprisonment. The Law also symbolized Chinese Government formally vowed its 
determination to crack down wildlife poaching.  
That the strong criminal punishment on Tibetan antelope poaching started in the late 
1980s was not accidental, but forced by the crazy poaching oriented by economic interest 
since China’s economic reform. During China’s transformation from totalitarianism to 
authoritarianism since the late 1970s, the limited withdraw of the state from society had 
inevitably weakened the pressure on criminal offence, because the traditional totalitarian 
political approaches to integration the society—such as militarization management, strict 
Party rules or other small bottom-level units (i.g. the neighborhood committee, or “ju wei 
hui” to make people to supervise each other’s actions during Mao’s era)—had been 
gradually abandoned or transformed, when the new legal system hadn’t been established. 
Thus, the social governance and integration system became the most vulnerable. In 
addition, factually, the consumer demand of shahtoosh was from outside of the territory 
beyond the Chinese Governmental measures, and, the side effects of opening up policy 
(duiwai kaifang zhengce) linked Chinese poachers to the international black market. 
Especially when the lady’s shawl made by shahtoosh became a fashion symbol in the late 
1980s, the price of the underwool of Tibetan antelope had been continuously promoted 
higher and higher, which achieved US$ 1115 for one kilo in 1992, and even US$ 1715 in 
1996, comparing with the US$ 43-86 for one kilo common mutton 1 . Under the 
stimulation of great profit, and the withdraw of totalitarian pressure and the shortage of 
legal enforcement during national transformation, although China had indicated its 
national will to protect the endangered species by stipulating strict criminal punishment 
and establishing several national and provincial reserves—Mount Arjin Reserve from 
1983, Qiangtang Reserve from 1992, Kekexili Reserve from 19952, and Three Rive Source 
Reserve from 2000—the poaching was still difficult to be prevented. According to the 
estimation of Chinese Forestry Administration in 1999, some 20,000 Tibetan antelopes, 
                                                        
1 See: Sun Danping, “Expose the mystery of an amice (jie kai shen mi pi jian zhi mi)”, Beijing Youth 
Daily, October 29, 1998. Page 3. 
2 The Kekexili Reserve was established in 1995 as a provincial reserve, and, promoted into national-level 
in 1997—writer.  
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living in a hostile habitat on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau some 4,500 meters above sea level, 
were being slaughtered each year1. Even though, in the 1990s, Chinese forestry police had 
caught about 3,000 poachers, confiscated more than 17,000 chiru hides and 2,425 pounds of 
Tibetan antelope fur2, poachers had become more organized and some of them better 
armed than local police3, deriving from the comparison between the great profit of selling 
the shahtoosh to international fashion market and the poor investment in local police by 
the Chinese government. It had decreased the crime cost of poaching, but it also had 
increased the risk of anti-poaching.  
We may conclude that Chinese government-dominated wildlife protection was 
limited by factors both subjective and objective. Objectively, the protection had been 
faced with triple difficulties: the formidable natural conditions of Tibetan plateau with 
the broad no-man land, insufficient oxygen and the constantly changing weather, the 
crazy consumer demand outside the ruling territory, and the high risk and cost of 
anti-poaching. And subjectively, an underlying reason might be that, different from today, 
Chinese Government during the 1990s factually was being driven mad of investing its 
limited resources into dealing with serious economic risks such as state-owned 
enterprises loss, bad debts of banks, foreign attacks to agriculture and the unemployment 
(“let-off” or “xia gang”) according to the radical progress to sell SOEs to the private 
capital. That means, the government couldn’t rank environmental problems in a high 
level of the policy agendas, therefore the problem had stayed in fringe until discovered by 
some the fringe NGOs. 
  
2. Environmental NGO Efforts to Shape the Subjectivity of the Civil Society 
2.1 Cooperation with Government as Shortcut to Obtain Original Legitimacy 
To be strictly, the same as in the Yunnan black snub-nosed monkey case, for the 
public antelope protection, it was not formed organization like FON, but the individual 
environmental activist firstly to take actions. However, the protection actions had only 
                                                        
1 “Bloody shawls exterminating chiru,” 
2 State Forestry Administration: “White Paper in Tibetan Antelope Protection,” released in 1998 
December. Source: http://www.qh.xinhuanet.com/old/qinghai/kkxl/zlybhxz.htm 
3 “Expose the mystery of an amice”. 
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become effective after the individual activists reached for organizational resources, and, 
they all then joined the organization. The process had indicated us an outline of the early 
development of China’s public green activism from individual to integrated actions.  
The individual environmental activists began to pay their attention as early as in 1995, 
when Yang Xin, an explorer and environmental volunteer, submitted his personal 
antelope protection scheme to the local Qinghai Provincial government. In this ambitious 
5-year scheme, Yang planned to cover 4 main points: a) to bring experts, journalists and 
volunteers into the careful field investigations; b) to build a nation-level natural reserve 
for Tibetan antelopes in Kekexili, Qinghai Province, under the cooperation with the 
Provincial  government; c) to develop international cooperation for research; d) to build 
the comprehensive volunteering regimes1. At first, without precedents to cooperate with 
the new-born public power in environmental governance regimes, the local governments 
at all levels of Qinghai province didn’t try to trust the personal activist. But Yang didn’t 
give up and he, breaking the formal procedures, presented his scheme at the door of 
Secretary of Qinghai Provincial Party Committee, the top provincial leader at that time, 
and, persuade the top official of local place to support his plan. According to Yang, it was 
not only his passion but his promise to raise money in those advanced places in East 
China for establishing a natural reserve in Qinghai to achieve success. Eventually, under 
the responsibility of species protection, the Qinghai Provincial Government had much 
earlier found it necessary to build a natural reserve, but, as one of the poorest provinces 
of China, the government had hesitated to squeeze the limited fiscal budget2. Thus, 
Yang’s promise of funding support became a good attraction, and, before long, Yang was 
given formal governmental permit, which authorize him to raise money for the 
establishment and drew public attention3.  
But when Yang began his work with the unbounded confidence, he immediately 
found himself powerless. On one hand, he failed in mobilizing people in advanced places 
                                                        
1 See: Xin Yang, Ten years of Self-Experiences in Kekexili (qinli kekexili shinian), Shanghai: Sanlian 
Bookstore, 2005. Source: http://vip.book.sina.com.cn/book/index_39087.html 
2 Although Tibetan antelope is under first-class state protection entitled for state-level natural reserve 
funded by Central Government, but according to related rules, a state-level natural reserve must be build 
on the basis of a formed provincial reserve funded by provincial government. –writer.  
3 Yang, Ten years of Self-Experiences in Kekexili 
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to support his career in remote Qinghai Province. When he firstly began to raise money in 
cities of Shenzhen and Hong Kong, where his works and networks located and the public 
had advanced environmental awareness, he got a lukewarm response, because the public 
naturally preferred to invest their resources to protect their own community, and thought 
the antelope protection should have been left to their local community1. On the other had, 
although mass media issue framing was an important approach of Yang’s plan, he 
couldn’t provide enough news dynamics to mobilize East China’s market-oriented mass 
media to carry out investigative reporting, with risking the ill natural conditions, 
language barriers in communication with ethnic natives, and possible life danger from 
armed poachers, in a middle of nowhere. After encountering setbacks in Shenzhen and 
Hong Kong, Yang turned to Beijing, trying to raise money by selling his book on the 
exploring experiences including stories on local anti-poaching heroes, where he got an 
active message from FON.  
FON, to speak strictly, Liang Congjie, who had encouraged by the Yunnan Monkey 
success, took Yang to give lectures on popularizing Tibetan antelope protection and raise 
money in universities—for the Yunnan monkey, FON had succeeded in making news and 
expanding public influence from campaigns in universities—the warm help had make 
Yang get his first fund. And further, in June 1996, Liang Congjie introduced Yang Xin to 
officials of State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), the top watchdog of 
China’s green career, and Shenzhen Municipal Government, speeding up their 
embeddedness in governmental actions. This integration quickly had effects several 
months later, when SEPA and Shenzhen Municipal Government funded Yang to lead a 
group of 24 members composed of experts, journalists and volunteers, with FON 
members being core participants, to go to Kekexili for an in-depth investigation. In the 
same year, SEPA entitled Sonan Dorjay, a local police official who died at his 
anti-poaching post—Yang Xin had heard his heroic stories according to the local 
habitants’ dictations and then written them into his book—with the honor of 
“environmental protection hero”. Yang’s efforts finally brought a natural resources 
protection station in Kekexili for observation on the antelope ecology—he didn’t achieve 
                                                        
1 Yang, Ten years of Self-Experiences in Kekexili 
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his ambitious targets we mentioned in his four-point scheme—and he then riveted all his 
attention on the small station and faded from the public view.  
Even though it was Yang to trigger the start of the public participation, its 
achievements had from the start to the finish severed the established target of Qinghai 
Provincial Government to build up the National Reserve, which was achieved in 1997. 
That’s why his independent attempts beyond the institutions without precedents had 
been permitted or even encouraged by the local political leader or the officials of the 
environmental watchdog. However, when his work was then relayed to FON, the social 
activity had not only been promoted into its climax, but also turned to the attempt for the 
subjectivity of the civil society, which led to the break of relations between NGOs and the 
local government.  
2.2 From passively being mobilized to positively mobilizing: Media 
Promotion of the Public “Hero” 
In 1998, FON, with international organizations of World Wide Fund for Nature 
(WWFN) and International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) and several NGOs located 
in Hong Kong, gathered Beijing’s environmental activists to discuss on a uniform action 
plan for Tibetan antelope protection. And, they sent messages to related departments and 
officials they knew well, demanded for their participation into the plan initiated by 
nongovernmental sectors. Without positive response from governmental departments, 
the attempt reached no feasible achievements. Confronted with setbacks, FON with other 
environmental NGOS hadn’t chosen confrontation actions, but temporarily returned to 
their original status as the favorable supplement to governmental policies: they 
determined to focus their resources on funding a local anti-poaching police agency. But 
there was a crucial difference from earlier actions. The local police agency, despite of its 
governmental identity and brilliant records of fighting poachers, was embarrassed with a 
shortage of resources distribution owing to being shunted aside by the local bureaucracy. 
Thus, FON had tried to channeling the public donation for antelope protection to the 
police agency, rather than to the local government for internal distribution, and further, 
bringing the embarrassed police agency a new identity as the symbol (or “brand”, 
according to Liang Congjie) of the public species protection.  
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2.2.1 Met the Hero: The Predicament of a Local Police Agency and Its 
Interaction with NGOs 
The formal title of the antipoaching agency was “West Worker Committee <xibu 
gongzuo weiyuanhui>”, and, through later lasting media reports, well known as “Wild 
Yak Team” by the public. The following texts will use the “Wild Yak Team” as researchers 
commonly do. The agency was founded in 1992 by Zhiduo county of Qinghai Province, 
given a limited autonomy with an original purpose to govern local natural resources. And, 
the first person in charge, named Jiesang Sonan Dorjay, began to take anti-poaching on 
Tibetan antelope as the agency’s key emphasis in work. But, in his twelfth time of 
enterings Kekexili—the largest depopulated area in China—in 1994, the arrest of 20 
poachers with over 1600 hides1 led to his death. After that, his brother-in-law, Zhaba 
Doje, resigned from his own official service and reorganized the “West Worker 
Committee” in 1995, beginning to rivet all the attention on anti poaching. From them, 
their respectable records had brought them awards honored by Qinghai Province and 
Chinese State Forestry Administration (SFA), a top watchdog for natural resources 
governance, respectively in 1996 and 1997. The Wild Yak Team also had got touch with 
public environmental activists early since Yang Xin, also a friend of Zhaba Doje, 
propagated their performance for raising money From 1996 to 1998, FON had 
continuously donated cash and vehicles for anti-poaching to the team under the name of 
a cooperative operation with several international NGOs.  
The donation from FON to the Wild Yak Team was not occasional but pointed at the 
police agency’s practical dilemma and further crisis of identity. Despite of being under 
ruling of Zhiduo county government, Of the 60 to 70 members, including Zhaba Doje, 
only 3 to 5 were regular governmental employees, and the rest were all without formal 
employment contract, of who most were veterans and local unemployed youth. For this 
reason, the Wild Yak Team hadn’t had a strong sense of identity with local government, 
but just followed their leader Zhaba Doje, who had recruited them, out of personal 
feelings, which brought Zhaba Doje the absolute authority in the team. In addition, 
consisting mainly of temporary workers also demonstrated their difficulty in drawing 
                                                        
1 Some other reports gave the data of 15 poachers and 1300 hides. –writer. 
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financial support from the local government, a state poverty county only able to spare the 
team RMB￥10,000 (about US$1,250) one year. According to a media investigative 
report, until 1998, despite of brilliant anti-poaching records, the team had been only 
equipped with three pistols, a old submachine gun and three outmoded pick-up vehicles, 
but burdened with a debt of RMB￥110,000 (about US$13,750) 1. As a result, the 
financial predicament and crisis of identity forced Zhaba Doje to pursue for sponsorship, 
which let to his communication with FON and its cooperative activists. And, for the NGO, 
the heroic stories of the Team to fight with poachers had greatly moved them. In 1997, 
FON and IFAW became the first NGOs to sponsor the Team, donating two jeeps and 
US$10,000 in cash2. However, the communication between NGOs and the Wild Yak 
Team had developed far beyond it. The Team then became faced with its real risk of being 
stripped of the political legitimacy, and, when the NGOs began to offer help for this, they 
located themselves in the independent activism from the local governmental purposes, 
demonstrating the attempts for the subjectivity of civil society.  
2.2.2 Media Campaign to Gift the Team Political Legitimacy through 
Constructing its Social Legitimacy 
Along with the increasing state sponsorship and environmental activists’ efforts, in 
1997, the Kekexili state-level natural reserve was established mainly for Tibetan antelope 
protection. But the seemingly happy ending for both state and civil society brought a 
problem for Wild Yak Team, the marginalized local police agency and close friend with 
environmental activists: the team was ordered to disband under the name of local 
governmental reorganization for the state-level natural reserve, in other words, it was 
deprived of the political legitimacy. According to the local government, exactly the 
Qinghai Provincial Forestry Bureau, this disband order was due to the temporary 
workers’ misuse of authority to make money, such as privately released the poachers, 
occupied plunders, or permitted illegal mining in or around the reserve, and so on. But, 
the official interpretation couldn’t prevent environmental activists from taking the order 
                                                        
1 Sun Danping, “Dissolve the mystery of shatooth <jiekai shenmi pijian zhi mi>,” Beijing Youth Daily, 
August 29, 1988. Page 3.  
2 See: Katherine Morton, “Transnational advocacy at the grassroots: benefits and risks of international 
cooperation”, in Ho, Peter and Edmons, Richard Louis (ed), China's Embedded Activism: Opportunities 
and Constraints of A Social Movement, London ; New York : Routledge, 2008. 203. 
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as rooted in the “jealousy” of local officials to the brilliant records1 of marginalized Wild 
Yak Team. Thus, it then became a turning point of the long-time brewed transformation 
of FON and their cooperating activists: from being mobilized by governmental policies as 
“favorable supplement” to positively mobilizing social resources for their independent 
targets, even possibly in conflict with governmental policies. In this case, it means to 
support Wild Yak Team to get back their deprived political legitimacy in Kekexili natural 
reserve, denying the local governmental arrangement. And, the most advantageous 
approach of the young civil society was carried on from the successful experiences in 
Yunnan Monkey issue: media campaign. But the critical difference was that the media 
campaign for Yunnan Monkey was not in conflict with the government but only transfer 
the officials’ concern to the peripherized agenda while the media campaign for Wild Yak 
Team was expanding the team’s influence in public, establishing kind of “social 
legitimacy”, so as to force the local government return the political legitimacy to the team. 
As an active reporter said, “propaganda was the most effective support” 2. For this reason, 
Wild Yak Team should have been framed as a “brand (pin pai, or symbol)” 3 of Tibetan 
antelope protection.  
With the concern that the far distance and severe natural conditions might prevent 
public of advanced areas from paying attention to Tibetan antelope and Wild Yak Team 
in remote Kekexili—according to the forthgoer, Yang Xin, at the time he started the work, 
even environmental activists had no sense of Tibetan antelope 4 —FON and their 
cooperating activists determined to invite Zhaba Doje to Beijing, the advanced capital 
where located a plenty of Party’s mouthpiece, influential commercialized media or 
branches from the whole country, and the branches of foreign news agencies, preparing 
to make a bigger and more lasting news event.  
In Zhaba Doje’s visit to Beijing in 1998, FON, his friend and sponsor, arranged the 
                                                        
1 According to the retailing of mass media, the records included solving 43 theft and hunt cases, 
catching 188 criminals, capturing 42 arms and 39 vehicles, and seizing 2914 hides including 2805 of 
Tibetan antelopes from September 1995 to November 1997. 
2 “Tibetan protection: the information propagation is the best support <baohu zang lingyang: 
xuanchuan shi zuihao de shengyuan>,” China Youth Daily, May 25, 2000. 
3 See: Interview with Liang Congjie in “To Tibetan antelope: what will you future be <zang lingyang: ni 
de mingyun jiang hui shi shenme>?”, ChinaNet, January 16, 2001. 
[http://www.china.com.cn/zhuanti2005/txt/2001-01/16/content_5017101.htm] 
4 See: Interview with Yang Xin by China Radio International. 
[http://gb2.chinabroadcast.cn/1015/2002-12-26/98@131172.htm] 
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agendas of not only meeting the environmental activists and potential financial sponsors 
including NGO members, entrepreneurs and university students, giving speeches on the 
team’s moving stories of antipoaching, but also being introduced to SFA and SEPA 
officials, with the identity of a local police official, to make a “work report”1, which 
indicated the acquiescence of the Central governmental watchdogs at their social 
campaigns. Besides these small-scale activities, FON also used their personal networks to 
arrange Zhaba Doje to directly access to mass media, accepting interview from multiple 
mainstream media organs both from China and abroad, including the Chinese Central 
Television (CCTV), Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) of United States, Voice of America 
(VOA) and Nihon Housou Kyoukai (NHK) of Japan, and a number of local 
large-circulation newspapers such as China Youth Daily—Party paper of Chinese 
Communist Youth League—and Guangming Daily—a mouthpiece mainly representing 
the voice of intellectuals serving the political system—and South Weekend—a most 
famous critical paper of China2. To mobilize the mass media, FON and Wild Yak Team 
made an adequate preparation of an elaborate speech draft and more than one hundred 
films on their brave antipoaching both for public exhibitions and media interview. And, 
for mass media, FON added a special explanation meeting for mass media on October 28, 
after Zhaba Doje left Beijing, to reaffirm their attitudes. In this meeting, according to 
FON, the journalists demonstrated their “heartfelt concern” to “actively raise questions” 
to FON staff and “emulatively borrow pictures (provided by Wild Yak Team) for 
reporting” 3.  
Under the positive access to well-developed mass media in advanced areas, Wild Yak 
Team was ensured to be the only first-hand information source of Tibetan antelope 
protection in remote Kekexili. Scholars found that the materials provided to mass media 
had given prominence to “artistic style of emotional sorrow” in telling their stories to 
                                                        
1 “Records of orientation meeting on Tibetan antelope situation,” 
Friends of Nature Newsletter. No. 3, 1998.   
2 Another reason why FON can mobilize so many influential mainstream media organs, especially those 
from abroad, might be the letter Liang wrote to Tony Blair, British Premier at that time, which had made 
a big news from 1998 October during Blair’s official visit to China. In this letter, Liang appealed to the 
western community to boycott the black market of the much-desired Tibetan Antelope fur, and received 
positive response. –writer.  
3 “Records of orientation meeting on Tibetan antelope situation,” 
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“shape heroic idols1, which was easier to inspire sympathy of common audience. Zhaba 
Doje’s visit started a continuous report lasting for three years until the its formal disband, 
with reporting number and quality being “without parallel in history” and making Wild 
Yak Team in Kekexili, which was rarely known by the public, become a symbol of China’s 
wild conservation “even as famous as the panda” 2. In addition to the a shortage of 
pluralistic information sources — for example, national legal system enforcement and 
antipoaching actions taken by both Central and local government — Wild Yak Team had 
been naturally given the public impression as the “only actor to actually protect Tibetan 
antelope”3 through media framing. In other words, it was the Wild Yak Team sponsored 
and propagated by non-governmental NGOs and mass media, rather than any 
governmental sector to draw the social legitimacy. As a result, on one hand, Wild Yak 
Team obtained the backup — financial support and public pressure on local 
government—from civil society to deal with their survival crisis. From 1998 to 2001, Wild 
Yak Team had received donations valuing more than RMB ￥ 800,000 (about 
US$100,000) both in cast and necessary equipments, and application of participation 
from hundreds of volunteers from more than 20 Chinese provinces4. On the other hand, 
the NGOs and active journalists successfully framed a social identity for the 
governmental agency and mobilized public resources to support the agency’s 
antipoaching — without the Wild Yak Team, there had been no formal channel for civil 
society to participate—which developed the capacity of the young civil society. 
2.2.3 Hard Work of Civil Society and the Local Governmental Resistance 
When the social energy following Zhaba Doje’s visit to Beijing seemed to indicate to 
environmental activists and journalists an optimistic prospect of a capable civil society 
which was comparatively independent from the government, a breaking news changed 
the situation, leading to their head-on confrontation with local government, and further 
                                                        
1 Zeng Fanxu, “Media Agenda Building and Public Expression in NGO: A Case Study of Tibetan 
Antelopes Protection in China <huanbao NGO de yiti jiangou yu gonggong biaoda: yi ziran zhiyou 
jiangou zanglingyang baohu yiti wei ge’an>,” Journal of International Communication, No. 10, 2007. 
pp. 14-18, p. 17.  
2 Sun Danping, “What’s most needed in Kekexili <kekexili zui xuyao de shi shenme>?” Beijing Youth 
Daily, July 8, 2002.  
3 “Media Agenda Building and Public Expression in NGO,” p. 17.  
4 Ding Pin, “Five years of gathering and the lessons <wunian shengju wunian jiaoxun>,” Friends of 
Nature Newsletter, No. 2, 2000.  
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to lose the acquiescence of Central governmental watchdogs.  
On November 11, less than two months after Zhaba Doje returned home, FON’s 
Beijing office heard the death of Zhaba Doje through an anonymous phone call. Then, 
under the public pressure and after criminal investigation, the local government 
announced his death to be committing suicide after a family dispute, but the public was 
hard to accept the conclusion. One reason was, in all the main stream media, Zhaba Doje 
had been a hero, brave, wise, creative, selfless, calm, direct, and friendly, who obtained 
great respect especially university students, and, such a hero shouldn’t have been died for 
family dispute. And the other reason was, as a framed symbol of non-governmental 
antelope protection, the “suicide” of Zhaba Doje might have reduced the persuasiveness 
of civil society to mobilize the public. Therefore, despite of the official explanation, 
proofless suspect that the hero might have been murdered by armed poachers or local 
officials for revenge or jealousy had been discussed for a time, privately among activists 
or on anonymous internet webs. However, at that time, environmental activists and 
journalists were still calm enough to avoid publicly challenging the official conclusion, 
but they still tried to express their doubt by implication. An investigative report written 
by a journalist of Chendu Business News (chengdu shangbao), a well-known critical 
newspaper located in the capital of Sichuan Province who had close relations with Zhaba 
Doje, might have reflected a consensus of the civil society. In this report, the journalist 
reaffirmed the hero image of Zhaba Doje by interviewing his relatives and Wild Yak Team 
members, and announced, without directly denying official conclusion, that “it’s hard to 
believe such a brave, aggressive and optimistic man to shoot himself”, and, “despite of the 
suicide, his fact as a hero shouldn’t be doubted” 1. Despite of facing with such a serious 
setback, in order to avoid head-on confrontation with local authority, young civil society 
at that time still chose to commit self-control2. For example, a friend of Zhaba Doje and 
                                                        
1 Miao Xi, “He flied away with the eagles <ta sui yingbei cangmang er qu>,” Chengdu Business News, 
November 30, 1998.  
2 Along with the contradiction had been intensified, the suspect was also brought into open. For 
example, a most influential local English newspaper, took the hero’s death as “being revenged by 
poachers” half a year later, see: China Daily, “Heeding a call of the wild,” June 28, 1999. And, FON 
leader, Liang Congjie, told www.china.org.cn that as he himself had phoned Zhaba Doje several hours 
before his death, it was “difficult” for him to accept the official explanation of “suicide”. See: 
www.china.org.cn, “Chiru’s Guardian Angels Shedding Blood, Tears,” uploaded on January, 16th, 2001. 
[http://www.china.org.cn/english/2001/Jan/6643.htm] 
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experienced reporter for China Youth Daily, stood up to relieving her peer by writing that 
“(Zhaba Doje) committed suicide under excessive pressure from both his work and 
family…some mass media had mistaken his death cause before”1. In addition, the local 
government then also indicated positive attitudes to continue cooperation with activists 
and journalists from advanced areas, by highly praising the brilliant achievements of 
Zhaba Doje2.  
By judging the following development, we now can conclude that the local 
government, after Zhaba Doje’s death had planned to orient the public resources used to 
channeling to Wild Yak Team to the politically legal agency of government, named 
Administration Committee for Kekexili National Natural Reserve. That’s why they 
indicated positive attitudes to the sad activists who had lost Zhaba Doje. But the civil 
society gave them negative response by continuing to support Wild Yak Team leaded by 
an assistant of Zhaba Doje. For example, from 1998 to 1999, Team members were 
sponsored by NGOs to give speech and hold exhibition in Beijing and Tianjin, for further 
propagating their saga and raise financial donations. In 1999, when the top watchdog for 
natural resources protection, SFA, organized all the armed forces under its ruling to 
launch a major operation against antelope poachers, generally known as “Kekexili Action 
No. 1”, and, as a local police agency, Wild Yak Team was included in this action. Through 
this chance, FON mobilized its journalist members to accompany with Wild Yak Team 
into the front-line. Therefore, in this massive action involving 170 police, with 
achievements of crushing 17 poaching groups, arresting 66 poachers, taking over 1658 
hides and freeing 545 antelopes, Wild Yak Team still played the leading role to attract 
public attention. We may judged from the examples that, from the death of Zhaba Doje, 
the social legitimacy of Wild Yak Team had not been reduced while the civil society for 
antelope protection had been still taking the team as a core image to mobilize public 
resources. And, to say from another aspect, it must have further challenged the political 
legitimacy of local governmental arrangement, making the governmental entitled 
Administration Committee evitable faced with an embarrassment of very little public 
                                                        
1 Deng Congcong, “The forever hero: mourn Zhaba Doje <yongyuan shi yingxiong: tong dao zha ba 
duo jie>,” China Youth Daily, November 26, 1998.  
2  “He flied away with the eagles,” 
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recognition and access to donations. Liang Congjie used to tell a story about how an 
influential foreign foundation gave up their donation plan when the heard the disband of 
Wild Yak Team because they had no idea of “who” were actually “doing anti-poaching” 
apart from Wild Yak Team1. Efforts of the civil society on Wild Yak Team might have 
potentially brought a sense of a “capable public”, independent from the Party-state 
regimes. But it also hade made the contradiction between local government and the civil 
society gradually develop into resistance. 
Also in 1999, the Central Government determined to add a financial investment of 
RMB￥600,000 (about US$75,000) into Kekexili Natural Reserve, and the distribution 
of this investment might have become the primacord of the rupture between local 
government and the civil society. In August, the local Yushu Autonomous prefectural 
Government finally made sure the official decision to disband Wild Yak Team. According 
to the government, it was to centralize the isolated antipoaching agencies into a 
standardized Kekexili Natural Reserve Administration Bureau. In other words, all the 
staff and responsibility of Wild Yak Team was demanded to under the ruling of the 
uniform governmental control, to lose its independence especially the relations with the 
civil society. Further, at the same time, the local government demanded the 
Administration Bureau to carry on the name of “Wild Yak Team”, because the 
government took the “great influence of the ‘brand’ at home and abroad” would “help the 
bureau at work”2. We can conclude from the official determination that the government 
aimed to compete with the civil society to dominate the powerful symbol of “Wild Yak 
Team” to mobilize public resources necessary for the problem solution. In other words, 
the local government denied the validity of social mobilization beyond political control, 
which basically threatened the efforts of NGOs and active journalists to frame public 
policies from bottom to top.  
When the civil society got aware of the aggressiveness of local government which 
                                                        
1 See: Interview with Liang Congjie in “To Tibetan antelope: what will you future be <zang lingyang: ni 
de mingyun jiang hui shi shenme>?”, ChinaNet, January 16, 2001. 
[http://www.china.com.cn/zhuanti2005/txt/2001-01/16/content_5017101.htm]  
2 Tang Yu, “It’s of great urgency to protect the chiru, Qinghai Provincial government will close the 
Kekexil Reserve <baohu zang lingyang keburonghuan, Qinghai jiang jinfeng kekexili>, China Youth 
Daily, August 19, 1999.  
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made their independent campaign seem vulnerable, they had got to turn to the traditional 
approach which use to bring them success in Yunnan Monkey case but be tried to avoid in 
this antelope case: appealing to top-level political leader in Central Government through 
personal activists with formal identity in the system. Several days after the local 
government issued their decision, Liang Congjie, as a CPPCC member, with the co-sign of 
17 journalists—most of them were serving crucial Party mouthpieces—wrote to Wen 
Jiabao, the vice Premier in charge of environmental issues and candidate for the next 
Premier at that time. In this letter, Liang tried his best to persuade the powerful leader 
that Wild Yak Team had been “the only police agency to regularly take antipoaching 
responsibility in Kekexili Reserve” during the past years, and its disband would be 
doomed to “give a handle to the poachers”. Basing on the description, Liang admitted 
that NGOs and mass media had tried to put public pressure on the local government, but 
failed, thus, he was forced to raise “an earnest, solemn appeal” to the vice Premier for a 
Central order to “maintain Wild Yak Team as a whole and further make sure their core 
function in the Kekexili Natural Reserve administration system” 1. The emotional letter 
somehow had drawn concern of the busy political leader. He transmitted the letter to 
Qinghai Provincial Government for an “appropriate handling”2. The leader’s concern 
might have been effective, because, judged from the result, the order to disband Wild Yak 
Team hadn’t been carried out until 2001.  
As discussed in the former chapters, some senior journalists and prestigious figures 
are privileged with the special channel to directly make the top leaders know certain 
problems they considered important, and it is always the last instrument for the civil 
society to influence the policy-making. Wen’s positive response to Liang and his alliances 
might have demonstrated a limited intervention in this issue, but it was rather a message 
of concern of the central authority than a certain compulsory policy. However, it still 
transferred a message of the civil society challenge the governmental political legitimacy.  
                                                        
1 Liang Congjie and others, “The letter on the attention paid to the endangered Tibetan antelope crisis 
and the dilemma of the ‘West Work Committee (Wild Yak Team)’ of Zhiduo county in Qinghai province 
<guanyu guanzhu woguo binwei dongwu zang lingyang muqian suo mianlin de weiji, yiji Qinghai sheng 
zhiduo xian xibu gongzuo weiyuanhui (ye maoniu dui) kunjing de xin>,” publicized in August 18, 1999. 
[http://www.qh.xinhuanet.com/old/qinghai/kkxl/zrzy4.htm] 
2 Ibid.  
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2.2.4 Local Governmental Methods to Handle Media Resources and the 
Recession of Civil Society 
The appealing to Central authority had brought hope for the civil society to 
undermine the political legitimacy of the local government—the social legitimacy of Wild 
Yak Team had moved the Vice Premier—but it also had teach the local government a 
lesson: pure political pressure and administrational approach against Wild Yak Team 
would only brought them into conflict with public opinion if the didn’t try to frame their 
own social legitimacy; and, conflict with public opinion in the Party-state system meant 
to violate the mass-line, which would lead to intervention from higher political authority. 
The Yushu local government in remote Qinghai province then changed their action mode: 
they had temporarily withheld the direct political pressure, but turned to strengthen their 
public communication. From 1999, the local government began to transfer negative 
information of Wild Yak Team—for example, according to the local government, under 
the shortage of living funds, members of the team had used to receive bribes from 
personal poachers—to undermine the “hero” image, while arranging their recognized staff 
of Kekexili Natural Reserve to accept interviews from media mouthpieces to frame their 
own social legitimacy by propagating their “achievements” in anti-poaching, trying to 
undermine the “irreplaceable” status of Wild Yak Team1. The combination of traditional 
administrational approaches and media communication policy imitated from the civil 
society had made the local government more advantageous in the conflict. But it might 
have been more significant to demonstrate a tendency in the mobilization mode of 
China’s Party-state: as the pressure of a new-born civil society possibly made traditional 
administrational approaches to mobilize public resources malfunction, the government 
would be forced to be beyond tradition and communicate with and respect more the 
public opinion in a more moderate and negotiable way, or even follow mobilization 
approaches of the civil society, even though they would still suppress the independent 
civil society.  
The aggressive policy change of the local government finally led to a head-on 
confrontation with the civil society. On 2000 June 18, a local newspaper under Qinghai 
                                                        
1 Zeng, “Media Agenda Building and Public Expression in NGO.” p. 16.  
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Provincial ruling issued a speed dispatch announcing that an antipoaching group of the 
Kekexili Nature Reserve Administration was trapped in the no man zone of Kekexili, 
risking their lives, for the shortage of petrol and vehicle damage. Under a nationwide 
passion to Tibetan antelope protection at that time, this news was worthy of attention 
from mass media and considerable journalists were sent to Qinghai to cover the rescue 
operation. And, the local government took advantage of the chance to strengthen their 
own social legitimacy. Under the conduct of Yushu local government, the named 
“KeKexili Great Rescue Operation” lasted for six days—two days of search and rescue in 
Kekexili and four earlier days of waiting owing to “bad weather and insufficient material 
supply”1—which had made this event remain a hot topic in the mass media for more than 
one week. During the operation, seven journalists from influential mouthpieces in Beijing, 
Shanghai and Chengdu followed the rescue team into Kekexili to cover the whole process 
at local governmental invitation, like FON’s journalist members did in 1999 “Kekexili No. 
1 Action”, but at this time, the media “hero” was changed from Wild Yak Team to the 
Natural Reserve Administration supported by the local government. Further, high-level 
local officials threw off their airs to positively become information source for mass media, 
and as a result, their names were given prominence in the following reports. By judging 
from the media reports, we may find that, like the reports to extol Wild Yak Team, most 
of the articles described a lot risk and tough conditions in Kekexili, to shape a brave and 
persistent image of the local antipoaching squad, but, the hero was not the Wild Yak 
Team but the Natural Reserve Administration. It was obvious that the original media 
strategy favorable for the Wild Yak Team was copied by their opponents to undermine 
their social legitimacy, which naturally irritated the resistance of the civil society.  
Supporters of Wild Yak Team quickly indicated their suspect that the “incident” had 
just been forged by local government for news sensationalization. Sun Danping, a FON 
member and pioneer journalist to have long-term experiences of deep investigation in 
Kekexili and have just finished a series of tracing reports with Wild Yak Team in a patrol 
in April, firstly stood up to question the truth in a environmentalist website for Tibetan 
                                                        
1 See: “ ‘KeKexili Great Rescue Operation’ is suspended to tomorrow <kekexili jiuyuan da xingdong tui 
zhi mingri kaishi>,” News Morning, June 22, 2000; and also see: “ ‘KeKexili Great Rescue Operation’ 
is postponed once again <kekexili jiuyuan da xingdong zaici tuichi>,” News Morning, June 23, 2000.  
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antelope protection. Sun quoted words of a journalist from Tianjin Cable Television 
Station who had entered Kekexili with the Wild Yak Team exactly from June 14 to 22 to 
raise several “doubtful points” 1 . For example, firstly, on June 18, they met the 
Administration group, whose fuel reserve seemed redundant. Secondly, Wild Yak Team 
even drew a map for the Administration who were “not familiar with this area”, enough to 
prevent them from getting lost. And finally, according to the rich experiences of Wild Yak 
Team, the unusual dry weather in 2000 made roads in Kekexili much more convenient to 
pass, making it difficult to trap vehicles. The testimony not only challenged the 
Administration’s announcement that the group was trapped for an insufficiency of petrol, 
but also implied that the Administration members hadn’t entered Kekexili for patrol as 
usual as the Administration declared. But at this time their efforts were not directly 
suppressed by the local government but confronted by journalists cooperating with the 
Administration. For example, a most active journalist might have been Luo Xinzhong 
from Shanghai Morning Post, a large-circulation commercial newspaper published 
under the CCP Shanghai Committee’s Party paper2, Liberation Daily3. He wrote several 
detailed reports including objective reports of the rescue operation and exclusive 
interviews with the main chiefs of the Administration, which were widely reshipped a 
first-hand materials by both the print media and the internet. Obviously the civil society 
felt very angry that the pubic attention originally mobilized by their hard work was to 
channel to the local government, who could be taken as their “opponents”. In a media 
interview, Liang Congjie just expressed the anger of activist to assert that the journalists 
backed up Natural Reserve Administration had been “bribed” by the local government, 
violating “human conscience and professional ethics”4.  
Despite the critics and suspect from the civil society, however, the incident had made 
Kekexili Natural Reserve Administration known to the public, and become another media 
information source besides Wild Yak Team. And moreover, the Qinghai Provincial 
                                                        
1 Sun Danping, “The journalists questioned the news of ‘the Kekexili official antipoaching team has been 
in danger’ <jizhi zhiyi ‘kekexili fan daolie duiwu yuxian’>,” Beijing Youth Daily, June 24, 2000.  
2 The Beijing Youth Daily was published under the Beijing CCP Committee’s Party paper, Beijing Daily.  
3 Luo wrote 6 tracing reports recording the Administration’s rescue operation, and reprinted one article 
a local journalist following the trapped group recording his experiences.  
4 See: Interview with Liang Congjie in “To Tibetan antelope: what will you future be <zang lingyang: ni 
de mingyun jiang hui shi shenme>?”, ChinaNet, January 16, 2001. 
[http://www.china.com.cn/zhuanti2005/txt/2001-01/16/content_5017101.htm] 
 107
Government had taken substantial measures to intervene, to establish a new police 
agency to assist the Administration who was illegal to hold guns 1 . Since the 
environmental activists used to recommend a plan of coordination between the 
Administration and Wild Yak Team that without being armed, the Administration could 
only set up checkpoints to conduct random sample inspection while the Wild Yak’s Team as a 
police agency could fight poachers2. The establishment of a new police agency undermined 
the value of the Team’s existence, which signalized that Wild Yak Team was completely 
excluded from the political arrangement.  
In the January of 2001, the local government formally disbanded the Wild Yak Team, 
but, it might have been surprised that the contradiction between the supporters of the 
Team and the local authority, having been made public for several times before, didn’t 
seem to lead to any serious conflict. We may think that the decision was made so 
suddenly that even the most active activists couldn’t have made response in time. Even 
until the end of 2000, supporters of Wild Yak Team were still passionately tracing their 
latest situation. China Environment News, ruled by the top environmental watchdog, 
SEPA, even published the Team leader’s message in the 2001 new year, alleging that the 
Team would “continue their responsibilities”3.  
Even though the enforcement of final governmental decision to disband Wild Yak 
Team also drew great media attention like before, the conflict had been alleviated and 
replaced by a delicate balance between governmental will and demands of the civil society. 
On one hand, although the local media under direct local governmental ruling didn’t take 
the news, several influential Party mouthpieces located in Beijing and Shanghai—they 
included People’s Daily under CCP Central Committee, China Youth Daily4; under China 
Communist Youth League (CCYL) Central Committee, Beijing Youth Daily under CCYL 
Beijing Committee, and Liberation under CCP Shanghai Committee—became the first to 
                                                        
1 China News Agency Newsletter: “Qinghai Province cracked down on illegal poaching of Tibetan 
antelopes <Qinghai yanli daji feifa liesha zang lingyang huodong>,” published on October 9, 2000.  
2 Xu Zhiquan, “Chiru’s Guardian Angels Shedding Blood, Tears,” China Internet Information Center, 
January 18, 2001. [http://www.china.org.cn/english/2001/Jan/6643.htm] 
3 See: “Massages to the new century with the love to the earth <manhuai diqiu qing, jingyu xin shiji>,” 
China Environmental News, January 1, 2000. Page 2.  
4 China Youth Daily has been active in environmental journalism from early 1990s; it was the first 
among the comprehensive newspapers in China to start the special page for environmental protection in 
1999. From 1998 until 2005, the rate of related reports has a 30 per cent increase annually on average. 
–the writer. 
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issue it from January 5. Among the most authoritative Party mouthpieces for leading CCP, 
although China Youth Daily and Beijing Youth Daily had been public supporters for the 
Wild Yak Team, People’s Daily and Liberation Daily had rarely participated in the issue 
before, and even, as mentioned before, a commercial paper subordinate to Liberation 
Daily was a most active supporter of the local government. Despite of having played 
different roles in this issue, the authoritative Party mouthpieces, who always to transfer 
the orthodoxy and directive of certain issues of highest political authority, about at the 
same time issued reports similar in: neutrally transferring the governmental decision 
without any critics against the local government, and, giving a record of achievements of 
Wild Yak Team without undermining its antipoaching hero image1. Under China’s 
political convention, the common action of Party mouthpieces can be easily to be 
interpreted as the will of highest authority to determine the nature of and make an end to 
the controversy on the issue, although there hadn’t been direct evidences to prove it. If be 
it, it might indicate that the social mobilization capability had been somehow recognized 
and even respected by the Central authority, but, it also agreed with the local government 
to strictly limit the capability subordinate to governmental needs.  
On the other hand, through mainstream media channel, the civil society 
demonstrated a much more moderate and cooperative attitudes to accept the sad result. 
For example, when Liang Congjie accepted the interview with a journalist who he knew 
well from China Youth Daily, while considering it a great loss to disband the Team as “the 
sole armed antipoaching squad during the recent years” 2 , he mentioned his 
“communication” with the main chiefs of the Natural Reserve Administration, and, said 
he just put hopes to their efforts. And further, Liang even indicated his compromise by 
sending a letter to Qinghai Provincial Government, in the name of his CPPCC member 
identity, to “thank the local governmental efforts to cultivate such an excellent 
antipoaching squad (Wild Yak Team)” 3—it implied Liang’s forced change to identify 
                                                        
1 The difference is People’s Daily and Liberation Daily took Kekexili Natural Reserve Administration for 
their direct information source, with China Youth Daily and Beijing Youth Daily taking green activists on 
the Wild Yak Team side. –writer.  
2 Wang Yao, “The Kekexili Wild Yak Team who have been fighting with poachers will be disbanded 
<tong toulie fenzi douzheng de kekexili ye maoniu dui jiang bei chexiao>,” China Youth Daily, January 
7, 2001.  
3 Zhao Lin and Chang Nanxi, “The ten years of Liang Congjie and the ten years of Friends of Nature 
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Wild Yak Team as a governmental agency rather than a “public symbol” which he and his 
colleagues had worked hard to frame, hoping it to exchange with the governmental to 
accept the agency again—but “it was too late” 1to obtain any concession from the local 
government2.  
However, the words of the most influential environmental activist might be 
interpreted as a last compromise rather than according to the will. Because in another 
interview by a more free internet media about the same time, Liang agreed that he 
couldn’t “trust the Administration at all” according to his “experience to communicate 
with the main chiefs”, especially couldn’t tolerate the chiefs to hire “morally corrupt 
journalists” to frame them as antipoaching heroes3. Apart from moderates like Liang, 
who were disappointed by the result and not to give up their distrust or even hostility 
against the local authority but also trying to reflect on the lessons from the premature 
actions they had taken beyond capability of the young civil society, some aggressive 
young activists just began to use alternative media and internet media — for example, 
www.Chiru.org — to express their support for the Team and the discontent with the local 
authority, but their voices had very little space in the mainstream media to have material 
effects4.  
3. Analysis 
This chapter, through early conservation activism of Chinese environmental NGOs, 
demonstrates – besides their initiatives of environmental priority and democratic ethics 
which have been intensively dug into – especially that how they are “selected” as social 
units to embed political mobilization: one point, environmental NGOs showed their 
                                                                                                                                                               
<liang congjie de shinian he ziran zhi you de shinian>,” South Weekend, June 10, 2004.  
1 Ibid.  
2 And also see: Katherine Morton, “Transnational advocacy at the grassroots: benefits and risks of 
international cooperation”, in Ho and Edmons, ed., China's Embedded Activism, pp. 214. 
3 See: Interview with Liang Congjie in “To Tibetan antelope: what will you future be <zang lingyang: ni 
de mingyun jiang hui shi shenme>?”,ChinaNet , January 16, 2001. 
[http://www.china.com.cn/zhuanti2005/txt/2001-01/16/content_5017101.htm 
4 The currently new-born internet in China had been utilized as intellectuals to send public expressions, 
however, the state was also trying to use the platform. See details in Zhou Yongming, Historicizing 
Online Politics: Telegraphy, the Internet, and Political Participation in China, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2006. pp. 155-180. Under the political pressure, green NGOs had become one of the 
first groups to take use of the internet. And, their expressions online had also drawn the attention of the 
mainstream media. For example, at the same time the www.chiru.com was established, China Youth 
Daily quickly publicized the news in an investigative report about the volunteers of the antelope 
protection. See: “Tibetan antelopes have got a brother in Beijing <zang ling you ge beijing xiongdi>,” 
China Youth Daily, March 8, 2001. Page 4.  
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capability of activism through mass media, with their good interaction with politics; the 
other point, the final failure witnessed the unacceptable coexistence of governmental 
authority and NGO subjectivity while separate initiatives were contradicted, which makes 
cooperation with and utilization of institutional resources a more practically reasonable 
choice for NGOs in future.  
3.1 NGOs’ Capability: Mass Media and “Public Opinion” to Influence 
Policymaking 
The activism on Tibetan Antelope has been commonly judged as the first symbolic 
issue of China’s green civil society, but its great influence seemed quite disproportionate 
with the actually poor resources of the very few environmental NGOs at the very early 
stage, with the limited members of mainly intellectuals and university students, the poor 
investment, and the loose organization which led to the activities mainly depending on 
the capability of several core members. However, the NGO activists had taken the best 
use of resources they could obtain from the unfavorable political ecology: the political 
identity of certain members and the mass media. But, it may be more important that, at 
the exact time when civil society found it the effective way to have immediate influence 
on policymaking rather than promoting achievements in the social community, the civil 
society would also found itself falling into the dependence on the political authority. 
Because, not only the core members’ capability depended on their approaches to 
influence political agendas, but also the mass media was part of the political system — 
mass media organizations and journalists also has the similar hierarchy to the 
bureaucracy, which can be interpreted as that a journalist with higher hierarchy can 
naturally have the supervision power on the lower-level officials — according to the 
tradition of communist system. Just as the antelope protection issue indicated, when the 
civil society attempted to construct their subjectivity to deviate the governmental targets, 
it would be faced with the risk to lose their support from the institution or even become 
suppressed.  
At the early stage, both the activities of Yang Xin and FON had been greatly 
encouraged by the government. The Tibetan antelope protection had been the set 
agendas of the nation with very clear legal assurance, and as the consumption market of 
 111
the antelope wool was in the foreign countries with the poachers coming from the social 
margins, there had been no institutional obstruction to the national protection policy 
except the shortage of financial foundation. The Qinghai Provincial Government had 
been pursued the establishment of a national reserve for Tibetan antelope to get the 
national investment, but before it, they should have built up a provincial reserve on the 
poor local financial capability. Under that condition, the brave suggestion of Yang Xin to 
raise money from the society seemed to be worthy of trying for the governor, which also 
didn’t seem to have the political risk. And, by judging from the related activities in Beijing, 
both by individual activists like Yang Xin and organizations like FON, we can see the 
entry of SEPA, the embarrassed environmental watchdog which had been just upgraded 
into the semi ministry. SEPA was one of the two most active central departments in the 
story — the other one was the Ministry of Forestry, and as the department had exactly the 
direct responsibility to fight with poachers, it played the much greater role in this issue, 
which also indicated the weak capability of SEPA’s overall planning on EP — and offered 
some help to the civil activism, such as presenting at Yang’s endowment drives, awarding 
the Wild Yak Team, and other similar coordination with NGOs. Although only in this case, 
the performance of SEPA hadn’t seemed so prominent, the new-born department 
demonstrated its initiative for new opportunities of better influence beyond its 
institutional weakness, and the willingness would developed into actions in the near 
future, which will be discussed in next chapters.  
And, as the “favorable supplement” to the governmental governance, the civil society 
chose the approach of making news to the public, which had oriented the public 
donations. Yang Xin himself had the background of journalism and the network in the 
circle of journalists, and, at the very early stage, he had once been the report focus. 
Tibetan antelope as part of Yang’s colorful exploratory experiences had become the 
attractive stories to attract the public. However, the entry of FON made the mass media 
the most prominent mechanism. The several pioneers, who were also FON key members, 
should have been thanked for their brave steps into the no-man Kekexili. If there hadn’t 
been the promoting dynamics from the NGO, it would be difficult to image the 
market-driven mass media organization to take the risk. However, after the sensational 
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effects of the pioneering reports, the Tibetan antelope protection then demonstrated its 
news value to journalists throughout the country. And, the reporting climax came along 
with Zhaba Doje’s visit in Beijing, during which the initiative use of media resources by 
environmental NGOs could be seen clear enough. The NGOs’ actions—arranging meeting 
with mass media at home and abroad, editing and providing materials to the mass media, 
and arranging lectures in universities—had guaranteed the media issue framing 
according to the purposes of the civil society. Thus, as the result, admitted by Liang 
Congjie, the Team developed into a symbol <pin pai> of the social activism, with most of 
the domestic and international donations being made clear by the donators to contribute 
to the Team1. 
3.2 More Practically Reasonable Choice in Future? 
The peaceful interaction between the civil society and the political power had been 
lasted until the establishment of Kekexili National Reserve, which meant the local 
government got the formal channel to share the national investment to complete the 
responsibility of antelope protection, and meanwhile, meant the institutionalization of 
the protection regimes in this area. And further, the public attention had been oriented to 
problem. Thus, for the government, the civil society had already finished its role as the 
“favorable supplement” to the governance and the integrated resources for the protection 
would be up to the governmental distribution. But such governmental attitudes would not 
be accepted by the civil society, whether for their hard work offered for this career or for 
the general politically liberalist inclination of the core members, as mentioned in the first 
section of this chapter.  
The construction of subjectivity had been carried through the social activism to 
support the Wild Yak Team, regardless of whether consciously or unconsciously. The 
contradiction between the civil society and the government—to speak accurately, the local 
Yushu Prefectural Government who had been backed by the Qinghai Provincial 
Government—had been made prominent at the point of who, the Wild Yak Team or the 
Reserve Administration, would be entitled to be the “only” legal anti-poaching agency in 
                                                        
1 See: Interview with Liang Congjie in “To Tibetan antelope: what will you future be <zang lingyang: ni 
de mingyun jiang hui shi shenme>?”, in www.china.com.cn, January 16, 2001. 
[http://www.china.com.cn/zhuanti2005/txt/2001-01/16/content_5017101.htm] 
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the Kekexili National Reserve. On one hand, for the local government, that was its 
exclusive power over personnel and it followed the bureaucratic rules, written or 
unwritten to make the decision. But on the other hand, the civil society—to speak 
accurately, the active environmental NGOs and journalists in this issue—wouldn’t easily 
abandon the Wild Yak Team, not only according to the emotional friendship, but also for 
the Team’s value to be “symbol” of China’s civil activism. Although the Team had always 
emphasized their political identity and denied to be described by the mass media as a 
social organization, and their cooperation with the environmental NGOs and mass media 
had been exactly for the political legitimacy, but the real voice was just, possibly 
consciously, ignored by the mass media1. The higher praise of the Wild Yak Team and the 
conscious emphasis on framing its “difference with the ineffective governmental 
agencies” 2 , lightened the anti-poaching heroes, but at the same time, objectively 
depreciate the government, ranging from the prefectural to the provincial government, 
even to the central agencies like the Ministry of Forestry3. The image of “the only 
anti-poaching squad” had also oriented the audience to ignore the sacrifices and hard 
work of other people under the direction of governmental management, such as that in 
the Kekexili No.1 action.  
In other words, the substance of the conflict surrounding the Wild Yak Team was 
whether the top-bottom bureaucratic rules or the public opinion would be the decisive 
factor to distribute the mobilized social resources. That’s why we can see the local 
government finally intervened in the media issue framing to compete with the supporters 
of the Wild Yak Team. And, the conflict just implied the contradiction between the 
modernization of China’s society according to the economic growth and the hysteretic 
political reform. Thus, there had been rarely no possibility of compromise between the 
fossil local officials and the idealistic and somehow hotheaded young civil society. Under 
the unacceptable coexistence of governmental authority and NGO subjectivity at that 
                                                        
1 Li Jing and Zhu Wenqin, “The elimination of Wild Yak Team: the report on its living and death of a 
environmental organization <ye maoniu dui de xiaoshi: yige huanbao zuzhi de shengsi baogao>,” 
Sanlian Life Weekly Online, published on September 3, 2000. See the reshipment on South News Group 
online. [http://www.southcn.com/news/china/china04/kkxl/tears/local/200304220799.htm] 
2 see: “Who will protect Kekexili”. And the conscious framing of the conflicting image had been a 
common choice of mass media in shaping the hero.   
3 Zeng, “Media Agenda Building and Public Expression in NGO,” p. 17. 
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time, the limited capability of the civil society had been demonstrated along with the 
disband process of the Wild Yak Team. Even though, the supporters of the Wild Yak 
Team had attempted to repeat their success in the Yunnan Monkey case, writing the 
petition to the top official for the central pressure on the local government, they only had 
the negative response. Because it’s easy to find that in this case, there hadn’t been any 
obvious local disobedience to the center. At the last moment of the Team, Liang finally 
got aware of that both NGOs and mass media had forgotten to “praise the parents before 
praise their children”1. Thus, Liang did his last effort to write a letter to the Qinghai 
Provincial People’s Consultative Committee, in the name of the member of the 
national-level CPPCC, to “thank the local authority for cultivating the heroic 
anti-poaching squad”2. But it was already “too late”3. For the respectable old man, it even 
might have been the vigorous support of the civil society had inspired the “counterattack” 
of the local government to lead to the tragic ending4.  
However, the sadness caused by the unsuccessful attempt for the subjectivity 
construction could be partly relieved by the success on concentrating national and public 
concern on the Tibetan antelope protection. Some participating activists and journalists 
believed that the antelope had got the status in China’s wildlife protection only secondary 
to the Panda5. Another well-known evidence is that the special passage for the antelope 
had been planned into the Qinghai-Tibet railway construction and drawn the extensive 
media attention. Another well-known evidence is that the special passage for the antelope 
had been planned into the Qinghai-Tibet railway construction and drawn the extensive 
media attention. And moreover, there is an especially important outcome of this activism 
that, from 2002, national power has formally intervened in antelope protection volunteer 
recruitment, which indicates the conscious attachment of importance of social resource 
integration and assure the “orientation” in favor of Party-state orthodoxy. 
                                                        
1 Zhao and Chang, “The ten years of Liang Congjie and the ten years of Friends of Nature.” 
2 Zhao and Chang, “The ten years of Liang Congjie and the ten years of Friends of Nature.” 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. And, similar statements can be also seen in：The open letter of Liang Congjie to a young 
environmentalist on the lessons of the civil antelope protection, [http://www.green-river.org/hujia.htm]; 
and Katherine Morton, “Transnational advocacy at the grassroots: benefits and risks of international 
cooperation”, in Ho and Edmons, ed., China's Embedded Activism, pp. 214. 
5 For example, Liang Congjie and Xi Zhihong used expressed this opinion while interviewed by the TV 
program, “The 60-minute Magazine”, produced by the Xinhua News Agency.  
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Chapter Four 
Environmental Department Initiatives and Normalized Channel to link 
Politics and Society: 
The Case of Yuanmingyuan Anti-seepage Project 
 
Tibetan antelope protection witnessed the early attempt of environmental NGOs to 
play the similar part of their counterparts in developed democracies and some certain 
nations in transition. The pursuit of subjectivity as an independent factor for 
policymaking cannot be taken as successful, but the experiences indicate their special 
advantages to combine with institutional resources to open the political access. And, 
correspondingly, policy entrepreneurs also noticed opportunities, especially, after 
reformists took leading position in the central environmental department (SEPA). During 
the first five years of 21st century, reformists had begun their battle to apply legal 
leverages and suppress aggressive construction plans designed by profit-oriented 
entrepreneurs, to speak specifically, the coalition of departments in certain industries and 
large state-owned enterprises. Thus, activists of environmental NGOs and mass media, 
who already experienced common actions in wild life conservation, was integrated under 
SEPA initiatives while SEPA’s positive investment of institutional resources promoted 
them to be much less vulnerable to profit-oriented entrepreneurs, so as to outline the 
embedded mobilization. 
This chapter pays special attention to an influential controversy on water resource 
management in urban Beijing, where the water supply has been always rigorous1. This 
case, well-known as “Yuanmingyuan Anti-seepage Membrane Project Issue 
<Yuanmingyuan fangshen gongcheng shijian>” or “Yuanmingyuan (Membrane) Issue” 
in short, is generally taken as the symbolic cooperation between the environmental 
department and NGOs with other “social actors” against profit-oriented environmental 
damage. However, there is an important point without being paid enough attention that 
the rapid actions might not be simply the “public response” to a wrongdoing. In fact, the 
                                                        
1 Chen Shaojun, “Water Saving and Seepage Reduction Projects: Experience from the Yuanmingyuan 
Lake-bed Seepage Control Project <fangshen gongcheng he jieshui: you yuanmingyuan hudi fangshen 
gongcheng xiang dao de>,” in China Environment and Development Review, Vol.3, pp. 249-254. 
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small-scale project just launched in 2003, and was almost completed in 2005 when it 
suddenly incurred great attention. And in addition, although all media discourses took its 
“negative effects on environment” as “obviously serious” in 2005, media coverage with 
regard to the project before it had never doubted the environmental influence. Then, if we 
link the phenomenon to the 2005 “Environmental Protection Storm <huanbao 
fengbao>” led by SEPA with utilization of mass media assistance, and, if we pay more 
attention to the SEPA efforts in the Yuanmingyuan issue to promote the process, we’ll 
find it not a paradox phenomenon but demonstrating how institutional resources had 
been initiatively embedded into the seemingly social mobilization.  
 
1. The Case Happening At the Climax of the 20005 “EP Storm”  
In early 2005, China's environmental watchdog, the State Environment Protection 
Administration (SEPA) launched a big action which was called by mass media as 
“environmental protection storm”. It indicated the attitudes of active declaration of War 
against the strong profit-oriented departments, and further the different tactics of SEPA 
beyond the formal institutions to mobilize the social resources. On 18th January 2005, 
SEPA ordered 30 large industrial projects—twenty-six of them were energy 
projects—located in 13 provinces and valued at more than RMB 118 billion yuan (about 
US$13.7 billion) to halt for the reason that they had failed to complete required legal 
procedures of environmental impact assessment (EIA), according to the national 
Environmental Impact Assessment Law. Although the law provisions, which ordered that 
a project would not be approved until it had undergone an environmental appraisal, came 
into effect in September 2003, it was the first time that SEPA has used the granted power 
to halt projects. And, on 27 January, SEPA launched a second wave by announcing a list 
of 46 thermal power plants. According to the SEPA, all of them were not equipped of 
needed de- sulphurization mechanisms, posing a threat to the environment. Those plants 
were among the 137 de-sulphurisation projects planned in the country's acid rain and 
sulphur dioxide control regions covering 109 square kilometers with 39 per cent of the 
nation's total population.  
Given SEPA’s weakness, as mentioned in the second chapter, the extensive and 
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clearly pointed “storm” had brought big surprise. Not only all the energy projects were 
designed to satisfy China’s rapid economic growth, which means economic priority, and 
major polluters, but also the listed banned projects included ultra-large projects backed 
by powerful profit-oriented departments much stronger than the environmental 
watchdog. For example, it included three hydro-electric power stations of China Three 
Gorges Project Corporation (CTGPC).The Ministry-level state-owned enterprises was 
established to operate the well-know Three Gorgeous Dam, the world’s largest 
hydro-electricity project, who was on a par with SEPA in the political hierarchy. Thus, the 
dynamics of “environmental protection storm” was naturally interpreted by observers as 
the result of a 'turf war' between SEPA and other profit-oriented departments. To put it in 
another way, SEPA is engaged in a “power expansion” (kuo quan)1. 
It’s unusual for SEPA to positively make the order public—he at the first time put it 
on website and held news conference—because traditional Chinese bureaucracy preferred 
to negotiate among conflicting departments with little information disclosure, at least 
until they had achieved the balance. SEPA’s unusual actions drew attention of mass 
media and environmental activists, and it might be taken as a good attempt to for the 
weak environmental department to involve the “third actor”, the public, into its conflict 
with profit-orientation, for example the CTGPC, who ignored the formal order for halting 
its projects of SEPA even despite of the top environmental watchdog’s threat to take legal 
actions. But the public attention hadn’t maintained long, because, National Development 
and Reform Commission, the central development planning body ruling above SEPA and 
CTGPC, quickly intervened in their conflict, said to be under the direct directive of the 
Premier. Two weeks from the SEPA order, CTGPC surrendered under an unexposed 
bureaucratic process, with consideration of national planning, interest balancing, 
bureaucratic shielding and leadership coercion. That means, although the conflict was 
resolved to in favor of SEPA’s target, either public participation or law’s authority was 
limited, and, SEPA’s institutional weak position in the system didn’t change. Thus, SEPA 
and mass media, activists with concern on environmental management and system 
                                                        
1 Jian Yang, “Understanding China’s ‘environmental protection storm’: Jian Yang comments on a recent 
burst of activity by China's environmental protection agency,” New Zealand International Review, Vol. 
30, 2005. [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_6991/is_3_30/ai_n28274641/] 
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reform needed more to demonstrate the demand and to expand the power, institutionally. 
As SEPA’s deputy director, Pan Yue, who was favored by Chinese liberalists as a maverick 
thinker or even exaggerated to be “China’s Yeltsin”, declared, “We must sharpen our teeth. 
We shall never be rubber stamps. We must take concrete actions” 1 . When the 
environmental “storm” and public passion hadn’t subsided, in 2005 March, a 
construction project in Beijing’s Yuanmingyuan Park ignited the passion again. And at 
this time, SEPA, environmental activists and mass media made a strong alliance, 
promoting an inspiring media wave, and, through the influence of “public opinion”, 
traditional bureaucratic policy making was excluded, SEPA successfully set a sample for 
its vow of reform: law authority, public participation, and further, democracy2.  
The Yuanmingyuan Park (Old Summer Palace) is located in the northeast part of 
Beijing, a masterpiece of royal gardens built from 1709 onwards and burned down by the 
British and French aggressor troops in 1860, and known as a famous scenic spot. The 
controversial project was launched from 2004, which was a multi-dollar environmental 
renovation scheme, including a water-saving plan to cover its 133-hectare lake bed with 
impermeable membrane, for preventing the lake seepage. And, media wave started in 
2005 March, when some experts expressed their question on the ecological influence of 
the antiseepage membrane plan. Thus, the public issue was generally known as 
"Yuanmingyuan antiseepage issue” (Yuanmingyuan fangshen shijian), or “Yuanmingyuan 
issue”. During the climax of media wave, the key words of “yuanmingyuan fangshen” 
(yuanmingyuan antiseepage) could lead to 81300 and 84800 reports separately on Yahoo! 
and Google searching3. In Beijing, the capital with both most complicated bureaucratic 
networks and most well-educated public, under the active role of SEPA, environmental 
activists (especially the organized NGO activists) and mass media, the focus of issue 
framing was promoted from discussion on whether the project had negative 
environmental effects to how to enforce legal procedurals and introduce public 
participation mechanisms to reform China’s environmental governance.  
                                                        
1 “Understanding China’s ‘environmental protection storm’,” 
2 See for example: Yuhong Zhao, “Public Participation in China’s EIA Regime: Rhetoric or Reality?” J 
Environmental Law, 22(1), 2010. pp. 89-123. 
3 See: Zhang Haixin, “Environmental NGO and Media Supervision <huanjing fei zhengfu zuzhi yu 
xinwen yulun jiandu>,” the Master Paper, Hebei University, publicized on July 8, 2006. 
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2. Entry of the Antiseepage Project into Media Coverage 
2.1. The Bureaucratic Scheme Making with the Absence of Environmental 
Agencies 
This controversial water conserve plan is part of the general scheme of 
“Comprehensive Project on Yuanmingyuan Park Environmental Renovation”. According 
to the Park administration, due to rainless period and lake bed seepage, the 
administration had suffered from financial problems to maintain enough water to keep 
scenic sight and plants alive. Irrigationists provided them with the method of 
impermeable membrane, which was judged by economic governmental sectors as a 
mature technology to conserve water1, and, also being used in some other parks of Beijing. 
The total spending of the membrane plan was reported by mass media to be 30 million 
RMB (US$3.6 million) at first, and for a time during the report climax, reported as 150 
million RMB (US$18 million). 
The scheme-making progress had taken a long time, from 2003 to 2005, with the 
participation of Beijing Municipal Administration of Cultural Heritage, Beijing Water 
Authority, Beijing Municipal Government and Haidian District Government. According 
to the formal files brought forth by the Park administration later, there seemed to follow 
the policy-making custom in urban governance of China—experts’ review and 
bureaucrats’ executive decision without public participation—environmental sector was 
also absent in this progress. Rather than saying the environmental sector was excluded, 
it’s better to say it was ignored.  From 2003 to 2004, only several media reports had 
mentioned the scheme, either on pure introduction to the necessity2 or kind of solicitude 
                                                        
1 The anti-seepage materials utilized in the membrane is listed in the “ordinary materials” according to 
the “Policy Guidelines for the Techniques of Saving Water in China <zhongguo jieshui jishu zhengce 
dagang>,” published by National Development and Reform Committee, Ministry of Science and 
Technology, Ministry of Water Resource, Ministry of Construction, and Ministry of Agriculture, on April 
21, 2005. The Article 2.2.3. 
2 Similar reports covering the project in 2003 can question the media statement in 2004 that “the 
public had been ignorant of the project before”. See for example: “Fu lake in Yuanmingyuan was 
changed into arable land <yuanmingyuan “fuhai” bian gedi>,” December 15. Also as reference to: 
Beijing Youth Daily, “Low water level brought death like flies to the fish in Yuanmingyuan Park, Beijing 
<beijing: dishuiwei shide yuanmingyuan yu dapi siwang>,” Beijing Youth Daily, March 3rd, 2003. 
Beijing Stardaily,  “Tracing water shortage in Yuanmingyuan: water from Wanquan River was 
channeled in <yuanmingyuan fuhai ganhe zhuizong: Yuanmingyuan yinlai wanquanhe shui>,” March 
19th, 2003. Beijing Daily, “Yuanmingyuan is troubled by water shortage every year during the seven 
month long rainless period <meinian kushuiqi qige yue zuoyou, shuijing queshui kunrao 
yuanmingyuan>,” July 26th, 2003.  
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to relic protection1.  
2.2  Early Media Exposure according to “Accident” 
In later March, 2005, when the Park administration nearly finished their work of 
covering lake bed, a tourist named Zhang Zhengchun “incidentally” discovered the 
project and soon wrote to several main stream newspapers—Beijing News, China Youth 
and People’s Daily—under the name of “an ecologist and visiting professor of Lanzhou 
University” in March 22nd. In his letter, he asserted that “covering the lake bed with 
impermeable membrane will cut off its relations with the underground water system”, 
was “an ecological disaster” and “should be stopped immediately” 2. After receiving 
positive response, Zhang further mailed an article, “Save Yuanmingyuan Park” to more 
journalists in 26th, and, at the same day, got touch with Li Hao, the leader of an NGO 
named “Earth View”, by whose help Zhang got more contact with the social circle of 
journalists from well-known local and national newspapers. In March 28th, only 6 days 
after Zhang’s letter, the first related media report was published on People’s Daily, the 
official paper of Chinese Communist Party. This article, named “Membrane on 
Yuanmingyuan’s lake bed: protection or damage”, led audience’s focus to environmental 
protection, which also keynoted the following media boom. As Zhang himself described, 
“It’s really like a bomb! That happened in Yuanmingyuan is reported throughout the 
country.” 3 In latter reports, several experts echoed Zhang’s view, and the possible 
“disaster” caused by the membrane was further claimed to be “preventing the water from 
seeping into the ground, disturbing Beijing’s underground water system”.  
Soon after the first report, NGO activists in Beijing energetically participated in. From 
March 28th, Liang Congjie, who had played important role in the case of Tibetan antelope 
with his well-known organization, “Friends of Nature” (FON), spoke to People’s Daily, 
South Weekend and Chinese Central Television, claiming to support the view of Zhang 
Zhengchun, asking to stop the nearly finished project. However, factually, as early as in 
                                                        
1 For example, the Beijing News had reported the opposition of experts on historical relics to the lining 
of the lake-bed. See: Beijing News, “Four sight sports of Yuanmingyuan are kept as it to be 
(yuanmingyuan si da jingdian huifu canmao),” September 17th, 2004. 
2 People’s Daily, “Is lining Yuanmingyuan’s lakebed with antiseepage membrane protection or damage 
(yuanmingyuan di zhengzai pushe fangshenmo baohu haishi pohuai)?” March 28th, 2005. 
3 Shanghai Morning Post, “The first one to quest antiseepage project just stood out (zhiyi fangshen 
gongcheng diyiren xianshen),” April 13th, 2005. 
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2004, Liang, as a veteran historian, had questioned Yuanmingyuan Park’s renovation 
scheme from the respect of historical relic protection, without being sensitive to possible 
ecological damage1. That may tell us, it was exactly the media exposure to lead people to 
link the “environmental renovation project” with ecological damage.  
2.3 Media Framing to Link the Project with Ecological Damage 
Generally, the media’s issue framing during those days was mainly consisted of two 
parts. Firstly, the membrane project was an ecological disaster, and, this conclusion was 
made by “experts’ agreement”. By checking the media reports, we can easily find 
assertions like “lake and vegetation going dead”, “whole ecological system being 
damaged” (People’s Daily)2, “this method (of membrane) has already been rejected by 
main stream ecology” (South Weekend) 3, or “ecological system can take care of itself so 
that there is no need to prevent seepage” (Beijing News) 4. And further, some experts 
described the lake water of the Park as “water of life for Beijing”, like “for Beijing, the 
ecological system of Yuanmingyuan is playing a role in water conservation, weather 
regulation, biodiversity maintenance, groundwater purification and supplement, and so 
on” (China Environmental News) 5, “water seepage in Yuanmingyuan is necessary to the 
whole Beijing’s water system and shouldn’t be prevented” (Beijing News) 6 , or 
“membrane would damage the Yuanmingyuan’ s ecological chains developed during 
hundreds of years, and also the whole ecological conditions of North Beijing” (Beijing 
Evening News) 7. Such discourses clearly impressed common audience with a negative 
image of the membrane project. And moreover, while these assertions were all claimed by 
“experts”, it became much more trustable. As Niklas Luhmann, in his book “Ecological 
Communication”, pointed, communication in environmental issue always became 
                                                        
1 See: “Yuanmingyuan Historical Relics is possibly not able to be protected anymore (yuanmingyuan 
yizhi gongyuan keneng baobuzhu le),” People’s Daily, July 20th, 2004. “Yuanmingyuan cannot be 
destroyed for the third time (yuanmingyuan buneng zai hui disanci le),” Beijing News, October 20th, 
2004. 
2 “Is lining Yuanmingyuan’s lakebed with antiseepage membrane protection or damage?” 
3 “What has been buried in Yuanmingyuan <yuanmingyuab maixia le shenme>?” South Weekend, 
April 1, 2005.  
4 Liu Jianhong, “The Lake-bed lining to save water in Yuanmingyuan has been questioned 
<yuanmingyuan hudi pu fangshen mo jieshui zao zhiyi>,” Beijing News, March 29, 2005.  
5 Zhang Zhengchun, “Yuanmingyuan marsh can benefit the capital <yuanmingyuan shidi ke zaofu 
shoudu>,” China Environmental News, April 21, 2005.  
6 Liu, “The Lake-bed lining to save water in Yuanmingyuan has been questioned,” 
7 Sun Haidong, “Specialists questioned the lake-bed anti-seepage measures <zhuanjia zhiyi hudi 
fangshen>,” Beijing Evening, March 31, 2005.  
 122
complicated because of profession limitation and multiple interests, and, in this situation, 
expert identity, which easily to be trusted, could make communication less difficult1. A 
2005 social investigation in China indicated that 58% of interviewees hoped “experts” to 
use their professional knowledge to influence public policies, and 38% took “experts” as 
“mouthpiece of public interest” 2. Also, another investigation in 2006 showed that 78.6% 
of urban interviewees and 80.8% of rural ones ranked “professors” as the first to trust3. 
Thus, we may find that the issue-framing of “ecological disaster” claimed by “experts” had 
left audience very few spaces to make their own consideration.  
Secondly, compared with critics expressed by commonly trustable experts, reported 
explanations to support the project were mostly expressed by park officials and experts 
who were “possibly share the same interest with officials (Beijing News, Jinghua Times)4. 
Media’ s discourses clearly framed the contradictions between two views  as rooted in 
the conflict between two social status, with experts to criticize the project on behalf of 
public interest and officials caring their own interest. Literally, the word of “zhen feng 
xiang dui” (be diametrically opposed to) was frequently used between “experts and the 
public” and “officials” (i. g. People’s Daily 5 , China Youth 6 , Beijing News 7 ). Like 
mentioned before, the symbol of “experts” made the critics more persuasive, with the 
symbol of “officials” made the opposition. There is a direct proof for this tactic. On one 
side, Zhang zhengchun, who at first exposed the project to mass media, might be the most 
well-known “expert” in this cast. His identity of expert was supported by the title of 
“ecologist” and “guest professor of Lanzhou University”. But, in 2005, the university 
                                                        
1 Niklas Luhmann, Ecological Communication, translated by John Bednarz, Jr. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1989. 
2 China Youth Daily, A poll indicates people takes the professor, teacher and judge as the most trustable 
characters (diaocha xianshi gongzhong dui jiaoshou, laoshi, faguan xinrendu pai qiansan), October 30th, 
2006. 
3 Data from: Horizonkey Investigation Company website. Source:  
http://www.horizonkey.com/showart.asp?art_id=605&cat_id=6 
4 Similar opinions to doubt the independence of the specialists to agree with the project can be seen, for 
example, in: Beijing News Editorial, “What kind of experts can determine Yuanmingyuan’s future 
<shenmeyang de zhuanjia dui yuanmingyuan you jueding quan>?”, Beijing News, April 22, 2005; and 
Bi Lei, “Who dose Yuanmingyuan belong to <yuanmingyuan shi shui de>,” Jinghua Times, April 4, 
2005.  
5 Zhao, “Is lining Yuanmingyua’s lakebed with antiseepage membrane protection or damage?” 
6 “The public cannot carry out their right to control public assets: the property predicament in national 
parks <zhuren wuquan zuozhu: guojia jingqu de chanquan kunju>,” China Youth Daily, March 31, 
2005.  
7 “The final safety of Yuanmingyuan depends on the management system reform <gaige guanli tizhi 
yuanmingyuan cai neng huode zuizhong anquan>,” Beijing News, March 29, 2005.  
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located in Gansu province officially declared it to be untrue on a local newspaper, and, 
demanded Zhang “stop doing anything under this title” 1. However, the university’s 
statement was ignored by most main stream media and the title was kept being used. On 
the other side, when the director of Yuanmingyuan Park tried to defend the project, he 
was introduced as “having experiences of grass-roots cadre”. There was no report to 
mention that the official, graduated from Beijing Forestry University, factually had a 
professional background of ecology.  
In general, media boom during the first several days made the impression of 
“environmental disaster”, which had preliminarily drew public attention. However, the 
first days only demonstrated the action of personal experts and journalists, but the strong 
issue-framing of “ecological disaster” could then link environmental NGOs and 
environmental watchdog “naturally” into the issue. In other words, it the issue framing 
made a base for the actual “mobilization”, which leaded to unified actions by 
“government” and “civil society”. 
 
3. Intervention of SEPA and the Official Orientation of mass media 
3.1 Expanding media Scope and the Obstruction from Government 
Based on the judgment of “ecological disaster”, it was logically for the mass media to 
ascertain where the responsibility lay. At the first time, which means, before the active 
participation of SPEA, the mass media generally focused on criticizing of individual 
officials from the Yuanmingyuan Park administration. It was surmised that officials from 
Yuanmingyuan Park administration might have tried to keep enough water in lake just to 
make tourists enjoy boating, thus, the administration could make more money (i. g. 
People’s Daily2, Beijing News34, China Youth5, Beijing Youth6, Nanfang Daily1, South 
                                                        
1 “May Zhang Zhengchun not be the professor of Lanzhou University <zhang zhenchun bushi lanzhou 
daxue kezuo jiaoshou>?” Guangzhou Daily, April 4, 2005.  
2 Zhao, “Is lining Yuanmingyua’s lakebed with antiseepage membrane protection or damage?” 
3 liu, “The Lake-bed lining to save water in Yuanmingyuan has been questioned,”  
4 Editorial, “The city kidney cannot be divided from the land mother <chengshi zhi shen yu dadi zhi mu 
buke fen>,” Beijing News, March 30, 2005.  
5 Media reporting claimed that the project contained “corruption” since that the building contactor was 
doubted to be unilaterally decided by water resource department without public bidding. See: “No public 
bidding in Yuanmingyuan project <yuanmingyuan zhengzhi wei jingguo zhao tou biao>?” Beijing 
News, April 13, 2005; and “Analysis of interests behind anti-seepage project <fangshen gongcheng 
beihou de liyi fenxi>,” China Youth Daily, April 4, 2005.  
6 Huang Jianhua, “Participants list for Yuanmingyuan anti-seepage hearing is decided today 
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Weekend2). While mass media emphasized the “stupid”, “irresponsible”, and “greedy” 
images of Park officials, they seemed to have been discussing it as an independent event. 
However, there were still some sensitive journalists having tried to dig deeper, 
reporting this issue as a more typical case to discuss the environmental governance 
system. The most important question of them was, whether this project had gone through 
enough legal procedures. For example, People’s Daily firstly raised the doubt on March 
30th that the Park administration might have abused their administrative power to 
disobey the law. This report, under the title of “Yuanmingyuan is not a pleasure ground: 
the membrane project is illegal” 3, firstly quoted relevant provisions of 2003 “Law of the 
People's Republic of China on the Environmental Impact Assessment” (EIA law) 4, which 
had been depended on by SEPA in the “environmental protection storm”, and 2002 
“Cultural Relics Law” to doubt that the membrane project hadn’t undergone its legal 
procedure without being assessed by environmental and cultural relic protection 
watchdog5. But, to journalists’ disappointment, their faming of illegal procedures hadn’t 
been echoed by relevant governmental sectors at the first time. On March 30th, Beijing 
Cultural Relics Bureau replied to interviewer from Beijing Evening News that, “as 
membrane project is part of Yuanmingyuan’s whole environment management scheme, 
it’s hard to make clear whether it is a ‘construction project’” 6. And, just on the next day, 
reporter of Beijing Youth also got a similar answer from Beijing Environmental 
                                                                                                                                                               
<yuanmingyuan fangshen gongcheng tingzheng hui jinri queding canhui renyuan mingdan>,” Beijing 
Youth Daily, April 12, 2005.  
1 Zhang Tiankan, “Yuanmingyuan anti-seepage and reflection on urban ecology <yuanmingyuan 
fangshen yu chengshi shengtai fansi>,” Nanfang Dushi Bao, March 30, 2005.   
2 liu, “What has been buried in Yuanmingyuan,” 
3 Liu Qiong, Lai Renqiong, Liu Yi and Zhao Yongxin, “Yuanmingyuan is not pleasure ground, 
anti-seepage project is not legal <yuanmingyuan bushi youlechang, fangshen gongcheng wu 
hefaxing>,” People’s Daily, March 30, 2005.  
4 “Law of the People's Republic of China on the Environmental Impact Assessment”, (Adopted October 
28, 2002.  Effective September 1, 2003). Source: www.chinaenvironmentallaw.com 
5 See: Liu Q, Lai, Liu Y and Zhao, “Yuanmingyuan is not pleasure ground, anti-seepage project is not 
legal,” This report claimed the Yuanmingyuan Administration “flagrantly violated” the “law of historic 
relics amended in 2002”, but didn’t point exactly which article was violated. I think, here, the “law of 
historic relics” was the most possible to mean the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the 
Protection of Cultural Relics” amended for the second time in 2002, specifically, Article 18 to formulate 
that “while carrying out capital construction or agricultural production， any unit or individual that 
discovers cultural relics shall immediately report the discoveries to the local department for cultural 
administration. In case of important discoveries， the local department for cultural administration must 
submit timely reports for handling by the departments for cultural administration at higher level”.  
6 “Environmental department intervenes into Yuanmingyuan anti-seepage project <huanbao bumen 
jieru yuanmingyuan fangshen gongcheng>,” Beijing Evening, March 30, 2005.  
 125
protection Bureau1.  
Why the two bureaus couldn’t give the mass media positive response to make a ruling 
on the membrane project? One reason might be that the provisions of the laws were 
somehow not clear in defining “construction project”. At that time, the EIA Law only 
stipulated, in its Article 9, the “specific scope of programs for which environmental 
impact appraisals shall be made according to the provisions of Articles 7 and 8 of the 
present Law shall be prescribed by the administrative department under the State 
Council in charge of environmental protection jointly with other relevant departments of 
the State Council and be submitted to the State Council for ratification”. And in addition, 
the EIA law still demanded that the “names of the construction projects subject to 
classified management of appraisal of environmental impacts shall be determined and 
published by the administrative department of the State Council in charge of 
environmental protection” (Chapter 3, Article 16). In fact, the formal directory of 
“construction project” hadn’t been completed until 2005. Also, relevant cultural relics 
protection laws hadn’t had a definite directory of “construction project” until 20082. Thus, 
it was hard for the watchdogs to conclude whether the Yuanmingyuan Park 
administration had disobeyed the laws. In other words, there was no authority, legal or 
governmental, to back up the judgment of mass media. But, on the contrary, the Park 
administration was attempting to persuade the public of the project validity, and 
moreover, they were supported by Haidian District Government, one of the original 
policy makers. On March 31st, the Park administration issued a formal statement to 
reaffirm the membrane project was a part of “environmental protection scheme”, 
thus, there was no need of environmental impact assessment3. And, on the same 
day, the Haidian District Government held a symposium, inviting irrigationists and 
ecologists. According to the invited experts’ argument, the membrane project to keep 
                                                        
1 “Haidian district government, Beijing, responds to questions on Yuanmingyuan anti-seepage project 
and invites specialists for reexamination <Beijing haidian zhengfu huiying yuanmingyuan fangshen 
gongcheng, qing zhuanjia zai lunzheng>, Beijing Youth Daily, March 31, 2005. 
2 However, with reference to related legal provisions, “Measures for Administration of Qualification for 
Construction of Cultural Relics Protection Projects” coming into force in May 2003 has no related 
formulation of coerce EIA process on relics-related projects. And there were no related formulations 
until 2008, when the “Provisional Regulations on Approving Relics Protection Projects” came into force.  
3 “Haidian district government, Beijing, responds to questions on Yuanmingyuan anti-seepage project 
and invites specialists for reexamination 
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water was a reaction to the general degradation of Beijing’s ecological system, in other 
words, the Yuanmingyuan, only trying to rescue itself, was not an injurer but a sufferer1.  
Even though the strong defense of the Park administration and original policy maker 
were not widely reported, there seemed that the mass media couldn’t have reached 
enough resources to support their critics. The most important was that when the 
departments resorted to by the mass media hesitated to cooperate, the media framing of 
“illegal procedures” would have become vulnerable. As an active environmental journalist 
wrote, unreconciledly, “under the active public participation and powerful media 
supervision, despite of there are verified evidences of ecological disaster and illegal 
construction project, the related departments still give no positive reaction” 2. Obviously, 
the mass media, their cooperating experts and NGO activists had got tired of their weak 
position in the debate with yuanmingyuan Park administration and the original policy 
makers in the government—especially the water resource sector and Haidian District 
Government—and, it was natural for the mass media to demand an effective ruling power 
to end the project whose “main part” had been “completed”3. And, echoing the voices, 
SEPA began to play its important role.  
3.2  SEPA Intervention according to Elite Network 
On March 31st, when expanding media scope was obstructed, SEPA formally stood up 
to demonstrate its ruling on the project, by issuing an official notice to Yuanmingyuan 
Park administration, charging them to stop the membrane project. The notice was the 
first official declaration to quote article 31 of EIA Law to deny the validity of 
Yuanmingyuan’s membrane project, and further, the notice called for a public hearing to 
“end the debate” 4, which was also based on the EIA Law. While officially halting the 
project, SEPA also publicized a press release to the mass media. This document was 
consisted of three parts. Firstly, SEPA expressed affirmative reply to the mass media’s 
question of the legal procedures. It said, the project had disobeyed the related provisions 
                                                        
1 Xia Mingqun, “Yuanmingyuan is not injurer on environmental destroy <yuanmingyuan bushi pohuai 
huanjing de shihai zhe>,” Jinghua News, April 1, 2005.  
2 Liu Jianqiang, “From one hundred days of fogyism to reform in Yuanmingyuan <yuanmingyuan 
shijian cong bairi weijiu dao bairi weixin>,” South Weekend, July 21, 2005.  
3 “Yuanmingyuan lake bed project questioned,” China Daily, March 30th, 2005, page 3. 
4 SEPA: Notice on Ordering Yuanmingyuan Comprehensive Improvement Project to be Halted <guanyu 
zeling yuanmingyuan huanjing zonghe zhengzhi gongcheng tizhi jianshe de tongzhi>,” SEPA letter No. 
101. [http://www.zhb.gov.cn/info/gw/huanhan/200504/t20050401_65763.htm] 
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of “large-scale construction project costing more than 50 million yuan (about 6 million 
US dollars) in any state-level important cultural relic sites should submit environmental 
impact assessment report to the SEPA for examination and endorsement” 1. Secondly, as 
regards to whether the membrane project was “construction project” applying to the EIA 
Law, SEPA also gave an affirmative response that “with large numbers of machines, 
severe change to the ecology and land surface, and a huge sum of investment…it must be 
a ‘construction’”2. Based on the affirmation, this document concluded, “it’s not only a 
breach of legal procedures, but also a much more serious case” 3. Thirdly, SEPA called for 
a public hearing held on the project, to introduce public participation into the resolution. 
To speak precisely, there were not enough details in the EIA law to support the 
conclusion, which means, it was the political identity of SEPA, a state-level ruling 
department for environmental protection, to make its conclusion persuasive. But it was 
exactly what the mass media and environmental activists needed, effective support from 
political authority. By tracing the actions of mass media before SEPA’s intervention, 
journalists had pinned their hopes on the watchdogs of municipal level, but the negative 
attitudes of the municipal sectors had brought the mass media into an embarrassment: 
they had early announced their justice of presenting public opinion before obtaining 
enough material evidences to support their accusation, while the Yuanmingyuan Park 
administration had steadfast governmental supporters, who had participated in the 
original policy making of the project. In other words, before the SEPA’s intervention, the 
efforts of mass media with some experts and environmental activists to boycott the 
project and to emphasize public participation put themselves on a non-negotiable 
opposition against the governmental power. As one of Beijing’s largest-circulation 
newspapers, Beijing News, wrote, “the local departments who have direct ruling on 
Yuamingyuan Park Administration refused to reflecting and performing their duty to 
                                                        
1 Liu Jianhong, “Yuanminguan lake-bed anti-seepage project was ordered to halt yesterday while 
nearing accomplishment <yuanmingyuan hudi fangshen gongcheng jiben wangong, zuo bei 
jiaoting>,” Beijing News, April 1, 2005.  
2 Editorial, “What’ll be the dropscene of Yuanmingyuan anti-seepage project <yuanmingyuan fangshen 
gongcheng gai ruhe shouchang>,” Beijing News, April 2, 2005.  
3 Liu, “Yuanminguan lake-bed anti-seepage project was ordered to halt yesterday while nearing 
accomplishment ,” But there was no further explanation to the conclusion of “much more serious case”.  
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punish the illegal project” 1, thus, appealing to a more authoritative watchdog had 
become a logical choice for the mass media. 
On March 31st, in a media event, a environmental activist and freelancer, Xi 
Zhilong—this name was also mentioned in the Tibetan Antelope isssue, and he had been 
a photographer of the Chinese Central Television—found deputy director Pan Yue of 
SEPA, who was one of the very few officials invited to the event mainly consisted of 
journalists and scholars2. Xi, as a private friend, presented Pan the front page report on 
South Weekend, titled “What dangers have been hidden in Yuanmingyuan 
(yuanmingyuan maixia le shenme)?” with photos by Xi himself. While indicating there 
was “ecological disaster” happening in the historical relic site, Xi asked Pan for “effective 
measures” by SEPA. Much different form the municipal sectors, Pan on the spot gave a 
positive reaction. While finishing reading, Pan “immediately” promised Xi that the SEPA 
would “certainly give a satisfactory answer to the public”, and to be more affirmative, he 
made a written comment on the South Weekend brought by Xi. As mentioned in early 
cases, in China’s political practice, the written comment of political leaders or other 
high-level officials, even if in informal situations, can be taken as of the same effects as 
official decisions through formal procedures. According to South Weekend’s later report, 
the written comment showed Pan had already made his decision to stop the membrane 
project “at once” while he had just finished reading the report brought by Xi3. Then, only 
hours later, mass media received the media release from SEPA to publicize the formal 
decision on the membrane project and Yuanmingyuan Park administration, as mentioned 
in details. Judged from the dramatic meeting between Pan and Xi, and also, as SEPA 
admitted later, in a media interview several days after the meeting, the top watchdog had 
been totally ignorant of the project before the media exposure, and moreover, the quick 
measures taken by SEPA were completely based on the information provided by mass 
                                                        
1 Editorial, “Yuanmingyuan Issue: it shouldn’t to let environmental department to fight a lone battle 
<yuanmingyuan shijian: bu gai rang huanbao bumen gujun fenzhan>,” Beijing News, April 26, 2005. 
2 That was the symposium for the 20th anniversary of Southwind Window Magazine, an influential 
reformist publication. Pan Yue was invited for his former working experiences as a journalist and the 
close relationships with reporting professionals also for his “reformist attitudes of development and 
transition”. See: “Record on the symposium for the 20th anniversary of Southwind Window Magazine,” 
Sohu web. [http://news.sohu.com/20050331/n224957941.shtml] 
3 Liu Jianqiang, “To pursue solution to Yuanmingyuan deadlock after 40 days of dry lake <hupo ganhe 
sishi tian hou qiujie yuanmingyuan jiangju>,” South Weekend, May 12, 2005.  
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media1.  
3.3 Motivations of SEAP Intervention: Application of EIA Law 
While discussing the success of mass media in achieving an authoritative 
governmental sector to support their issue-framing and to strengthen the material 
pressure on Yuanmingyuan Park administration, we are also confronted with two 
questions: a) why the deputy director of SEPA could quickly make his decision just by 
basing on a single media report, without further consultation or analysis? b) The very 
short time, between Pan’s meeting with Xi and the SEPA’ s media release and official 
notice to the Yuanmingyuan Park administration, indicated that it was impossible for 
SEPA to communicate with any original policy makers of the project or any other 
governmental sectors. In other words, SEPA didn’t hope the handling of the case to be 
limited in the official channels. Then, what made the top environmental watchdog decide 
to abandon the bureaucratic tradition in this case? Answers to these two questions may 
be oriented to a conclusion that SEPA’s focus was far beyond the Yuanmingyuan case 
itself. 
As mentioned in the second chapters, environmental sector had been powerless 
compared with economic profit-directed departments. That may explain why it was 
naturally absent in the original policy making of the Yuamingyuan project. However, also 
as mentioned before, its influence had been promoted from late 1990s, under efforts of 
both environmentalists and political leaders who had hoped to change China’s 
development mode. A most crucial policy to upgrade its real power was the legislative 
actions. In September 1st, 2003, China’s first “Law of the People's Republic of China on 
the Environmental Impact Assessment” (EIA law) came into force. According to this law, 
as in the general provisions, it tried to make the EIA a responsibility of any construction 
entity: 
 
To work out any of the programs…of the present Law or to build any project 
within the territory of the People’s Republic of China or within other seas subject 
                                                        
1 “Pan Yue, Deputy General of SEPA, claims ignorance of the project construction <guojia huanbao 
zongju fu juzhang pan yue: gongcheng donggong women bu zhiqing>,” Beijing News, April 14, 2005. 
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to the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China, appraisals shall be 
conducted about the environmental impacts according to the present Law.  
(Chapter 1, Article 4) 
And also, the environmental departments had been privileged to strengthen the 
enforcement power. As stipulated in the legal liabilities, the environmental department 
had been authorized the privileges of administrative penalty on violators, as: 
 
Where any construction entity fails to submit its environmental impact 
appraisal documents of the construction project concerned or fails to submit 
environmental impact documents for examination and approval anew or for 
inspection anew according to the provisions of Article 24 of the present Law and 
unlawfully starts the construction, it shall be ordered by the administrative 
department of environmental protection that is entitled to examine and approve 
the environmental impact appraisal documents to stop the construction and go 
through the relevant procedures within a prescribed time period. If it fails to go 
through the relevant procedures within the time period, it may be fined not less 
than 50,000 yuan but not more than 200,000 yuan, and the person in-charge 
and other personnel of the construction entity who are held to be directly 
responsible shall be given an administrative punishment.  
Where any construction entity unlawfully starts construction without obtaining 
approval for its environmental impact appraisal documents or without 
obtaining new approval of the original examination and approval department, 
it shall be ordered by the administrative department of environmental 
protection that is entitled to examine and approve the environmental impact 
appraisal documents to stop construction, and may be fined not less than 
50,000 yuan but not more than 200,000 yuan, and the person in-charge and 
other personnel of the construction entity who are held to be directly responsible 
shall be given an administrative punishment.  
Any construction entity of marine construction projects who commits any of the 
unlawful acts as described in the preceding two paragraphs shall be punished 
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according to the Law of the People's Republic of China on Protecting the Marine 
Environment. 
(Chapter 4, Article 31) 
These stipulations, if strictly enforced, obviously could become an effective weapon 
for environmentalists to withstand the profit orientation. But, since even today’s China 
still cannot to be taken as a country “ruled by law”, the EIA Law inevitably hadn’t been 
treated seriously until the Yuanmingyuan project being exposed by mass media. During 
the nearly one and a half years after the EIA Law had come into force, according to SEPA, 
there had been none of construction projects positively undergoing the EIA procedures 
dominated by environmental departments. As we mentioned at the beginning of the 
chapter, SEPA launched “environmental protection storm” to demonstrate the law 
authority, but the efforts was counteracted by traditional bureaucratic shielding. Thus, 
naturally, the SEPA found the Yuanmingyuan issue a big chance to promote the law 
provisions. As a SEPA official pointed to mass media, “Yuanmingyuan Park is not the 
only one to ignore the environmental impact assessment, and we can see through this 
issue that…there is serious defect in governance system1”. In other words, SEPA had the 
very dynamics to intervene in the Yuanmingyuan issue, not only linking the issue with 
environmental protection, but also subverting the whole bureaucratic policy making 
customs to set an example to strengthen the authority of the EIA Law and the 
environmental watchdog also.  
Besides emphasizing the authority of law, there was another action of SEPA to deal 
with the “serious defect in governance system” through Yuanmingyuan issue, that was, to 
create a public participation model of EIA. In SEPA’s March 31st notice to Yuanmingyuan 
Park administration office, in addition to the order to stop the project, SEPA called for a 
public hearing on resolution of the membrane project and the whole environmental 
restoration scheme, and the time was set on April 13th. The public hearing is a process of 
law generally applied in systems of Anglo-Saxon countries, which means a proceeding 
before court or other decision-making body or office. In the course of litigation, hearings 
                                                        
1 “Yuanmingyuan anti-seepage project drew attention: who does Yuanmingyuan belong to 
<yuanmingyuan fangshen gongcheng yinfa guanzhu: yuanmingyuan jiujing shi shui de>,” Beijing 
Evening, April 4, 2005.  
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are conducted as oral arguments in support of motions, whether to resolve the case 
without further trial on a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, or to decide 
discrete issues of law, such as the admissibility of evidence, that will determine how the 
trial proceeds. Limited evidence and testimony may also be presented in hearings to 
supplement the legal arguments. China’s public hearing system seems to be transplanted 
from the United Stats, where, from the “due process revolution”1 in 1960s, the public 
hearing has been taken as a necessary proceeding when many administrative decisions 
were once mad much less formally. In this case, the Public Hearing is a process in which 
interested parties and any other persons who may be affected by the result have the 
opportunity to make submissions, ask questions or register objections to a development 
application or other matter under the law, and, a Public Hearing body is comprised of 
elected officials or citizen members appointed by a special council2. This proceeding was 
drawn into the Chinese EIA Law for the purpose below:  
 
In case a program may cause unfavorable environmental impacts or directly 
involve the environmental interests of the general public, the organ that works 
out the special programs shall, prior to submitting the draft of the programs for 
examination and approval, seek the opinions of the relevant entities, experts 
and the general public about the draft of the report about the environmental 
impacts by holding demonstration meetings or hearings or by any other means, 
except it is provided by the state that it shall be kept confidential. 
The drafting organ shall take the opinions of the relevant entities, experts and 
the general public about the draft report of environmental impacts into careful 
consideration, and shall attach a remark whether the opinions are adopted or 
refused to the report of environmental impacts to be submitted for examination 
and approval.  
(Chapter 2, Article 11)  
                                                        
1 Due process revolution is a development of the due process clause of American legal system, whose 
main focus was on the application of that to political judgments by officials about how to run a school or 
to administer a government agency.  
2 Reference: Lorch Robert, Democratic Process and Administrative Law, Wayne State University Press, 
1980.  
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Obviously, judged form Article 11, holding a public hearing could be in favor of SEPA 
at least in three aspects: a) it helped to give prominence to the EIA law. b) A transparent 
and open proceeding could help minimize the intervention of other governmental sectors, 
especially local district or municipal governments who had direct ruling on 
Yuanmingyuan Park administration and participated in the original policy making of the 
project, and avoid a direct conflict inside the government, where SEPA was not in a 
strong position. c) By encouraging the public participation, the alliance of SEPA, mass 
media and environmental activists could be integrated through the proceeding, achieving 
a maximization of utility to withstand the original policy makers. That’s why the public 
hearing was also generally welcomed by the mass media. For example, China Youth Daily, 
the party paper of Chinese Communist Youth League and a good seller in Beijing, praised 
SEPA and the deputy director highly of recording “first” for establishing new public 
participation model1. South Weekend, a national best seller famous for its sharp political 
and social criticism, took the intervention of SEPA was a “successful start to create the 
‘harmonious society’ by the joint efforts of the government and public” 2. And, from then 
on, the focus of the mass media had transferred to report on the public hearing—details 
will be discussed later—as People’s Daily, the CCP party paper said, the mass media and 
the whole issue came into “the second stage” 3. What was it to be?  
 
4. Environmental Departments, NGOs and Mass Media United: against 
Original Policy Makers 
When we analyzed the mutual interests of mass media and environmental 
departments and their alliance in this case, we shouldn’t ignore the active participation of 
environmental NGOs. As in the research rhetoric, environmental NGOs are commonly 
permitted as a symbol of the “public”, thus, an empirical study of the new “political 
mobilization” of China cannot be without the absence of environmental NGOs. However, 
                                                        
1 “Yuanmingyuan, a number of events created the first hundred days exposure to environmental 
assessment,” China Youth Daily, July 12th, 2005. 
2 Liu, “From one hundred days of fogyism to reform in Yuanmingyuan,” 
3 Zhao Yongxin, “Yuanmingyuan Issue Promoted Public Participation <yuanmingyuan shijian tuidong 
gongzhong canyu>,” in Liang Congjie and Yang Dongping (ed.), FON Green Paper Book 2005: Crisis 
and Breakout, Beijing: Social Science Academic Press, 2006. p. 52.  
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following the trace of the Yuanmingyuan case, we may find that environmental NGOs 
hadn’t become the starter. At the first stage—as the mass media defined, before SEPA 
formally halted the project and called for a public hearing—although there had been 
several leaders of environmental NGOs, such as Liang Congjie from FON, receiving 
media interview to support the expert Zhang Zhengchun, who had firstly exposed the 
membrane project to mass media as “ecological disaster”, and there had been persons of 
the dual identity of journalist and NGO member, such as Xi Zhinong who had got touch 
with SEPA deputy director, playing active role, all of them had just acted in personal 
identity. The entity of “NGO” hadn’t participated until April 1st, 2005, when FON hosted a 
symposium on “the ecological condition and protection of the historic Yuanmingyuan 
Park”. 
Before discussing the significance of this symposium, we need say firstly that it was 
not the first time environmental NGOs tried to participate in the policy-making of urban 
governance, and it exactly was the experiences influencing their behavioral pattern in the 
Yuanmingyuan issue. In 1998, Beijing Municipal Government made a plan to cover the 
riverbed of Kunyu River, a main waterway of Beijing’s old river networks, with cement. 
As a part of a diversion canal construction, the target of the plan was obviously to prevent 
seepage. The plan had then been questioned by some experts and environmental activists. 
Like in the Yuanmingyuan issue the criticism had been quickly upgraded form purely of 
its expected negative effects on environment, to its policy-making procedure without 
environmental impact assessment and enough public participation. During the next two 
year, environmental NGOs, accompanied by some media reporters, had continuously 
attempted to discuss with the Municipal Government for “the right to know and 
participate” 1 . But there had come no negotiation. In 2001, two most influential 
environmental NGOs in Beijing, Friends of Nature (FON) and Green Earth Village, held a 
symposium and invited the former deputy mayor of Beijing Municipal Government. But, 
at last, the face-to-face discuss had broken down with ill feelings, due to a wide 
divergence of opinion—no compromise between radical green ideas of NGOs and 
profit-directed tradition of the government. And moreover, the deputy mayor had 
                                                        
1 liu, “What has been buried in Yuanmingyuan,” 
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“prevented mass media from reporting anything on the meeting”. That had disappointed 
NGOs seriously because “no media report had made the meeting’s most serious failure (in 
expanding the influence of NGOs’ voice)” 1. We can judged from this process that, what 
the environmental NGOs had demanded in Kunyu River issue had been from two aspects: 
a) to change the original policy-making through public pressure; b) under the failure of a), 
at least to speak loud of their voices by making news events. The failure in Kunyu River 
issue might have made NGOs and mass media more sensitive to the Yuanmingyuan Park 
membrane project, because we can find several reports recalling the Kunyu issue to 
compare with the Yuanmingyuan project, both by interviews and NGO interviewees. And, 
the real negative effects of Kunyu River’s cement cover had been taken as a proof of the 
expected “ecological disaster” by Yuanmingyuan’s plastic cover2, although, strictly, the 
two projects weren’t based on the same kind of technique.  
On April 1st, FON, internet media www.bokee.com and tech.sina.com.cn 
co-sponsored a symposium on “the ecological condition and protection of the historic 
Yuanmingyuan Park”. University professors, scientists, engineers, lawyers, and officials 
of the Park were invited to attend the symposium. Liang Congjie, president of FON, 
announced in his opening remarks that this symposium was held for two aims. Firstly, it 
provide a plat to listen to the opinions of specialists to find out whether covering the lake 
bed with plastic membrane to prevent water seeping would be effective or harmful for the 
preservation of the ecology of the Park. And Secondly, it would discuss whether “the 
public had the right to the information concerning such a large-scale project” going on “a 
famous historic site and embodies a deep meaning for the whole country”, and whether 
the public had “the right to voice their opinions”3. In other words, this symposium was 
about green priority and public participation. By now, it seemed that the behavior of FON 
had been nearly the same with that in the Kunyu River issue, which was, voicing through 
a media event to expand the influence and to integrate the opinion of objectors. But there 
                                                        
1 Tang Jianguang, “Chinese NGO says: I object <zhongguo NGO: wo fandui>!” News Weekly, No. 24, 
2004, pp. 30-34.  
2 Media and NGOs inclined to judge the two projects as similar, and used the proved negative effects of 
Kunyu River lining project to make reasonable the critics of Yuanmingyuan project, despite of that 
techniques applying in the two projects were factually different. See for example: liu, “What has been 
buried in Yuanmingyuan,”; and Editorial, “The city kidney cannot be divided from the land mother,”  
3 Friends of Nature: Newsletter, Autumn 2005. Source: http://www.fon.org.cn/content.php?aid=8755  
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was a very crucial difference that the sponsors invited some special guests, officials of the 
State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA). Why was it important? By 
tracing the Kunyu River issue, a lesson NGOs learnt might be that their radical ideas of 
environmental protection wouldn’t have been easily accepted, and if they had wanted to 
play a part in urban governance, they couldn’t have completely put themselves on the 
opposition of the powerful governmental ruling. Thus, they needed an allay in the 
governmental sector to balance the power, who should have both taken green targets as 
priority, and been seeking more effective participation in policy-making of governance. 
That was why the SEPA had become the exact one to combine with for environmental 
NGOs, because they both had got tired of being peripheralized in policy making of city 
governance. Although, according to FON, they had also sent invitations to Haidian 
District Government, Forestry and Historic Relics sectors, none of them had given 
positive response, like SEPA. That means, in the combination, the environmental NGO 
was not the only active one. And moreover, this active combination between 
environmental departments and environmental NGOs, a metaphor of “harmonious 
relations between the government and public” was publicized through mass media 
attended. According to FON and Zhang Zhengchun, this event attracted 20 mainstream 
media organizations, including People’s Daily, Beijing News, China News Week, several 
channels of Chinese Central Television, China Radio International and Television 
Broadcasting Works from Hongkong1. Different from that in Kunyu River issue, voices of 
this symposium was “presented through mass media”, which taken by FON as “a most 
important achievement” 2. We may judge the event as an open ceremony to demonstrate 
the alliance of environmental department, environmental NGOs and mess media. In this 
ceremony, their mutual interests were systematically expressed. And further, opinions of 
expressed in this symposium made the basis of media issue-framing at the “second 
stage”.  
                                                        
1 See: Friends of Nature, “Follow-up Articles on Yuanmingyuan anti-seepage project,” 
[http://www.fon.org.cn/content.php?aid=302]; and, Zhang Zhengchun, Diary on Yuanmingyuan Issue, 
unpublished documents collected from personal channel.  
2 Yi Yimin, “One case of public participation in environmentally influential issues: NGO is the active 
power to promote public participation – judged from the event process of the hearing on Yuanmingyuan 
membrane issue <huanjing yingxiang zhong de gongzhong canyu anli zhiyi: minjian zuzhi shi tuidong 
gongzhong canyu de jiji liliang – yuanmingyuan pumo shijian tingzhenghui de qianqian houhou>,” 
Friends of Nature Newsletter, No.3, 2005. [http://www.fon.org.cn/content.php?aid=6630] 
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Although this symposium was announce to present voices from both supporters of 
the membrane project and objectors, there was a clear inclination among the attendants: 
firstly, as mentioned before, SEPA officials were the only representatives of ruling 
departments; secondly, headed by Zhang Zhengchun, all the attending experts were from 
fields of ecology, city planning, environmental education and humanistic research, which 
means they generally took an environmental priority, without scientists on seepage 
preventing, and, most of them had a close relations with FON as member or cooperator 
and obtained information of the membrane project from media critics or retails by FON; 
and, thirdly, all the attending “citizens” were FON members1. Thus, it’s not strange that 
all the expressions leant to one side. According to FON, it focused on five points, listed 
below2: 
a) Covering the lakes in the Park with plastic membrane might block the natural 
recycling of the water bodies, thus causing the deterioration of water quality; 
b) The project might decrease the biodiversity in the Park’s wetlands, directly 
affecting water plants and fish in the lakes and indirectly the birds in the 
Park. 
c) While it is true that Yuanmingyuan is short of water, the whole city of Beijing 
is suffering from a severe shortage of water. Therefore, any solution to water 
shortage should take the whole situation of Beijing into consideration. 
Tackling the water problem of Yuanmingyuan in isolation would not be 
appropriate. 
d) Such a large-scale project should go through proper legal procedures. Before 
the start of the project, an environmental impact assessment report should be 
submitted to the State Environmental Protection Agency, which will then 
review the report and make a ruling. Yet, the project started without any legal 
procedures. Therefore, the project should halt immediately while an 
environmental impact assessment is being conducted. 
                                                        
1 See the list of main participants and the record of speeches in “Record of Yuanmingyuan Ecology and 
Historical Relics Protection Symposium (held by Friends of Nature, Green Earth Village and Blog.com 
online),” [http://tech.sina.com.cn/d/2005-04-01/1433568907.shtml] 
2 Friends of Nature: Newsletter, Autumn 2005.  
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e) A public hearing should be held on the project,and public participation in 
policy-making should be emphasized. 
These five points reflected three aspects of considerations for the three most active 
actors in the Yuanmingyuan issue: at first, to reaffirm the mass media’s issue-framing of 
“ecological disaster”; then, to echo SEPA’s judgment of “illegal procedures” and the order 
to hold a public hearing, which respected the authority of SEPA; and, at last, on the status 
of the environmental NGOs to represent the “public opinion”, to emphasize the “right to 
know” and more public participation in urban governance. Therefore, under the alliance, 
the focus of the mass media’s issue-framing had been transferred from technical 
discussions on “ecological disaster” to more common topics. At the so-called “second 
stage”, mass media had begun to made it clear that the political and social concerns, such 
as the public’ right to know “the environmental policy making procedures” （Jinghua 
Times, April 2）, “the defects of present policy-making systems and procedures reflected 
by the issue” (Beijing News, April 2), or “the interest relations of policy makers hidden 
behind the membrane project” （China Youth Daily, April 4）, were the very reason why 
the mass media cared about the project.  
 
5. Public hearing: Orientation for Symbolic Meaning rather than Substantive 
Meaning 
5.1 Target of the Public hearing: SEPA’s Role of Law defender 
At the “second stage”, the common interest made mass media, environmental NGOs 
and SEPA united together to commonly counteract with original policymakers and try to 
reverse the project, in order to set the sample for similar policymaking process in future. 
For this common target and making valuable news, SEPA, depending on the formal 
administrative power, ordered the project to halt, and facilitated a public hearing – there 
had been no example of public hearing in environmental realm – to open political access 
to the allies.  
Public hearing system, a modern democratic proceeding, has been formally drawn 
into Chinese legal system since middle 1990s, and it had been used to assure guarantee 
the reasonableness of administration, mainly limited among the bureaucratic system and 
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corporation juridical persons. For example, according to the “Administrative Punishment 
Law” came in power in 1996, before “making an administrative punishment decision for 
suspending production and business operations, revoking certificates or business licences, 
imposing relatively large fines or imposing other administrative punishments, 
administrative organs shall notify the parties concerned of their right to a public 
hearing”1. From then on, this proceeding had become gradually improved, and taken as 
an approach to a more democratic and open policy making. For example, according to the 
“Administrative Permission Law of the People’s Republic of China” adopted by the 
National People’s Congress in August, 2003, the administrative department “shall make 
known to the general public, and hold hearings on, the matters for the granting of 
administrative permission which, according to the provisions of laws, regulations or rules, 
need hearing, or other matters of vital importance involving public interests for the 
granting of administrative permission which the administrative department believes need 
hearing”2. And, for environmental protection, after the EIA law had drawn in the public 
hearing proceeding, SEPA released “Interim Measures for Hearing the Administrative 
License in Respect of Environmental Protection” in June, 2004, to improve the 
“scientificity, impartiality, reasonableness and democracy”3 in respect of environmental 
protection. By judging from these provisions, we may conclude the public hearing 
proceeding in China has been designed to achieve a scientific and reasonable decision 
making in administration, based on hearing multiple opinions from different parties. In 
other words, its effects have been expected on promoting both substantive and 
procedural justice, with the former being the target and the latter being the approach.  
Even though, from middle 1990s to early 2000s, the public hearing had grown into a 
mature system in China, with detailed legal assurances, and it also had been put into 
practices in administration, like the price hearing, until the Yuanmingyuan issue in 2005, 
                                                        
1 “Administrative Punishment Law of People’s Republic of China,” Article 42. 
[http://www.lehmanlaw.com/resource-centre/laws-and-regulations/administration/administrative-pu
nishment-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-1996.html]  
2 “Administrative Permission Law of the People’s Republic of China”, Article 46. 
[http://www.gov.cn/english/laws/2005-09/07/content_29926.htm]  
3 SEPA : “Interim Measures for Hearing the Administrative License in Respect of Environmental 
Protection,” Article 1. 
[http://www.lawinfochina.com/NetLaw/display.aspx?db=law&sen=rLdDdW4drhdDdWhdrhdGdW4d/
DdvdWnd9DdFdWfdrddydWud9hdGdWEd/DdTdWud/ddTdWud9Dd+&Id=3608&]  
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it hadn’t been practiced in respect of environmental protection. Thus, the substantive 
effects on policymaking were hard to be awaited. According to an investigation taken by 
Chinese Central Television’s news program publicized on April 13th, 2005, only 9% of the 
informants agreed that a public hearing could play important role in improving 
democracy of policy-making. On the contrary, 64% of those doubted its actual effects, and, 
27% took it as “partly” effective1.  
As Pan Yue, the deputy director of SEPA, announced openly, the public hearing was 
expected to effect in four aspects of: a) the implementation of the concepts of ‘scientific 
development’ and ‘harmonious society’ initiated by the Central authority; b) the 
implementation of related environmental regulations, including EIA Law and “Interim 
Measures for Hearing the Administrative License”; c) the promotion of public 
participation mode; d) the promotion of democracy in environmental decision making2. 
We can see in the announcement that there was no word exactly on the Yuanmingyuan 
issue itself. All the four aspects were pointed to the implementation of procedural justice. 
On the contrary, the substantive result of the Yuanmingyuan membrane project was 
ignored, because, according to Pan Yue in another membrane interview, the membrane 
project itself was not more than “an insignificant work with a trivial investment and a 
simple controversy on whether lining lakebed or not”, which didn’t worth a public 
hearing hosted by the top environmental watchdog, thus, as he added, the “only” 
significance of the public hearing was to “firstly give the public a chance to experience a 
lesson of how to participate in such a open procedure in environmental policy making”3. 
In other words, a scientific and reasonable alternative scheme to the membrane project 
was not considered with priority in SEPA’s Yuanmingyuan agenda. What SEPA hoped 
was to use its enforceability to set an example, demonstrating their equal legal status in 
policy-making with the profit-directed departments4, and, even, further expanding the 
                                                        
1 See : The Column of “Oriental Time Space <dongfang shikong>,” by Central Television, April 13, 2005. 
[http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-04-13/20066377604.shtml] 
2 Wang Jing, “Pan Yue: we must listen more to opinions of specialists and the public, not to easily 
decide a project <panyue: duo ting zhuanjia gongzhong de yijian, buneng pai naodai ding xiangmu>,” 
People’s Daily Online, [http://env.people.com.cn/GB/1072/3317155.html] 
3 “SEPA deputy general Pan Yue: I valued more of Yuanmingyuan hearing <huanbao zongju fu juzhang 
pan yue: wo geng zaihu yuanmingyuan tingzhenghui>,” Legal Daily, September 24, 2007.  
4 See for example: “Pan Yue of SEPA: dealing with environmental violation will not be dependent on 
opinion influence <huanbao zongju pan yue: chuli huanjing weifa bu shou yulun yingxiang>,” Beijing 
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application sphere of EIA from pure natural environmental impact assessment to social 
human environment1.  
5.2 SEPA’s Agenda-setting of the Hearing and Passive Resistance of Original 
Policy Makers 
While SEPA’s had exerted itself to arrange the public hearing, the original policy 
makers of the Yuanmingyuan project chose to give conservative response. As mentioned 
before, the original policy makers include the Yuanmingyuan Park administration office, 
its direct ruling, Haidian District Government, and Beijing Municipal Government, with 
Water Resource Bureau and Historical Relic Bureau of Beijing City. On April 1st, Haidian 
District Government, as the most direct ruling upon Yuanming Park administration office, 
was forced accept SEPA’s administrative order to halt the membrane project formally, 
but it still insisted that they agreed on the Park’s self-defense2 that a) the membrane 
project should not have been judged as a construction project; b) the scheme of the 
project had been based on careful appraisal; c) the project as countermeasures for dealing 
with water shortage of Yuanmingyuan Park shouldn’t have been suspended; d) 
anti-seepage measures wouldn’t have negative impact on ecological environment. Also on 
April 1st, Beijing Municipal Historical Relic Bureau formally reacted to SEPA and the 
mass media. Besides agreeing with the Park’s self-defense, it identified the 
implementation of plastic membrane as “world-widely applied techniques also accepted 
in the field of archeology” 3. In other words, the Bureau denied the negative impact on 
historical relics of Yuanmingyuan Park reported by mass media. However, neither 
Haidian District Government nor Historical Relic Bureau was ready to clash with SEPA. 
On April 13th, the two low-level administrative sectors sent representatives to the public 
hearing at the demand of SEPA, but they chose to keep silence4. Different from them, the 
                                                                                                                                                               
News, June 1, 2005; and Huang Yiyin, “Pan Yue and his environmental revolution <pan yue yu ta de 
huanbao geming>,” Economic Observation, April 17, 2005.  
1 “Citizens can apply for participation in Yuanmingyuan anti-seepage project hearing held on next 
Thursday <yuanmingyuan fangshen gongcheng xia zhousan tingzheng, gongmin ke shenqing canyu>, 
Beijing News, April 7, 2005.  
2 “Yuanmingyuan anti-seepage project restarted <yuanmingyuan fangshen gongcheng zaici kaigong>,” 
Beijing News, April 2, 2005.  
3 Wang Qing, “Beijing municipal bureau of historical relics argues that Yuanmingyuan anti-seepage 
project hasn’t damaged relics <Beijing shi wenwu ju chen yuanmingyuan fangshen gongcheng wei 
pohuai wenwu>,” Jinghua Times, April 2, 2005.  
4 See: Gou Xiaofeng, “EIA becomes a hot potato, the end of Yuanmingyuan anti-seepage becomes a 
suspence <huanbao pinggu cheng tangshou shanyu, yuanmingyuan fangshen shouchang cheng 
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water resource sector even kept from openly expressing anything 1 . And, Beijing 
Municipal Government, the only one among the original policy makers having a similar 
administrative level with SEPA, only held a press conference, in which, the Municipal 
Government expressed their critics of the mass media reporting on Yuanmingyuan issue 
as “not objective and comprehensive enough”, implying their dissatisfaction with SEPA’s 
intervention. But, this press conference was held on May 24th, more than one month after 
the public hearing, thus, it also avoided a direct clash between the two high-level 
administrative sectors2. Then, under the passive resistance by the original policy makers, 
SEPA dominated the organizational process and agenda-setting of the public hearing.  
On one hand, the organizational process assured the dominance of SEPA. On one 
hand, on SEPA’s time table, there was only one week for participants to prepare: SEPA 
publicized details on how to apply for how to participate on April 6th; the application 
procedure started on 7th; the list of those selected was publicized on 12th, one day before 
the day the public hearing was held. That means, the procedure left scanty time for 
participants to investigate and collect information, thus, very few participants couldn’t 
raise substantive evidences to support their views, except those objectors against the 
project from the very first time. As Chinese Central Television noticed, most of the 
participants had brought more “an earnest hope to change the situation (of absence of 
public participation in policy making)” rather than adequate evidences”3.  
On the other hand, the selection of participants was also managed by SEPA. Among 
the more than 200 applicants through phone, internet and fax—according to media 
reporting, one third of them were specialists on ecology and historical relics, one third 
                                                                                                                                                               
xuannian>,” Economic Reference, May 17, 2005; and Liu Jianhong, “Specialists will be organized again 
to reexamine Yuanmingyuan anti-seepage project <yuanmingyuan fangshen gongcheng jiang zuzhi 
zhuanjia zaici lunzheng>,” Beijing News, April 14, 2005.  
1 In another symposium held on April 20 to invite 11 specialists on water resources and ecology, the 
participants demonstrated their agreement with the project as reasonable, which consciously pointed 
against the conclusion of the public hearing held by SEPA. The symposium was held jointly by China 
Water Resource and Hydropower Press and Tom.com online. However, in comparison with the public 
hearing, the symposium and its opinion drew very little attention. See: Fan Yinghua, “Thorny issue raise 
on Yuanmingyuan anti-seepage that some specialists petitioned to restore the project <yuanmingyuan 
fangshen zaiqi bolan, zhuanjia yaoqiu huifu fangshen gongcheng>,” Huaxia Times, April 21, 2005.  
2 See details in Liao Weihua and Shi Weijia, “Beijing Municipal Government held conference today in 
response to Yuanmingyuan Issue and claimed media reporting as not existing objectively <Beijing jin 
kaihui huiying yuanmingyuan shijian, chen meiti baogao bu keguan>,” Beijing News, May 24, 2005.  
3 See : The Column of “Oriental Time Space <dongfang shikong>,” by Central Television, April 13, 
2005. 
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were university and high school students, and the rest were “common citizens caring 
environmental protection”, with Beijing’s influential environmental NGOs among 
them1—SEPA selected 50 lucky persons. Objective standards for selection hadn’t been 
publicized. According to SEPA, Yuanmingyuan Park was “belonging to all the Chinese 
citizens” and, the issue should have been “serving the whole social benefit” 2, making the 
issue have no direct stake holder to set any standards. In result, the participants were 
insisted of four parties: representatives of original policy makers being invited, who chose 
to keep silence in the hearing, as mentioned before; 33 experts, most of who had clearly 
boycotted the project through mass media; 10 representatives from environmental NGOs, 
who clearly took green priority to object the project, and 17 common citizens having 
environmentalist inclination or being NGO members3, among whom, a 11-year-old 
schoolchild and NGO member with her speech in the hearing drew the most media 
attention. The participant arrangement and the media’s attention to a legal-disabled child 
clearly indicated more symbolic meaning than substantive meaning of the hearing.  
Not only the organizational procedural, but the agenda setting of the hearing was 
framed by SEPA. According to an open record, the agenda was set in respect of two points: 
for substantive justice, it questioned the whether lining the lakebed with plastic 
membrane to be the only effective way to prevent seepage, and whether to bring a 
disaster to ecology; and, for procedural justice, it doubted whether there had been 
corruption and other wrongdoing in the policy making, and, further defect of the 
environmental management system. As both the two points were main issue-framing of 
mass media had brought before, we can judge it as another evidence to reflect SEPA’s 
positive response to, or, active cooperation with mass media. In other words, the agenda 
had been predetermined by the well-formed one-sided media pressure, thus, the hearing 
was inevitably oriented to a platform for objectors. Actually, the hasty selection procedure 
and the media pressure prevented “people with multiple views” from “participating in” 4. 
                                                        
1 Huang, “Participants list for Yuanmingyuan anti-seepage hearing is decided today,” 
2 Qi Ye (ed.), Research on China’s Environmental Supervision System, Shanghai: Sanlian Bookshop, 
2008, p. 208.  
3 Detailed list of participants can be seen on China Environmental News, April 12, 2005.  
4 Xia Mingqun, “SEPA commented on Yuanmingyuan hearing for the first time and claimed 
representatives to be not rational enough <huanbao zongju shou ping yuanmingyuan tingzhenghui, 
chen daibiao lixing buzu>,” Jinghua Times, June 5, 2005.  
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And in addition, the bias could also be judged from the atmosphere during the hearing 
itself. While dissenters reiterating their critics of the membrane project were loudly 
applauded, speech by supporters could only get lukewarm response out of politeness1. 
Even SPEA, after the event, had got to admit the discussion to be flooded by sentimental 
speech with a shortage of persuasive evidences and rational reasoning2. However, it 
didn’t prevent the event from setting a sample to demonstrate the authority of law 
procedures and SEPA’s ruling. 
5.3 Environmental NGOs’ role of Symbolizing “Public Participation” 
Judging from the participators, we may find that, as an allay with SEPA in the issue, 
not only environmental NGOs participated in the name of groups, but also NGO 
members occupied most of the seats for “citizens”. That means, in the event, while SEPA 
played the important part of the defender of law authority, NGO demonstrated another 
important part of “public participation”. Early on April 1st, in the symposium on “the 
ecological condition and protection of the historic Yuanmingyuan Park” hosted by FON, 
the leading environmental NGO specialized its standpoint to be promotion of 
implementing EIA Law…through the chance of Yuanmingyuan issue3. Rightly after the 
symposium, Beijing’s several leading NGOs released an open annunciation to support 
SEPA and look into their role in the hearing. It said: 
 
We admire the positive and swift response of the ruling governmental sector 
(SEPA) to the Yuanmingyuan issue, and, we support its administration in 
accordance with the law and reasonable solution to the problem…We NGOs 
hope that the hearing can listen carefully to views by experts and citizens…We 
NGOs hope to participate in the hearing process and also the EIA work, and 
further, through this issue, to promote public participation in environmental 
management and policy making.  
                                                        
1 See: Zhao Shengyu, “Record of Yuangmingyuan anti-seepage project hearing on environmental impact 
<yuanmingyuan fangshen gongcheng huanjing tingzhenghui jishi>,” April 13, 2005. in: 
http://news.qq.com/a/20050413/001621.htm 
2 Xia, “SEPA commented on Yuanmingyuan hearing for the first time and claimed representatives to be 
not rational enough,” 
3 See: “Record of Yuanmingyuan Ecology and Historical Relics Protection Symposium (held by Friends 
of Nature, Green Earth Village and Blog.com online),” 
[http://tech.sina.com.cn/d/2005-04-01/1433568907.shtml] 
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(Friends of Nature release: “Statement for governmental decision to hold a 
hearing for Yuanmingyuan lakebed membrane issue”)1 
 
Under the hearing agendas set by SEPA, the activeness of environmental NGOs was 
also demonstrated. To seize the big chance to perfectly express their view, on April 10th, 
several NGOs and some other environmental activists acted a simulation exercise for the 
hearing. From this rehearsal, NGOs found that “to effectively defeat supporters of the 
project”, they must have succeeded in both “voicing as one” and “releasing clear evidence 
easy to understand and vivid illustration with impact effect”, “in a limited speech time” 2. 
Following the lesson, NGOs took their actions from two respects.  
On one hand, they integrated together to “voice as one”. There were 9 NGOs selected 
to participate the hearing3, of who, the leading FON had offered active help to other 
weaker ones to get entry permission, through its personal network with SEPA officials4. 
In the hearing, selected NGO representatives uniting together as a strong power insisted 
the membrane project be bringing ecological disaster and violating legal procedures as 
mass media had stated. And, based on the conclusion, NGOs’ common voices shaped the 
image of “public opinion”, consisting of demands for: a) the lined membrane being 
removed regardless of cost, as “however high cost” would be compensate by “the benefit 
from defending the law”; b) application of institutional guaranteed public participation 
into Yuanmingyuan Park administration; c) local governmental subsidy for water supply 
of Yuanmingyuan Park; d) application of administrative accountability system into 
environmental protection5. Judging from the demands, we can find its identification with 
                                                        
1 Friends of Nature, “Statement on Supporting Governmental Decision to Hold Hearing with Regard to 
Yuanmingyuan anti-seepage membrane Issue <zhichi zhengfu zhendui yuanmingyuan pushe fangshen 
mo shijian juxing tingzhenghui de shengming>,” April 1, 2005. 
[http://www.fon.org.cn/content.php?aid=11822] 
2 Yi, “One case of public participation in environmentally influential issues: NGO is the active power to 
promote public participation – judged from the event process of the hearing on Yuanmingyuan 
membrane issue,” 
3 See: Detailed list of participants on China Environmental News, April 12, 2005.  
4 Ding Yue and Wang Haixin, “Record on the first visit of “Public Interest China” to Friends of Nature: 
to protect the last pure land <gongyi zhongguo chufang ziran zhiyou shouzha: shouhu zuihou de 
jingtu>,” [http://www.pubchn.com/blog/pubchn/articles.php?article_id=12666] 
5 Joint statement by Friends of Nature, Green Earth Volunteers, Green Earth Village, Environment and 
Development Institute, Tiaxiaxi Education Research Institute, Alxa SEE Ecological Association and Wild 
China: “Appeals with Regard to Rehabilitation Work of Yuanmingyuan Anti-seepage Project <guanyu 
yuanmingyuan fangshen gongcheng shanhou de huyu>,” [http://www.fon.org.cn/content.php?aid=138] 
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SEPA’s orientation, which is, giving the hearing more symbolic meaning to promote a 
reform of environmental management—emphasis of green priority, legal procedurals and 
democracy—rather than substantive meaning to offer the membrane controversy a 
special solution. 
On the other hand, NGO representatives had prepared “clear evidence easy to 
understand and vivid illustration with impact effect”. A most well-know example was 
some photos released by FON, which demonstrated images of lotus “photoed separately 
in 2002 and 2005”. FON representatives argued that, as the lotus in the “2005” photos 
looked to have worse growth than those in the “2002” ones, the photos just proved the 
“ecological disaster” brought by the membrane project. These photos were paid great 
attention in and after the hearing, widely quoted by mass media as a most important 
evidence 1 . Although these photos and the following conclusion were used to be 
questioned, only in the internet, of being not reasonable enough without more detailed 
interpretation and substantive proof of the photoing time, place and other special 
conditions2, it actually reflected environmental NGOs’ success in bringing the audience 
“impact effect”, which made their argument more persuasive to common people than 
pure scientific data.  
5.4 Mass Media Choice: Strengthening SEPA Agendas and NGO Demands 
More than 50 print, broadcasting and internet mass media organizations were invited 
by SEPA to the hearing. Among them, National broadcasting, Party paper, commercial 
best seller were included. Their reporting and framing of the discussion through the 
hearing further strengthened the orientation. 
In first place, like at the first stage, mass media put their reporting focus on 
objections against the project, with the discussion between objectors and supporters 
                                                        
1 In an media interview in August 2005, Yuanmingyuan Administration took these pictures for an 
example of the “terrible effects” made by mass media. See: Li Ningyuan, “To repair what should be 
repaired and to dig what should be dug – Yuanmingyuan Administration particularizes ‘anti-seepage 
project’ <gai bu de bu gai wa de wa, yuanmingyuan xishuo ‘fangshen gongcheng’>,” News Evening, 
August 11, 2005.  
2 After the reporting climax, Yuanmingyuan Administration offered the explanation of the pictures as, 
“nobody doubted the two pictures, but the fact is ridiculous: the former one is the lotus lake in 
Changchun garden in 1998, and the latter one is another lake in 2004. The former lotus had grown for 
five years, and the latter had only grown one year. Anyway, these two lakes had never been lined with 
anti-seepage membrane.” See: Li, “To repair what should be repaired and to dig what should be dug – 
Yuanmingyuan Administration particularizes ‘anti-seepage project’,”  
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framed as conflict between the Yuanmingyuan Park administration office and common 
citizens. Judged from the reporting contents of media organizations invited to the 
hearing, the reports concentrated on four topics as: a) disastrous influence of the 
membrane project on ecology; b) suggestions of alternative scheme for the project; c) 
economic dynamics of Park administration officers involved in the project; d) defect in 
environmental management system reflected. We can use the table 4-1 below to compare 
the SEPA agendas, NGO demands, as mentioned before with media reporting focus, 
illustrating the accordance among them. By integrating the focus of SEPA, environmental 
NGOs and media reporting through the hearing, we can find a more clear indication of 
their alliance: when SEPA and NGOs, separately representing “government” and “public”, 
demonstrated their will to overthrow the original project schemes and promote their 
influence in future policy making, mass media used their information choice to transfer 
their orientation as “public opinion”. 
 
Table 4-1 Comparison among SEPA agendas, NGOs demands and media focus 
SEPA agendas NGO demands Media focus 
Judgment of 
project 
influence on 
ecology 
Judgment based on 
green priority 
Continuing reporting contents at the first stage 
to frame ecological disaster with concentrating 
on evidences raised by NGOs, for example, lotus 
photos 
Alternative 
schemes to 
resolve the 
water shortage 
of 
Yuanmingyuan 
Remove of lined 
membrane and local 
governmental 
subsidy for water 
supply 
Alternative schemes raised by objectors to satisfy 
the water supply of Yuanmingyuan: 1) 
channeling water from reservoir or 2) using 
recycle water 
Tracing 
corruption and 
wrongdoing 
 a) Park administration must have  
undertaken the project for commercial benefits; 
b) Construction without inviting tenders 
indicated corruption;  
c) Park’s publicized cost was not in accordance 
with that mass media reported. 
Discussing 
defect in 
management 
system 
1) Public 
participation; 
2) administrative 
accountability 
a) Park administration needed a third-party 
supervision; 
b) More governmental sectors needed to 
involve in policy making; 
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system c) Environmental management needed the 
cooperation among experts, representatives of 
citizens and the environmental department; 
d) Administrative accountability system 
needed to be applied; 
e) EIA process needed to respect the 
participation of environmental NGOs.  
 
On the other hand, according to the reporting contents, mass media chose discussion 
on tracing corruption and wrongdoing of the project and on how to reform the existing 
environmental management system as their focus, rather than paying attention to a 
substantive resolution to the special issue. One reason may be that was what the 
discussion really focused on, as mentioned earlier. But, the most important reason may 
be that was exactly what the media tried to achieve. After the hearing, although the mass 
media admitted it hadn’t achieved a resolution, they all cheered up for the hearing to 
symbolize a “success in promoting democracy”. Let’s raise reports of some influential best 
sellers for example. Beijing News took the hearing “gloried with spirits of democracy and 
science”, and, “bringing a practical approach for China’s political democracy 
construction” 1. Nanfang Dailiy, located in Guangdong Province, praise the hearing as “a 
new start” for “a well-formed democratic public participation” 2. Critical South Weekend 
judged it a “demonstration of the authority of ‘ruling by law’” 3. Beijing Youth Daily 
thought that the agendas focusing more on “common public policy making procedures” 
rather than on “a single case of Yuanmingyuan” had just brought the hearing more 
significance4. SEPA-ruled Chinese Environmental News made clear that holding “such a 
hearing related to public policies” on “a grand scale” was to make a sample for 
establishing “an institutional approach to put an end to similar illegal actions” 5. And, 
                                                        
1 Fang Ning, “Hearing: important practice of democratic politics <tingzhenghui: minzhu zhengzhi de 
zhongyao shijian>,” Beijing News, April 23, 2005.  
2 Guo Weiqing, “To protect Yuanmingyuan needs strengthening of public participation and supervision 
<baohu yuanmingyuan xuyao jiaqiang gongzhong de canyu yu jaindu>,” Nanfang Dushi Bao, April 16, 
2005.  
3 Liu Jiangqiang, “Main body of Yuanmingyuan lake-bed anti-seepage project is in state of shutdown 
<yuanminguan hudi fangshen gongcheng zhuti gongcheng chuyu tinggong zhuangtai>,” South 
Weekend, May 12, 2005.  
4 Editorial, “Can anti-seepage hearing decide fate of Yuanmingyuan <fangshen tingzhenghui nengfou 
jueding yuanmingyuan mingyun>,” Beijing Youth Daily, April 14, 2005.  
5 “Responsibility Investigation becomes the focus on how to end Yuanminguan issue <yuanmingyuan 
ruhe shouwei zeren zhuijiu cheng jiaodian>,” China Environmental News, April 15, 2005.  
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according to People’s Daily, “whatever the final (substantive) resolution” to 
Yuanmingyuan issue would have become, the “form of public hearing” had achieved its 
“symbolic meaning” for “offering a platform” for participation1. From these media 
judgment, we may find that, whether in Party paper, environmental-special paper or 
well-known critical media, not only “procedurals” and “symbolic meaning” we mentioned 
before were continuously focused, but also the keywords as “democracy” and “ruling by 
law” were also used to describe significance of the hearing. And, as we know, “democracy” 
and “ruling by law” were both most important keywords of China’s political reform 
targets.  
 
6. Maintaining SEPA Pressure until Final Resolution 
The public hearing indicated the democratic color – despite of the somehow bias 
agenda-setting and “irrational” (originally expressed by SEPA) debates – and, until then, 
“disastrous influences” of the project – and in addition, the speculation of its connection 
with “corruption” and “management systematic deficiency” – had been framed as an 
undoubted conclusion for the public opinion. However, the substantive resolution was 
finally up to the technically assessment according to EIA Law, not the informal 
conclusion of public hearing or media judgment. Factually, even after the legal 
assessment process formally started, continuing media critics were still exerting pressure 
on work of the assessment institution2. And, more important, SEPA maintained keen 
supervision through the whole process and dominated the information channel, which 
greatly influence the process orientation.  
6.1 Active News-making of SEPA: Promotion on EIA and Information 
Disclosure 
After the heated public hearing, SEPA continued keeping touch with mass media, and, 
for its positive information disclosure, the reporting focus had been transferred to the 
                                                        
1 Chen Jiaxing, “Symbolic meanings of Yuanmingyuan anti-seepage <yuanmingyuan fangshen de 
xiangzheng yiyi>,” People’s Daily, April 14, 2005. 
2 The pressure was also confirmed by Tsinghua University who finally made the EIA report. See: Xinhua 
News Agency newsletter, “Chief in Yuanmingyuan EIA announced to burden enormous pressure 
<yuanmingyuan huanping fuzeren chen chengshou juda yali>,” July 5, 2005. 
[http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-07-06/00336358377s.shtml] 
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SEPA. In first place, just at the end of the hearing, SEPA announced to the mass media 
that whatever the EIA result of Yuanmingyuan project to be, SEPA would penalize the 
Park administration: with EIA result being disqualified, SEPA would give a penalty on 
negotiation with the local government; with result being qualified, the Park 
administration would also be penalized for having not accomplished legal procedures 
before SEPA noticed, according to article 31 of EIA Law. In this decision, it implied two 
important messages of SEPA: on one hand, the Park administration had truly made 
mistakes, and, on the other hand, it indicated that the Yuanmingyuan membrane project 
might be without negative influence on ecology (EIA result qualified), which was different 
from mass media had reported. But, most of mass media just seized the keyword as 
“penalty”.  
Secondly, along with the end of the hearing, most media lost their energy on this 
issue, except some few ones, who had been active from the very first stage, reporting a 
little information on the EIA process from SEPA officials. Factually, at that time, there 
was no professional EIA institution agreeing to accept this work, and the reason was said 
vaguely to be “technical problems” and “hard time limit” 1. But there was also an opinion 
that the EIA institutions might have avoided this work for worrying about offending the 
local government or SEPA2. However, the slow EIA process had worn down the public 
passion, and related media reports had fallen since April 20th. From April 28th to May 8th, 
there was even no related report on mass media (except personal discussions through 
internet BBS). In the silence, SEPA stood out again. On May 9th, SEPA, under the 
entitlement offered by EIA Law (article 31) 3 , ordered the Yuanmingyuan Park 
administration to raise EIA report in 40 days 4 . This order restarted the media 
                                                        
1 Wang Qing, “No EIA unit wills to take the EIA of Yuanmingyuan for skill difficulty and time pressure 
<jishu nandu da shijian jin, huanping danwei bu yuan huanping yuanmingyuan>,” Jinghua Times, 
April 20, 2005.  
2 From internet sources and personal interviews by the writer.  
3 According to this article, “any construction entity fails to submit its environmental impact appraisal 
documents of the construction project concerned or fails to submit environmental impact documents for 
examination and approval anew or for inspection anew” shall be “ordered by the administrative 
department of environmental protection that is entitled to examine and approve the environmental 
impact appraisal documents to stop the construction and go through the relevant procedures within a 
prescribed time period”.  
4 SEPA: Notice of Charging Yuanmingyuan Administration to Apply for Completing Required EIA 
Approval Formalities for Yuanmingyuan Environmental Comprehensive Improvement Project <guanyu 
zeling xianqi bu ban yuanmingyuan huanjing zonghe zhengzhi gongcheng huanjing yingxiang pingjia 
baopi shouxu de tongzhi>,” SEPA letter, No. 167. 
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concentration long at rest, making SEPA become the most important information source 
and reporting focus. In addition, as routine EIA procedures usually spent more than 2 
months1, the 40-day time limit seemed to give the Park administration a mission 
impossible. Thus, the Park administration had got to appeal to SEPA’s intervention to 
“appoint an EIA institution”, to “make a faster progress” 2 . Even though, strictly, 
according to EIA law, SEPA was not allowed to appoint the EIA institution or influence 
any other technical details 3 , but, under the demand of Yuanmingyuan Park 
administration itself, SEPA could logically gave a positive response and then supervise 
the whole EIA process.  
After responding to Yuanmingyuan Park administration, SEPA quickly demonstrated 
their influence on May 11th when the deputy director, Pan Yue, named the EIA institution 
subordinate to Beijing Normal University—one of the EIA institutions having refused the 
duty of EIA for Yuanmingyuan Park—to criticize their negative attitudes to make a morra. 
According to the press release of SEPA, Pan flayed the university institution as “violating 
either moral concepts or professional ethics”, and valuing “economic benefits and private 
interests” rather than “social responsibility”. He declared that, taking it as an opportunity, 
he would “improve management on EIA institutions”, and, “rectify the order of the whole 
industry” 4. By judging from the official expression, we can easily find that the focus of 
SEPA was still on the system reform, like that during the public hearing.  
SEPA’s activeness and clear attitudes quickly woke mass media. Pan’s declaration was 
widely quoted and echoed with high spirit. Media reports on May 12th was dominated by 
analysis of EIA institutions “violating either moral concepts or professional ethics” and 
editorial suggestions on how to “rectify the order of the whole industry”. And, compared 
                                                                                                                                                               
[http://www.zhb.gov.cn/info/gw/huanhan/200505/t20050509_66478.htm] 
1 According to a professional of EIA talking to mass media, a normal process of EIA commonly costed at 
least two months, exceeding the SEPA time limit of 40 days. See: Xia Mingqun, “EIA units take it 
unnecessary to risk Yuanmingyuan EIA for the wide range of influence <huanping danwei: 
yuanmingyuan sheji mian tai guang, meiyou biyao mao fengxian>,” Jinghua Times, May 11, 2005.  
2 Wang Qing, “Yuanmingyuan Administration claims to be unable to guarantee submitting EIA report 
on time <yuanmingyuan guanlichu: buneng baozheng anshi jiao huanping baogao>,” Jinghua Times, 
May 11, 2005.  
3 The information is publicized by Xinhua News Agency on May 5, and quoted by several media 
organizations such as Beijing News, Jinghua Times and so on.  
4 SEPA newsletter No. 44: “Pan Yue, the deputy general of SEPA criticized the EIA units being afraid of 
taking responsibility by name <huanbao zongju fu juzhang pan yue dianming piping bugan chengdan 
zeren de huaping danwei>,” [http://www.zhb.gov.cn/xcjy/zwhb/200505/t20050511_66450.htm] 
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with reports on the public hearing, the criticism, once pointed to Yuanmingyuan Park 
administration, was even pointed to “higher-level governmental department”, implying 
that it was the political intervention of strong administrative power to prevent any EIA 
institution from performing their “social responsibility”. Most mass media believed that 
the EIA report would lead to overthrow the whole project, and, the EIA institution was 
afraid of “retaliation” from the original policy makers. The most interest might be that 
both Party paper and critical commercial best seller held this view. Beijing News’ 
editorial might be the most clear. It took SEPA’s ruling to represent a “new 
administration mode”, and, it believed there existed an “old mode” on the opposition. As 
it argued, the “old mode” was “disregard of law, science and public opinion”, with the 
“new mode” respecting all of them, and the result of conflict between the two modes 
would determine the future of system reform1. Interestingly, this somehow liberalist view 
was corresponded with People’s Daily, when the CCP Party Paper, by a more cautious 
choice of words, suggest to establish a “third Party” to supervise the EIA process, to keep 
EIA process independent from political power, maintaining equality and justice2.  
Under the pressure of SEPA and mass media, EIA institutions of Beijing successively 
demonstrated their willing to accept this work. On May 17th, SEPA said to mass media 
that Tsinghua University had been chosen to take the responsibility, and, SEPA 
“appreciated very much” 3.  
6.2. To interpret EIA Report for a Final Success 
When Tsinghua University formally took over the EIA of Yuanmingyuan project, it 
meant the legal procedures would determine the fate of the project, which mass media 
and other project objectors had advocated. In other words, the task of experts, 
environmental activists and mass media for this issue could be taken as completed. 
However, objectors immediately found themselves faced with a new trouble: what if the 
scientific report negated their estimation of “ecological disaster”, to support the 
                                                        
1 Editorial, “Ruling by law is the certain orientation of solving Yuanmingyuan problem <fazhi, shi jiejue 
yuanmingyuan shijian de biran fangxiang>,” Beijing News, May 13, 2005.  
2 Editorial, “EIA of Yuanmingyuan exposes moral risk <yuanmingyuan huanping baolu daode weiji>,” 
People’s Daily, May 12, 2005.  
3 Wang Jing, “Tsinghua University takes over EIA and will submit report on time <qinghua jieshou 
huanping, jiang zai xianding shijian nei tijiao baogao>,” People’s Daily Online, 
[http://env.people.com.cn/GB/1072/3394018.html] 
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reasonableness of the membrane project? Because in that situation, not only the pressure 
on Yuanmingyuan Park administration would be relieved, but also the reputation of 
objectors, who had screamed for overthrowing a nearly finished project without enough 
substantive evidences, might bear negative influence. On June 19th, Beijing Daily, quoted 
from an anonymous source, reported the final EIA report would “basically support the 
Yuanmingyuan lakebed membrane project” 1 . Despite of being proved to be not 
dependable, the information still made objectors get emotional. FON even held an urgent 
informal meeting with objectors to discuss countermeasures, with active mass media 
participated2. Obviously, objectors needed to improve the media framing to maintain 
absolute predominance in the conflict with Yuanmingyuan Park. After participating in 
the urgent meeting, active journalists immediately took actions. Beijing News released 
three editorials on June 20th and 21st, titled “Resolution to Yuanmingyuan problem 
should not only depend on scientific judgment” (yuanmingyuan wenti bu jinjin shi 
zhuanye panduan), “Value rationality 3  cannot be ignored in Yuanmingyuan issue” 
(yuanmingyuan wenti buneng hushi jiazhi lixing) and “The more important thing 
Yuanmingyuan problem needs is judgment based on humanistic spirit” (yuanmingyuan 
geng xuyao jiazhi panduan). Different from former reports, these editorials didn’t 
emphasize the “ecological disaster” in respect of scientific analysis, but tried to interpret 
the artificial project to change the nature as the original sin of Yuanmingyuan Park, and, 
philosophy concepts like “value rationality” or “humanistic spirit” were taken as a higher 
criterion than “scientific judgment” according to EIA report. Another critical paper, South 
Weekend, even declared, “under a conflict of interests, scientific conclusion shouldn’t 
determine, as the so-called expert views can be fabricated” 4. For finally succeeding in 
changing the project policy, mass media, accompanied by other objectors, had got to 
abandon part of their former emphasis. And moreover, in Chinese public opinion, 
                                                        
1 Ma Li, “It’s said that EIA result supports Yuanmingyuan anti seepage <chuan huanping zhichi 
yuanmingyuan fangshen>,” Beijing News, June 19, 2005.  
2 Ma, “It’s said that EIA result supports Yuanmingyuan anti seepage,” 
3 This philosophical concept, which also called substantive rationality, provides support to social action 
taken to lead to a valued goal, without thought of its consequences and consideration of the 
appropriateness of the means chosen to achieve it. It also can be commonly interpreted as “the end 
sanctifies the means”.—writer. 
4 Editorial, “Yuanmingyuan EIA report is coming soon, and will it replace interest expression with 
specialist opinion<yuanmingyuan huanping baogao jiang chulu, zhuanjia yijian qudai liyi biaoda>?” 
Nanfang Dushi Bao, June 20, 2005.  
 154
concepts of humanistic spirit or value rationality were much less persuasive than 
scientific judgment to common citizens. The change to media issue framing implied the 
embarrassment of objectors. Who could relieve the stress?  
On June 30th, after the appraisal acted by a panel consisting of specialists from fields 
of ecology, gardening, cultural relics, and water preservation1, Tsinghua University 
formally submitted the EIA report to SEPA for examination, in accordance with the legal 
procedures. Almost at the same time, mass media was again told by anonymous source 
that the report judged the project to be of no big defects23. According to the report 
publicized later, the information source seemed to be correct. Generally, the report views 
conflict with mass media framing of ecological disaster in4: 1) countermeasures to keep 
enough water-supply was necessary, even to prevent ecosystem degradation（15.1.1[1], 
（15.1.1[2]））; 2) the materials taken to line the lakebed was not only effective for keeping 
water but of no ecological risk (15.1.3); 2) according to scientific investigation, analogy, 
and simulation analysis, the water ecosystem could be recovered in a short time after 
lining lakebed, and there was no serious influence on land ecosystem(15.1.6 [4], [5]). And 
further, the report also took an investigation on historical relics, and negated serious 
negative influence（15.1.7[2], 15.1.7 [3], 15.1.7 [4], 15.1.7 [5]）, which similar to the 
conclusion had been made by Beijing Historical Relic Bureau before5. The report 
publicized on July 5th further pressure the stress on objectors. Active experts and 
environmental activists quickly declared their discontent through mass media, refusing to 
accept the EIA report as the only substantive basis for resolution6. Concepts of “spirit and 
human feelings”, “historical ethics”, “aesthetic standard” were attempted to frame as a 
                                                        
1 “Tsinghua University report backs lake project,” People’s Daily, July 2nd, 2005. 
2 Ma Li, “EIA report approves Yuanmingyuan anti seepage <huanping baogao renke yuanmingyuan 
fangshen>,” Beijing News, July 2, 2005.  
3 Wang Qing, “Yuanmingyuan EIA report announces lake-bed membrane innoxious and harmless 
<yuanmingyuan huanping baogao chen hudi pumo wudu wuhai>,” Jinghua Times, July 2, 2005.  
4 See: Tsinghua University EIA Office, “Environmental Impact Assessment on Yuanmingyuan East Lake 
bed anti-seepage project <yuanmingyuan dongbu hudi fangshen gongcheng huanjing yingxiang baogao 
shu>,” publicized in June 2005, pp. 271-277 
[http://www.mep.gov.cn/ztbd/ymyfcgc/zjgd/200507/t20050705_68267.htm]; and also see: Liu 
Shukun, “Re-reflection on Yuanmingyuan anti-seepage project <dui yuanmingyuan fangshen gongcheng 
de zai sikao>,” in Special Issues of Specially Invited speeches in 2005 Academic Annual Meeting of 
China Hydraulic Engineering Society (documents collected from personal channel), pp. 97-106.  
5 “Environmental Impact Assessment on Yuanmingyuan East Lake bed anti-seepage project,” 
6 Zhao Yongxin and Liu Yi, “Specialists in various fields comments on Yuanmingyuan EIA report with 
satisfaction and regret <you manyi you yihan, gefang zhuanjia pingjia yuanmingyuan huanping 
baogao>,” People’s Daily Online [http://env.people.com.cn/GB/35525/3521111.html].  
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new aspect to object the project1.  
Facing with the embarrassment of mass media and other objectors, SEPA, who had 
been standing on the same side, made a quick reaction. According EIA Law, there was a 
60-day period for SEPA to examine the report, and, even on July 2nd, the EIA chief of 
SEPA told Jinhua News, a local popular newspaper, that the examination would spend at 
least 35 working days2. But, “when experts of multiple views” were still “discussing the 
report details” 3, SEPA made a surprisingly fast determination. On July 7th, deputy 
director, Pan Yue, took a press conference to transfer the final determination of the top 
watchdog in environmental protection field: with careful examination, SEPA agreed on 
the conclusion submitted by Tsinghua’s EIA report, and order the 
Yuanmingyuan Park administration to thoroughly rectify (quanmian 
zhenggai) the project plan (to remove all the lined membrane)” 4. It should be 
admitted that, this determination were some how self-contradictory. As we know, the EIA 
report basically supported the project, then why SEPA could make such a determination 
ordering to remove the membrane while agreeing on the report conclusion? Factually, in 
this 277-page report, besides basically affirming the scientific reasonableness, to be more 
precise, investigators also pointed out several unavoidable defects of an artificial project, 
and indicated suggestions for improvement. But under a pressure of 40-day time limit, 
the hastedly raised suggestions sometimes contradicted with the general conclusion5, 
which naturally left space for different interpretations. In the interpretation of SEPA 
released to mass media, negative effects of an artificial project were emphasized. For 
example, when mentioning the membrane materials, SEPA accepted the report 
conclusion to be of no risk to pollute the water, but it still demanded the project to take 
“(more environmental friendly) natural antiseepage approaches” 6, without defining 
exactly what approaches. For this reason, SEPA’s determination on the future of the 
                                                        
1 Editorial: “Evidences raised by EIA report are not sufficient for Yuanmingyuan’s resolution <huanping 
bushi gaizao yuanmingyuan de chongfen tiaojian>”, Beijing News July 6th, 2005.  
2 Wang, “Yuanmingyuan EIA report announces lake-bed membrane innoxious and harmless,” 
3 Zhao, “Yuanmingyuan Issue Promoted Public Participation,” p. 54.  
4 SEPA newsletter, “SEPA demands Yuanmingyuan anti-seepage project to be comprehensively 
improved <guojia huanbao zongju yaoqiu yuanmingyuan fangshen gongcheng quanmian zhenggai>,” 
publicized on July 7, 2005. [http://www.zhb.gov.cn/xcjy/zwhb/200507/t20050707_68352.htm] 
5 See: Liu, “Re-reflection on Yuanmingyuan anti-seepage project,” 
6 SEPA newsletter, “SEPA demands Yuanmingyuan anti-seepage project to be comprehensively 
improved,” 
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project seemed to be on the opposition to what the EIA report had prospected.  
The final determination of the top environmental section could be taken as an end to 
the whole public event, leading to the result in two respects. On one hand, as most of the 
common people reached information from mass media release rather than spending time 
on a 277-page technical document, the public statement of SEPA naturally had much 
greater influence on public opinion than the conclusion of the EIA report, which kept the 
consistency of media issue framing. On the other hand, when Yuanmingyuan Park 
administration was ordered to remove the “false” membrane, it indicated the success of 
the environmental-priority coalition of SEPA, experts, environmental activists and mass 
media. As the Zhao Yongxin, the journalist of People’s Daily to firstly report the issue, 
admitted, the “SEPA’s order for thorough rectification” had “swept away” his 
“bewilderment” 1from reading the EIA report. He acclaimed, “citizens are greeting 
SEPA’s courage (against wrongdoings and to reform the system—writer), and celebrating 
the social progress…which is the success of law, public participation, science and 
democracy, and is a token of China’s modernization” 2. 
 
7. Analysis 
The Yuanmingyuan case just happened at the climax of the “Environmental Storm” 
began by SEPA to strengthen the legal authority of the Environmental Impact 
Assessment Law, and was taken by SEPA and NGO as a test case for the public 
participation in environmental decision making3. In comparison with the Environmental 
Storm and the “Nu River Defense Battle” which will be discussed in the next chapter, it 
didn’t seem to match the extensive media attention, because the actual environmental 
impact of the Yuanmingyuan project was undetermined and very possible to be much less 
serious. However, this case is still worth of studying for the very clear steps of the 
proceedings according to SEPA’s active intervention during a certain short time, helping 
                                                        
1 Zhao Yongxin, “Delight and Expectation: thoughts on SEPA’s order for improvement of 
Yuanmingyuan anti-seepage project <huanxin yu qidai: huanbao zongju yaoqiu yuanmingyuan 
fangshen zhenggai ganyan>,” People’s Daily Online, July 8, 2005. 
[http://env.people.com.cn/GB/35525/3527088.html] 
2 Ibid.  
3 Nick Young, “Public enquiries draw SEPA and environmental NGOs closer together,” China 
Development Brief, April 22, 2005. [http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com/node/72] 
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us to understand the pattern of SEPA’s mobilization. And, also important, by judging 
from the case, we are indicated the frequent communication, trust relations, and some 
sort of action coalition between environmental officials and environmental NGOs with 
other active journalists. In other words, we may say that, after the setbacks of Tibetan 
Antelope issue, environmental NGOs found exactly the stable partner in the political 
system for them to obtain beneficial resources. And as well, that was exactly the action 
capability of NGOs which had been developed during those years to make them get 
recognition and initiative proximity from the political actors.  
This controversy was firstly aroused by the accidental discovery of an intellectual. In 
order to stop the project, the discoverer chose to report it to the mass media rather than 
relevant departments. And, the news value of this issue was felt by a journalist of the 
most authoritative Party Paper and quickly became a public issue. The mass media 
framed the project as an “environmental tragedy” having disastrous consequences not 
only on the ecology of the Yuanmingyuan Park area, but also on the whole ground water 
system of Beijing. With the existing public concern on the poor water resource 
management of Beijing, the issue framing easily aroused the extensive sympathy. A 
current public survey indicated that as many as 85.4% of the interviewees agreed to 
remove the membrane, which had been strongly advocated by the mass media, but 86.7% 
of the interviewees admitted that except the media information, they had no idea of what 
the project would really make or what the antiseepage membrane was1. However, the 
great media influence hadn’t been formed at the early stage, because the media issue 
framing of the environmental tragedy and the corruption doubt had been only kept as the 
conjecture of mass media, public intellectuals and environmental activists. Although they 
had asked for the governmental intervention to recognize the conjecture, they hadn’t got 
any positive governmental response, because, not only the objection didn’t sound 
reasonable enough to prove the “tragedy”, but also according to the customary 
bureaucratic process, the policymaking of the project didn’t seemed be obviously illegal.  
In comparison of the other departments to have disappointed the project opponents, 
                                                        
1 “Environmental Impact Assessment on Yuanmingyuan East Lake bed anti-seepage project, pp. 
253-254. 
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SEPA became the decisive player to promote the Yuanmingyuan issue into the climax. 
The SEPA intervention indicated its well-established network with journalists and 
environmental activists, who had made SEPA’s information channel to know the project 
and make the decision to halt it. For the observers, it might be quite strange for the semi 
ministry, only with the interpretation of a news report, to directly exert the 
administrative pressure on the Park administration at the grass-root level of the 
bureaucratic hierarchy. However, it was easy to understand the action according to its 
succedent actions to turn the public concern to the legalization of the EIA process and the 
public hearing, which indicated the urgent needs of SEPA. Thus, it would be natural to 
conclude that the keen SEPA top official took the chance of Yuanmingyuan to set an 
example of the environmental priority and the “rule by law”.  
Despite of the informal information channel, SEPA’s order to halt the project 
depended on its institutional resources according to the bureaucratic hierarchy, but it 
also broke the tradition, as a central semi ministry to jump over the municipal 
government and EPB. As the issue happened during the period of Environmental Storm, 
it might not be surprising for other departments to see the heterodoxy of SEPA, but the 
antiseepage project in a Park was too small in scale—in comparison with the hydropower 
projects SEPA halted to angered the powerful electricity goliath—to arouse the 
counteraction of departments at the similar level with SEPA. Thus, we can see the Beijing 
municipal Government announce to respect the SEPA and decision and left the Park 
Administration alone to deal with the controversy. However, instead of solving the 
controversy limited to the bureaucratic procedures, SEPA chose to embed its 
mobilization in the public participation.  
The embedded mobilization was firstly indicated by the role of SEPA in this issue. 
During the whole process, SEPA hadn’t used its administrative authority to clearly claim 
to remove or maintain the membrane, but only played the role of agenda setting in order 
to solve the problem and the neutral intercessor between the Park Administration and the 
public opponents. But it’s also easy for us to see the conscious orientation of SEPA 
leading to the subversion of the original policy, based on the administrative capability it 
had. Several evidences had implied the orientation: for example, the sign-up procedure of 
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the public hearing made it more favorable for the participation of well-organized 
opponents to “represent the public”; SEPA took the control over the time-set of EIA 
process and the choice of EIA institution; and, SEPA dominated the interpretation of the 
final EIA report. For the pioneer official, Pan Yue, the domination of SEPA of the EIA 
process was an “exploration” of “governmental itself” to “set up an open platform for all 
kinds of comments focused on the government decision-making”1.  
Besides the active orientation of SEPA, the activities of journalists, especially those 
with the liberalistic view, and the environmental NGOs had made the foundation, the 
“social units”, of embeddeness, making it possible for SEPA to link its efforts to the public 
rather than its unreliable bureaucratic colleagues. In the last chapter, we have already 
discussed the dynamics of the coalition of environmental NGOs and liberalistic 
journalists for environmental protection and participation in policymaking, and, the 
dynamics also linked them to the coalition with SEPA. When SEPA launched the public 
hearing and EIA process, the organized environmental activists and liberalistic 
journalists actively participated in and perform the responsibility of public supervision. 
Their opinion expression over Yuanmingyuan event – to create a number of first 
exposure to the EIA market unspoken rules ions and activism against the membrane 
project, publicized on the hearing and through media channels – had become the source 
of the validity for SEPA’s heterodox beyond the bureaucratic customs. As the only 
governmental department “intervening in the issue actively”2, the orientation of SEPA 
was also welcomed. According to the China Youth Daily, SEPA had “left enough freedom 
to the mass media”3. 
In summary, the Yuanmingyuan membrane project issue seemed like an elaborate 
experiment of the embedded mobilization, setting the good example for the exploration 
of better governance on environmental issues. Beijing News, an important liberal news 
paper used the concept of “effective and inexpensive democracy <hui er bugui de minzhu 
                                                        
1 Liu Shixin, “Yuanmingyuan event 100 days to create a number of first exposure to the EIA market 
unspoken rules <yuanmingyuan shijian baitian chuang duoxiang diyi bao huanping shichang qian 
guize>,” China Youth Daily, July 8, 2005.  
2 See for example, Yi Rongrong, “Three wonders with regard to Yuanmingyuan <guanyu yuanmingyuan 
de san ge xiangbutong>,” Science Times, May 12, 2005; and also Beijing News editorial, “Yuanmingyuan 
Issue: it shouldn’t to let environmental department to fight a lone battle,” 
3 Liu Shixin, “Yuanmingyuan event 100 days to create a number of first exposure to the EIA market 
unspoken rules,” 
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zhengzhi>”1 to praise the practice. The concept may be interpreted as that on one hand, 
it had been “effective” in subvert the result of the bureaucratic policymaking through the 
expression of the “public opinion”, and in enforcement the influence of the weak 
environmental watchdog; and on the other hand, it had been “inexpensive” in the use of 
existing institutional resources and administrative authority of SEPA to avoid the conflict 
between the government departments and the public possibly along with the mobilization 
of social resources, thereby to reduce the system cost to keep the social stability.  
But, as supplementary, we may still get aware of that — in comparison with the 
positive meaning of the Yuanmingyuan issue for the procedural democratization of 
environmental governance — there finally hadn’t been any scientific alternative scheme 
for either proponents or opponents. At last, the plastic membrane had been still lined 
along the lake-bed, with some trivial changes to the material and the size. Not only the 
opponents had been hard to accept the result2, but also the Park Administration had been 
annoyed because the serious seepage and water waste hadn’t been relieved3. Despite of 
the situation, the media attention had already faded away.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 Fang, “Hearing: important practice of democratic politics,” 
2 Zhao Yongxin, “Anti-seepage membrane in Qichun garden, Yuanmingyuan, hasn’t been removed 
according to the improvement order <yuanmingyuan: qichunyuan anbian fangshenmo hai wei an 
zhenggai yaoqiu chaichu>,” People’s Daily Online, September 12, 2005.  
3 Wang Qing, “Yuanmingyuan finished ordered improvement and begins to fill the lake with water, 
however, the Administration claims that water will be lost quickly <yuanmingyuan fangshen zhenggai 
hu kaishi zhushui, yuanfang chen shui henkuai hui liushi>,” JInghua Times, September 9, 2005.  
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Chapter Five 
Clash between Informal Environmental Politics and Institutional Vested 
Interest Group: 
The Case of “Nu River Defense Battle” 
 
The last two chapters have demonstrated the outline of the embedded mobilization in 
China’s environmental governance, the reformatory attempt promoted by the coalition of 
SEPA, environmental NGOs and mass media. And moreover, we can see from the two 
cases the actual result of the embedded mobilization to achieve the “effective and 
inexpensive democracy”, not only having inspired the public attention to China’s 
environmental situation, but also helping to offer SEPA and the civil society the new 
policy leverages to influence the decision-making.  
However, after analyzing the purposes and action modes of the entrepreneurs in the 
embedded mobilization and its general characteristics, this study now is faced another 
question. The last two cases haven’t indicated the “true” conflict between SEPA and the 
economic-orientation, thus, it was hard to examine the real effects of the embedded 
mobilization. As mentioned in the second chapter, in the authoritarian Party-state with 
the bureaucratic fragmentation, the environmental governance in China had been mainly 
strongly obstructed by the strong economic orientation in accordance with the nation’s 
general industrialization plan. And that was why the SEPA had been offered less 
institutional resources, and the environmental NGO activism hadn’t got the extensive 
public support. But in the last two cases, the attempt of the embedded mobilization to 
influence the decision-making hadn’t tried to challenge any national line. To speak more 
specifically, in the Tibetan antelope protection, the environmental NGOs and mass media 
with the help from SEPA had tried to give prominence to the social action in an 
established national protection plan. And, in the Yuanmingyuan case, SEPA had taken 
control over the process, the top environmental watchdog, with environmental NGOs and 
mass media as the coalition, had depended on the EIA Law to enforce the SEPA authority 
and pursue public participation, without challenging the validity of the Party-state system. 
And further, in this case, although the mass media had strongly described the 
contradiction between the reformatory actions of SEPA and the fossil bureaucratic 
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tradition to ignore the public opinion, it must be admitted that there hadn’t been any 
actual conflicts between SEPA and the economic-oriented departments at the similar 
administrative level, or the local municipal government.  
To further comprehend the embedded mobilization, we must analyze its application 
to cases substantially involving the contradiction between the EP and economic 
development, which would maintain the long-term controversy of China. This chapter 
raises the case of Nu River Project (NRP), which started in 2003 with climax from 2003 
to 2006 and had continued its influence even until today. The internationally known 
social action to object the hydropower construction on a non-dam river, romanced as the 
“Nu River Defense Battle”, had been judged as a symbol of China’s great civil 
achievements and the political pluralization. However, this study will explore its value for 
the embedded mobilization which had somehow been ignored, without denying its great 
meaning as the symbolic social action. While further analyzing the embeddedness and 
mobilization in a much lager scale to deal with a much more complicated situation, this 
chapter will added two aspects of focuses: one aspect is the conflict with the truly strong 
group of development-oriented departments and the state-owned enterprise, whose 
dynamics of benefits were backed by the official framing of economic developmental 
priority; and the other aspect is, besides the obstruction from the political sphere, the 
coalition of SEPA, environmental NGOs and mass media had been faced with the 
challenge from the public sphere, to speak specifically, the public intellectuals who denied 
the environmental priority in the industrialization and the environmental NGOs’ identity 
of “representing the public”. Especially the latter aspect has been more possible to be 
ignored, but may have brought the more complex implication. 
 
1. Controversy on Dam Projects in China 
For the serious harm of seasonal floods to an agricultural society, “water management 
<zhishui>” has been an important public issue and governmental responsibility during 
China’s history. It even led to the thesis of “hydraulic state”1, proposing that the 
                                                        
1 Karl. A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1957. 
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autocratic power of China’s dynasty was derived from water management. Although the 
thesis had been called into question, history told us that control of flooding was a critical 
criterion for measuring the rulers’ capability, and even in middle 197os, the floods had 
been still a big threat to man’s life and property. Dam construction used to be a 
traditional approach to deal with the problem, by saving water in rainy seasons to ease 
flooding and drainage in dry seasons for irritation. Dams have still been taking the 
responsibility, however, the main imperative of massive “water management” today has 
been economic benefits. Especially from the end of 1990s, the high-speed increasing need 
of electricity in accordance with economic development1, hydro power, which was 
described as a “clean and renewable energy” in comparison with non-renewable coal and 
oil, unstable wind power and risky nuclear power, has been strongly encouraged in China. 
A plenty of dams have been built on nearly all the riverways. According to the statistics by 
the World Commission on Dams (WCD), until 2005, when the Chinese anti-dam action 
had reached its climax, China had maintained 22000 dams, nearly half of the total 48000 
dams through the world2. Although, most of them are of short scale and only small parts 
are for hydroelectricity, the small parts have draw great attention according to its 
involvement of interest division, political sensitiveness, and social effects like 
environmental concern.  
1.1 “Occupying Resources”：Dam Project for Interest Division 
The controversy on dam projects firstly derived from the unfair distribution of the 
economic benefits, which had mainly flowed to the State-owned electricity companies, 
who were commonly called “five electricity brothers”, being the most active players of 
hydropower development in Southwest China. From the beginning of 21st century, there 
had been a eager development of rich potential “clean energy” along the large rivers—Nu 
River, Jinsha River, Yalong River, Dadu River and so on—in Southwest China. The rapid 
development had quickly demonstrated its characteristics of disorder, unreasonableness 
and over-exploitation. And, this phenomenon had been generally called as “riding on 
                                                        
1 See details in the annual data of National Bureau of Statistics of China 
[http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/]. 
2 Wang Yongchen (ed.), Change: 2006 Survey Report of Chinese Environmental Journalists (gaibian: 
zhongguo huanjing jizhe diaocha baogao 2006), Beijing: Sanlianc, 2007. p. 124) 
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horse occupying resources” (paoma quanshui), which had been generated from certain 
economic and political incentives.  
The first and most important reason for “occupying resources” was the 
profit-orientation after the reorganization of State-owned electricity enterprises in early 
2000s. In 1996, to deal with the growing electricity demand, the Ministry of Electric 
Power—it was abolished two years later—organized the State Power Company of China 
(SPCC) composed of individual entities for the State investment on electricity 
exploitation. And the assets of SPCC were distributed to five entities: Huadian Group, 
Huaneng Group, Guodian Group, Datang Group and China Electricity Investment Group. 
Before the 2002 reorganization, any electricity development of the individual entities 
under SPCC was arranged by the national plan, thus, there had been no pressure of profit 
or self-development. However, the reorganization made the “five brothers” 
profit-oriented companies to build up their own business, which had become the 
economic dynamics for the State-owned enterprises (SOEs) to compete for occupying 
potential resources. In addition, these SOEs had the rank equaling to vice-ministry in the 
bureaucratic hierarchy, which had brought them great self-governance autonomy in 
exploitation and occupying potential hydropower resources, and the administrative 
power to promote their plans in front of the local government and other governmental 
sectors1. Under economic dynamics and entitled administrative ability, “five brothers” 
had made their strategy to go to the undeveloped area in Southwest China for exploiting 
potential resources to the greatest extent.  
The second reason was that there had been the custom of the “domination by who 
occupies”. There had been an unwritten rule that when a SOE had build dams on a 
certain river, it automatically owned the exclusive right in developing the water resources 
along the river. For example, between the most powerful “brothers”, Huadian Group 
handled Nu River development in Yunnan Province and Huaneng Group owned the right 
to develop Lancang River. This rule might have originally been permitted by the State to 
                                                        
1 In addition, although these SOEs are in theory vice-ministry level, they actually had greater power and 
language power for many reasons. The most important might be that, on one hand was their financial 
power through monopoly, and on the other hand was some special identities of their directors. For 
instance, the Huaneng Group was generally known controlled by the family of Li Peng, the former 
Premier.  
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encourage active development, but it obviously had prevented effective supervision on 
the disorder exploitation of “five brothers” and healthy economic competition.  
The last reason was that the profit-orientation and absence of effective supervision 
had made SOEs commonly ignore the social and environmental influence of exploitation. 
Most investment had put on the project building itself, and influence like resettlement, 
heritage and ecology rarely received enough financial distribution, which had brought 
negative images of the public to “occupying resources” 1, In comparison with the great 
economic benefits of the SOEs through monopoly development2. In other words, there 
had been a serious inequity between SOEs who took large benefits away with little input 
especially the payment for using the resources and the local people who had been forced 
to suffer from the side effects of dam projects.  
Besides profit-oriented SOEs, “occupying resources” had also obtained support from 
the local government, mainly for economic increase and, in accordance, the political 
achievements to help future political career. Even though the main part of direct benefits 
from hydropower would be distributed to the SOEs—for example, the development of 
Lancang River had been operated by a special corporation with Huaneng Group owning 
70% stock and Yunnan Provincial Government owning 30%; in addition, the local 
government had some influence but not very effective because the central-level Huaneng 
Group had centralized leadership relations (chuizhi guanli) with the special corporation 
(Huaneng Lancang River Corporation) at provincial-level3—the local government in 
Southwest China concentrated more on the creation of new jobs and potential prosperity 
of other business brought by the dam construction, such like building material industry 
and services. Thus, the local government in the undeveloped Southwest China would 
incline to take administrative measures or even political coercion to suppress opposition. 
On the other hand, the governments in advanced East China were also demanding the 
cheap electricity provision and wouldn’t anti the eager resources occupation, and, since 
                                                        
1 See: Zhang Fan, “Economic Reasons of ‘Occupying Resources’ Phenomenon and Countermeasures,” 
China Water Resources, Vol. 18, 2005, pp. 34-36.  
2 Yang Min, “Looking Back China’s Electricity Reform (huiwang zhongguo dianli gaige),” in Change: 
2006 Survey Report of Chinese Environmental Journalists, pp. 106-120.  
3 See details in: Andrew C. Mertha, “China’s ‘soft’ centralization: shifting tiao/kuai authority 
relationships,” China Quarterly 184 (December 2005), pp. 791-810. 
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political leaders from East China generally had more language power than those from the 
west part, their energy demand would also bring pressure on the State to encourage 
“occupying resources”.  
1.2 Political Dissidents on Dam Projects: Case of Three Gorgeous Project (TGP)  
Another factor to make the dam project controversy was its political sensitiveness, 
which had drawn global attention since the debate on the Three Gorgeous Project (TGP). 
The TGP controversy, which had lacked grassroots debates1 but mainly involved the 
leadership (CCP or TGPPC), bureaucracy, their think-tanks, media, and some 
independent intellectuals, with political struggle, suppression, and even 
conspiracy—might have been not so typical in comparison with the anti-dam climax in 
the first 10 years of 21st century. However, its political implication as a symbol for Chinese 
political dissidents had deeply stigmatized the anti-dam actions.  
The idea of the TGP had been firstly raised by Dr. Sun Yat-sen during 1910s, as “the 
alternative to coal”2. From 1932 to 1935, the RC government had planned a relative 
financial scheme and signed a contract of technical cooperation with an American 
company. And at that time, the plan had been taken by media as a national pride to 
demonstrate the industrialization of an ancient agricultural civilization3, but the plan had 
been finally given up due to war and financial crisis of the RC government. After the 
establishment of People’s Republic of China, during the 1950s, surrounding the TG dam 
construction on the mainstream of Yangtze River, a small scale debate was progressing in 
Central bureaucracy, limited to few ardent supporters represented Lin Yishan, by head of 
Yangtze Valley Planning Office (YVPO) of that time, or opponents represented by Li Rui, 
former head of General Bureau for Hydroelectricity4, and leaders like Mao Zedong and 
                                                        
1 GØrild Heggelund, Environment and Resettlement Politics in China: The Three Gorges Project, 
England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003, p. 2. 
2 See: “It’s proper for China to use water power: as the alternative to coal (zhongguo yi liyong 
mei zhi tidaiwu), ” Shen Bao, September 18, 1919. 
3 See print reports during that time for example: “The state is planning the large-scale dam (jianzhu 
daguimo shuiza woguo zhengzai jihua zhong),” Wenhui Bao, October 23, 1935. Yangtze hydropower 
project has been gradually developed with smaller scale (changjiang shuidian gongcheng suoxiao 
guimo zhubu fazhan),” Dagong Bao, November 8, 1935. “Develop Yangtze water resources, construct 
large-scale dam (fazhan changjiang shuili, jianzhu dashuiza),” Wenhui Bao, November 29, 1935. 
Sino-American technical contract signed for TG hydropower project (sanxia shuili fadian gongcheng 
zhongmei qianyue jishu hezuo),” Wenhui Bao, December 2, 1935. American technicians come to Wuhan 
(mei jishu renyuan xiangji laihan),” Wuhan Daily, April 12, 1936. 
4 The YVPO was reorganized into Yangtze River Water Resources Commission (YRWRC) in 1990, and 
the organization of General Bureau for Hydroelectricity doesn’t exist now. 
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Zhou Enlai. Generally, it was a debate between section on water resource and section on 
hydroelectricity1, and the latter had raised more scientific analysis, while, judged from a 
lot of evidences, Mao Zedong seemed very interested in the suggestions of the former. 
However, the debate had kept behind the scene until 1956, when Lin Yishan wrote on 
Chinese Water Resources journal published by Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) an 
article to interpret his idea of constructing a dam with an unbelievable height of 235 
meters2 mainly for control floods. And the opponents, guided by Li Rui, made a special 
issue on official journal, Hydroelectricity, against the idea of Lin, raising respective 
problems on floods, electricity, shipping, economic cost, etc. However, the debate was too 
technical and professional, so that it was limited in the two bureaucratic sections, not 
known by “common people”, and even never came into the notice of Mao Zedong3. But 
according to the memories of Li, the supporters succeeded in framing issue by inviting 
specialists from Soviet Union into discussion, so as to put their plan into political agenda4. 
On September 1st, 1956, an article taking the supporting standing was published on the 
front page of People’s Daily5, and it involved even very detailed plans and the scale of 
generating electricity in future. So that the article had shaped an image to the people that 
the Leaders had already recognized the plan and it would have soon been started6. In fact, 
before the influential article, several articles on survey along TG area had appeared on 
print media, including People’s Daily7. Li Rui then wrote a response named “Brief 
argument on Three Gorges project” against that published on September 1st. To his 
disappointed, the most important Party Paper accepted firstly but finally refused to 
publish it, for the former Premier, Zhou Enlai, thought it was not suitable to discuss the 
topic publicly at that time. However, still, the topic was allowed to be discussed in some 
                                                        
1 Li Rui, “Be Responsible for History: Memories on How the Three Gorges Project Started (dui lishi fuze: 
huiyi sanxia gongcheng shangma guocheng de shimo)”, Modern China Research, Vol. 166, No. 3 1999.  
2 The final plan is 175 meters in height. 
3 “Be Responsible for History,” 
4 Ibid.  
5 “Survey on Yangtze basin water resources ends (changjiang liuyu shuili ziyuan chatan gongzuo 
jieshu),” People’s Daily, September 1, 1956.  
6 “Be Responsible for History,” 
7 See for example: “Large-scale survey on Yangtze River basin is in full swing (changjiang liuyu 
daguimo kance gongzuo quanmian zhankai),” People’s Daily, March 25, 1956. “Large-scale survey work 
on engineering geology and hydrologic geology along Yangtze River basin is in active progress 
(changjiang daguimo de gongcheng dizhi he shuiwen dizhi kance gongzuo jiji jingxing),” People’s 
Yangtze Paper, May 19, 1956. And, “Survey work on geology along both sides of Yangtze River has been 
completed (sanxia liangan dizhi diaocha gongzuo quanbu wancheng),” Hubei Daily, August 24, 1956. 
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other papers and magazines which were not so influential. The year 1956 was considered 
as the beginning of a limited public debate on Three Gorges Project1. In the next year, 
1957, Li wrote another article on People’s Daily, implying his critics on the project. He 
mentioned that how effective the great dam would be against floods couldn’t have been 
perfectly proved, and moreover, the project would cost too much2. 
From 1956 to 1957, we have seen not only the debate between top bureaucrats of 
central departments, but also their mobilization of mass media to expand the influence of 
ideas. However, the use of media had been just taken as an aid to persuade the top 
political authority, rather than to involve multiple participation. Along with Li Rui being 
dismissed in the political campaign of late 1950s, the voice of opponents had faded away. 
However, also according to the continuing political campaign until the late 1970s, 
proponents had also failed in promoting their plan. In addition, from late 1970s, after the 
death of Mao and Zhou, the charisma leaders, Lin Yishan and the YVPO lost their strong 
position in top-level policymaking process, while Li Rui gained more trust from new 
leaders at that time like Hu Yaobang in charge of Party issues, Zhao Ziyang leading the 
government, and Chen Yun generally planning the economic reform. The change of 
power balance between the two Li’s had for a time driven the TGP from political agendas.  
However, the new leaders preferred the policymaking mode different from Mao. As 
GØrild Heggelund pointed3: 
 
(T)he reform movement in the 1980s diminished the role for personnel 
leadership and created a greater regard for consensus in 
decision-making…top leaders became more reluctant to employ Mao’s 
methods to overcome bureaucratic resistance, such as ideological campaigns 
and broadsides and deification of top leaders. Top leaders now prefer active 
co-operation of all major parties concentrated to prevent long delays of a 
project. 
                                                        
1 Li Rui, On Three Gorgeous Project (lun sanxia gongcheng), Hunan: Hunan Technology Press, 1985. 
pp. 1-2. 
2 Li Rui, “The Ethics of ‘Big Fishing Net’ (da yuwang zhuyi),” People’s Daily, April 14, 1957.  
3 Environment and Resettlement Politics in China, p. 27. 
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On one hand, the policymaking participants had been expanded from several top 
leaders and active bureaucrats, to the fragmented bureaucratic departments. On the 
other hand, according to the need of comprehensive industrialization had taken the place 
of ideological struggle to become the national priority, technocrats with engineering 
background had achieved dominance in policymaking process. Thus, the TGP idea, with 
its expected great benefits and the charming challenge in engineering, quickly found its 
supporters, especially those top officials from the newly-organized Ministry of Water 
Resources and Electricity Power (MWREP), including Li Peng, the later Premier whose 
family then controlled Huneng Electricity Group. In 1983, MWREP was entitled to lead 
the planning of TGP, and 400 experts were hired to examine the conditions of fields 
including hydrology, sediment management, geology, flood protection, electricity 
generation, shipping, resettlement, environment, engineering and economics, and so on. 
While feasibility research and expert advices were focused to make the decision 
seemingly “scientific”1, the totally absence of public participation had proved it not 
“democratic”. The details of the examination process had been only publicized on 
professional media mainly with positive comments. Until the examination was 
elementarily completed in 1988, the top Party paper, People’s Daily, raised the report 
“GTP special examination comes to an end (changjiang sanxia gongcheng zhuanti 
lunzheng gaoyiduanluo)”, to describe the TGP as “comprehensive” and “commonly 
agreed by most participating experts a technically feasible and economically reasonable”, 
while agreeing that “some experts with dissidents” had “refused to approve the 
examination report” 2. Four months later, People’s Daily added another report to further 
describe the examination as with “two sharply opposing views”3. And, a newsletter of the 
National Xinhua News Agency listed the detailed objections on economic benefits, 
technical difficulty and environmental effects4.  
                                                        
1 However, according to Li Rui, the “scientific” decision had been to a great extent framed by MWREP 
from the choice of experts and setting of research agendas. See: “Be responsible for history,” 
2 “TGP special demonstration has come to a conclusion (changjiang sanxia gongcheng zhuanti 
lunzheng gao yi duanluo),” People’s Daily, December 2, 1988. 
3 “TGP demonstration work has completed (sanxia gongcheng lunzheng gongzuo quanbu wancheng), 
People’s Daily, March 8, 1989.  
4 “TGP demonstration has formally ended and will be submitted to State Council for 
macro-policymaking (changjiang sanxia gongcheng lunzheng zhengshi jieshu, jiang jiao guowuyuan 
zuo hongguan juice yiju),” Xinhua News Agency, March 9, 1989.  
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However, to admit the existence of opposite views by Party mouthpieces had seemed 
to be rather an objective description of the examination progress and reflection of top 
authority than a signal for public discussion. The main framework of the mouthpieces 
reports—mainly on People’s Daily and Hubei Daily, since TGP was designed to locate in 
Hubei Province—was mainly “teaching” common people the great economic benefits and 
importance for the national energy demand of the TGP. Opposite views were only 
mentioned without influencing the main framework. For example, the doubted 
environmental effects were interpreted as “of both positive and negative effects...with 
bringing more good than harm”1, and “negative effects” were believed to be “possibly 
reduced to the minimum extent under the condition of high concern”2.  
In comparison with the highly limited public discussion in China mainland, there had 
seemed to be an open channel for TGP opponents through mass media in Hong Kong. 
But if we carefully checked the Hong Kong media active at TGP discussion, we may easily 
find them all having close relations with CCP, like Dagong Bao, Wenhui bao and Ming 
Bao. Thus, it’ll be not unnatural for us to speculate that relative reports on these papers 
might have been — rather than a channel for suppressing opposite views — encouraged to 
frame a image of the Chinese government as “open to comprehensive discussion for 
decision-making”, as high-level political leaders, bureaucrats and experts repeatedly 
expressed through these Hong Kong papers3. Another direct evidence to confirm this 
speculation was that a group of Hong Kong reporters4 were invited by the Chinese 
government for a field investigation in TGP area in Hubei Province. And they were 
“thanked” by the government for “promoting a comprehensive public understanding of 
                                                        
1 Zhang Guangdou, “TGP should be constructed as early as possible (changjiang sanxia gongcheng yi 
zaori Xingjian),” People’s Daily, December 1, 1991.  
2 “The group of members of the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress investigates on TGP 
(renda changweihui zutuan kaocha sanxia gongcheng),” People’s Daily, November 25, 1991.  
3 See for example: “Controversy on advantages and disadvantages of TGP: related companies clarify 
misunderstandings (sanxia gongcheng libi zhengduan, youguan gongsi chengqing wujie), Wenhui 
Bao, March 9, 1986. “Deng Xiaoping talks about TGP to judge advantages more than disadvantages 
(dengxiaoping tan sanxia gongcheng, zhichu haochu duoyu huaichu),” Wenhui Bao, January 31, 1986. 
“Li Peng reveals that foreign experts will be hired for consultation (lipeng toulu jiang pin waiguo 
zhuanjia canjia zixun),” Wenhui Bao, June 16, 1986. Pan Jiazheng, “The problems faced with TGP 
(sanxia gongcheng miandui de wenti), Ming Bao, August 18, 1988. “TGP scientific research provided 
basis for policymaking (sanxia gongcheng keyan tigong juice yiju),” Dagong Bao, May 15, 1991. “TGP 
is economically feasible(sanxia gongcheng jiji shang kexing),” Dagong Bao, December 20, 1991. 
4 The group members were from Dagong Bao, Wenhui Bao, Ming Bao, Business Paper, Dongfang Daily, 
Nanhua Daily, Xin Evening, Economic Guide, TVB and Radio Hong Kong.  
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TGP”1. 
To summarize, until the TGP plan was passed by Chinese People’s Congress in April 
1992，despite of the 177 vetoes, 644 abstentions and 45 members having not voted2，there 
had been very little space for opponents to frame their views to the public. Common 
people had only been given an impression of peaceful consensus in policymaking. The 
role of mass media was still for the traditional “political mobilization”, using the 
information monopoly to make common people accept the official frameworks and then 
prove the policy validity according to the framed “opinions of masses”. But on the 
contrary, there had been hidden very severe struggle in the political sphere. In other 
words, without the existence of a public sphere and open discussion, the debate between 
proponents and opponents had been inevitably developed into zero-game political 
conflict and finally got to be managed only through political approaches. For example, Li 
Rui, the earliest opponent had been long excluded from core decision-making circles. 
And further, there had been a saying that in the early 1990s, some 179 people had been 
imprisoned for their opposition to TGP, which had made it a hot topic of China’s politics 
and taken as an important illustration of the totalitarian remains. For example, Dai Qing 
and her well-known book of critical essays Yangtze! Yangtze! which had been banned in 
China and made Dai a representative oversea dissent, was a summary of such 
expressions3. Even though, since late 1990s when Zhu Rongji replaced Li Peng—Li and 
his family had been believed to be representing the interest group of water resource 
department and electricity SOEs—to become Premier and made good cooperation with 
liberalists and mass media to promote his drastic reforms, negative effects of TGP had 
been encouraged to be discussed publicly, the debate still had been only open to the Party 
mouthpieces and governmental think-tanks, without adopting grassroot organizations 
and political dissidents4. Thus, the “anti-TGP” had remained an important symbol of 
                                                        
1 “Reporter group from Hong Kong pays attention to TGP (xianggang jizhe tuan guanzhu sanxia),” 
People’s Yangtze Paper, November 4, 1990.  
2 Vetoes were mostly from the provinces along upper Yangtze River, who would not benefit much from 
the hydropower generation as the East advanced areas would, but would be directly burdened with the 
side problems like resettlement or environmental effects. The vetoes had demonstrated a bad 
coordination among provinces and further the smaller language power of local leaders of West China at 
the national-level. 
3 Dai Qing: Yangtze! Yangtze! Toronto, Canada: Earthscan, 1994.  
4 Environment and Resettlement Politics in China, pp211-221. 
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China’s “abroad democratic movement” (haiwai minyun) composed of political 
dissidents, and its heritage of political implications had been applied in the issue 
frameworks of later anti-dam climax.  
1.3 Environmental Concerns of Dam Projects: from Fringe to Main Agendas 
Opponents to the eager dam construction began to bring environmental concern into 
their issue frameworks of the TGP issue from late 1990s. In May 1999, the State Council 
announced a resettlement policy change, moving a large number of people originally 
planned to be resettled in the reservoir area completely out of the reservoir. And the 
stated reason for the change was “the weak environmental and ecological condition in the 
area” 1, marking the environmental effect a decisive factor of dam policymaking at the 
national-level. But the environmental concern in TGP issue was only subordinated to the 
resettlement problem. And, its evolution into an independent factor to counteract with 
eager hydropower exploitation had been connected with the development strategy change 
of the central political authority.  
After the Premier term of Zhu Rongji, his successor, Wen Jiabao, and the forth 
political leader, Hu Jintao, have paid more attention to a “comprehensive and scientific 
development” (kexue fazhan guan), caring side social effects derived from economic 
increase as well as the increase itself, to build the “harmonious society” (hexie shehui). 
This directive has also guided the national strategy to develop the lagging west part of 
China, which named “The Great Western Development Strategy” (xibu da kaifa zhanlue), 
formulated in 2000 and legislated on the Tenth People’s Congress in 2004. That the 
environmental concern has made a main factor for the “comprehensive development” in 
the strategy might have been according to a) the serious pollution derived from the 
20-year rapid economic increase had brought the top authority impressive lessons; b) the 
especially vulnerability of ecology in western regions and the special feelings and habits 
of some ethnic groups related to certain natural environments had upgraded the value of 
environmental concern; c) China could be influenced by the pressure from relative 
international governance regimes more than it used to be, especially after its entrance 
into the WTO. According to Wang Jinxiang, deputy-director of the leading group for the 
                                                        
1 Environment and Resettlement Politics in China, p. 4; pp. 185-188. 
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Great Western Development office directly under the State Council, Environmental 
protection have been taken as “a key principle in developing China's west”1. Beyond 
stated principles, special plans have been also formulated. For example, the 2003 
"Returning Grazing Land to Grassland" policy was aimed at the regions crucial to the 
Yangtze River basin protection, and the efforts under the imperative national policy have 
made China “one of a few countries in the world that have been rapidly increasing their 
forest cover”, according to David Dollar, director of the World Bank in China2. 
However, we cannot simply overestimate the environmental factor in policymaking, 
because the “development” has been still the core concept of the State issue frameworks. 
Especially for the hydropower development issue, before, during and after the anti-dam 
climax, although the disorder “occupying resources” action have been continuingly 
criticized by Party mouthpieces, official think-tanks and even top leaders themselves, 
there has always been encouragement on “proper” exploitation, because the top authority 
have not only taken it a large business but also an approach to coordinate the economic 
gap between western and eastern regions as most of the generated electricity have been 
sold to advanced eastern areas like Shanghai and Guangdong. Although this 
long-distance transmission had been doubted as market inefficiency, and seen by the 
advanced areas as a national mandated dependence on southwest energy, the central 
government hadn’t hesitate to take administrative approaches to ensure the southwest 
projects. For this purpose, hydropower projects had been even banned in Guangdong 
Province from 2001 to 20053. In other words, the environmental concern has been 
actually a crucial factor to make the development “comprehensive and scientific” rather 
than a priority over the development.  
 
 
 
                                                        
1 “Western china tries to balance environment, development”, Xinhua News Agency, April 10, 2006. 
[http://www.mwr.gov.cn/english/news/200604/t20060411_101705.html] 
2 Rogerio Wasserman, “Can China be green by 2020?” BBC News. Web, December 11, 2009. 
[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7972125.stm] 
3 Andrew C. Mertha, China's Water Warriors: Citizen Action and Policy Change, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2008. p. 30. But there is also an opinion that the banning had been held for the 
monopoly profits of The State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC), commonly recognized as backed by 
the family of Li Peng.  
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2. Governmental Fragmentation Triggering Nu River Project (NRP) 
Controversy 
2.1 Fragmentation and Alliance of SEPA and Environmental NGOs 
The Nu River is an international river, which rises in Tibet autonomous region of 
China, follows through Yunnan province, Burma, where it is called Salween, and Thailand, 
where it is known as Salaween. For the industrializing China hungering for clean and 
renewable energy, the river with a length of 742 kilometers in Chinese territory and a 
natural head of 1578 kilometers would provide the second highest potential generation. 
However, besides the energy temptation, the river also has very high value of species and 
cultural diversity, as a home to 7000 species of plants and 80 rare or endangered animals 
and fish, so that it has been called by UNESCO as “may be the most biologically diverse 
temperate ecosystem in the world”1 and listed on UNESCO World Heritage Site2 as part 
of the “Three Parallel Rivers Area”3 at the beginning of July 2003.  
Early from 1958, the view to construct a dam on the waterpower abundant river had 
been conceived by Congress representatives from Yunnan Province, and raised as the 
congressional proposal for several times during the 1980s. The national energy sector 
formally started the plan in 1988 and primarily schemed 6 hydropower stations with an 
installed capacity of 10.9 million kilowatt4. In 1999, National Development and Reform 
Committee (NDRC), the top functional department for macroeconomic control under 
State Council, took dominance on the project, in accordance with the “congressional 
                                                        
1 From Wikipedia. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nu_river]  
2 The UNESCO World Heritage Site is a place (such as a forest, mountain, lake, desert, monument, 
building, complex, or city) that is listed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) as of special cultural or physical significance. By 2011, the list includes 936 
prosperities which the World Heritage Committee, composed of 21 state parties, considers as having 
outstanding universal value. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UNESCO_World_Heritage_Site; and 
also, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list.  
3 This area lies within the watershed areas of the upper reaches of the Jinsha, Lancang and Nu rivers, in 
the Hengduan Mountains of Yunnan Province, China, extending over 15 core areas, totalling 939,441.4 
ha, and buffer areas, totalling 758,977.8 ha across a region of 180 km by 310 km, and, judged by 
UNESCO as possibly being “the most biologically diverse temperate region on earth” and “An 
exceptional range of topographical features”. See: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_Parallel_Rivers_of_Yunnan_Protected_Areas; and also: 
http://www.worldheritagesite.org/sites/parallelriversyunnan.html. And, the area was added in the list 
just in July 2003, one month earlier than the NDRC examination meeting on NRP report. See: “China 
adds three more sites to World Heritage List,” People’s Daily, July 6th, 2003.  
[http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200307/06/eng20030706_119513.shtml].  
4 Cao Haidong, Zhang Peng, “Civil power behind the suspension of Nu River dam (nujiang daba gezhi 
muhou de minjian liliang),” Economics, May 20, 2004.  
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suggestion”1, announcing to promote it “in accordance with legal procedures”2. Then, 
under the supervision of water resource sector, two research institutions — Beijing 
Exploitation & Design Institute and Huadong Exploitation & Design Institute — 
successfully bid the job of the survey and design. In 2003 July, the “Report for 
Hydropower Plan in Middle and Lower Nu River Project (the NRP report)” was 
completed, planning a series of 13 hydropower stations with an installed capacity of 21.32 
million kilowatt, equaling to 20% of the total installed capacity of China at that time. And, 
factually, earlier than the completion of the NRP report — in other words, when the plan 
hadn’t been formally approved according to legal procedures — the State-owned 
electricity goliath, Huadian Electricity Group, who  not only possess economic resources 
but also considerable political power and support from the Ministry of Water resources”3 
had already taken material steps to get the entitlement of Yunnan Provincial Government 
to exploit the Nu River hydropower resources, and a share-issuing enterprise exactly for 
the exploitation was already built on June 14 with high investment, much earlier than 
NDRC gathered all “relative sectors” to examine the NRP report on August 26th. This 
process was not strange according to the policymaking custom of China’s hydropower 
development: it was the money (investment of State-owned goliath) and scientific data 
(the NRP report) to be emphasized rather than discussions by multiple stakeholders, and 
in addition, the hydropower development had been acquiesced as the sphere of the water 
resource sector and electricity goliath in the bureaucratic balance. Thus, the legal 
procedure of “examination” on August 26th had been only taken as a matter of form which 
wouldn’t have truly influenced the policy. Similar to the decision-making process, the 
report emphasized the expected great electricity generation, prospected economic 
benefits and engineering details, with insufficient attention to the social effects of the 
environmental community with the relocation of more than 50,000 people, most of who 
from ethnic minority hill tribes. And, it hadn’t been expected the “ignorance” to invoke 
the “heretic” who had dared to deny the plan, that was, the marginalized SEPA.  
                                                        
1 Li Ziliang, “Controversy on Nu River dam: what’s the point (nujiang zhengba: daba zhizheng zheng 
shenme)?” Liaowang News Weekly, December 6, 2004.  
2 “Controversy on Nu River dam: what’s the point?” 
3 “Bridge Over Trouble Waters,” p. 139. 
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According to a SEPA speaker, the SEPA had “never heard the plan” until they were 
informed to participate in the examination procedure on August 12th, making them hard 
to accept1. As discussed in last chapter, SEPA had been long unsatisfied with their 
marginalized position in the policymaking process, and, the Environmental Impact 
Assessment Law, coming into effect in 2003 September 1st, had been expected to be an 
effective tool to challenge the powerful profit-oriented sectors. Thus, in the meeting to 
examine the NRP report, SEPA became the only objector, demanding to apply the coming 
EIA provisions to this project to raise EIA report for SEPA’s special examination, 
“according to its large scale and considerable influence”2. Although the drafters argued 
that the Report had already included a detailed EIA part which had cost RMB
￥5,000,000 (about US$600,000) 3, this job was carried out in accordance with a 1992 
administrative regulation issued inside the water resource sector, which was different 
from the 2003 EIA Law in details4. According to the SEPA representative, that Huadian 
Electricity pushed the NRP at that time was seemingly an attempt to escape the critical 
date of September 1st, when EIA Law came into effect. Thus, he insisted that the EIA 
process be reworked strictly following the EIA Law and SEPA supervision, rather than the 
dominance by the water resource sector.  
However, the rare tough position of SEPA still hadn’t been taken serious enough 
when all the other sectors and NDRC achieved consensus to approve the Report, with 
SEPA representatives only being able to insist NDRC write their objections in the meeting 
summary5. The isolation of SEPA was not strange because the Nu River, being planned 
for more than 10 years, had been entangled with complicated economic interests: 
electricity goliath, water resource sector, local government, and also, state tax revenue. 
The planned series of 13 hydropower stations, with the installed capacity larger and 
annual electricity generation 21.5% more than the Three Gorgeous Program, was 
expected to bring a production value of 34 billion RMB yuan (more than 4 billion US 
                                                        
1 Jianguang Tang, “The public pressure behind the suspension of Nu River dam project <nujiang daba 
gongcheng zanhuan beihou de minjian liliang>,” China News Weekly, May 20, 2004.  
2 “Controversy on Nu River dam: what’s the point?” 
3 Xu Xiaoying, “The reversion of ‘Nu River Defense Battle’ <nujiang baoweizhan nizhuan>,” Business 
Weekly, Vol. 20, 2005.  
4 Huang Yikun, “Nu River project needs reexamination <nujiang gongcheng chongshen>,” Economic 
Observation, April 12, 2004. 
5 ”The public pressure behind the suspension of Nu River dam project,”  
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dollars) per year, which means 5.199 billion RMB yuan (about 0.65 billion US dollars) for 
Central tax and 2.718 billion yuan (about 0.45 billion dollars) for local tax.  
Besides the State-owned electricity goliath who “didn’t deny” to be the “biggest 
beneficiary”1 in hydropower development, the local government—Yunnan Provincial 
Government and Nu River Prefectural Government—was another active promoter of the 
project. Nu River Prefecture, along the Southwest border of China, was one of the least 
advanced areas of Yunnan Province, with long border, complex topography and pressure 
to protect rare natural resources to seriously obstruct its modernization and 
development2. Until 2003, Nu River Prefecture only had a 5.9% GDP increase much 
than the National average and the annual tax 0.1 billion yuan could only offer 14.07% of 
its financial need. Among the 492-thousand population, 130 thousand had the annual 
income of less than 625 RMB yuan (about 74 US dollars) 3. To break away from the 
financial predicament and speed up economic increase, the Nu River Project was quite 
attractive for its prospect of bringing a 1 billion tax increase for the Prefecture, and in 
addition, creating 448250 long-term jobs and save 500 thousand cubic meters of wood 
fuels, which would help to protect local natural resources4.  
After the examination meeting on August 26, despite of the ignored strong objection 
of SEPA, the NRP report was commonly judged as being formally approved by the 
majority supporters. However, SEPA didn’t surrender but turned to search for alliances, 
and lead the policymaking into a non-traditional, more complicated process which had 
mobilized pluralistic resources. Just on a short break of the June 26th meeting, the SEPA 
representative Mu Guangfeng, vice director of the Environmental Impact Assessment 
Office and director of SEPA’s supervision department, initiatively shared their 
                                                        
1 A high-level administer of Yunan Huadian Corporation also emphasize that the electricity goliath was 
just “represent the State” in a media interview. See: Zhang Hui’e, “Nu River will also be constructed 
dams (nujiang ye yao jian daba le),” Nanfang Dushi Daily, November 25. 
2 See: Xie Yi (the Nu River Prefectural Party Secretary at that time), “Promote protection through 
development, and develop in protection, to achieve the harmonious development between human beings 
and nature <yi kaifa cu baohu, zai baohu zhong kaifa, shixian nujiang ren yu ziran de hexie fazhan>,” 
the speech in the High-level Forum on Hydropower Development and Environmental Protection. 
[scitech.people.com.cn/GB/53753/3796205.html] 
3 See: Nu River Prefectural Party Committee, “Instructions of Nu River Prefectural Party Committee 
Government on Nu River Development and Environmental Protection <zhonggong nujiang zhouwei 
zhou renmin zhengfu guanyu nujiang kaifa yu huanjing baohu de yijian>,” in “Civil power behind the 
suspension of Nu River dam,” 
4 “Promote protection through development, and develop in protection, to achieve the harmonious 
development between human beings and nature,” 
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information on NRP with Wang Yongchen at the first time1. Wang was a personal friend 
of Mu and the leader of Green Earth Volunteers (GEV), a Beijing-located NGO mainly 
consisting of mainstream journalists, asking the activist to recommend a specialist for 
consultation in their further actions to prevent the project2. In other words, the official 
wanted environmental activists to help his “beat back” 3. According to a later report of 
South Weekend, the official suggested Wang the possibility of “mobilizing” the “experts 
on the Nu River” and “massive efforts of social groups” to “help mount a campaign”4. 
That was also the first time the activist and her colleagues paid attention to the 
important river area. According to Wang, she had only got very little knowledge on dam 
projects or few experiences of anti-dam actions before, except glimpsing its possible 
connection with environmental protection from an earlier tour in Thai when she ever saw 
a village who were withstanding with local dam construction5. The experience had 
brought her an impression that “‘dam project’ equals to ‘environmental degradation’”, 
connecting China’s green activity with international anti-dam activity6. Thus, when her 
SEPA friend told her that Nu River was the last “no-dam river” of China, Wang quickly 
made her decision to cooperate, recommending her friend, biology Professor He Daming 
of Yunnan University, as consultant for SEPA.  
2.2. “Beijing Conference” and Voicing of Counterviews 
One week after the examination meeting, on September 3rd, SEPA hosted a 
symposium on “hydropower development and ecological protection issues of Nu River 
basin”. This symposium commonly known as “Beijing Conference” invited NGO activists 
and specialists “mainly majoring in ecology, environmental protection, biology, and 
                                                        
1 Xu Xiaoying, “Alliance of Chinese NGOs and government <zhongguo minjian zuzhi yu zhengfu de 
jiemeng>, Business Weekly, Vol. 6, 2005.  
2 Metha, China's Water Warriors, p. 119. 
3 “Civil power behind the suspension of Nu River dam,” 
4 Deng Jie, “New Power of Environmental Protection is Growing,” South Weekend, December 27, 2005.  
5 “Civil power behind the suspension of Nu River dam,”  
6 See details of the international anti-dam activism in: B. R. Taylor ed., Ecological Resistance 
Movements: The Global Emergence of Radical and Popular Environmentalism, Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1995, pp. 90-94; W. M. Adams, Green Development: Environment and 
Sustainability in the Third World, London and New York: Routledge, 2000. In Addition, the anti-dam 
activism has been always designed beyond the environmental controversy to care about the rights of 
interests of the residents in dam areas, see also: Aviva Imhof, Susanne Wong and Peter Bosshard, 
Citizens’ Guide to the World Commission on Dams, International Rivers network, Berkeley, CA, USA, 
2002.  
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humanities” 1 who “on the whole had negative feelings against hydropower development2. 
Among them, Pro. He Daming, who had been recommended by Wang Yongchen to SEPA 
for consultation, raised six reasons to boycott the construction, which included3: a) it was 
China’s state responsibility to maintain the ecosystem of Nu River Valley, as part of the 
“Three Parallel Rivers Area”4 listed on UNESCO World Heritage Site5; b) maintaining 
the natural valley was favorable for both species and ethnic cultural diversity; c) 
vulnerability to severe geographic conditions like soil erosion, mudslide and earthquake 
would make constructions profit much less than expected; d) the following ecological 
migration might bring social problem, according to the experiences of Three Gorgeous 
Dam; e) it was still uncertain that local people would factually benefit from the project 
profits to shake off poverty. As the consultant for SEPA and the only specialist from local 
place, the suggestions of He was depended by the rest specialists, who were all from 
Beijing, and led to a common agreement—publicized to mass media—that Nu River, as its 
“special importance” for “national long-term objective of ecological security”, should have 
been “conserved from any modern development”6. In addition, as “shaking off the 
poverty of local people” was a main political correct of hydropower development, the 
attendants also emphasized on “ecotourism” as an alternative approach7. The specialist 
statement was echoed by the hosting SEPA official. He further made clear that 
development might “worsen the local poverty” for “the possibility of land decrease and 
                                                        
1 ”The public pressure behind the suspension of Nu River dam project,”  
2 ”The public pressure behind the suspension of Nu River dam project,” 
3 See: “Planned 13 dams on Nu River are strongly opposed by environmental experts (nujiang jiang 
shangma 13 ji shuiba, zao huaibao zhuanjia qianglie fandui),” Beijing News, November 25, 2003. And 
“Nu River will also be constructed dams,” 
4 This area lies within the watershed areas of the upper reaches of the Jinsha, Lancang and Nu rivers, in 
the Hengduan Mountains of Yunnan Province, China, extending over 15 core areas, totalling 939,441.4 
ha, and buffer areas, totalling 758,977.8 ha across a region of 180 km by 310 km, and, judged by 
UNESCO as possibly being “the most biologically diverse temperate region on earth” and “An 
exceptional range of topographical features”. See: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_Parallel_Rivers_of_Yunnan_Protected_Areas; and also: 
http://www.worldheritagesite.org/sites/parallelriversyunnan.html. And, the area was added in the list 
just in July 2003, one month earlier than the NDRC examination meeting on NRP report. See: “China 
adds three more sites to World Heritage List,” People’s Daily, July 6, 2003 
[http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200307/06/eng20030706_119513.shtml].  
5 The UNESCO World Heritage Site is a place (such as a forest, mountain, lake, desert, monument, 
building, complex, or city) that is listed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) as of special cultural or physical significance. By 2011, the list includes 936 
prosperities which the World Heritage Committee, composed of 21 state parties, considers as having 
outstanding universal value. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UNESCO_World_Heritage_Site; and 
also: http://whc.unesco.org/en/list.  
6 “Planned 13 dams on Nu River are strongly opposed by environmental experts,” 
7 “Planned 13 dams on Nu River are strongly opposed by environmental experts,” 
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soil erosion during passive migration”1. This agreement made by attending specialists and 
SEPA officials then “formed the basis of further protest against the project”2 during the 
next five years. Even though “two or three “hydroelectricity experts”3 had tried to defend 
the development by reaffirming the views in the NRP report, they then had become 
“isolated” with “tease and mockery” 4.  
This symposium, commonly known as “Beijing Conference”, was then judge by 
“environmental activists and officials in the environmental protection sector” as 
“triggering off the first shot” for “Nu River defense battle”5. The expression of “battle” 
might have told the future of little space for dialogue and space between NRP supporters 
and objects. And, in addition, the symposium demonstrated the coalition of SEPA and 
green civil society from the very first time of the “battle”.  
2.3 “Kunming Conference” to Start the Debate 
In response to the “Beijing Conference”, Yunnan Environmental Protection Bureau 
hosted symposiums separately on September 29th and October 10th, and, different from 
“Beijing Conference”, specialists invited—also mainly in the field of environmental 
protection—were all from the local Province. It had also made fundamental divergence in 
the unanimous conclusion. The attendants denied the statement of their Beijing peer to 
judge Nu River as “having not been developed before”, by arguing that there have already 
been large-scale effects of human activity along the river basin during the history, 
including a small hydroelectricity station on the upper river in Tibetan Autonomous 
Region, and other development by other sovereignties along the downriver. Thus, 
according to the attendants, it was “impossible to keep a completely natural ecosystem 
along the Nu River” 6.  
Even though the meeting was hosted by local environmental protection sector in 
accordance with SEPA’s instruction, the final conclusion clearly indicated the will of the 
local provincial government, who controlled SEPA’s local branch through its power over 
                                                        
1 Han Luowu, “Should dams be constructed on Nu River <nujiang jiujing gaibugai jian shuiba>,” Legal 
Daily, September 4, 2003.  
2 “Planned 13 dams on Nu River are strongly opposed by environmental experts,” and “Nu River will 
also be constructed dams,” 
3 “Planned 13 dams on Nu River are strongly opposed by environmental experts,” 
4 “Planned 13 dams on Nu River are strongly opposed by environmental experts,” 
5 “Civil power behind the suspension of Nu River dam,” 
6 “Planned 13 dams on Nu River are strongly opposed by environmental experts,” 
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personnel. On October 20th and 21st, the local provincial and autonomous prefectural 
government, accompanied with related sectors who had participated in the original 
policy-making process1, confronted with SEPA in another “symposium”, commonly called 
“Kunming (capital of Yunnan Province) Conference” to be in contrast with the “Beijing 
Conference”. This conference, although named as “symposium” to indicate the 
“independence” from formal policymaking process, was attended by project supporters 
and objectors from the government far beyond only specialists. In such a face-to-face 
confrontation among governmental sectors, it was undoubted for SEPA again to feel 
isolated and weak. Public statement of the “Kunming Conference” judged the conclusion 
of objecting specialists on the ecosystem importance of Nu River and its vulnerability to 
constructions as exaggerative. It argued2: 1) the Nu River project was designed to be 
located below the 2000-height (above sea level) line, which meant it was outside the 
UNESCO “Three Parallel Rivers Area” and wouldn’t influence the natural heritage 
protection; 2) vegetation in the project planning area had been proved to have enough 
self-recovery capability; 3) there hadn’t been State special protected fishes in this river 
basin. And moreover, rather than ecological consideration, “to make the living and 
deployment for local poor people” was insisted by the statement to be “the first and most 
important responsibility of Central and local government”, and, the statement 
emphasized that the local people had “already sacrificed for the State ecological 
protection in this area” and deserved compensation through State modern development3, 
refusing to abandon the project.  
It might have seemed that the objections had been suppressed again, however, SEPA 
in this conference was taken as an equal negotiation counterpart, which meant a great 
progress in comparison with how it had been treated in the NDRC examination meeting. 
And moreover, the Project supporters also tried to placate angry SEPA officials by 
                                                        
1 The participants were composed of delegates from Yunnan Provincial Government, Provincial 
Environmental Protection Bureau, Provincial Planning Commission, Provincial departments on 
agriculture, water resources, forestry, and land resources, Provincial Policy Research Office, “Three 
Rivers Parallel” Protection Office, Beijing Survey and Design Institution, Huadong Survey and Design 
Institution, Kunming Survey and Design Institution, Nu River Prefectural Party Committee, Nu River 
Prefectural Government, Prefectural EPB, Yunnan Huadian Corporation and SEPA. See: the brief of 
“Kunming Conference”. [http://www.Nu.ngo.cn/Files/Cat01/018.doc] 
2 See: the brief of “Kunming Conference”. pp. 2-3. 
3 See: the brief of “Kunming Conference”, p. 4. 
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promising to consider their views more. They admitted that the hydropower development 
needed to be coordinated with protecting local ecological, environmental, cultural and 
ethnic resources, thus, the original NRP report should have been improved with more 
care about “sustainable development” 1. In other words, SEPA successfully framed 
environmental thought as the main controversy issue of Nu River construction, then 
making the environmental watchdog an indispensable player for the policymaking. SEPA 
further took the chance to raise its main purpose, demanding to add the EIA process 
dominated by SEPA to the policymaking according to the newborn EIA Law, to replace 
the EIA undergone by the water resource sector2.  
2.3 Information Transparency  
When SEPA and the original policymakers were confrontated according to traditional 
bureaucratic rules of negotiation, mass media were doing their work to bring a 
information transparency. During the “Kunming Conference”, views of supporters for 
NRP was carried, with views of opponents being ignored, by local media, however, the 
views of opponents obtained much more public attention through mass media located in 
Beijing, which had much larger circulation, much more skilled reporter, and much 
greater influence in comparison with the local media.  
Early in the Beijing Conference, Wang Yongchen was invited to attend. As the leader 
of GEV, the environmental NGO mainly composed of journalists, Wang called on her 
members from nearly 20 media organizations3, and these journalists then became 
pioneers and predominant players of issue framing during the “Defense battle” 4, 
according to an administrator of Huadian Electricity, the hydropower goliath. According 
to a investigation report, the organizations covered best sellers and influential Party 
mouthpieces included CCTV, Beijing News, China Youth Daily, South Wind Window, 
Economic, News Weekly, International Herald Leader, 21st Century Business Herald, 
Green China, Oriental Morning Post, China National Geographic, Forest and Human 
                                                        
1 See: the brief of “Kunming Conference”, p. 4. 
2 See: the brief of “Kunming Conference”, p. 4. 
3 ”The reversion of ‘Nu River Defense Battle’,” And also see: “Civil power behind the suspension of Nu 
River dam,” 
4”The public pressure behind the suspension of Nu River dam project,” 。 
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Ecology, and China Environmental News1.  
We may use an example to demonstrate the media power. In 2003 October, to deal 
with the local Prefectural Governmental actions to construct “local public opinion” 
through the “rubber stamp”, local people’s congress and CPPCC. Newprobe (xinwen 
diaocha), CCTV’s popular column for in-depth news investigation and whose chief editor 
was a well-known activist in the green public sphere, interviewed opposing activists and 
Nu River Prefectural Governmental officials. In this interview, opposing activists asked 
the officials several questions which made the officials seem to have “betrayed an almost 
complete ignorance beyond the most general aspects of the project, underscoring the lack 
of information that was extended to local officials and their somewhat unqualified 
support for the project”2. According to the opposing activists, before the Newsprobe 
broadcast, prefectural people’s congress and CPPCC had placed the NRP on the agenda, 
but after the broadcast, the NRP was “dropped from the Schedule”3. 
 
3. Mobilization of Environmental NGOs 
3.1. Environmental NGOs as the Main Player on Front Stage 
Although SEPA, with the assistance of environmental NGOs, successfully framed the 
public opinion to emphasize its importance, it didn’t immediately change its weak 
position, because the supporters obviously had much more institutional resources. After 
the “academic symposiums”, top officials of Nu Autonomous Prefecture—we may judge 
the local government as a most active supporter because officials pursued economic 
development for political achievements, as mentioned in the former chapters— quickly 
went to Beijing on October 22, to report the details of environmental controversy to 
NDRC and other main supporters. And, at the same time, local governmental active 
attempt even looked effective for a time. On November 12th, some key SEPA officials went 
to Yunnan Province for “investigation” in Nu River valley and have a non-public 
                                                        
1 Hu Kaiping and Yu Xiaogang, “Bridge Over Trouble Waters: The Role of the News Media in Promoting 
Public Participation in River Basin Management and Environmental Protection in China,” in Jennifer L. 
Turner and Kenji Otsuka (ed.), Promoting Sustainable River Basin Governance: Crafting Japan-U.S. 
Water Partnerships in China, Chiba, Japan: Institute of Developing Economies (IDE)/Japan External 
Trade Organization (JETRO), 2005, pp. 125–140. p. 137.  
2 China's Water Warriors, p. 117.  
3 Ibid, p. 118.  
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communication with local officials, without any specialists, activists, or journalists to 
attend at this time1. On January 5th, the environmental evaluation part of NRP report, 
after separated from the whole Report as a compromise to SEPA, had been proved by 
NRDC. This seemingly “result” of the controversy just gave people wrong impression that 
the policymaking process of Nu River Project had been finally dragged back to the 
traditional way, ending under the interest coordination inside bureaucratic sectors, 
without any substantial change to the original Project scheme.  
But the trivial compromise, without either respect to SEAP authority under the new 
EIA Law or opening to public participation, was quite different from the expectations of 
SEPA and its activist friends. Factually, they had never given up, and their efforts to 
influence policymaking outside the formal process had always been continuing. While 
SEPA were communicating with supporters through institutional channels, it hadn’t 
stopped exchanging information with environmental activists and journalists, and 
continuously received “encouragement” of “holding on”2 from them. For environmental 
activists like Wang Yongchen, that was not a peaceful balance of interests but a smokeless 
“battle”. And, from then, environmental NGOs had developed their role beyond only the 
assistant to SEPA before.  
3.2. Environmental NGO coalition: Domestic and International 
On 2003 October 25th, in the representative congress of a half-official organization, 
the China Environment and Culture Promotion Society, an artist and the vice president of 
the Society expressed his “worry” on the NRP construction to damage the “original 
ecology”. His words made Wang “suddenly have a bainwave”, and immediately decide to 
persuade the attendants to support their petition, using their “personal influence” to 
protect Nu River”. Wang’s “brainwave” finally brought her 62 signs on the spot, from 
celebrities from the fields of science, arts, journalism, and gross root environmental 
protection. This signed petition was then publicized through mass media and brought 
great widespread of the “defense battle”.  
However, GEV was not fight alone. Besides the allies located in Beijing, it also got 
                                                        
1 Nu River will also be constructed dams,”。 
2 “Civil power behind the suspension of Nu River dam,” 
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touch with the small NGOs in or near the local place who had paid attention to the 
hydropower construction for quite a time. Among them, Green Watershed was the most 
capable. From 2000 when the organization was founded, its leader and main sponsor, Yu 
Xiaogang, put his energy on monitoring the dam effects of Manwan Dam (finished in 
1994 on Jinsha River) and Xiaohua Dam (currently under construction on Langcang 
River).  
Just at the time the Nu River controversy began, Yu tried to meet SEPA officials 
directly during their visit in Kunming for a field investigation in November, but he failed 
when the officials abruptly revised their itinerary1. And after that, Yu turned to get touch 
with environmental NGOs in Beijing. During his visit to Beijing in November, with the 
real experiences of Green Watershed, a common vision of how to protect Nu River and 
even other Southwestern rivers was formed. And, “a coalition was born”2 by 
Beijing-located domestic and international NGOs including Green Earth Volunteers 
(GEV), Friends of Nature (FON), Institute of Environment and Development, Global 
Village of Beijing, Beijing Books Education Center, Society Entrepreneur Ecology, 
Conservation International and Wild China, with NGOs from Southwestern China 
including Green Watershed, Green River, Friends of the Earth, and Sanjiangyuan 
Environment Protection Association, and many others through the country3. Especially 
the participation of Green Watershed provided the coalition with first-hand information, 
which made him a spotlight. During the visit in Beijing, even nationally televised popular 
column of CCTV, the Party broadcast, invited them for speech as local expert. In February 
2004, Green Watershed and GEV organized a trip for nine large media resources to Nu 
River basin, which “resulted in nationwide awareness of the ill planned dam building 
situation”4. On the other side, the social campaign experiences of Beijing-located NGOs 
made Green Watershed more capable. In May 2004, Green Watershed arranged 14 
citizen representatives of proposed NRP-effected area to visit villages at Manwan Dam 
and Xiaohua Dam, showing them the negative effects of dam building on rural 
                                                        
1 Mertha, China's Water Warriors, p. 120.  
2 “Bridge Over Trouble Waters,” p. 136. 
3 Ibid, p. 135-136.  
4 Ibid, 137.  
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communities that when they were forced to leave their agricultural environment, it might 
be very hard for them to make the living. And the representatives were then given 
opportunity by the NGO coalition to voice their opinion to mass media in Beijing. 
Besides domestic coalition, the international cooperation was also a critical factor for 
environmental NGOs to succeed in the “battle”. In November 2003, “Third Meeting of 
China and the United States Environment Forum” was held in Beijing. Beijing’s 
well-known environmental NGOs were in attendance. Wang Yongchen with her GEV 
became the first to petition attendants, including grass root NGOs from both at home and 
abroad, and UNESCO officials, to pay attention to and discuss the dam building issue in 
Nu River. Wang’s appeal was echoed by a heated debate on whether the dam building 
would help local people out of poverty or lead them even harder to make living after the 
remove from their accustomed agricultural environment. Although there hasn’t been any 
agreement in this meeting, environmental NGOs successfully drew international 
attention to their issue framing over NPR, especially the attention from the international 
anti-dam coalition.  
In November 2003, Chinese NGOs GEV, FON, Green Watershed and Green Island 
were invited to the World River and People Opposing Dams meeting held in Thailand. 
This event had been the main opinion expression platform for international anti-dam 
activity since its first meeting held in 1997 in Brazil. The 2003 meeting took anti NRP as a 
main topic, and it led to a signed petition by NGOs from over sixty countries to protect 
the Nu River and sent to UNESCO which obtained a UNESCO reply promising to keep 
close attention to this issue. And further, under the great promotion of Chinese NGOs, 
more than eighty NGOs in Thailand on the lower Nu River (named Salween in Thailand 
territory) wrote a letter to the Chinese ambassador in Thailand to express opposition1. 
In March 2005, GEV, FON and Global Village of Beijing, as most influential and 
capable NGOs of China, attended in the Fifth UN Civil Society Forum and become the 
main player. GEV representative was invited to raise a speech on their actions to protect 
Nu River, and they attained signatures from attending high-level UN officials for their 
                                                        
1 However, there have factually development plan and actions along Salween River according to the 
national economic plan of Burma and Thailand. See details in Salweenwatch. Web. 
[http://www.salweenwatch.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=frontpage&Itemid=1]  
 187
petition to Chinese government. And this event in Beijing again made a lead font-page 
story for mass media. According to the efforts, by early 2004, the NRP controversy had 
“attracted worldwide interest as 60 international organizations agreed to lobby the 
Chinese government”1. 
3.3. The Issue Frameworks of Mass Media: Environmental Priority 
As it was mentioned before in this chapter, we can find how active SEPA and 
environmental NGOs played their role to frame the issue over NRP through their close 
media resources, leading the public opinion to an environmental concern. Environmental 
activists also agreed that “some journalists abandoned a neutral position as observers and 
took the bias for the powerless (local citizens having rare participation in policymaking) 
and disadvantaged NGOs (in comparison with governmental sectors and electricity 
goliath)” as “their responsibility (to balance the interest division) during social 
transformation” 2. So what exactly the frameworks were? 
The basic framework was the expression of “virgin river” with obvious environmental 
priority to describe Nu River, giving emphasis to the “potential (environmental) risks” 3 
of dam construction. This expression was firstly raised by Wang Yongchen and her close 
friend Zhang Kejia, leader of NGO Green Island and a veteran environmental journalist 
of China Youth Daily. When Zhang used the expression on China Youth Daily, 
advocating to “leave a virgin river for human beings in the rush wave of economic 
development”4 on August 19th, Wang, on South Weekend, expressed more emotionally to 
judge the development of “the virgin river” as a “profanity to nature” which would “bring 
retribution”5 on 20th. This expression was then applied to the “Beijing Conference” 
agreement and diffused by mass media transparency, and judged as a core expression of 
“Nu River Defense battle” to inspire the public feelings to respect “biodiversity and the 
                                                        
1 Jim Yardley, “Rule by law: seeking a public voice on China’s ‘angry river’,” New York Times, December 
26, 2005.  
2 Fu Tao, “The Development of Chinese Environmental NGOs <zhongguo huanjing zuzhi de 
fazhan>,“ in FON Green Paper Book 2005. pp 160-167, p. 161.  
3 Wang Yongchen, “Western River Development and Public Participation <xibu jianghe kaifa yu 
gongzhong canyu>,” in Wang Yongchen (ed.), Change: Chinese Environmental Journalists Investigation 
Report 2006 <zhongguo huanjing jizhe diaocha baogao 2006>, Beijing: Sanlian Shudian Press, 2007, 
pp. 122-164. p. 134.  
4 Zhang Kejia, “Nu River dam project met voice of objection <nujiang shuiba jihua zaoyu fandui 
sheng>,” China Youth Daily, August 19, 2003.  
5 Wang Yongchen, “Petition to leave the last ecological river <qing liuxia zuihou de shengtai he>,” 
Nanfang Dushi Bao, August 20, 2003.  
 188
value of natural and cultural heritage”1. It was still doubtful about the reasonableness of 
“virgin river”, because China, Thailand and Burma government had already constructed 
several dams for hydro electricity respectively on the upper and lower Nu River. However, 
the insist on this expression might indicate the “media bias” for “their responsibility 
during social transformation”. According to Nanfang Dushi Daily, the controversy was 
factually a choice between “maintaining a precious ecosystem river” and “depending on 
the dam construction (which might not be the only and most effective way) to increase 
economic earning”2. And mass media chose the former, echoing activity of SEPA and 
environmental NGOs. For example, China Youth Daily described the “lost” of 
constructing 13 dams as “destructive” to Nu River valley which had been “a spotlight for 
ecologists from all over the world”, and argued to pay more attention to “its unique value 
for ecological and social humane environment” rather than “for energy demand”3. 
People’s Daily took the Nu River ecosystem as “scarce even of the whole world”, and 
emphasized the need to consider more about “environmental benefits” rather than 
“economic benefits”4. And, Beijing Youth Daily even went farther to judge Nu River valley 
as “a main passage and safety basin for the migration of living creatures between North 
and South in Eurasia Continent”, and suggested to “add damages of species, culture and 
ecology into the hydropower construction cost”5. Thus, through media issue framing, 
environmental priority was lifted from a technically topic in the original policymaking, to 
the core concern of the NRP controversy.  
While advocating the environmental priority, media framework also included 
suspicion of reasons of NRP supporters, especially the substantial benefits of 
development. Hydro electricity was commonly doubted in mass media as an “unclean 
energy” and as of less economic benefits than that being expected. As evidences, 
environmental NGOs translated the 2000 Report,  
                                                        
1 “Western River Development and Public Participation,” p. 136.  
2 “Nu River will also be constructed dams,” 
3 Zhang Kejia, “Many specialists questions Nu River Development, calling on GDP with ecological input 
<zhongduo zhuanjia zhiyi nujiang kaifa huyu GDP baohan shengtai chengben>”, China Youth Daily, 
September 5, 2003.  
4 Zhao Yongxin, “Don’t forget environmental protection in hydropower construction <shuidian mo 
wang huanjing baohu>,” People’s Daily, September 19, 2003.  
5 Sun Danping, “Nu River planning invoked controversy on whether we need more dams <nujiang 
guihua jian daba yin zhengyi, women shifou xuyao jian gengduo shuiba>,” Beijing Youth Daily, October 
30, 2003.  
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“Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making”, of World 
Commission on Dams—a coalition of international civil society formed in 1997 to 
research the environmental—social and economic impacts of the development of large 
dams globally for media sources. According this investigation result provided by the 
report1, the potential risks of dam building and hydropower development included 
resettlement problem, sediment accumulation to water interception, damage of 
biodiversity, flush of historical heritage (for ancient culture had been inclined to grow 
along big rivers), increase of greenhouse gases emission, and difficulty to rebuild the local 
society with ethnic and cultural diversity. In addition, this report judged that, due to the 
shorter useful time and larger construction cost than that being expected, most of the 
dam construction couldn’t achieved their planned economic benefits. Based on these 
investigation results, this report concluded hydro electricity shouldn’t have been taken as 
“clean energy” and recommend state governments to search alternative approaches for 
energy demand. According to Wang Yongchen, environmental NGOs and mass media 
used this report text to transfer the public a image that “international society” had 
changed their “elementary view of how to deal with river resources”, from “development” 
to “recovering its original ecology”2. But the diffusion of this information also indicated 
the media “bias”. Even though World Commission on Dams might have represented the 
anti-dam civil society to advocate for environmental priority over dam issues, their 
“framework of decision-making” hadn’t generally accepted, especially by developing 
countries confronted with energy risk. For example, in the 2002 World Sustainable 
Development Summit held in Johannesburg, South Africa, leaders from 192 countries 
agreed large hydroelectricity as a most clean and renewable energy resources and made 
consensus to encourage development, to relieve the stress of climate change3.  
3.4 Issue Frameworks Encouraged by Top Leader 
Influenced by the public opinion, the activity of Huadian Electricity Group and NDRC 
                                                        
1 See details in World Commission on Dams (WCD): 
“Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making,” November 2000 [From: 
http://www.dams.org/report] 
2 “Western River Development and Public Participation,” p. 136.  
3 Zhang Boting, “Dams and Development: A News Policymaking Framework <shuiba yu fazhan: yige xin 
de juice kuangjia>, People’s Daily Web. October, 24, 2005. 
[http://scitech.people.com.cn/GB/53753/3796280.html] 
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to push the NRP planning to People’s Congressional procedure was slowed down1, and 
SEPA adopted a tougher touch. In its formal response to Huadian Electricity Group over 
NRP, SEPA clear raised two necessary prerequisites for approval on this project: 
undergoing EIA process according to the EIA Law, and take another prove process over 
the project planning of 13 dams with participation of SEPA2. SEPA’s holding on to its 
legal status further encouraged its NGO allies. On January 8th and 9th 2004, NGOs Green 
Watershed and Resettlement Research Institute with The Chinese Academy of Social 
Science and Geological Society of Sichuan held a symposium to discuss the opposing 
views to NRP and sent the symposium record to “top policymakers”3. At the end of 
January, Li Xiaoxi, a key member of FON and a Deputy to the people’s congress of 
Haidian District, Beijing, directly sent a letter on NRP controversy, especially the reasons 
of opponents, to Premier Wen Jiabao. And, this letter became the key.  
In February, NDRC raised the NRP report to the State Council for approval. But to 
the supporters’ great disappointment, the report was denied with the written comment by 
Premier Wen to suspend the project, for the reason that “such a large-scale hydropower 
project drawing great public concern and controversy in respect of environmental 
protection” needed “cautious investigation and scientific policymaking (without rush)”4. 
This written comment was then specially transferred to Li Xiaoxi5, as a direct response to 
her petition to the Premier. The top authority recognition of “public opinion” indicated 
the mobilization effects of SEPA and NGO activity and greatly encouraged them. For 
example, Wang Yongchen, on hearing this news during the trip she organized journalists 
to Nu River basin for a survey, was cheered up to acclaim it to be “a great progress of 
China’s democratic process”6.  
On the other hand, the position of SEPA was also strengthened. Although Mu 
Guangfeng — the first SEPA official who triggered the “Nu River Defend War” as 
mentioned at the beginning of the chapter — was deprived of real power and moved to a 
                                                        
1 ”The public pressure behind the suspension of Nu River dam project,”  
2 “Controversy on Nu River dam: what’s the point?” 
3 Ibid.  
4 ”The reversion of ‘Nu River Defense Battle’,” 
5 ”The reversion of ‘Nu River Defense Battle’,” 
6 “Western River Development and Public Participation,” p. 122. 
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sinecure making him politically marginalized, as the price of his challenge to the 
customary policymaking system1, SEPA didn’t change their hard insist. After the Premier 
suspended NRP, “SEPA had dominated the development steps” 2, through finally forcing 
NRP supporters to accept EIA process under SEPA’s authority. The project then was 
suspended until SEPA gave approval to the EIA report in 2008. While achieving the main 
purpose, SEPA also demonstrated an inclination to care about the appeals of 
environmental NGOs. As Pan Yue, the deputy general of SEPA, told Yu Xiaogang (Green 
Watershed):  
 
The base for government administration is people’s genuine support. The true 
support of the people will result in social stability, but social stability depends 
on social justice. Social justice depends on socialist democracy, and the best 
situation of socialist democracy is public participation. In the current Chinese 
political system, the best area for public participation is in 
environmental issues because environmental problems affect everyone, so 
the whole of society must participate in the solution…Public participation does 
not result in social unrest, but social unrest is the result of a lack of outlets for 
public participation3.  
 
Pan’s statement seemed to echo the cheer of Wang Yongchen—through her activity in 
protecting Nu River, she had been well recognized as the representative China’s anti-dam 
green society—for “a great progress of China’s democratic process”. We may remember 
that in the Yuanmingyuan membrane issue, Pan had quite a many similar expressions.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 China's Water Warriors, p. 122.  
2 Sun Rongfei, “High-level authority has gradually lifted the embargo on Nu River hydropower planning 
after the postpone for one year by State Council <guowuyuan jiaoting yinian hou, gaoceng zhujian jiejin 
nujiang shuidian guihua>,” Diyi Caijing Daily, June 3, 2005.  
3 Hu and Yu, “Bridge Over Trouble Waters,” p. 137.  
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4. Social Risks of Environmental NGOs: a Different Angle to Understand the 
Dual Identity 
4.1. Challenge to Natural Validity of Environmental NGOs to “Represent the Public” 
For the giant scale of the NRP, for the active participation of public, for the 
involvement of China’s top leaders, and for the international influence, the “Nu River 
Defense Battle” was judged as a most important public issue of China’s environmental 
protection history, and a typical case of modern China’s social mobilization. However, 
with this premises, as mentioned in this chapter, political factors were quite initiative to 
promote the process. The “mobilization” was factually triggered by the environmental 
watchdog who had been tired of its weak position in the bureaucratic institutions, making 
the base for following issue framing. Besides it, a fact being easily neglected was that the 
most serious challenge to green NGOs hadn’t been from the Party-state — not only 
environmental NGOs had received support from the top bureaucratic leader, but also 
most of the political pressure from NRP supporters were counteracted by SEPA — but 
from inside the public sphere. This story may show us another side, or natural defect of 
China’s young green civil society, which might have weakened the ideal expectation of 
optimistic liberalists on them to mobilize the potential social resources of China against 
the high political pressure, but would help us to observe more complexity of China’s 
pluralistic public sphere.  
When the Premier ordered to suspend the project, the great success also brought 
risks to environmental NGOs. Firstly, the activity of SEPA turned to “silence”1 in 
mobilization as it had already reached the main purpose of applying EIA procedure into 
the policymaking. That meant less opportunity for the green civil society to use 
institutional resources. A most obvious signal of the divergence between SEPA and 
environmental NGOs was over the choice of a responsible EIA agency. NGOs emphasized 
to opposite the participation of agencies under supervision of water electricity sector, but 
SEPA, at least publicly, announce it “proper” to entrust such agencies, because only water 
electricity sector had enough detailed data of the river basin to “deal with the complex 
                                                        
1 “Nu River hydropower program: problems on protection and development of a ecological river 
<nujiang shuidian xiangmu: yitiao shengtai he de kaifa yu baohu nanti>,” East Morning, November 2, 
2004.  
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EIA work” 1, very like a compromise under bureaucratic rules.  
Secondly, profit-oriented sectors and the local government finally got aware of their 
failure in framing public opinion and tried to do a better media communication more 
actively, instead of passively responding to pressure from the civil society. According to a 
research section chief of Yunnan Provincial Province, the local government had found 
them “lack skills to transfer to the public how the project being helpful to solve the local 
poverty problem and protect the ecology”, and on the contrary, the NGO might have been 
“making mistakes in professional knowledge but skillful at arousing audiences’ fervor”2. 
And further, the chief also criticized environmental NGOs as “extreme”, for NGOs and 
some journalists had been inclined to avoid serious discussion but simply judge the 
supporters as “stakeholders”, “dogs of government” or “malfeasants” 3  to put the 
supporters into a morally weak position. With such considerations, Yunnan Provincial 
and Nu Prefectural government started to invite journalists to the local place for field 
work from 2004.  
However, the two facts didn’t certainly mean NGOs were faced with political pressure. 
Although the changing attitudes of SEPA made the civil society lose a strong alliance in 
mobilization, after all, SEPA didn’t, at least for a time, change his status against NRP 
supporters. And moreover, although the local government found their shortage of media 
communication, officials in the far Southwest part was still difficult to influence the 
shaped issue framing of mainstream mass media mainly located in advanced East areas, 
at least in the short term. Factually, from 2004, the strongest doubt about the 
environmental NGOs was from those who had the same non-governmental identity with 
the environmental NGOs, which had put them in a risk of social validity.  
It should be admitted that most environmental activists, at least during the early time 
of “Nu River Defense battle”, were fervent and dedicated, but not knowledgeable to 
control rational discussion. As mentioned before, Wang Yongchen, the most active 
sponsor had agreed with the SEPA official to “defend the river” when she only had very 
few special knowledge on the river and international anti-dam movement. And a most 
                                                        
1 “Nu River project needs reexamination,” 
2 ”The reversion of ‘Nu River Defense Battle’,” 
3 ”The reversion of ‘Nu River Defense Battle’,” 
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active sponsor even had mistaken the hydropower units of “kilowatt” and “kilowatt-hour” 
in her cited sources, directly reducing the persuasiveness of her announcement to mass 
media that the large NPR only had very small electrical energy and would be a waste. As a 
result, there extreme environmentalist position and emotional discourses, while easily 
arousing fervor of audiences — mainly of rising middle class in big cities but not from the 
local place — led to severe opposition from some professional persons who announced to 
take “science” as the priority rather than “emotion”. These oppositionists emphasized the 
core value of “development”, and insisted that people would make positive use of the 
nature in a proper and controllable way. We can easily find that was really the difference 
between environmental ethics (subjectivity of environment) and development ethics 
(subjectivity of development), which had been a popular controversy in academic, 
political and public sphere of developed democracies from the late 1960s1, but the 
common controversy had different meaning in China. With poor preparation of 
professional information, environmental activists attained the social validity mainly 
through their non-official identity rather than reasonal persuasiveness, based on the 
decrease of government credibility. According to the announcement of Wang Yongchen, 
their actions were “naturally valid” for the activists were “belonging to middle class in 
economic status”(to the contrary with interest group, such as the electrical goliath), 
“considering both economic and social effects”(to the contrary with profit-oriented 
consideration), “taking the approaches of mass media, law, academic actions and other 
social capitalism”(to the contrary with administrative means), and “representing the 
interest of marginalized local people without caring their own self benefits or benefits of 
any organization”(to the contrary with interest group) 2 . Obviously, even though 
environmental activists also had taken a role to follow the route of SEPA and thus 
somehow shared the institutional resources, they preferred to stress the non-official 
identity and the image of no involvement in any special interest, with judging specialists 
                                                        
1 See in reference to: Rom Harré, ,Jens Brockmeie and Peter Mulhausler, Greenspeak: A Study of 
Environmental Discourse, Thousands Oaks, CA: Sage, 1999; and also Takis Fotopoulos, The 
Multidimensional Crisis and Inclusive Democracy, English translation published on: The International 
Journal of Inclusive Democracy, Vol. 1.5, Special Issue, August, 2005. 
2 “Western River Development and Public Participation,” p. 147.  
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who had supported NRP as “bending to governmental pressure”1. And, the simple view of 
differentiation had become expanded to the public in accordance with environmental 
NGO’s rich media resources2. However, on the contrary, how about their activism going 
to result if the identity of “representing common people” was shaken? 
4.2. Debate over “Worship nature” as continuation of NRP Controversy 
The risk of environmental NGOs to continue their efforts on protecting Nu River was 
started by the debate over “worship nature”, in which their environmental priority was 
doubted with “emotionalism” and “enthusiasm”.  
The staged success of “Nu River Defense Battle” not only brought environmental 
NGOs, especially their key members, great fame as “public intellectuals” but also 
encouraged them to develop their language power. After the 2004 tsunami in Indian 
Ocean, an environmentalist activist raised the topic that “The catastrophe factually 
warned people to feel worship to the nature” 3 on South Weekend of January 6th 2005. 
This article, while being fervently echoed by environmental activists, was noted by a 
biochemist and free-lancer named Fang Zhouzi. Fang was also a non-official “public 
intellectual” famous for his experiences of revealing corruption in academic world and 
pseudo-science from 2000. Different from most experts who were weak at transferring 
their views to public, Fang, who had experienced his research career in United States 
during the whole 1990s and been one of the first Chinese to sponsor internet media from 
the late 1990s, knew how to take advantage of media tactis as well as environmental 
                                                        
1 For example, in the “Kunming Conference” in October 2003, the objectors were mainly from Beijing 
and the supporters were mainly from the Yunnan Province. Thus, the sensitive objectors criticized the 
supporters of just obeying the governmental pressure. However, the critics hadn’t been accepted by the 
specialists from Yunnan Province. As Han Lianxian wrote, “along with the more times of communication 
with the local people and the deeper participation into their true life, the more worries grow about their 
bad living conditions. That’s exactly why the presenting specialists in the Kunming conference had been 
divided into two pacts…the objectors of scholars and environmentalists from Beijing criticized the 
Yunnan scholars of bending to the government, but the truth was the Yunnan scholars had more 
experiences of studying along the Nu River basin, which made them recognize more about the local 
poverty”. See: Han Lianxian, “Thought About Nu River Dam Construction <nujiang jianba de sikao>,” 
Great Nature, No. 5, 2004, pp. 2-5. p. 3.  
2 See for example, Beijing News described it as “the head-on confrontation between the ‘Beijing pact’ 
and the ‘Yunnan pact’,” (“Planned 13 dams on Nu River are strongly opposed by environmental 
experts,”); Nanfang Dushi Bao doubted the specialists from Yunnan to be “too afraid of losing their jobs 
to say the truth,” (“ Nu River will also be constructed dams,”) For Youth Reference <qingnian cankao>, 
a paper published by the China Youth Daily Group, the controversy between opponents and proponents 
just equaled to the “living place divergence”. (“Interest conflict behind the Nu River hydropower with the 
investment of near 100 billion RMB yuan <zong touzi jin 1000 yi yuan, nujiang shuidianzhan beihou de 
liyi zhi zheng>,” Youth Reference, March 16, 2004.  
3 Liu Hongbo, “Human attitudes to the nature and ourselves <renlei miandui ziran he ziji de taidu>,” 
South Weekend, January 6, 2005.  
 196
NGOs. After reading the topic of “worship nature”, Fang quickly wrote an article under 
the title of “What can we learn from the tsunami,” on January 8th. Formal publication of 
this article was postponed to January 19 on China Youth Daily, where Fang had his 
column, and was modified to make the view seem not so sharp. In this article, Fang 
criticized the discourse of “worship nature” as “prittle-pralle”1, like the well-known fight 
between catholic and protestant in the 18th century, when they accused the each other of 
bringing tsunami for annoying the God. And, Fang expressed his view of taking nature as 
the objective serving human beings, which needed “vigilance and emergency mechanism 
to the potential catastrophe”2. About the same time, another scientist named He Zuoxiu3, 
published the article, “People need no worship nature,” the theoretical physicist and 
Academician of Chinese Academy of Science directly pointed “worship nature” as an 
“anti-science slogan”. And, he even took the “Nu River Defense Battle” as an example of 
“anti-science”, arguing that “some degradation of natural environment” was not 
“avoidable” for China’s modern development, only if either development or 
environmental degradation was “oriented by people’s demand”4. We may find that, He 
and Fang emphasized the human beings as subjective, which indicated the philosophy of 
“development ethics”, while “worship nature” implied “environmental ethics” which 
considers extending the traditional boundaries of ethics from solely including humans to 
including the non-human world. And, it further angered environmental activists when 
“Nu River Defense Battle” had been taken as an example of “anti-science”. As a clear 
counterattack, Wang Yongchen, sponsor of “Defense Battle”, immediately wrote the 
article named “’Worship to nature’ is not anti-science” on Beijing News, the Beijing 
branch of South Weekend. In this article, Wang especially emphasized her insist on 
anti-hydropower and announced that He Zuoxiu had started a “battle of controversy”5, 
which gathered more activists to participated in the debate, and, the concept of “battle” 
signaled that the debate would not be a peaceful dialogue. According to the statistics of 
                                                        
1 Fang zhouzi, “What revelation can tsunami bring us <haixiao neng gei women shenme qishi>?” China 
Youth Daily, January 19, 2005.  
2 Fang, “What revelation can tsunami bring us,” 
3 Some literatures have mistaken his name as “He Zuoma” for the name included a difficult character.  
4 He Zuoxiu, “People need no worship nature <renlei wuxu jingwei da ziran>,” Globe, January 11, 2005.   
5 Wang Yongchen, “’Worship to nature’ is not anti-science <jingwei ziran bushi fan kexue>,” Beijing 
News, January 15, 2005.  
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Fang Zhouzi1, the climax of this “battle” lasted for one month. Even only on Beijing News 
— the main “battle field” — from January 15th to February 15th, a total of thirty-one 
articles by twenty-second writers were published for this topic. Among them, twenty-one 
articles were provided by sixteen environmental activists, including famous leaders like 
Wang Yongchen (GEV) and Liang Congjie (FON), who had just contributed a lot to the 
“Defense Battle”. And the rest included nine articles by five opponents to “worship 
nature” and a neutral one, which indicated the continuing “bias” of mass media. And 
there were articles and discussion on other print media and websites. Articles had 
decreased after the middle of February, but not finally ended until May, when opponents 
judge environmental activists as “being unable to refute any more” but environmental 
activists announced to be “suppressed by government”2. In other words, this “battle” ends 
with “both sides declaring to beat each other”3 without any consensus.  
Even though this “battle” might have seemed to be like a usual battle of words among 
intellectuals, as it happened just after the staged success of “Nu River Project” had 
brought environmental activists great credibility and social validity, the controversy 
factually made somehow negative influence on them, because it was really a controversy 
of public sphere with no political interventions. Thus, it challenges their natual validity of 
“representing common people”. The opponents like Fang and He were academicians and 
free-lancers, with no obvious official background as well as the environmental activists, 
and no involvement in — at least no direct evidence indicated — any governmental or 
commercial interests, thus, like environmental activists, they were originally “positive 
character in media stories (to represent the public opinion)” 4 . Even some 
environmentalists admitted it a controversy between “two kinds of philosophy”5, rather 
                                                        
1 Fang Zhouzi, “Review on the ‘worship to nature’ controversy <renlei shifou bixu jingwei daziran 
zhizheng shuping>,” SinaTech (internet media). 
[http://tech.sina.com.cn/d/2005-03-01/1030538478.shtml] 
2 With regard to the end of the controversy, the anti “worship to nature” pact judged it as the result of 
the “worship to nature” pact feeling their unreasonableness, but on the contrary, the “worship to nature” 
pact announced to have been “interrupted by the government agencies”. See respectively: Fang, “Review 
on the ‘worship to nature’ controversy; and Wang, “Western River Development and Public 
Participation,” p. 142.  
3 “Scientific fighters criticize environmental NGOs <kexue doushi jichi huanbao minjian zuzhi>,” 
Waitan Pictorial, April 20, 2005.  
4 Ibid.  
5 Zhang Shuanghu, “Controversy on pro ‘Worship to nature’ and the anti- is the conflict between two 
civilizations <jingwei yu fan jingwei shi liangzhong wenming zhi zheng>,” Science Times, April 15, 
2005.  
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than in relation to special interests. In other words, the environmental priority of 
environmental activists given to anti-dam was not the only choice of public1. In addition, 
some environmental activists themselves used quite an emotional and enthusiastic 
expression in the debate, making them seem not so “reasonable”. For example, Wang 
Yongchen, to prove the necessity of “worship”, told the story on a Chinese-Japanese joint 
climbing expedition who died in accident on Meili Snow Mountain, describing the deaths 
as a result of “mountain god’s anger”2. However, for the mainstream Chinese society with 
no religious tradition in the history and under the education of atheism from 1949, 
Wang’s such expression was not so commonly acceptable, and, for her opponents, it even 
sounded like that the “worship nature” camp had been “not immune from falling into 
superstition or ignorance, as lacking scientific training”3.  
And moreover, for a quick success, some environmental activists even tried to play a 
theatre of “public participation” to seek support, which finally harmed their own 
credibility. Beijing News used to publish a letter from a junior school student to judge it a 
“scientific common sense” to “worship nature”, and argued that it was “truly anti-science” 
to deny the “common sense”4. This letter was then highly praised by environmental 
activists in mass media as a proper illustration of “true public choice”. And the junior 
school girl became famous and even invited as “civil representative” to the online debate 
hosted by www.sina.com.cn, a most influential livedoor of China. But it was then exposed 
that this girl was the daughter of a famous environmental activist, and her mother just sat 
with her in the online debate, without leaking any information of their relations5.  
However, the result that “worship nature” debate developed beyond a simple war of 
words among intellectuals was owing to that it had been taken as the continuation of the 
                                                        
1 See details respectively in: Liao Xiaoyi, “What’s the fault to worship nature <jingwei ziran he zui zhi 
you>?” Beijing News, January 24, 2005; and Fang Zhouzi, “Retort to Liao Xiaoyi: Does environmental 
activism naturally have the justice <bo liao xiaoyi: nandao gao huanbao jiu daibiao zhe zhengyi>?” 
Beijing News, January 26, 2005.  
2 Wang Yongchen, “Worship nature is not antihuman,” Beijing News, January 14th, 2005.  
3 Fang Zhouzi, “Should humans worship nature: whether rationalism or enthusiasm is more important,” 
env.people.com.cn/BIG5/35525/3290166.html; and also see: Fang Zhouzi, “What kind of 
‘environmental protection’ do we want?” http://tech.sina.com.cn/d/2005-02-23/0837532641.shtml.  
4 Xin’er, “It’s the scientific common sense to worship nature <jingwei daziran shi kexue changshi>,” 
Beijing News, January 18, 2005.  
5 See: “Guest chat record of Liao Xiaoyi, Wang Yongchen and Zhao Nanyuan in Sina <liao xiaoyi wangy 
yongchen zhao nanyuan zuoke xinlang liaotian shilu>,” [www.sina.com. 
[http://tech.sina.com.cn/d/2005-01-27/1845517088.shtml]  
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NRP controversy. Since He Zuoxiu had mentioned the NRP in his first article, following 
participants in the “battle” of “worship nature” couldn’t stop repeating this most 
influential environmental issue of China during recent years, as a case to illustrate their 
views1. This chance was then seen by an expert on hydroelectricity named Zhang Boting. 
As the vice secretary of Chinese Water Engineering Association — an association of 
related academicians and engineers—at that time, failure of NRP supporters was due to a 
shortage of channels and skills to introduce positive effects of large-scale hydro project to 
the public, when the mass media was filled with propaganda of its negative effects and 
even “slander”2 by the environmental NGOs and their media friends. Thus, when he 
found the opponents to “worship nature” had just weakened the social validity of 
environmental activists, he got touch with them and used his personal networks, 
promoting the Yunnan Provincial Government to invite the scientists and free-lancers for 
a field investigation. This action factually promoted the intellectual controversy rise to 
the practical discussion on the real policymaking of the NRP.  
4.3 Debate Focus from “Worship nature” to “Represent Local People in Nu 
River Basin” 
During early April 2005, the anti “worship nature” pact experienced their 
investigation in Yunnan Province, especially the Nu River basin residence. As mentioned 
before, in the “worship nature” debate, the elementary contradiction had been focused on 
“environmental ethics” and “growth ideology”, in other words, the priority of non-human 
world or material demand of human beings. The intellectuals were then showed the 
serious poverty of local people, which further strengthen their belief in priority of human 
demand and opposition to environmental activists. Thus, with their intervention in the 
public sphere of Nu River Project, the focus of the issue framework was changed from on 
“whether to protect the ecology (virgin river)” to “whether to lift the local poor people out 
of poverty”. This change led the role of environmental activists from the dominant of 
public sphere to only a “competitor” of views. And moreover, since the topic of “lifting 
                                                        
1 Fang Zhouzi, “Replies to the New York Times reporter on Nu River dams <jiu nujiang jianba da 
niuyue shibao jizhe wen>, People’s Daily web, December 28, 2005. 
2 “The sermonizer for the public communication of China’s hydro science <zhongguo shuidian kexue 
dazhonghua chuanbo de budaozhe>,” Yunnan Hydropower Paper, November 6, 2007.  
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somebody out poverty” traditionally belong to the philosophy of growth ideology1, debate 
under such a framework had eventually made marginalized environmental NGOs.  
A fact not to be ignored was that, despite of a “green” title, some active opponents to 
NRP had concentrated on care of local living. One of them was Yu Xiaogang of “Green 
Watershed”. According to long-term survey on Manwan and Xiaohua dams which had 
finished construction before NRP planning was completed, Yu argued that hydropower 
benefits wouldn’t certainly shaking off local poverty because the division of earning was 
always unfair for serious corruption. During “Nu River defense battle”, Yu organized 
representatives from NRP-effected area to Manwan and Xiaohua dams to experience the 
negative influence of hydropower construction, and made a documentary movie to 
persuade audience both from the local place and big cities of the hard life of dam-effected 
people when they had been removed from their agricultural environment and traditional 
communities2. Yu’s greatest shock to others might be in late October 2004, when he 
brought with him two local peasant activists to the UN International Conference on 
Hydropower and Sustainable Development, which was taken to be a break of rules only 
accepting policy experts and officials to such meetings. Under the persistence of Yu, those 
peasant activists were permitted to give speech in the conference, named “The Relations 
between Dam Construction and the Rights of Original Inhabitants to Participation”. This 
speech used the case of Tiger Leaping Gorges Dam along Jingsha River to echo many 
concerns on NRP. The speaker, Ge Quanxiao, described negative impact of dams such as 
“other infrastructure constructions being cut”, “resettlement to strange surroundings”, 
“loss of traditional courtyard houses”, “social upheaval”, “undermining harmony of ethnic 
groups that evolved over generations”, and so on3. And he described the goals of local 
inhabitants—according to Ge, “common famers” and “the biggest group of 
stakeholders”—as “bright sunshine, fresh air, clean water and fertile lands” rather than 
                                                        
1 Generally, the economic growth is judged as the base of poverty solution. Although the ecological 
scholars have raised some instances of poverty going serious according to the ecological deterioration, 
the common sense hasn’t been shaken, especially in developing countries. See for example: T. Dos 
Santos, “The Crisis of Development Theory and the Problem of Dependence in Latin America” in Henry 
Bernstein, (ed.), Underdevelopment and Development, United Kingdom: Penguin, 1973. And, Ted Trainer, 
Developed to Death, London: Greenprint, 1989. And, Takis Fotopoulos, The Multi-Dimensional Crisis 
and Inclusive Democracy, Athens, 2005, pp. 133-149.  
2 “Voice of Nu River,” DVD documenting Yu’s May 2004 trip to Manwan area.  
3 See: www.irn.org/basics/conferences/beijinghydro/pdf/dampar.pdf 
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“tall buildings and prosperity of big cities”1. And, for the diverged goals from dam 
supporters, “the biggest group of stakeholders” demanded to “participate in the 
decision-making process for the sustainable development of this beautiful place”2.  
The voice of the peasant activists made environmental NGOs believe that local 
inhabitants also preferred to environmental priority, thus they hadn’t prepared 
prediction scheme to deal with a different voice. Early in 2004 May, several most active 
NGOs of Beijing hosted a conference. It was on the climax of “Nu River defense battle” 
and environmental NGOs had been rarely doubted with the public consensus they had 
mobilized. This conference invited three local young people who were then students of 
China Youth University for Political Science located in Beijing, and expected them to 
speak the “voice of local people”. But “totally different from what environmental activists 
had expected”, those students expressed their view that “most local people” had 
commonly sought for “better (modern) life”, and “the resettlement” might not have met 
much “obstruction” since “governmental subsidy (for resettlement” would have been a 
considerable fund to improve their living” 3. Their view had just made the host “feel 
shocked and disappointed” 4. In addition, the voice of doubt had also grown among 
environmental activists themselves. For example, a environmental volunteer and expert 
of Chinese Academy of Social Science Finance Institution—after his field work in the local 
place—described the local life he had seen to mass media as “unbelievably (for people 
from metropolis) primitive, closed and poor” 5. And that experience had forced him to 
conclude that, although he still supported environmental protection in the abstract, he 
doubted “to keep the original ecology” might only have made more sense for well-to-do 
environmentalist living a modern life in Beijing, rather than the local people, for whom 
the hydroelectricity construction had seemed to be the “only way” to lift them out of 
poverty and achieve modern life6.  
On the visit to Yunnan Province, anti “worship nature” camp applied their growth 
                                                        
1 See: www.irn.org/basics/conferences/beijinghydro/pdf/dampar.pdf 
2 Ibid. 
3 Tang Jianguang, “Who will decide the future of Nu River <shui lai jueding nujiang mingyun>?” China 
News Weekly, No. 18, 2004.  
4 Ibid.  
5 Cao and Zhang, “Civil power behind the suspension of Nu River dam”.  
6 Ibid.  
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ideology to the Project policymaking. For them, priority of lifting local people out of 
poverty made the Project construction reasonable enough. Thus, they then became 
opponents to environmental activists. On April 8, Fang Zhouzi, representing the 
investigators for his activeness and persuasiveness, was invited to give a speech to 
students of Yunnan University, where he generalized their views as1: a) They also agreed 
with environmental activists that policymaking of hydropower projects needed to be 
prudent. b） But, for Fang and his comrades, the actions of environmental activists would 
not make sense for the cautious policymaking of Nu River Project, since they focused the 
effects of arousing enthusiasm and mobilization, rather than reasonableness in the issue 
framing. The most crucial point was that although environmental activists advocated to 
protect the original ecology, without real field investigation, they didn’t find that the 
ecology had actually been damaging by primitive approaches of the local poor to make a 
hard living, rather than a poetic image framed by environmental activists. c) They 
criticized some journalists as being responsible for the diffusion of unreal information, 
which also had negative effects on cautious and scientific policymaking. d) Fang and his 
comrades announced to agree with environmental activists that the policymaking system 
and even political system needed to be reformed and improved—for example, to promote 
public participation, to normalize policymaking procedures, to eliminate political 
corruption, and so on—but they still doubted that if it was a reasonable choice to boycott 
all the hydropower policies until the political reform finished. Fang especially mentioned 
the expression of “original ecological river” (or “virgin river” as a more romantic wording), 
which had been a main concept of environmental NGOs’ issue framing. Fang argued this 
phrase as a faked concept, as he described2,  
 
I didn’t see much primitive forest…I have seen patches of farmland on quite 
steep slopes. Locals call them “big character posters on the wall”. Slashing 
with burning is the method used to farm such land…We think that’s a very 
                                                        
1 See: Speech record of Fang Zhouzi in Yunnan University, People’s Daily Web. 
[http://tech.sina.com.cn/d/2005-04-11/1357577996.shtml]; and also see: Fang Zhouzi, “Comments on 
the several opinions on Nu River hydro development <ping fandui nujiang shuidian kaifa de ruogan 
shuofa>,” New Youth – Balance Magazine, No. 1, 2006 (January).  
2 See: Speech record of Fang Zhouzi in Yunnan University.  
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primitive and outdated method, but the head of Nu River Prefecture told us 
this is the most progressive approach that adapted to local conditions, for the 
slopes are too steep to plow…Local people can only burn grass to fertilize the 
land because they cannot afford fertilizer. The used time of these lands are 
only a few years, thus the local people need to burn another patch then. And 
moreover, the production of such lands is very low: even 40 to 50 kilograms 
per mu can be taken as good and 5 mu can only serve one person…According 
to Lu Youmei (an authoritative expert on water resources from Chinese 
Academy of Science, with Fang in this survey), soil erosion have brought 
many landslides and mud-rock flows…Local people cut trees for heating and 
cooking, with a family cutting 3.5 cubic meter wood annually…So during my 
trip, I haven’t seen any “original ecology”. It was only a concept made up for 
media.  
 
Fang’s speech then pointed at the FON secretary, Xue Ye, who had just raised a 
speech on “ten reasons” to oppose NRP. According to Fang1, 
 
One of Xu’s reasons was to protect the cultural diversity in accordance with 
UNESCO provisions since the Three Rivers Parallel had been listed in World 
Heritage…but the provisions to protect World Natural Heritage has no 
connection with “cultural diversity”…He mentioned Nu River is a 
international river and criticized China of refusing to join “Mekong 
International Convention” (to protect international rivers in Southeast Asia), 
but according to the experts I consulted, there’s no “Mekong International 
Convention”, but a “Down Mekong International Convention” signed among 
Southeast Asian Countries. In other words, China is unable to join the 
convention…Xu’s ten reasons included problems of policymaking institutions, 
energy supply, resettlement, shaking of poverty and corruption. I may ask 
you, aren’t the problems involved in all dam constructions? You think Nu 
                                                        
1 See: Speech record of Fang Zhouzi in Yunnan University. 
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River shouldn’t to be developed hydro electricity for these problems, so should 
all the dam constructions to be halted? It may take tens or even a hundred 
years to solve these problems since it was connected with the whole (political 
and social) system and citizen quality…So do you think no dam can be 
constructed in China? You announced yourselves to be “cautious” in 
policymaking, but factually you unconditionally oppose any dam construction 
only. 
  
In addition, Fang ridiculed Xu, who majored in economics in university, as “not 
entitled to discuss scientific problems in the presence of professionals, without any 
learning of science”. This sharp criticism was pointed to Xu’s declaration that “it’s a 
commonly known physical principle that scientists only see what they want to see”1. 
Factually this obvious misunderstanding not only annoyed Fang Zhouzi but also the 
attending university students, most of who were majoring in science. Thus, when Xu Ye 
tried to cut into Fang’s speech for retort, he was again and again interrupted by applause 
to Fang and laughter, and finally he left in a huff before Fang accomplished the speech.  
There had been only a few print media—several local newspapers of Yunnan Province 
and a magazine with Fang’s column—and some websites published the views on Nu River 
Project of intellectuals anti “worship nature”, however, their pointing views and clear 
position against environmental activists forced environmental activists who had more 
media resources to make response. 
Then it came the time for environmental activists to feel embarrassed. Environmental 
activists in developed democracies might envy the great success of young Chinese 
environmental NGOs on anti-large-scale constructions, but the great success depended 
on the loss of governmental credibility—to speak exactly, the slow political reform and 
shortage of public participation regimes made Chinese citizens inclined to believe there 
was serious corruption and interest involvement in policymaking, and the issue framing 
of environmental activists just strengthened the common opinion—rather than its 
advocacy of environmental priority. In other words, the social validity of environmental 
                                                        
1 See: Speech record of Fang Zhouzi in Yunnan University. 
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NGOs was obtained through their identity of representing the public to doubt the 
government. Thus, when intellectuals anti “worship nature” took the point of “lifting local 
people out of poverty” as a key reason to support the Project construction, and criticized 
environmental activists as having no idea of local people’s true demand, environmental 
activists was confronted with a strong competitor for “the representative of the public”. 
And then, environmental activists were force to be faced with a dilemma: to maintain 
their environmental ethics and continued to boycott any man-made construction along 
the Nu River basin, or to prove the anti-hydropower action was for the local people life 
rather than environmental priority, which might keep their identity of “representing 
people” but might weaken their green identity.  
Environmental NGOs had been unable to make the choice until they was faced with a 
great challenge in October. During this month, He Zuoxiu, the theoretical physicist and 
Academician of Chinese Academy of Science, who was also a main member of the anti 
“worship nature” camp, and Lu Youmei, both an authoritative expert on water resources 
from Chinese Academy and a former general engineer of Three Gorgeous Construction, 
wrote letter to Premier Wen Jiabao, raising their views of positive effects of hydropower 
in accordance with “local people’s demand of modern development”, and asked for a 
reconsideration of Nu River Project. They soon received the Premier’s positive response 
that “it seemed that decision-making of this issue needed to be adjusted again,”1 and the 
responsibility was transferred to NDRC. Here, we can find that, the anti “worship nature” 
camp had become new supporter of Nu River Project in the public sphere, and, they used 
the same approach with environmental NGOs—remind the top authority directly—to 
promote their opinion into political sphere and formal policymaking process. The turning 
of situation had made little choice space for environmental NGOs.  
With the instruction of the Premier, NDRC restarted the policymaking process. On 
October 22nd, NDRC entrusted “China Investment Magazine” to host a consultation 
conference with the title of “China’s hydropower development and environmental 
protection Audit Forum”, sending invitations to NDRC officials, SEPA officials, and 
                                                        
1 “Top authority had gradually loosed ban on NPR planning after the one-year suspending,” 
<guowuyuan jiaoting yinian hou, gaoceng zhujian jiejin nujiang guihua>, 1st Financial Business Daily, 
June 2, 2005.  
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intellectuals from both sides. Even though “environmental protection” was still included 
in the symposium title—that indicated the great power of the issue framing of 
environmental activists during the “Nu River Defense battle”—environmental priority 
factually lost its language power there. Since environmental activists anti hydropower 
development had refused to attend in order to “avoid embarrassing clash” 1. Intellectuals 
who support hydropower development, especially Fang Zhouzi, became the main actor. 
In his speech, Fang reemphasized his core point as “(any large-scale project being 
constructed) according to the demand of local people”2, and he raised an opinion poll 
made by the institutions who had made the original NRP report (the NRP report poll) to 
illustrate the “demand of local people”. According to this poll covering 400 local 
habitants in the middle of Nu River, 68.4% of the interviewees agreed with the 
hydropower development, 13.5% objected, 7.4% indicated indifference, and 
10.7% gave no answer. And, 70.1% of the interviewees believed the 
development would bring them increasing incomes, with 62.7% thought it 
would have positive effects on improving the quality of living3. Under the 
absence of environmental activists, Fang still mentioned his view of them as “selfish”, 
because, the environmental activists who had enjoyed modern life style in Beijing wanted 
the Nu River basin to maintain the primitive situation, just like a “museum for their 
travel, fun and research in spare time”, without considering that the primitive situation 
would have isolated the local people from relatively sufficient and convenient modern life 
and made them “forever poor” 4.  
Despite of refusing to attend the symposium, environmental activists still followed 
the statement of their opponents. Fang’s speech, especially his quotation of the opinion 
poll which indicated a local support to hydropower development, then gathered strong 
critics. Wang Yongchen immediately announced to deny the credibility of the poll result, 
since she thought the local people just had “answered the questions without knowing 
                                                        
1 Besides NDRC officials, hydropower engineers and intellectuals supporting the development, the 
environmental activists and SEPA officials were also invited to the conference. But the environmental 
activists collectively denied to present in order to “avoid the embarrassment similar to that happened in 
Yunnan University”. See: Xu, ”The reversion of ‘Nu River Defense Battle’,”. 
2 See: Memoir of “China’s hydropower development and environmental protection Audit Forum”. 
[http://gov.finance.sina.com.cn/zsyz/2005-10-27/72217.html] 
3 Memoir of “China’s hydropower development and environmental protection Audit Forum” () 
4 Memoir of “China’s hydropower development and environmental protection Audit Forum” () 
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enough information of how much of their interest would be harmed” 1. Several months 
later, in 2006 February, Wang and her comrades of GEV organized their own survey 
covering “one hundred potential ecological migrants”. Different from Fang’s quoting 
evidence focusing on economic interests of local people, Wang chose the potential 
problem possibly brought by ecological migration. According to Wang’s investigation2, 
86.7% of the interviewees expected more compensation than the government 
promised to afford, with 80% of the interviewees felt “distrust” to the 
government, and 61.5% of the interviewees thought it was hard for them to 
share benefits of hydropower development. In accordance with the interrelated 
data, Wang concluded that, without enough public participation—according to the same 
investigation, 73.3% of the interviewees thought they have “very little or none” 
participation in local public issues—the interests division of hydropower benefits 
would bring serious conflict between the common people and local government, and  
“make new social stability”. 
It was of our purpose in this chapter to give pros or cons over the two opinion polls 
with opposite conclusions, or views to support or boycott the hydropower. There may be a 
simple reason to the complete difference that they chose different groups of people as poll 
samples. Even though, in public speaking, the “local people” was generally taken as an 
overall variable by officials, public activists of both opponents and supporters, and 
journalists, they actually had diverging expectations, according to differences in age, 
residence, industry, ethnic groups and so on. For example, a university student from Nu 
River Prefecture told me that, for sure, she and her tribe members hadn’t chosen to 
support the dam, despite of knowing the positive effects. The reason was they had been 
afraid that the local county head, who belonged to another ethnic group which was 
majority in local place, would allocated the main part of State compensation to his ethnic 
members and left other groups very little. And, according to her, the environmental 
NGOs and mass media activism had exactly had influence on the local people, educating 
                                                        
1 Wang, “Western Hydropower Development and Public Participation,” p. 152.  
2 See: Wang Yongchen, “Interview Record with One Hundred Potential Resettlers in Nu River Basin 
<nujiang baiming qianzai yimin fangtan lu>,” from Wang’s blog 
[http://blog.sina.com.cn/huanbaozhuyi].  
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them how to frame their discontent1. In addition, the different survey approaches might 
have also influenced the result: the NRP report poll set simple yes-no choices for clear 
questions, while Wang and GEV discussed with interviewees to find what they implied2. 
According to Wang, her interview had concentrated on six questions as3: a) Are you aware 
that you will be relocated? b) If so, where did you get this information? c) Have you been 
consulted by the government or any relevant authorities, given that your lives are likely to 
be affected by the dam building? d) Do you know anything about compensation terms? e) 
Do you have any specific concerns or special difficulties related to resettlement? f) Do you 
think building the dams could help lift you out of poverty? However, in the actual 
interviews, these set questions were implied in the chatting contents rather than clear 
asked. Thus, Wang’s detailed discussion would obviously bring more complex 
implications.  
For more details, this chapter quoted the first and second interviewee of Wang’s for 
examples to show NGO’s framework of public opinion (Annex 1 and Annex 2). The 
attitudes of the two interviewees, if in the NRP report poll, might have been simply 
judged as “agreeing to” the government with NRP. However, in comparison — since 
Wang hadn’t given the clear criteria of her judgment — we may reason4 in the conclusion 
of Wang and GEV that the first 50-year old restaurant owner in the first interview and the 
70-year old ethic minority might have been classified as “expecting more compensation 
than the government promised to afford” for he mentioned the worry about future living, 
“trusting” government and not taking it “hard” to share benefits of hydropower 
development as they directly indicated, and agreeing to “have ‘very little or none’ 
participation in local public issues” as they suggested several times to obey government 
and said the government hadn’t held any discussions for the public. And in addition, it 
may be also important to sense the “education” of environmental activists besides the 
“inquiry” about local habitants.  
 
                                                        
1 Personal interview. November 11, 2010.  
2 “Interview Record with One Hundred Potential Resettlers in Nu River Basin,” 
3 See: http://eng.greensos.cn/ShowArticle.aspx?articleId=65 
4 The conclusion is also helped by advices of a volunteer for GEV during that period. 
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Annex 1 “Interviews with a hundred potential migrants in Nu River Valley 1” 
Source: http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4ed9bee601000d1s.html  
Interviewee: Yuan Liuzhao 
Ethnic group: Han 
Age: 50 
Occupation: Family restaurant owner 
Wang Yongchen (Wang): How old are you? 
Yuan Liuzhao (the interviewee, a small family restaurant owner, Yuan): 50. 
Wang: Are your business Ok? Are there many tourists? When did tourists begin to 
increase? 
Yuan: When the Three Rivers parallel listed in World Heritages. 
Wang: How’s the increase comparing with last year? 
Yuan: About a 20% increase. 
Wang: Which season has the most? 
Yuan: Not only in golden season. 
Wang: Do you know there is to be hydropower construction? 
Yuan: Having heard for two years. 
Wang: Do you think it good? 
Yuan: River water will become as precious as oil. 
Wang: Where did you hear? 
Yuan: The construction survey had already begun. 
Wang: Do you know the county seat will be flooded? 
Yuan: There have been rumors, no political leader saying so. It may take more than 
10 years for survey and construction, no possibility to start at once. I think the state 
will compensate the persons and enterprises.  
Wang: How much do you think the State will compensate? 
Yuan: It depends on the construction. 
Wang: Do you know where to move? 
Yuan: Bingzhongluo. The government hasn’t said but there is people’s view. 
Wang: Is Bingzhongluo big enough for your county? 
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Yuan: It’s broader, no other place can (for it’s hard to find a broad ground to 
establish cities in southwest mountains). 
Wang: Is it suitable for farming there. 
Yuan: No good production neither. For the speedy development, farm land will also 
be occupied (even without the hydropower construction).  
Wang: When did you build the restaurant? 
Yuan: 2002. 
Wang: Is there any difficulty for your resettlement? 
Yuan: Quite a difficulty. I built it on bank lawn, so it actually belongs to the bank. 
Wang: How much have you returned? 
Yuan: SARS came when the construction had just finished (which influence the 
business). 
Wang: How much have you learn from the bank? 
Yuan: 1.1 million RMB (about US $140,000). 
Wang: How much have you returned? 
Yuan: Less than a half. 
Wang: So what do you worry about most for resettlement? 
Yuan: It’ll be ok if the lawn can be relieved. 
Wang: How if it cannot be? How about if the State compensate you according to the 
value of your restaurant, not the lawn? 
Yuan: If the State won’t compensate me, I’m not able to return. They can’t let me 
sleep on the dam. 
Wang: Is there time limit for returning the lawn. 
Yuan: Time has already expired. I’ve got a one-year extension.  
Wang: How about if you can’t return in next year? 
Yuan: The rate increased from 5.1% to 5.5%. 
Wang: What’s your former job? 
Yuan: Working in the construction bureau.  
Wang: Retired. 
Yuan: Not yet. 
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Wang: So you do two jobs? 
Yuan: Family members manage the restaurant.  
Wang: What do you feel best of the river? 
Yuan: The green water. 
Wang: Do you know whether the water will keep green after the dam lifting it? 
Yuan: No idea. 
Wang: What’s your education? 
Yuan: Junior School. 
Wang: Have you ever worried about the dam effects on you? 
Yuan: No, I don’t want to continue the restaurant, too hard. 
Wang: Do people around you agree with the construction? 
Yuan: Most. Everybody just think about following government policies.  
Wang: How about if the policy is not proper? 
Yuan: That’s also up to the government.  
Wang: How about if the compensation is not proper, or the new residence is smaller? 
Do people here just obey or fight for something better? 
Yuan: We have no worry, because it’s anyway the State’s Key project with 
investment of tens of billions RMB. There is no reason for government to give us 
insufficient compensation. 
Wang: have your heard cases with bad compensation in other places? 
Yuan: Not yet. I have only heard good news. I think the State will have policies. We 
need to trust the government, or we can achieve nothing. 
Wang: Which will you choose? Dam construction or develop tourism resources? 
Yuan: Both are acceptable. And I think we can have both. 
Wang: But the landscape of Three Rivers Parallel will change according to the dam. 
Yuan: I’m too old to consider it. People will feel you strange, and think you’re bored 
to consider it. We generally obey the government.  
Wang: Have the government held meetings to discuss it? 
Yuan: No. 
Wang: So is all information from rumors? 
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Yuan: No, hydropower companies from Beijing are on survey. 
Wang: Why do you think the water will become as precious as oil? 
Yuan: Nu River Newspapers had said so. It said that the key work of government 
was focused on promoting quality of officials and the major project. The dam is the 
project. 
Wang: How many persons in your family? 
Yuan: My wife, three children (possibly means two sons and a daughter-in-law, and 
the grandsons. Seven persons. 
Wang: How’s your children’s education? 
Yuan: The elder went to technical secondary school, and the younger went to junior 
college. 
Wang: Thank you. 
 
Annex 2 Interviews with a hundred potential migrants in Nu River Valley 2 
Source: http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4ed9bee601000d1s.html  
Interviewee: Ma Yuehan (the Chinese pronunciation of “John” as being a Christian) 
Ethnic group: Dulong 
Age: 70 
Occupation: Family restaurant owner 
Wang (to the daughter of Yuehan): Do you hear the dam?  
Ma Lihua: Yes, I heard there would be a hydropower station, and we’ll move to 
Bingzhongluo. I don’t want to move there. 
Wang: Why? 
Ma Lihua: I’ll miss here. 
Wang: Why. 
Ma lihua: Good-looking. 
Wang: What’s the best good-looking? 
Ma Lihua: Landscape. 
Wang: Are you all family reluctant to move? 
Ma Lihua: May father wants move. 
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Wang: Why? 
Ma Lihua: His family is there. 
Wang: How old are you? 
Ma Lihua: 12.  
Wang: What’s your most worry about moving? 
Ma Lihua: I don’t know.  
Wang: What’s your name? 
Ma Lihua: Ma Lihua. She’s my younger sister Ma Liying. 
Wang: What are you living on? 
Ma Lihua: May father has a salary of one thousand.  
Wang: Where does he work? 
Ma Lihua: The county hall of culture.  
Wang (on the phone): Hello, are you the father? Are you in the county hall? Your 
daughter tells me you’re a specialist on Dulong ethnic group. 
Ma Yuehan (Ma): I belong to Dulong, but I’m not a specialist.  
Wang: What’s your work in the county hall? 
Ma: Cultural work.  
Wang: Do Dulong youth still have tattoos1 on face? 
Ma: No.  
Wang: How about women over 40? 
Ma: There are some. 
Wang: Your daughter is good. She adores you. How old are you? 
Ma: More than 70. 
Wang: With such little daughters? 
Ma: I adopted her. Her father died. 
Wang: Do you have religious faith? 
Ma: Christian. 
Wang: Are many Dulong people Christians? 
                                                        
1 Tattoos on face had been an ancient custom of Dulong women from before Tang Dynasty. It was 
explained as the self-protection of young women from cruel rulers or for a sense of beauty. This custom 
was forbidden by the government in 1966, for its harm to women’s body.  
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Ma: Yes, we have little education. 
Wang: Have you been to school? 
Ma: No. 
Wang: Do you know Susu characters?  
Ma: all Christians know Susu characters1.  
Wang: Do you hear the hydropower construction? 
Ma: Yes, people need to move. 
Wang: Who did you hear from? 
Ma: The government. 
Wang: Which (level of) government? 
Ma: The Gongshan county government. 
Wang: Where do you know you will move? 
Ma: Bingzhongluo. 
Wang: Is there enough residence space? 
Ma: The government will arrange it. 
Wang: Do you want to move? Do you want the hydropower station? 
Ma: It’s okay to leave it to the government. 
Wang: But the river is to be damaged. 
Ma: Never mind. The government put more efforts, and we people put more efforts, 
our life will be better according to the hydropower construction. 
Wang: Do you ever worry about it? 
Ma: Not yet. We’ll follow the government.  
Wang: Do you have any difficulties if the government let you move to Bingzhongluo 
tomorrow? 
Ma: It’ll be okay if the government arranges it for us. 
Wang: Do you have any difficulties to tell the government? 
Ma: The difficulty is I may lose my farmland 
                                                        
1 Susu is a minority ethnic group in Southwest China. During the Republican China era, missionary 
entering Yunnan Province used Latin characters to create Susu characters, in order to spread the Bible. 
The old characters had been reformed from 1949. For the special history, family churches of some 
southwest ethnic groups succeed the tradition to use Susu characters in religious activities.  
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Wang: Is it hard to find new arable land? 
Ma: Yes. 
Wang: Do you know you daughter doesn’t want to move? 
Ma: She must follow her father. 
Wang: But you hear that the traffic is not so convenient there? 
Ma: I haven’t heard that. If so, it’ll be difficult to collect firewoods. 
Wang: Do you think the problem of traffic can be solved? If it cannot be solved, do 
you move? 
Ma: I hope to choose a better place. 
Wang: Do you believe the government will agree? 
Ma: Yes. 
Wang: Are there many tourists coming to your place? 
Ma: Not so many. Bingzhongluo has a lot.  
Wang: Where do you think is the most beautiful in the place? Your daughter says 
there is very beautiful landscape. 
Ma: The most beautiful landscape has already disappeared. 
Wang: Do you know the influence of the hydropower station? 
Ma: I think it’ll be somehow different to resettle so many residents. 
Wang: Do you want to go there? 
Ma: I follow the governmental arrangement. How will be the life of so many people? 
Wang: Are your grains provided by the government？ 
Ma: No, I bought it myself.  
Wang: How many people in your family? 
Ma: Five. 
Wang: How much can you earn from your vegetable garden? 
Ma: About five, six hundred yuan. 
Wang: How about if you lose it? 
Ma: I can’t live without it, because my salary is a little more than 1000 yuan a 
month. 
Wang: How does children’s school cost? 
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Ma: Annually 400 yuan for each child. 
Wang: Are there additional incomes besides the 1000-yuan salary and 500 yuan 
from selling vegetables？Do you feed pigs? 
Ma: Yes, it adds about 400 yuan annually.  
Wang: And chickens? 
Ma: No, I buy chickens for eating. 
Wang: Do you think the resettlement will influence Dulong characters? 
Ma: No, the characters have already faded away. Very few people are interested in 
it.  
Wang: Aren’t you working to protect the characters? 
Ma: There isn’t enough money. 
Wang: How about the youth? 
Ma: The government hasn’t given enough financial support. 
Wang: How many people can read Dulong characters in the county? 
Ma: Totally less than one hundred persons. 
Wang: Where do they learn the characters? 
Ma: In the county hall of culture. I teach. 
Wang: How many persons can teach like you? 
Ma: 20. 
Wang: Can you sing Dulong songs? 
Ma: No, I only know the characters. 
 
 
5. End to “Nu River Defend Battle” and Analysis of the Issue 
5.1 Changes to Original Planning and Differentiation Among Opponents 
In January, Wenhui Bao, a newspaper located in Hong Kong leaked—for its close ties 
to CCP, it could be taken as inspired by governmental policy makers, to probe the 
reaction of public opinion—some main conclusions of the EIA report of NRP. According 
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to the interpretation by New York Times1, 
 
A Chinese government environmental review has recommended reducing the 
number of dams included in a hydropower proposal on the Nu River in 
southwestern China to limit environmental damage and decrease the number 
of people who would be resettled, according to a Hong Kong newspaper 
report and a provincial environmental official… (T)he the recommendation 
calls for four hydro dams instead of the 13 in the original Nu proposal. The 
article, citing an unnamed source "close" to the government review, said a 
reduced number of dams would meet "the needs for economic development 
and environmental protection.” Officials with the State Environmental 
Protection Administration, which has responsibility for the review, declined to 
comment. But an environmental official in Yunnan Province, where many of 
the proposed dams would be built, confirmed that the environmental 
assessment review has been completed and recommended only four dams. If 
so, the project would next be presented to the National Development and 
Reform Commission, a powerful government ministry, for approval. Then, if 
approved, it would be presented to the State Council, or the Chinese cabinet, 
for final consideration. The possibility of a scaled-down project would seem to 
represent a partial victory for environmentalists, academics and others who 
have lobbied against the project. But many environmentalists are concerned 
that approving four dams would merely serve as an opening for the full 
project to be built later. 
The leaking of information seemed to be a limited compromise of the NRP supporters, 
but the opaque process of EIA completely diverged from the main demand of activists as 
“public participation”. According to New York Times, “a coalition of environmentalists, 
lawyers, journalists and nongovernmental organizations” then called for “the release of 
the report as well as public hearings on the project”, with citing “a 2003 environmental 
                                                        
1 Jim Yardley, “Hydroelectricity project in China may be shrunk,” New York Times, January 12, 2006.  
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law (EIA Law) that required public participation, including hearings, in deciding such 
major projects”1, but “ (Weihui Bao) said the Ministry of Water Resources and the State 
Secrets Bureau” had classified the report “as a state secret, citing laws restricting the 
release of information about projects on international rivers”2. 
Under the pessimism of the activists, SEPA released a document on providing 
provisional approaches to allow limited public participation. In accordance with this 
document publicized in late February, on one hand, public could be facilitated to “take 
part in the EIA by answering EIA questionnaires, consulting experts, or participating in a 
symposium or public hearings.”3 On the other hand, developers would have to “release 
the data on the environmental impact of the project and the measures that are in place to 
handle it”. This document was more an appeasement rather than having actual effects. 
Even for the optimistic SEPA deputy general, Pan Yue, it was expected more in the form 
to be a “guide for establishing a comprehensive system for releasing information and set 
into place mechanisms to ensure more public participation in the policy process” 
according to its identity as “the first official document on public involvement in the 
environmental sector… (to) make government decisions in the sector more transparent 
and democratic”4. However, activists still tried to encourage the efforts of the weak 
non-profit-oriented department. About a month later on March 20th, SEPA register its 
first request under the document provisions5. 
Not only information transparency was not enough, but a shrinking from 13 dams to 
4 dams was not an acceptable result for environmental NGOs who persisting on 
protecting a “virgin river” from the man-made change, and they hadn’t given up hard 
working. Wang Yongchen with GEV, in the second half of 2006, launched the “Decade 
River Project <zhongguo jianghe shinian xing>” campaign. This campaign was planned 
to organize environmental activists and journalists to take a half-month survey along 
China’s southwest rivers included Nu River annually, from 2006 to 2015. This campaign 
                                                        
1 Yardley, “Hydroelectricity project in China may be shrunk,” 
2 Ibid. 
3 Sun Xiaohua, “Public to help assess impact on environment,” China Daily, February 23, 2006.  
4 Sun, “Public to help assess impact on environment,” 
5 Elaine Wu, “Activists seek hearing on dam project,” South China Morning Post, March 21, 2006.  
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was supported to1:  
a) record the decade of change to river development situation, water quantity 
and quality, landscape, and local people’s living; 
b) publicize the records on mass media, to promote citizens’ right to know; 
c) influence governmental policymaking, promoting scientific and orderly river 
protection and development; 
d) protect ecological and cultural diversity along river basin. 
 
In accordance with the planning, the campaign is still continuing2. Environmental 
NGOs’ activism on southwest rivers possibly cannot reach its climax of influence like 
around 2004, the local survey anyway indicated the growth of China’s NGOs, for their 
initiative communication with the local communities who were direct stakeholders of 
river issues, to learn the local people’s need on one hand and to socialize their own issue 
frameworks on the other hand.  
5.2. Analysis of the Nu River issue 
In 2004, when the vice secretary of Yunnan Provincial Government of that time was 
interviewed by Liaowang — a Party mouthpiece sponsored by the national Xinhua News 
Agency to socializing the Party directives through interpreting the focus news — he 
transferred the local official interpretation on “five factors obstructing Nu River 
hydropower development” and admitted that the SEPA and environmental NGOs had 
been the most influential entrepreneurs to mobilize the public opposition to the NRP, and 
mass media bias had been the most effective approaches for mobilization. As he pointed3, 
 
Firstly, the examination on Nu River hydropower development planning was 
at the same as the EIA Law was coming to effect, whose new provisions 
demanded the independent EIA report included in the project planning, thus, 
the NRP planning needed to undergo a new procedure which slowed down the 
                                                        
1 See: Introduction to “Decade River Project”, from the official web of Alex SEE Ecological Association 
[http://gongyi.sina.com.cn/gyzx/2009-02-21/15577250.html]. 
2 For more details on its annual records, see: http://eng.greensos.cn/RiverNews.aspx 
3 Li, “Controversy on Nu River dam: what’s the point?” 
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project progress…The second factor is the special attention (both from the 
government and public) to NRP, for its planned large installed capacity of 
more than 20 million kilowatt, about 20% of the current installed capacity 
through the whole country…The third factor is a public misunderstanding of 
the real conditions of Nu River area. Many scholars, depending on the 
second-handed information rather than field work, hurriedly judged Nu River 
as a “virgin river” with original ecology and idyllic ethnic culture…Fourthly, 
in addition, some unreal reports of a few scholars and environmental NGOs 
have strengthen the misunderstanding image. At the beginning of controversy, 
such unreal reports might have derived from insufficient survey on the true 
situation of Nu River basin, but after the one-year discussion and 
investigation, we may say that it’s quite irresponsible for some scholars and 
environmental NGOs who should have been familiar with the real situation to 
insist on publicizing their unfair views. And finally, we also must admit that 
the government have made many mistakes in past hydropower development. 
For example, in the Manwan Dam construction, the subsidy for resettlement 
had been not enough to improve the living level of the resettled residents, and 
even lower the living level of some of them. The mistaken resettlement policy 
has also become a reason to boycott the NRP…To speak generally, the five 
factors have reflected “the crash between the two values of protection and 
development” . 
 
The official statement on an important Party mouthpiece, besides its obvious bias 
against the opponents, also implied the characteristics of the embedded mobilization in 
NRP case, which also will answer the questions raised at the beginning of this chapter.  
This chapter examined the actual effectiveness of the embedded mobilization to 
counteract with the truly powerful profit-oriented departments, and there seemed to be 
the fundamentally positive answer. In comparison with the Tibetan antelope and 
Yuanmingyuan cases respectively dominated by the civil society and SEPA, the similar 
policy influence of the governmental actor and the social power in the Nu River Defense 
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Battle had been better integrated. Similar to the two cases, SEPA and environmental 
NGOs united together to promote the same media issue framing preferring the 
environmental priority and the democratic implication. On one hand, it had been the 
governmental fragmentation to trigger the anger of SEPA, who mainly concentrated on 
applying legal means to counterattack its arrogant profit-oriented co-workers. For this 
purpose, SEPA had embedded its authority in the public participation and media issue 
framing, as the informal approach to mobilize the social resources against the established 
bureaucratic custom. On the other hand, environmental NGOs couldn’t have contacted 
the NRP policymaking without SEPA’s provision of institutional resources, while the 
environmental NGOs’ non-governmental identity and networks, especially the media 
networks which had accumulated through their social activities, had also helped SEPA 
reach extensive public resources. And, with regard to the media issue framing, similar to 
the last two cases, mass media had been the first choice for SEPA and the environmental 
NGOs as the mobilization approach, and mass media also hadn’t hesitated to become 
their ally to demonstrate the obvious bias in the issue framing. According to the 
“incomplete statistics” of FON, during the controversy climax “from August 2008 to 
September 2004”, only “the national mass media” of “near one hundred print and 
broadcasting media organizations” had “published and broadcasted more than one 
hundred articles and TV programs”1. The former texts had introduced the main media 
frameworks and the bias, but it’s still necessary to reemphasize that as many 
environmental NGO members had been current or former professionals within the mass 
media circle, the issue framing from the very beginning demonstrated an “us versus 
them”2 impression. As the result, the success to get the order of the top political 
to suspend the project indicated the clear effectiveness of the embedded mobilization, 
despite of the actually strong pressure of the economic orientation.  
However, observers shouldn’t be too excited about the success of the “civil society”, 
“public opinion” and “reformatory environmental department” to ignore exploring the 
                                                        
1 Fu Tao, “The Development of Chinese Environmentalist NGOs <zhongguo minjian huanjing zuzhi de 
fazhan>,” in Liang Congjie and Yang Dongping (ed.), FON Green Paper Book 2005: Crisis and 
Breakout, Beijing: Social Science Academic Press, 2006, pp. 160-167. p. 161.  
2 Water Warriors, p. 145.  
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power source of their actions, which will offer the positive proof for the “embedded 
mobilization”. Factually, rather than the direct clash between SEPA and its 
profit-oriented bureaucratic co-workers, the success had been led by the clear proceeding 
of “SEPA and NGO promotion  extensive media reporting  formation of public 
opinion pressure  decision of top political authority  top-bottom political pressure on 
the electricity department and enterprises”. In other words, the embedded mobilization 
had been effective not directly on changing the decision-making, but on drawing the 
highest-level concern to force the strong departments and enterprises to compromise. 
Thus, we can conclude that the national orthodox of “sustainable development” had been 
the depended on as the power source of the embedded mobilization. And further, the 
visible media issue framing had also directed to the same conclusion. Although the mass 
media had tried to establish the environmental priority and ethics against 
profit-orientation and the increase ethics, they had never tried to clearly transcend the 
Party line. On the contrary, the directives of the central authority, especially the 
environmental concerns of “The Great Western Development Strategy” had been applied 
and interpreted to strengthen their reasons to boycott NRP. And coincidentally, although 
environmental NGOs and mass media framed their indications of demanding more civil 
“rights to know” and public participation in decision-making, their critics had only 
limited to be targeted at the local governmental “impropriety”, at the most up to the 
national-level SOEs and the water resource department — these national-level entities 
were also main “rivals” with SEPA in the bureaucratic system — without challenging the 
validity of the political system. 
Then, according to the further development of the issue, we can see SEPA had 
gradually lost the motivations for further mobilization along with the top leader 
suspending the project and ordering the law procedure for EIA, and, had got to 
reconsider their negotiation with co-workers in the bureaucratic system. But meanwhile, 
the great success on changing policies and the expansion of influence in the international 
civil society had encouraged the environmental NGOs to continue the anti-dam 
mobilization, not only for universalize the value of environmental priority, or “worship 
nature”, but also for more language power in policymaking and even further political 
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reform implications beyond the existing institutions. The divergence between the 
environmental department and the civil society could be taken as the logical result 
because of the different agendas of the entrepreneurs. Especially after the halt of the 
project, while maintaining the self-censorship on domestic occasions, the environmental 
NGOs and the liberalistic journalists had indicated more political implications of their 
actions in their communication with the foreign mass media, especially on the potential 
effects of the green civil society on potential political transformation as: the social 
discontent with public policiesthe discontent with improper actions of a certain level 
government of departmentthe discontent with the political system the impropriety 
deriving fromreform or even some more radical happening like that in Soviet Union. 
And we may also see that the foreign media had inclined to emphasize the political risks 
of the social mobilization in China—it might have be in accordance with the audience’s 
image of China as a totalitarianism of dictatorship—and possibly, the memories of the 
political struggle under TGP issue and the oversea dissidents might have framed the 
anti-dam mobilization a zero-game between the government and the public. In 2006, a 
New York Times story on NRP controversy obtained the Pulitzer Prize, a most important 
U. S. award for achievements in newspaper and online journalism, literature and musical 
composition. This story described the struggle of environmental NGOs for “rule by law” 
through the NRP issue, under the high political pressure1:  
 
The block marks the spot on the Nu River where officials here in Yunnan 
Province want to begin building one of the biggest dam projects in the world. 
The project would produce more electricity than even the mighty Three 
Gorges Dam but would also threaten a region considered an ecological 
treasure…For decades, the ruling Communist Party has rammed through such 
projects by fiat. But the Nu River proposal, already delayed for more than a 
year…A coalition led by Chinese environmental groups is urging the central 
government to hold open hearings and make public a secret report on the Nu 
dams before making a final decision. In a country where people cannot 
                                                        
1 Jim Yardley, “Seeking a public voice on China’s ‘angry river’,” New York Times, December 26, 2005.  
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challenge decisions by their leaders, such public participation is a fairly 
radical idea. But the groups argue that new environmental laws grant exactly 
that right. "This is the case to set a precedent," said Ma Jun, an environmental 
consultant in Beijing. "For the first time, there is a legal basis for public 
participation. If it happens, it would be a major step forward."…For many 
people in China's fledgling "civil society"—environmentalists, journalists, 
lawyers, academics and others—the law has become a tool to promote 
environmental protection and to try to expand the rights of individuals in an 
authoritarian political system. But trying to invoke the law is risky…the 
activism on the Nu and other issues has provoked deep suspicions by the 
Communist Party even as a broader clampdown against such NGO's has 
forced some to shut down…The closed process that led to the Three Gorges 
Dam is what opponents of the Nu dams most want to avoid…Mr. Ma, the 
environmental consultant in Beijing, said…”Before the Nu River proposal, you 
would hear about opposition to certain projects…But it was all based on the 
tremendous courage of individuals. This time, we see progress in Chinese law 
that makes it possible for a more systemic challenge."  
 
The emphasis of international media on the political meaning of the Nu River 
Defense Battle might have helped exerting the influence of environmental NGOs, but it 
also had promoted them, especially the most influential activists, to challenge the 
orthodox. When the NGOs inclined to completely object the construction — for the sake 
of “worship to the nature” — rather than to demand for a more democratic and cautious 
policymaking process, they deviated from the national line of “development”. Thus, 
without the embeddedness of SEPA’s institutional resources, the mobilization of 
environmental NGOs and the liberalistic journalists had not only suffered from the 
attacks of the profit-oriented departments, the electricity goliath and the local 
government, but also been faced with the challenge from another pact of public 
intellectuals who preferred the great industrialization, economic growth and technical 
factors in the policymaking.  
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As we see in the New York Times story, the weak position of the environmental NGOs 
in the controversy was impressive, the same as it had been in the last cases. But in the 
NRP case, there had been a new phenomenon of the “weak position” being doubted by, as 
discussed in this chapter, the activists of anti “worship nature” pact. In his speech in 
Yunnan University, Fang Zhouzi directly said the environmental NGOs factually had been 
“in quite a powerful position”1 based on the financial support from oversea foundations 
and even governmental organizations, the close alliance with mass media and SEPA. This 
accusation might have been interpreted as the counterattack to the inclination of the 
environmental NGOs to accuse NRP supporters of the government’s dogs. However, it 
may be far beyond the simple abuse in the war of words. Factually, according to such 
opinion, the anti “worship nature” pact had not only provided another issue framework of 
the NRP issue beyond the “green civil society versus government” struggle and leading a 
complex public sphere with more “multiple” views which we haven’t found in the last two 
cases, but also — it may be more important — implied that the incentives of 
environmental NGOs’ social mobilization had been partly from the governmental 
acquiescence or even support, in other words, limited within the “Party line”. And further, 
the participation of anti “worship nature” pact had somehow staked the environmental 
NGOs’ position of “pubic representative”, which had weakened the natural validity of 
their issue framing. To speak exactly, in order to make the mainstream of public opinion 
in the competition, the environmental NGOs and their mass media comrades had got to 
increase the reasonableness of the framing, especially to reflect on the extremalization of 
environmental priority. Among the mass media, there had been voice that the media 
might have concentrated too much on “abstract conclusion” rather than “concrete 
analysis”, and restricted to the “value bias” too much so as to ignore the “ipso facto”, but 
finally, the “media inclination” would not have been equal to the “public choice”2. In the 
“Decade River Project” survey organized by Wang Yongchen and her GEV, there had been 
also voice among GEV members that “the pressure of the local poverty” had been “higher 
                                                        
1 See: Speech record of Fang Zhouzi in Yunnan University.  
2 Ren Bo, “The role of mass media in Nu River hydropower controversy <daba jianfei zhi zheng zhong 
de meiti juese>,” Youth Reference, September 21, 2005.  
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than that of the environmental protection”1. In December 2008, the Chinese Central 
Television (CCTV) broadcasted a series of “Nu River Stories” in the column of “Green 
Space”, a program for environmental protection. The series reviewed the controversy 
from 2003, and the producer announced the purpose to be “how to create the chance for 
the living and development of the local people” with “objectively demonstrating the living 
situation of the residents”, and “let the audience themselves to think” 2. Obviously, the 
series had a similar issue framing with the anti “worship nature” pact and, through a clear 
content emphasis on the local poverty and detailed compensation policies of the 
government, implied its support to the construction.  
In 2008, the dam construction on Nu River had been restarted, it may be quite 
strange that there had been neither clear encouragement of nor clear opposition to it by 
the central government, thus, the public controversy and informal gaming had still 
continued in a much smaller scale, especially after the National Energy Administration in 
February 2011 leaked the message that the Nu River would possibly be permitted to 
“comprehensively” developed in the National Twelfth Five Year Plan within the planned 
over 60 hydropower projects3. But the restart of NRP shouldn’t be simply interpreted as 
the “failure” of the green civil society, as well as the mobilization to change certain polices 
for environmental concerns shouldn’t be taken as the zero-game between the civil society 
and the government. Factually, according to the whole NRP progress, on one hand, the 
central government had encouraged the mobilization of SEPA and the environmental 
NGOs to counteract with the greedy SOE who hadn’t earnestly carried out the Party line 
of caring environmental effects and resettlement fairness in developing the west. On the 
other hand, the mobilization ability of the environmental NGOs had been strengthened 
through the institutional resources afforded by SEPA according to the governmental 
                                                        
1 Zhang Ke, “Under the endless controversy on Nu River Hydropower, the local poverty pressure has 
prevailed over environmental protection <nujiang shuidian kaifa zhengyi buduan, dangdi pinkun yali 
yi chaoguo huanbao>, First Financial Daily, January 8, 2008. And the writer had also heard similar 
views through the personal communication with some other journalists. 
2 Wu Qingquan and Li Li, “Narration on Nu River stories from the humanistic perspective <cong 
renwen jiaodu jiangshu nujiang gushi>,” Yunnan Daily, December 17, 2008.  
3 See for example: “NRP is faced with the newest opponents (nujiang shuidian yinglai zuixin 
fanduipai),” South Weekend, March 3, 2011. And “Several hydropower projects along Nu River have 
been accused to be constructed without permission, making the ecological degradation (nujiang duozuo 
shuidianzhan beizhi weipi xianjian, zhi shengtai huanjing biancha)”, Daily Economic News, September 
22, 2011.  
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fragmentation, and further, they had learnt a lesson from the challenge of anti “worship 
nature” intellectuals so as to improve their issue framing, which might have made the 
environmental NGOs mobilization more persuasive of “representing the public”, in order 
to construct the healthy public sphere of China.  
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Chapter Six 
Confirming Central Orthodoxy in Embedded Mobilization: 
The Case of Tai Lake Crisis 
 
The analysis of the cases in the last three chapters has gone very close to 
complete the jigsaw of “embedded mobilization”, and the last piece is the role of 
the top authority at the central level. Whether from the active opinion orientation 
and resources investment of SEPA or from the campaign and petition of 
environmental NGOs, we cannot ignore the existence of the central authority, and 
what we can make clear is that the central orthodoxy to value the environmental 
factor of the development had been depended on by those main actors in order to 
dwarf their rivals. However, judged from the visible process, the formal presence of 
the top authority — especially the presence of the Premier in the Nu River Project 
issue — had seemed to be in response to the petition of the SEPA official or the 
environmental activists with the special channel of transinformation. Then, should 
we just take the central authority as a passive player whose power had been just 
extracted according to the route map of the “embedded mobilization” composed of 
the environmental department, environmental NGOs and the media opinion they 
inspired? This question reflects another crucial point that whether the 
combination of institutional resources and informal politics does 
undermine the centralized Party-state system or become a positive 
factor to improve the system with carrying out central orthodoxy; and 
further, whether the intervention of center is a subjective factor of the 
“embeddeness”. With such concern, this chapter extends to another important 
EP field as the environmental emergency, which most directly indicates the 
contradiction between economic growth and environmental quality. In this field, 
local economic interests and local leaders’ careers of those “elite regions” – those 
local regions with advanced economic achievements and more political influence in 
the central institutions, as discussed in the second chapter – are involved, bringing 
the alliance of environmental department, NGOs and mass media more 
obstructions.  
 229
At the end of 2007, the source of tap water for Wuxi Municipality, Jiangsu 
Province, located in Tai Lake, had been severely polluted by blue-green algae. As 
one of the frequent water crises in China from 1990s, mostly occurred with 
industrial pollutions1, this so-called “Tai Lake water crisis <taihu shui weiji>” (or 
“Tai Lake blue-green algae accident <taihu lanzao shijian>”) was typical but also 
had special significance for us to pay attention as, in the first place, it occurred in a 
most economically advanced area to make clear its non-accidental connection with 
industrialization and development mode; secondly, this crisis signaled the failure 
of a long-term and costly pollution management in Tai Lake basin, which naturally 
concentrated the attention to governmental responsibility; and lastly, the pollution 
on tap water directly caused the close concern of urban citizens at the very first 
time. And in addition, for our research on embedded mobilization, this case has its 
special point, which is, there was the direct connection between central leadership 
and the interest expression of local community. In other words, environmental 
departments and NGOs became supporting players, which leads us to see more 
clear the initiatives and incentives of environmental management as the strong 
national willingness. In the Tai Lake emergency, the central leadership concerning 
development sustainability and public complaints directly conflicted with the local 
Party and government who benefited from the extensive economic pattern. 
However, the institutional arrangement of local economic autonomy limited the 
administrative operation of the center – and in addition, the strong position of 
local leaders from advanced regions in State Council might also be the obstacle – 
and therefore, the mobilization of “public opinion” was still effective to aid the 
intervention of central leadership, in order to take control of the institutional 
reform on pollution management and emergency response mechanism.  
Similar to other public issues discussed, mass media was the vehicle to frame 
                                                        
1 For example, in 1990, Wuxi suffered from half a month without tap water due to blue-green algae. 
Recently, in February 2006, the water resource of Mudanjiang Municipality, Heilongjiang Province, was 
officially announced as polluted, leading to a panic buying of pure water. The last serious accident may 
be the severe pollution along Songhua River, Heilongjiang Province, from November to December 2006, 
caused by leaking benzene from a chemical plant explosion, resulting in the resignation of SEPA head at 
that time. 
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the issue and mobilize social attention. However, media framing in this case 
demonstrated the clear differentiation among media organizations, rather than the 
phenomenon of overall predominance. What may the new phenomenon help us, 
under the situation of direct conflict between center and the local, to understand 
more comprehensively the framework of “embedded mobilization”? 
 
1. Case Background and Process 
1.1 Industrial pollution in Tai Lake as National Protection Agenda 
The rapid industrialization in Tai Lake basin transformed the blue-green algae from a 
common trouble of nature to modernized problem influencing basic living and 
development quality, which projects the whole serious situation. The blue-green algae 
(cyanophyte) are a kind of prokaryote found mostly in fresh water; some species produce 
neurotoxins, hepatotoxins, cytotoxins, and endotoxins, making them dangerous to 
animals and humans. Common to residents in the Tai Lake area, each summer the 
blue-green algae reproduce massively and leave remains floating on the lake, a process 
that has increased since the 1970s due to man-made processes from agricultural fertilizer, 
industry, and domestic waste. Research materials demonstrated that as early as until the 
late the 1990s, around the rural area of Wuxi Municipality, both surface water and 
ground water in superficial layers were badly polluted and had become undrinkable1. The 
species had firstly appeared in Tai Lake during the 1960s and become a troublesome 
pollution source for the local people from the 1970s. And, as early in 1990, there used to 
be a similar water crisis which led to a half-month break of tap water supply and the 
direct economic loss of 200 million yuan RMB. The severe deterioration of the situation 
from the 1990s2 had been caused by the great increase of industrial pollutants, including 
a large scale of sewage without any treatments, and the increase of agricultural and 
sanitary sewage according to the modernization. As the result, even not during the season 
of the massive reproduction of the blue-green algae, the water quality of Tai lake still kept 
                                                        
1 See: Research Centre of Environment and Development of CASS: China Environment and 
Development Review, Vol. 1, Social Science Documentation Publishing House, 2001. 
2 Gang Gu, “Reason and Control on Blue-green Algae Fast Growth of Eutrophication in Taihu Lake 
<taihu lanzao baofa chengyin ji fu yingyang hua kongzhi>,” The Administration and Technique of 
Environmental Monitoring, Vol. 8, No. 6, Decemeber 1996, p. 7. 
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in quite a low level, with 32% of the lake water failing to achieve the standards of drinking 
water1. And further, from 2000 to 2006, there have been about 2 to 6 times of massive 
reproduction annually2, bring the local residents into great trouble3.  
On the contrary to the serious water pollution had been the impressive economic 
achievements. People in the area around Tai Lake had created the development pattern 
called “South Jiangsu Pattern <sun nan moshi>” depending on township enterprises for 
industrialization, which promoted the GDP per capita of Jiangsu Province to about 6,000 
US dollars in the middle of the 2010s, in comparison with the national average level of 
2000 US dollars during the same time. The “South Jiangsu Pattern” of encouraging 
township enterprises also used to be a good sample for the less advanced areas. However, 
besides the impressive achievements, the bad negative effects of township enterprises on 
the environmental conditions shouldn’t have been neglected, and further, according to 
the theory of Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC)4—the theory hypothesizes the GDP per 
capita of 5000-10000 US dollars as the turning point for an industrializing country to 
shift its focus from the simple economic increase to the balance between economic 
growth and environmental governance—the Tai Lake area should have been taken as 
capable of increasing the environmental investment. Thus, the central government had 
paid great attention to the natural environment improvement in the Tai Lake basin, 
because the pollution management had not only been in response to the urgent pressure 
of the bad water quality, but also been taken as the example for the less advanced areas to 
reflect on the pollute-firstly-clean-secondly pattern.  
The Tai Lake pollution management started from the middle of the 1990s. In April 
1996, the State Council Environmental Protection Committee held an on-the-spot 
                                                        
1 Ninghong Zhang, Gang Li, Jianqiao Yu, Ming Ding and Liang Xu, “Character of Blue-green Algae 
Blooms Outbreak in Taihu Lake <taihu lanzao shuihua baofa zhuyao tezheng chuxi>,” Environmental 
Monitoring in China, Vol. 25, No. 1, January 2005, pp. 71-74. p. 71. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Since 1991, Environmental Kuznets Curve has become standard features in the technical literature of 
environmental policy, though their application is strongly contested. See for example: Bruce Yandle, 
Maya Vijayaraghavan, and Madhusudan Bhattarai, "The Environmental Kuznets Curve: A Primer,” 
2000, The Property and Environment Research Center. [http://www.perc.org/articles/article688.php]; 
William T. Harbaugh, Arik Levinson, and David Molloy Wilson, “Reexamining the Empirical Evidence 
for an Environmental Kuznets Curve.” Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 84, No. 3, August 2002, 
pp. 541-551; and Julianne H. Mills and Thomas A. Waite, "Economic prosperity, biodiversity 
conservation, and the environmental Kuznets curve". Ecological Economics, Vol. 68, No. 7, 2009, pp. 
2087–2095. 
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meeting in Wuxi Municipality to check the achievements of the environmental law 
enforcement in Tai Lake basin. In this meeting, Song Jian, a State Councilor at that time, 
raised the suggestion to completely clean the Tai Lake water until 2000. The suggestion 
then oriented to the formal determination of the meeting as: a) the establishment of the 
leading team on Tai Lake pollution management, with the manning of representatives 
from the relative ministries and leaders from Jiangsu Province, Anhui Province and Wuxi 
Municipality; b) the establishment of the operation office for the leading team; and c) the 
establishment of a specialists team to make the “The Ninth Five-year Plan of Tai Lake 
Pollution Management and 2010 Plan <tai hu wu ran zhi li jiu wu ji hua ji 2010 nian 
guihua>”. The scheme actually finished in 1998 planned to completely achieve the set 
wastewater discharge volume in Tai Lake basin until the end of 1998, clean the visible 
pollution in Tai Lake water body until 2000 to guarantee the drinkable water quality, and 
further, until 2010, to low the level of eutrophia in the Lake in order to guarantee the 
benign ecological cycles. According to the guiding plan, the State Council, in 1998, had 
invested plentiful resources as the emergency measures to contain the deterioration, 
including the blitz of organized governmental actions to suspend or terminate the 
operations of enterprises taking illegal waste discharge, the establishment of special 
sponsorship to promote the technology with regard to pollution control engineering and 
stream restoration, and so on.  
With such measures, until December 31st of 1998, 97.3% of the supervised 1035 
enterprises with the most impressive waste charge had achieve the set waterwaste 
discharge volume, and the annual sewage volume had been reduced to 540 million cubic 
meters1. But after the State Council announced to “fundamentally achieve the interim 
goal”2, the governmental supervision on and law enforcement of illegal waste discharge 
had gradually become relaxed, and in addition, the management focused on the Tai Lake 
basin couldn’t factually prevent the waste along the river channels linked to the lake. To 
people’s disappointment, the unstopped industrial boom according to China’s entry into 
WTO had brought the waterwaste volume up to the surprising number of 3.24 billion 
                                                        
1 Hesheng Chen, “Tai Lake Management Shouldered Heavier Responsibilities<taihu zhiwu renzhong 
daoyuan>,” China Water, No. 3 (Vol. 429), March, 1999.  
2 Ibid. 
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cubic meters in 2000. Thus, in 2001, the State Council had got to admit that the 
achievements of “Ninth Five-year Plan of Tai Lake Pollution Management” to still “have a 
long way to the set goals” 1. And, based on the judgment, SEPA was appointed to 
formulate “The Tenth Five-year Plan of Tai Lake Pollution Management <tai hu wu ran 
zhi li shi wu ji hua>”, which set the general and interim goals during the five years from 
2001 to 205, the general financial plan and the division of responsibilities among the 
different governmental departments and between the center and the local place.  
1.2 Difficult Enforcement of National Willingness: Fragmented Management 
and Partial Interests 
With the directives of the Tenth Five-year Plan, the large number of more than 10 
trillion yuan RMB had invested into the Tai Lake pollution management, but the 2007 
water crisis obviously demonstrated the unsatisfactory results of the years of efforts from 
1998, which forced the State Council to consider another another 100 trillion of 
investment after 2007. However, the failure perfectly illustrated the sticking point of the 
central-local contradiction in pollution management, as we have analyzed in theory in the 
second chapter. And moreover, the contradiction hadn’t derived from any accidental 
happenings, but the institutional arrangement of the responsibility division and, this will 
help us to comprehend the incentives of the center to mobilize the “public opinion”, as 
supplement to the weak institutional regimes.  
The implement of Tai Lake basin management—factually, it is the common rule in all 
the river-valley managements in China—just follows the principle of the “localized 
management”. According to the general legal arrangement, the responsibilities with 
regard to water resources development, utilization, conservation and protection are up to 
the local governments at or above the county level (Water Law of People’s Republic of 
China, enforced from October 1st of 2002, Article 1), and, the local environmental 
protection department at various levels is pointed as the agency to supervise and 
integrate the anti-pollution actions (Water Pollution Prevention Law of People’s Republic 
of China, amended in May 15th of 1996, Article 4). In consistence with the legal setting of 
                                                        
1 See: SEPA, “Ninth Five-year Plan of Tai Lake Pollution Management,” the Introduction. 
[http://www.jshb.gov.cn/jshbw/jhgh/gjgh/zxswgh/200909/P020090901794650559130.pdf] 
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the core responsibility of the local government in river-valley management, the Tai Lake 
management had taken the rule of “local executive chief responsibility system 
<xingzheng shouzhang fuze zhi>”, attributing the crucial responsibilities with regard to 
collecting funds, policy enforcement and construction supervision1. 
The system design of localized management, besides its original purpose to utilize as 
many resources as possible and guarantee the favorable local freedom of policy choice 
according to the different local conditions, has also brought the “tragedy of the commons”. 
The Tai Lake basin, with the wide range of 36,500 kilometers, covers parts of the areas of 
Jiangsu Province, Zhejiang Province and Shanghai Municipality. Although the executive 
power on Tai Lake is mostly integrated to Jiangsu Province, the actual control power is 
divided to Suzhou Municipality with 70% of the water range, Wuxi Municipality with the 
29% and Changzhou Municipality with the 1%. The three municipal administrations have 
no subjection to each other, and further they have been all benefited from the “South 
Jiangsu Pattern” with both the rapid economic growth and the serious environmental 
damages, thus, the Tai Lake resources, as the “commons” 2 . In other words, 
administrations under the rule of localized management have naturally tended to value 
the economic growth in the short term as their visible achievements, while shifting the 
blame of bad environmental management on other local administrations, because it 
would be technically hard to clearly define which local administration had factually 
caused what damages.  
In order to deal with the dilemma of coordinating the short-term benefits-orientation 
and centralize the management, the institutional system has offered two regimes. One is 
pointed at the certain dispute in relation with water pollution among different 
administrative regions. According to the Water Pollution Prevention Law (Article 28), the 
dispute is encouraged to be solved through the negotiation among the parties, or 
appealed to the coordination of the government at higher level upon all the parties, but 
the higher government is not authorized to take mandatory measures. The other regime 
just depends on the key role of environmental departments, especially SEPA at the 
                                                        
1 SEPA, “The Tenth Five-year Plan of Tai Lake Pollution Management”, Articles 1, 2, and 3. 
2 For more details on “tragedy of the commons”, see in reference to Garrett Hardin, Science, Vol. 162, 
1968, pp. 1243-1248.  
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national level, to integrate the trans-regional resources through formulation of general 
plans, supervision on certain program progress, and adjust and update the specific 
responsibility division among regions and departments to cope with the situation change 
(Water Pollution Prevention Law, Article 8, 17, 27, 45, 56, 86).  
However, in the actual execution, with the shortage of external mandatory force, 
there are few incentives to reach the trans-regional negotiation. And further, the written 
integration role of SEPA is interrupted by the bureaucratic fragmentation. The table 6-1, 
through listing several programs crucial for Tai Lake management and the sophisticated 
setting of administration sections, indicates the practical dilemma of coordinating actions. 
And moreover, to mention the obedience of local EPBs to the local government, it was 
even harder for the environmental agencies to playing the effective role.  
 
Table 6-1: Fragmentation in Tai Lake Pollution Management Programs： 
Source: Huang Xianjin, Wang Lachun, Gao Chao and Shi Yunniang, Research on Tai Lake Water Resources 
and Water Environment, Science Press, 2008. p. 140-141, table 11.1, “State of power distribution among 
managing departments”.  
Programs Management Sections Nature of Fragmentation1 
Discharge control Committee of Tai Lake Water Pollution 
Prevention, Jiangsu Provincial 
Environmental Protection Administration, 
EPBs of Suzhou, Wuxi and Changzhou 
Municipalities, EPBs of counties under the 
three Municipalities, and marine sections of 
the three Municipalities and their counties.  
Vertical and horizontal 
fragmentation 
Discharge volume 
management 
Tai Lake Basin Bureau of the Ministry of 
Water Resource, and Jiangsu Provincial 
Environmental Protection Administration 
Horizontal fragmentation 
Management on 
lake drainage 
installment 
Tai Lake Basin Bureau of the Ministry of 
Water Resource, Jiangsu Provincial Water 
Resource Administration, and Water 
Resource Bureaus of Suzhou, Wuxi and 
Changzhou Municipalities 
Vertical fragmentation 
Drinking water 
source protection 
Water Resource Bureaus and EPBs of 
Suzhou, Wuxi and Changzhou 
Municipalities and of their counties 
Horizontal fragmentation 
                                                        
1 Horizontal fragmentation pointed at the fragmentation among departments with different functions, 
and vertical fragmentation referred to that, inside a certain department system, from center to local 
regions at various administrative ranks.  
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Even though we may say that the department fragmentation and local responsibility 
are the characteristics rooted in the public governance system of modern countries, as we 
mentioned in the first chapter, the shortage of either law leverage to normalize the 
willingness of individual executives, or a authoritative environmental department to 
coordinate the fragmentation, have factually led to the dilemma of discontent of all the 
actors. There has seemed to be the deadlock of the system that the local executives have 
been complaining about the center to burdening them with responsibilities both of 
economic achievements and environmental management, while the center has been 
worrying about their authority on the local administration according to the 
decentralization. In the environmental crises gradually becoming frequent from the late 
1990s, the central anxiety and censure to the local government had not been unusual to 
see for observers. However, the 2007 Tai Lake water crisis nearly contained all the typical 
factors to indicate the systematic contradiction: the economic advanced region, the 
powerful elite executives (the second chapter mentioned the elite administrative regions 
with more influence in the national-level policymaking according to their economic 
achievements and revenue contribution), the important water area with prominent 
historical and cultural meanings and well-known for its poor pollution management 
effects despite of the large investment and the high-sounding governmental attention, 
and the slow response of the local government to indicate the bad emergency system.  
1.3 Event Process: Local Disguise, Media Exposure, Local Response and 
Central Involvement 
Based on the summary of information collected from different media channels and 
official release, the table 6-2 outlined the event process of this crisis. The potential danger 
had early appeared from April 25, with the material threat being found at the latest on 
May 25, and, the urgency was recognized by local officials including political leaders and 
related agencies about the same time. But all the crisis information had not been 
publicized, except the information about the some emergency measures against the 
unusual phenomena of the Jiangsu Provincial and Wuxi Municipal Government, 
published in some local Party papers. However, these papers had generally drawn little 
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attention from common citizens1. However, on May 28, a lot of citizens, who noticed the 
tap water had become too smelly to be used, called the hotline of the Wuxi Municipal 
Government, but they only got the vague response that there had been “no serious 
problem with the water quality”2. Without any official explanation, a two-day social panic 
occurred through the spread of complaints, conjectures, and internet rumors3. 
 
Table 6-2: Time table of the event process 
Time Events 
April 
25–May 
7 
Potential danger was found.4 
May 8 Wuxi Municipal Government planned emergency measures. 
May 16 
– 25 
Deterioration of water quality was found in several waterworks. 
May 21 Wuxi Municipal Government launched emergency measures. 
May 28 Crisis broken out — about 70 percent of drinking water in Wuxi Municipality 
had been polluted, affecting two million citizens. 
May 30 Information released in the local mass media. 
May 31 Wuxi Municipal Government’s press conference held, emphasizing 
unpredictable natural causes; public crisis answer mechanism launched. 
June 1 A meeting discussing emergency measures allowed the mass media to sit in, 
attracting 30 media agencies through the country5. 
June 2 Vice Premier, Zeng, gave comments on local environmental governance. 
June 3 
– 4 
Wuxi Municipal Government reiterated that water quality reached standards. 
June 5 SEPA declared the connection between this crisis and long-term contamination. 
June 8 Local Government’s official explanation to frame natural factors as the “chief 
cause”6. 
                                                        
1 Two influential local newspapers expressed a little concern with the issue. Yangtze Evening Post 
published a short article informing readers that the blue-green algae had appeared and would be 
harmful to water quality, see: “Blue-green algae has appeared in Tai Lake” (tai hu chu xian lan zao), 
Yangtse Evening Post, April 21, 2007. On the contrary, Xiandai Kuaibao published a more detailed 
article. However, this report did not mention the potential danger to water source either. It was an 
investigative article on the harm of blue-green algae to the tourism industry, with an analysis of the 
accumulating water pollution in the Tai Lake area. See: “Unexpected earlier boom of blue-green algae 
makes tourists unhappy” (wu xi tai hu lan zao ti qian bao fa sao le you ren xing)，Xiandai Kuaibao, 
May 17, 2007. 
2 See: “Boom of Tai Lake blue-green algae makes water in Wuxi taste off” (wuxi tai hu lan zao bao fa zi 
lai shui fa chou)，Yangtse Evening Post, 30th, May, 2007; “Wuxi city attacked by blue-green algae”. 
3 Citizens rushed into markets to buy water; some planned to escape to other places. See: “Wuxi city 
attacked by blue-green algae”. 
4 The blue-green algae broke out near a drinking water source on April 25. See: Jiang Mingdao, “Wuxi 
City attacked by blue-green algae” (wuxi lanzao gongcheng), China News Week, June 8, 2007. 
5 Brief, Xiandai Kuaibao, June 2, 2007. 
6 Reporting staff, “Huge sewage mass was the chief cause”(juda lanzao wushuituan shi huoshou), 
Yangtze Evening Post, June 7, 2007.  
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June 
10-11 
Vice Premier, Zeng, investigated Wuxi City and Jiangsu Province with the 
directive of the Premier that the crisis suggested the pollution treatment in the 
Tai Lake area be enhanced. 
State council discusses raising the environmental standard in the Tai Lake area. 
June 13 A formal speech of the Secretary of CPC Jiangsu Provincial Committee was 
published by main local media, promising to enhance pollution treatment under 
the “concept of scientific development”. 
June 
29-30 
Premier Wen investigated Tai Lake and gave guidelines for local environmental 
governance. 
July 7 Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee and Government held a high level working 
conference on Tai Lake pollution control. The conference evaluated the effects of 
the policies in response to the water supply crisis, and formulated concrete 
targets and policies for maintaining the priority of environmental protection in 
the Tai Lake area. 
 
There may be no clear evidence to know the current governmental purposes to make 
the information transparent, which might be the self-confidence to control the situation 
according to the customary procedures, but anyway, the failure of early measures and the 
following social panic had put them on the position of being seemed incapable and 
serving to be criticized, especially when the story had spread in a wide range by the mass 
media from May 30th, started by the influential local urban newspaper1, Yangtze Evening 
Post, and the Central Television CCTV2. At that noon of May 31st, the Wuxi Municipal 
Government had forced by the media pressure to give the public explanation that it was a 
natural disaster. From then on, not only the mass media had continued to concentrate on 
the governmental emergency measures and the event pace, but also the central 
government had quickly and actively intervened in the “local executive chief 
responsibility”. And, according to the recovery of the water quality standards at least on 
June 4, the rehabilitation measures and introspection on existing environmental 
governance policies had still continued, with related media reports and central 
intervention kept on. Finally, a provincial-level conference on local pollution 
management — it put the raising of environmental standards in the Tai Lake basin and 
                                                        
1 The newspapers published by party organs for profit. Except the Party censorship, its daily operation is 
totally marketized and commercialized. 
2 On the same day, two main local Party papers, the Xinhua Daily and Wuxi Daily News published 
reports with nearly the same contents. It meant the local government had given up blocking the 
information or ignoring citizens’ complaints. 
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strengthening of coordination among related agencies into the future agenda — 
concluded from the concentrated media reporting. 
Judged from the process, there had been two points interesting for this study. One is 
that the media concern had gone beyond the crisis solution itself, ranging the main focus 
onto the pollution management reform. And the other is the governmental actions at the 
national-level. There hadn’t been any direct orders to define the local measures, which 
hadn’t broken the established system of central-local division for “local executive chief 
responsibility”, but the actions like guiding conferences and the local visit of the Premier, 
had all along been together with the media pressure. The two points then, with the 
central-local contradiction mentioned in the last section, brings the question that 
whether the media channel had been initiatively encouraged by the center to supervise 
the local authority and further to take the chance to promote the system reform, by 
mobilizing resources outside the defective system.  
 
2. Media Framing with Political Censorship: Local Control and Remote 
Supervision 
As mentioned in the first chapter, although the marketization and commercialization 
of Chinese mass media provided the dynamics for journalists to pursue media freedom, it 
did not necessarily lead to media independence from political control. Chinese mass 
media still must keep accordance with the political orthodoxy, known as “direction on 
public opinion”. However, the practice hasn’t naturally led to the unitary media opinion, 
as the common image under the communist media control. This phenomenon is factually 
not ridiculous. If we break the set thinking mode that the “competition of ideas” only 
derived from “market”, and linked it to the competition – not only of power but also of 
ideas – inside the Party-state system, we may find that the seemingly paradox, besides 
being influenced by the liberalistic inclination of individual journalists, has been also 
caused according to the decentralization.  
It should be made clear that, the media organizations — as the public institution 
<shiye danwei> establishment — are respectively under the direct control of its 
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“departments in charge <zhuguan bumen> 1 ”, usually the government and CCP 
committee one level higher, or a certain department. Thus, the direction on media is 
practically in accordance with the orientation of the “department in charge”. That’s the 
“local control <shudi guanli>” as legacy of the communist media system, which makes 
the local authority easier to suppress the bad news for them. However, the system has 
been counteracted by another media practice as the “remote supervision <yidi jiandu>”, 
which means media channels under the control of other departments, local governments 
and CCP committees in other places, or those directly under the central authority, can be 
more free to expose the local wrongdoings, with much less systematic obstructions2. And 
even, in the practice, it’s likely for the “department in charge” to encourage the media 
organization to expose the wrongdoings of the competitors. Some foreign media also got 
aware of the special Chinese phenomenon as “the practice of sending reporters to 
investigate wrongdoing in other locations”, while “out-of-towners escape their reach, one 
of the most effective investigative means involved reporters digging for news in distant 
parts of the country, away from their own censors”3. Thus, the mixture of marketization, 
individual inclination and the decentralized systematic arrangement has brought the 
specialized media “pluralization” in China.  
The common coexistence of “local control” and “remote supervision” just gives the 
inspiration of how to observe the wrestle of the center and the local authority in this crisis. 
And fortunately, the well-competitive media market in Jiangsu Province4 gives good 
samples for the obvious comparison. Table 6-3 demonstrates the respective issue 
frameworks of the Yangtze Evening Post and Xiandai Kuaibao. The reason to choose the 
two dailies is, even in the most competitive media market of China, these two dailies had 
                                                        
1 A newspaper must be directly led and controlled by a department in charge of the publishing entity, 
according to Regulations on the Administration of Newspaper Publication, Article 8, issued by General 
Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP), 2005, published in the official site of China State 
Council: www.gov.cn. 
2 See: Jiang Zhan (ed.), Watcher of Social Transformation in China: Context and Practice of Media 
Supervision in the New Century, Beijing: China Customs Press, 2002. 47.  
3 Geoffrey A. Fowler and Jason Dean, “China’s reporters face a back lash over investigations”, Wall 
Street Journal, December 21, 2006. Page A1. 
4 Local newspapers in Jiangsu Province are highly commercialized and sensitive to potential news for 
the intense market. See for reference: Research Center on Media Development, GAPP: 2007 Chinese 
Newspaper Competitiveness Report <2007 zhong guo bao ye jing zheng li jian ce bao gao>; Baoguo Cui, 
Mingzuo Zhu, “Newspaper Competition in the Yangtze Valley”, record of a symposium in School of 
Journalism and Communication of Tsinghua University, from: 
http://tech.sina.com.cn/other/2003-10-21/1230246575.shtml. 
 241
the largest circulations1, which meant them to the most influential media weapons to 
orient public opinion and mobilize social resources. And in addition, they were different 
in their “departments in charge”, with the former being supervised by the propaganda 
department of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee, while the latter belonging to 
Xinhua News Agency, both the biggest center for information collection and an 
semi-political institution of the State Council in China, as the “central media <zhongyang 
meiti>”. 
Table 6-3 integrated the main focus of Yangtze Evening Post and Xiandai Kuaibao 
according to the event process, as they had caught up with the paces almost every day. 
This comparison, with contrast to the Table 6-3 to indicate the event development, clearly 
indicated the differences in the choice of information transparency. The first is whether 
emphasis was placed on environmental pollution or on abnormal natural factors as the 
cause of the crisis. Although we may differentiate the two as a fundamental cause and 
immediate cause, emphasis on accumulating environmental pollution drew the attention 
of the public to claim the local government’s responsibility of environmental governance, 
while emphasis on natural factors helped avoid discussing local governmental 
responsibility. The Yangtze Evening Post before June 12 had not given any prominence 
to the fundamental cause as environmental deterioration, while Xiandai Kuaibao, on 
June 2 — three days after the official informing of this crisis — published an investigative 
report, which, using the complaints of interviewed local citizens and conclusions from 
experts, implied that they aimed to attribute the crisis to the bad performance of the 
government on pollution management. Even when the two newspapers published the 
same local official’s explanation declaring the crisis to be caused chiefly by a huge sewage 
mass formed from abnormally high temperature, Xiandai Kuaibao added another report 
that five officials in Yixing City2 were administratively punished for tolerating illegal 
discharge into Tai Lake 3 , indicating that the local government also admitted the 
                                                        
1 These two newspapers are said to have the highest circulations in Jiangsu Province according to their 
rank of 60 and 61 in the World Newspaper Congress in 2007 and 2008. Data from: 
http://www.yangtse.com/sytj/jqyz/200806/t20080616_457880.htm.  
2 This is a city under the administration of Wuxi Municipal Government, where plenty of highly 
contaminated chemical plants are concentrated. 
3 It should be noted that this issue was first exposed by journalists of CCTV, thus the local government 
was forced to take some measures, and the five officials punished all had a basic level status. Briefing, 
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connection between bad pollution management and the crisis, but refused to confess to 
the public. 
 
Table 6-3: Reporting focus of Yangtze Evening Post and Xiandai Kuaibao 
NY = number of articles in Yangtze Evening Post that day; NX = number of articles in Xiandai Kuaibao that day 
Time (NY/NX) Yangtze Evening Post  Xiandai Kuaibao  
May 30 (1/0) Information about the crisis released.  
May 31 (2/1) Municipal emergency measures to assure 
water supply; 
A purified water company gave help. 
Municipal emergency measures to 
assure water supply. 
June 1 (2/3) Municipal emergency measures showed 
effectiveness; 
Provincial leaders paid close attention. 
Details of the emergency measures; 
Provincial leaders paid close attention. 
June 2 (5/1) Provincial management intervened; 
Governmental measures were successful 
and comprehensive, and the water quality 
markedly improved. 
Investigative report to demonstrate the 
connection between this crisis and 
accumulating environmental pollution. 
June 4 (1/0) Provincial leaders investigated related work 
in Wuxi City. 
 
June 5 (1/0) Provincial leaders mentioned strengthening 
environmental governance as part of the 
emergency measures. 
 
June 6 (1/1) A provincial institution supplied its 
municipal branch with purified water. 
A provincial CCPCC member demanded 
a pollution index of drinking water to be 
open to the public. 
June 7 (2/1) Old wells were reused to supplement the 
water supply; 
A Wuxi citizen was administratively 
attached for “spreading rumors” 
A special comment implied that data on 
water quality published by local 
government might be fake. 
June 8 (1/2) Official explanation of this crisis, 
emphasizing natural factors as “chief 
cause”, given (zui kui huo shou). 
Official explanation of the cause for the 
crisis; 
Five officials in Yixing City 1  were 
administratively punished for tolerating 
illegal discharge into Tai Lake2. 
June 9 (0/1)  Local EPBs planned to enhance 
management on chemical and tourism 
industries around the Tai Lake area. 
June 11 (1/0) Old wells were reused.  
                                                                                                                                                               
Xiandai Kuaibao, June 8, 2007. 
1 This is a city under the administration of Wuxi Municipal Government, where plenty of highly 
contaminated chemical plants are concentrated. 
2 This local official sanction was taken for the pressure of being exposed by journalists from CCTV. The 
5 officials were from the basic administrative level.  
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June 12 (1/3) A Vice Premier investigated the local area 
and gave the Central government directives 
on strengthening environmental 
governance. 
Central government’s directives on 
strengthening environmental 
governance; 
State council required the raising of 
local environmental standards; 
Central government demanded to 
rectify local chemical plants. 
June 13 (1/1) Secretary of Jiangsu Provincial Party 
Committee’s formal speech asking to follow 
Central leaders’ core directives and 
strengthen environmental governance. 
Secretary of Jiangsu Provincial Party 
Committee’s formal speech. 
June 15 (0/1)  Special comment: advocacy of giving 
interested citizens the right to prosecute 
entrepreneurs or officials whom they 
considered to be responsible for the 
crisis. 
June 17 (1/0) Recovery of tourism industry in Tai Lake.  
June 18 (0/1)  Recently emerged blue-green algae did 
not affect the water quality; 
June 22 (0/1)  A serious mistake of the local 
government: enterprises having stopped 
production were found in the official list 
considered to be rectified. 
June 25 (0/1)  Wuxi Municipal Government declared 
to close all the sewage outfalls into Tai 
Lake by the end of 2007. 
July 1 (1/1) Premier Wen investigated the local area. Premier Wen investigated the local 
place. 
July 3 (1/1) An outline of Wen’s investigation route, 
emphasizing the local government’s active 
coordination with Central directives. 
A special comment demanding local 
leading cadres to set an example in 
environmental protection. 
July 8 (1/1) Provincial general meeting on 
environmental governance in the Tai Lake 
area held, and the goals and measures 
decided. 
Provincial general meeting on 
environmental governance in the Tai 
Lake area held, and the goals and 
measures decided. 
June 9 (1/2) Another report of that meeting, focused on 
related policies of various agencies. 
Another report of that meeting, 
emphasizing the local government’s 
responsibility; 
A new water supply policy of the 
provincial government came into being. 
* Yangtze Evening Post mostly used news releases of local related agencies, while Xiandai Kuaibao used news from Xinhua 
News Agency and independent investigative reports. The meeting on July 7 summarized the crisis and the emergency 
measures, and established a new environmental governance plan and emergency answer mechanism for the future. Thus, 
the concentrated reports in the two local newspapers ended on July 9.  
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In addition to the information choice, the comparison of the two most influential 
print media can be taken with regard to the information sources and the reporting style in 
respect of subjective or objective writing, as shown in Graphs 6-1 and 6-2, respectively. 
The concentrated articles publicized from late May to early July were divided into three 
categories: information released by local officials with clear marks of related political 
agencies as the source; other objective articles without marks of political agencies as the 
source; and subjective articles, editorials, and special comments. 
Graph 6-1: The proporation of article contents in Yangtse Evening Post，
              Total number=24; Period=May 30 - July 9.
6, 25%
18, 75%
0, 0%
local official information release
other objective articles
subjective articles
 
Graph 6-2: The propotion of article contents in Xiandai Kuaibao ,
Total number=23; Period=May 30 - July 9.
15, 65%
5, 22%
3, 13%
local official information release
other objective articles
subjective articles
     As demonstrated, 75% of the content from the Yangtze Evening Post depended on 
official sources, indicating that this newspaper completely followed the issue frame of the 
local government. After a vice premier investigated the local area on June 11 and 12, the 
Yangtze Evening Post began to emphasize environmental pollution because it had to 
make his talk and the Central government’s main criticism on local environmental 
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governance stand out. The vice premier conveyed Premier Wen’s comments that “this 
crisis has sounded a warning to us, indicating that the long-time Tai Lake water pollution 
problem didn’t get fundamentally solved, and we must attach greater importance”1. On 
June 13, this paper published the formal speech of the Secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial 
Party Committee, the highest local leader, admitting mistakes in the local government’s 
crisis response mechanism and environmental governance, promising to strengthen 
pollution management under the Central directive of “scientific development” <ke xue fa 
zhan guan>2. 
Judging from Graph 6-2, although official information accounted for 65% of the 
related content, it did not cover as much information on the repetitive guidelines of the 
local top brass as the Yangtze Evening Post; such information was used to shape a good 
image of the local officials to be rapid, responsible, and effective in dealing with the crisis. 
In addition, Xiandai Kuaibao demonstrated more questioning against local officials’ 
announcements of their effectiveness through information from other sources. Two 
outstanding examples reflected this feature. When the Yangtze Evening Post conveyed an 
official announcement vaguely expressing that the water quality “markedly improved” 
and “basically reached standard”, but with no concrete data3 on June 2, Xiandai 
Kuaibao kept silent until it published two pertinent articles on June 6 and June 7. The 
former was on the suggestion of a provincial CPPCC member demanding the local 
government to regularly publish detailed data on water safety4, and the latter quoted a 
case in Guangdong Province indicating that even scientific data could be manipulated 
according to the utility of local officials5. Not surprisingly, on several days, Xiandai 
Kuaibao issued an investigative report exposing serious mistakes of the local government. 
                                                        
1 “Environmental protection standard in the Tai Lake area should be more strict” <tai hu huan bao biao 
zhun geng gao geng yan>, Yangtze Evening Post, June 12, 2007.  
2 The same speech draft was published in both the Yangtze Evening Post and Xiandai Kuaibao with 
different titles. “Persist in environmental protection priority, improve Tai Lake water quality with joint 
efforts <jian jue shi xing huan bao you xian qi xin xie li zhi li tai hu>”, Yangtze Evening Post, June 13, 
2007. “Thoroughly eradicate the pollution in Tai Lake, making the water become clean again <che di 
zheng zhi tai hu shi tai hu shui bian qing>”, Xiandai Kuaibao, June 13, 2007. Page A11. 
3 “Water quality in Wuxi City markedly improved <wu xi zi lai shui shui zhi ming xian hao zhuan>,” 
Yangtze Evening Post, June 2, 2007. 
4 “Whether water quality is good should be informed everyday” <shui hao bu hao tian tian rang ren zhi 
dao>, Xiandai Kuaibao, June 6, 2007. Page A 13.  
5 “Dirty water could be ‘caroused’ under manipulated data” <shu ju ma bi xia wu shui ye neng chang 
yin>, Xiandai Kuaibao, June 7, 2007. Page A 10.  
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For example, the Wuxi Municipal Government declared it would close or rectify 71 
enterprises considered to be highly contaminated on June 16, but it was discovered that 
some of them had stopped production several years before, raising the question of 
whether the local government had taken the environmental work seriously1. 
Another difference was in the newspapers’ editorial attitudes. There was no subjective 
article in the Yangtze Evening Post to directly demonstrate the editorial attitudes on the 
crisis and the government. We might only found in its information, other than official 
information releases, mostly trivial details, with the efforts of citizens and companies to 
help themselves highly praised and the local government’s “care” of citizens strongly 
emphasized. 
Xiandai Kuaibao published three sharp special comments. The first was mentioned 
above, which used a case in Guangdong Province — Nanfang Dushi Bao exposed on June 
6 that the water quality index of Guangzhou City published by Guangdong Province and 
Guangzhou Municipality were totally different — to criticize local officials of 
manipulating data according to their own utility2, although not directly aimed at the local 
government in the Tai Lake crisis. However, after Central top leaders investigated the 
local area and the local leader officially announced their work deficiency and promised to 
follow the Central directives, Xiandai Kuaibao became much more aggressive against the 
local government. A commentary article on June 15 sharply criticized the interests of 
local officials, who pursued economic increases as their political achievements at the 
expense of environmental degradation and the health of residents, to be “the worst enemy 
of contemporary environmental protection in China”, calling for a “legal right on the 
environment of citizens” to supervise and influence governmental behavior on 
environment protection through lawsuits 3 . The author of this article especially 
emphasized that it was a better way for the Central government to enforce environmental 
policies in local areas, rather than just depending on local EPBs.  Not surprisingly, 
another article on July 2 criticizing local officials was also under the name of Central 
                                                        
1 “Closed enterprises were unexpectedly listed to be rectified” <ting chan qi ye jing ran shang le zheng 
zhi ming dan>, Xiandai Kuaibao, June 22, 2007. Page A 8.  
2 “Dirty water could be ‘caroused’ under manipulated data”. 
3 “Let the legal right of citizens on environment counteract the pollution for economic interest” <rang 
bai xing huan jing quan lai xiao jie wu ran huan zheng ji>, Xiandai Kuaibao, June 15, 2007. Page A 9.  
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orthodoxy. The commentator, a professor of Nanjing University, by admiring the actions 
of President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen for setting an example for how to save energy 
and protect the environment, expressed his discontent with local officials1. 
 
3. Bias of “Remote Supervision” Along With the Central Intervention 
3.1 Initiative Central Encouragement and Remote Media Focus 
Besides the comparison — the contents of Xiandai Kuaibao had just corresponded 
with the central worries in the central-local contradiction with regard to the Tai Lake 
Pollution management plan — as the indirect evidences to imply the central mobilization, 
the initiatives of central governmental could also be found. The anger at the local officials 
and the decision to intervene of the center had been indicated by on People’s Daily, the 
official organ of CCP Central Committee. This crisis was judged as “a seemingly natural 
disaster with the substance of human calamity”2. What might be more important was its 
underlining that the local government had made costly mistakes in development3, and 
declared that it was the local officials’ pursuit of mere GDP growth”4 that made them 
violate Central policies on regional environmental governance, undermining the expected 
effect of Central plan5. Further, this newspaper suggested that those officials having 
connived on an excessive pollution discharge be made responsible6. 
And, there had also been direct evidences to show that, along with the central 
governmental intervention going deeper — from the related agencies MWR and SEPA to 
the vice premier in charge of environmental governance and the premier as well as 
general directives given to field and investigation by high-level leaders — the media 
attitudes toward the local government became more critical. For example, Xiandai 
Kuaibao, before Vice Premier Zeng investigated the local area and gave Premier Wen’s 
                                                        
1 “President’s plain dressing in meeting and Premier’s drinking Tai Lake water” <zong shu ji jian 
zhuang yu hui he zong li xi pin tai hu shui>, Xiandai kuaibao, July 2, 2007. Page A 4.  
2  “Tai Lake blue-green algae alarms”. 
3 See especially: “Tai Lake blue-green algae alarms <tai hu lan zao qiao xiang le jing zhong>”, People’s 
Daily, Overseas Version, June 2, 2007; “Pollution is the main cause of Wuxi water crisis <wu xi lan zao 
shui weiji wu ran shi zhu yin>”, People’s Daily, June 4, 2007; “New southern Jiangsu economic mode: 
transmuted GDP <xin su nan mo mo shi shan bian de GDP>”, People’s Daily, May 29, 2007, etc.  
4  “New southern Jiangsu economic mode: transmuted GDP”. 
5 See: “Blue-green algae send out warning light to Tai Lake <lan zao gei tai hu liang hong deng>”, June 
1, 2007; “Pollution is the main cause of Wuxi water crisis”. 
6  “Pollution is the main cause of Wuxi water crisis”. 
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directive, took the tactics of irony, implication, and allusion to express its discontent with 
the local government. However, later criticism included in investigative reports and 
subjective articles were directly aimed at the local government and the crisis, as conveyed 
by Zeng and then expressed by Wen himself during his later investigation of the local area: 
“Despite many years of Tai Lake pollution management, the problem was not solved. This 
water crisis warned us to pay more attention to the threat. The cause of this crisis needs 
to be analyzed more deeply and carefully. The local government is responsible to propose 
new schemes and measures, strengthening pollution control and comprehensive 
treatment.”1 This statement made clear the issue frame of the Central authority, bringing 
encouragement to the media. In addition, the investigation implied a face-to-face 
communication of Central and local leaders, the official announcement thereafter 
indicating an ultimate result of compromise. A formal speech by the Secretary of CPC 
Jiangsu Provincial Committee was published by the local major media — he promised to 
enhance pollution treatment under the Central authority’s core value, “concept of 
scientific development”2 — demolished the former local official explanation to emphasize 
natural factors, which implied the issue frame of the Central government prevailed in this 
game between the Central and local governments. 
3.2 Media Issue Framing: Choice of Information Transparency and 
Reformatory Meaning 
On June 1, the third plenary meeting of the emergency headquarters for this crisis, 
which allowed thirty media agencies nationwide to sit in 3, showed an attitude of 
information transparency, but, cross-regional media started to participate in the 
reporting earlier from May 31. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 “Premier Wen gave comments that the Tai Lake pollution alarmed us <wen zong li pi shi tai hu shui 
wu ran gei wo men qiao xiang jing zhon>”, Xiandai Kuaibao, June 12, 2007, page A8.  
2 “Thoroughly eradicate the pollution in Tai Lake, making the water become clean again”.  
3 Brief, Xiandai Kuaibao, June 2, 2007. Page A4.  
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Table 6-4: The cross-regional media focus according to event process 
Time Focus 
May 30  Drinking water polluted; 
Local residents rushed to buy water. 
May 31 Local residents rushed to buy water; 
A certain social panic and discontent; 
Governmental response: driving Yangtze River water into Tai Lake and appeased 
public emotions. 
June 1 Central governmental agency’s intervention in emergency response; 
Residents’ inconvenience had not been alleviated; 
Peripheral area had not been affected. 
June 2 Vice Premier Zeng gave comments on environmental governance; 
Local governmental measures to appease public emotions: prohibit binding up water 
prices, and reducing the water fee by half in June. 
June 3 – 4 Local government declared that the water quality reached standards, with no 
carcinogen included. 
Recovery of water supply. 
June 5   SEPA’ s press conference announcing the connection between the crisis and 
environmental pollution; 
Local provincial leaders announce to strengthen environmental protection. 
June 6 – 7 Repetition of SEPA’ s press conference and its judgment; 
A local citizen was attached for the name of “spreading rumors”. 
June 8 – 
late July 
Five local officials of a city in Jiangsu Province were administratively punished for 
delinquency in environmental governance1; 
The State Council held a special meeting for environmental governance on Tai Lake, 
raising environmental standards in the area; 
Jiangsu Province closed 772 chemical plants against environmental standards. 
* Most of the objective articles were based on Xinhua News Agency’s news, with a few independent 
investigative reports. 
 
Table 6-4 demonstrates the cross-regional media’s focus according to time: on May 
30 and May 31, besides spreading the news of this crisis nationwide, media reports 
emphasized the inconvenience brought to local citizens and governmental emergency 
response; on June 1 and June 2, Central governmental intervention was added, with the 
framing of words implying the Central attitude taken on this issue was as an artificial 
environmental crisis; local official declaration that the crisis was relieved prevailed on 
June 3 and June 4; the focus of June 5 and June 6 was the press conference of SEPA, 
                                                        
1 These officials were announced to be responsible for conniving illegal waste discharge even during this 
crisis.  
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which further impressed the audience that the local government had been in breach of its 
duty in environmental governance; on June 6 the news reported that a local citizen was 
arrested for “spreading rumors”, and the next day, this action was given negative 
evaluation by several media; from June 8, related reports obviously reduced and became 
less concentrated until late July when media reports were about how to improve 
environmental governance in future. 
Like Xiandai Kuaibao, the cross-regional media were inclined to frame the issue as 
an artificial crisis, an “outbreak of long-term imbalance of economic development and 
environmental protection”1. Judging from Table 6.3, the outline of the inconvenience 
brought to local citizens by this crisis and following social instability was also a focus 
from the early stage, implying that the local emergency measure was not as effective as 
the local government had announced. Further, editorials and special comments sharply 
expressed their discontent with the local governmental direction on public opinion: no 
formal response to citizens questioning the water quality the first two days2, the mayor of 
Wuxi’s announcement to deny the connection between the crisis and industrial pollution3, 
a governmental newsman’s insisting that water quality met standards, albeit with a bad 
smell4, declaration of this crisis as purely a “sudden happening” 5. The goal of the local 
government was considered by cross-regional media as to escape from their 
responsibility, conceal their failure to solve pollution problems in long term, and to use 
the media as a propaganda tool. Some wrote ironically, “when confronted with a crisis, 
although the importance of direction on public opinion is not to be denied, it didn’t justify 
hiding the truth”6. However, although the original intention of blocking information was 
to keep stability, the non-transparency was exactly the cause of “great panic among 
residents”7. Xinhua News Agency issued a piece of news that a local citizen was attached 
                                                        
1 Jiang Gaoming, “Why a place famous for its beautiful water became short of water <jiang nan shui 
xiang yuan he nao shui huang>”，Beijing News, June 3, 2007. 
2 Li Bin, “Taihu pollution shouldn’t be given a blind eye <tai hu wu ran qi neng yan bu jian wei jing>”, 
Information Times, May 31, 2007. 
3 Wang Yongchen, “Is Tai Lake water crisis a natural or man-made calamity? <tai hu shui huang shi 
tian zai hai shi ren huo>”, Beijing News, June 1, 2007. 
4 Editorial, “Who’s the most necessary to reflect upon Wuxi crisis <wu xi shui wei ji shi jian shui zui gai 
fan xing>”, Nanfang Dushi Bao, June 1, 2007. 
5 “How could Tai Lake pollution be taken out of sight and out of mind?”. 
6 “Who’s the most necessary to reflect upon the Wuxi crisis”. 
7 Zhao Zhijiang, “Tai Lake water crisis shouldn’t be forgotten <tai hu shui bie cheng le yi bei wang qing 
shui>”, Yangzhao Dushi Bao, June 7, 2007. It’s not a simple assumption. 
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for “spreading rumors”, which was judged by remote media as a governmental behavior 
to suppress dissent to their announcement of the drinking water safety1. 
However, the considerable interest of these cross-regional media was due not only to 
the crisis itself as a piece of big news to excavate, but, judging from these reports, 
especially the subjective articles, their wanting to frame this crisis as a typical case 
representative of similar issues throughout the country2 rather than an accident isolated 
in a single place. Thus, rather than excavating scoops, they focused more on discussing 
the general significance. Some hoped the reports on the Tai Lake water crisis would warn 
audiences of the possibility of similar happenings in other places 3 , expecting the 
discussion on the solution would provide reference to solutions for other water pollution 
cases4. 
The discussion might be divided into three levels according to the degree of risk as, a) 
the local government still had some alternative methods to sanction remote media when 
they were irritated; b) publishing journalists committing on-spot investigations or 
exercising pressure on the Central government to sanction the media administrator or the 
editor5; and, c) the discussion on certain topics might challenge the legitimacy or core 
value of the Central authority.  
The first level of the discussions was the repetitive emphasis on serious 
environmental pollution and the demand for more effective governance. Some of the 
articles were written by famous environmental activists6, which indicated the close 
                                                        
1 This attached person spread the message that “Tai Lake water contained carcinogens 200 times over 
standards” through mobile phone. But there was some related research that might prove that 
carcinogens in Tai Lake water were exactly over standard. Even according to official data published by 
Jiangsu Province in May 2007, cancer patients in Jiangsu Province accounted for as much as 12% of the 
whole country, caused by serious water pollution. 
2 Water pollution all over China makes similar suffering crises possible not only in Wuxi, or the Tai Lake 
area. For details on this serious situation, see: Ma Jun, China’s Water Crisis, Beijing: China 
Environmental Scientific Publication, 1999; IPE: China’s Water Pollution Map: http://www.ipe.org.cn/. 
3 For example, Ma Longsheng, “Wuxi water pollution is a great alarm <wu xi shui wu ran shi zen yang 
yi ji cheng zhong de jing zhong>”, Yangcheng Wanbao, June 2, 2007. In this article, the author 
considered that it would be very natural for everybody to wonder if a similar crisis could happen in the 
city he lives in. 
4 Wang Wenqi, “How to effectively prevent illegal pollution discharge <ru he cai neng you xiao e zhi wei 
fa pai wu>”, Guangzhou Daily, June 13, 2007. 
5 Southern Weekend and the Bing Dian Weekly, both influential activists in remote supervision, had 
been officially sanctioned several times, reflecting their threat those in power. In 2005, local leaders 
from 17 provinces and municipalities jointly wrote a letter to the central government for prohibition 
against remote supervision. See: Ji Shuoming, “Relying on economic strength, the local government 
dared say no to the central government”, Yazhou zhoukan, Vol. 19 (39), 2005.  
6 See for example: Yongchen Wang, “Is the Tai Lake water crisis a natural or man-made calamity? (tai 
hu shui huang shi tian zai hai shi ren huo)”, Beijing News, June 1, 2007; “Why a place famous for its 
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relation between environmental journalists and activists. However, as discussed in the 
last section, such contents were strongly encouraged by Central leaders’ directives and 
were of hardly any risk. 
The second level of the discussion was on how to improve the political system by 
forcing officials to perform their duties well. For example, some suggested vesting more 
power to the SEPA and local EPBs for a more coordinate enforcement of Central 
environmental policies1. Some others suggested perfecting the rule of law, like by 
requiring a law to ascertain local officials’ criminal responsibilities in environmental 
governance2, or calling for a guarantee of directly interested citizens’ rights to prosecute 
related governmental departments 3. Also worthy of mentioning is that, since they 
involved suggestions on resource reallocation in the political sphere, which might harm 
some actors with vested interests, to reduce the risk, all of these articles explicitly or 
implicitly conveyed the Central governmental orthodoxy. For example, the China Youth 
Daily, which advocated investigating local officials’ criminal responsibilities, utilized the 
speech of Premier Wen and precedents to punish local officials penally in Shandong 
Province and Heilongjiang Province4. 
The last and riskiest level was the discussion of whether to apply more public 
participation in environmental governance. Such advocacy was not as clearly expressed 
as the other suggestions. The most interested in this topic seemed to be the newspapers 
under of the Nangfang Media Group 5 , known as Nangfang Baoxi (Southern 
Newspapers)6. 
                                                                                                                                                               
beautiful water became short of water”, Beijing News, June 3, 2007. 
1  “The approach of nine the nine year pollution improvement in the Tai Lake area became controversial: 
environmental protection immediately requires public participation <tai hu jiu nian zhi li lu jing re 
zheng yi: huan bao ji xu gong zhong can yu>”, Diyicaijing Ribao, June 7, 2007. 
2 Ruan Zhanjiang, “Officials responsible for Tai Lake pollution should be punished penally <tai hu shi 
jian ying wen guan yuan xing ze>”, China Youth Daily, June 2, 2007. 
3 See: Ou Muhua, “Wuxi water accident shouldn’t only blame for blue-green algae <wu xi yin shui shi 
jian bu jin shi lan zao wen ti>”, Yanzhao Dushi Bao, June 1, 2007; Wang Wenqi, “How to effectively 
prevent illegal pollution discharge <ru he cai neng you xiao e zhi wei fa pai wu>”, Guangzhou Daily, 
June 13, 2007. 
4  “Officials responsible for Tai Lake pollution should be punished penally”. 
5 See: editorial, “Who should contemplate in Wuxi water crisis”; Lian Yue, ”Environmental problems 
can bear stalling tactics no more <huan jing wen ti yi wu fa zai shi huan bing zhi ji>”, Nanfang Dushi 
Bao, June 16,, 2007; editorial, “Power of Public Decision on Environmental Protection <huan jing bao 
hu de gong zhong jue ding li>”, Southern Weekend, June 18th, 2007; Huang Xiaowei, “Social force is still 
weak in Tai Lake environmental pollution improvement <tai hu zhi wu min jian li liang yi ran bo ruo>”, 
Southern Weekend, August 12th, 2007. 
6These newspapers, especially the Southern Weekend which is known as the largest circulation weekly in 
China, have been the pioneer in “remote supervision” from 1990s. Exposure of a lot of scandals has 
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On June 1, Nanfang Dushi Bao, the highest circulated daily newspaper of Nangfang 
Baoxi, published its first editorial, pointed out that the dilemma in China’s environmental 
governance was that “the interested mass was powerless, while officials with power paid 
little attention”1. The subsequent editorials were all based on this point, especially in their 
focus on how to improve the capability of citizens to ensure their rights. To put it 
concretely, some made a general demand to supervise the local government through “an 
effective channel between the public opinion and Central decision makers”; another 
recommended an effective European operational model, in which public participation in 
environmental issues become the decisive power2. In the later stage, the influential 
weekly, Southern Weekend, took its advantage of investigative reports. Based on 
deliberations of the situation and the deficiency in official governance, it interviewed 
several civil environmentalists. The main focus of this article3 was the great efforts of 
grass root environmentalists and their poor surroundings with limited registration, poor 
sponsorship, and few young volunteers. On the other hand, while highly praising the civil 
struggle to protect the Tai Lake environment, the article also put a premium on the 
attempts of some open-minded local officials to encourage the growth of social power.  
 
4. Analysis 
The 2007 Tai Lake water crisis demonstrated both similarities to and differences 
from the last cases. Obviously, on one hand, they were similar in the mobilization of 
social resources as supplement to the environmental management system, and further, 
the mobilization had been embedded in the shaping of public opinion through mass 
media channels, to counteract with the systematic deadlock of the central-local 
contradictions. And on the other hand, the main difference was the absence of social 
power to directly push the event process, who participated as supporting roles as help 
enriching reporting contents. To speak specifically, in this case, it was not SEPA and 
                                                                                                                                                               
brought them high reputation in the public and great pressure from many local governments. For more 
details on the official sanction to “nan fang bao xi” for its being “too negative”, see: 
http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/english/2002/10/200210290950.shtml. 
1 “Who should contemplate in Wuxi water crisis” 
2 “Power of Public Decision on Environmental Protection” 
3 “Social force is still weak in Tai Lake environmental pollution improvement”. 
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environmental NGOs to respectively be clients of “central willingness” and “public 
interests”, but central leadership directly went up to the stage, involving in the game with 
the local authority, and responded to the complaints of local citizens. And further, 
opinion expressions and material actions of central leadership directly shaped and 
supported the media framing of the issue. However, the central orientation of media 
framing of public opinion was also faced with the counteraction of local authority, who 
took institutional control on local media organizations. The direct clash, bringing the 
nationwide boom of media reports concentrated in a short time, just contributed very 
precious data as the last piece to the “embedded mobilization” jigsaw. That point is, 
although in last cases, mass media's critical issue framing of development mode and 
existing institutions is emphasized according to their relations with the environmental 
department and NGOs, the process of Tai Lake crisis just made clear of its 
political identity as the institutional mechanisms to connect the highest-level 
authority and the common public. In other words, it help us to comprehend more 
the substance of “embeddeness” that, with the progress of environmental civil society 
<min jin>, the Party-state hasn’t “withdrawn” from the space, but been strengthening its 
institutional capability to control the process.  
This crisis happened in Wuxi City, a most economic-developed city in the advanced 
East China area, with the urban citizens having good living and comparatively 
well-educated. And in addition, a most competitive and commercialized media market 
was located in this area. All the factors seemed to orient to the normative democratization 
and liberalization in a developing country, but the obvious comparison between the local 
and remote media on the choice of information transparency and the bias of editorial 
comments had made it clear that the initiative governmental orientation had prevailed 
over the market demand for the mass media in order to achieve certain purposes. There 
might be a simple explanation that the more economically developed and well-educated a 
region is, the governmental elites pays more attention to the mass media and have more 
approaches of public communication with the journalist.  
Undoubtedly, The Tai Lake issue was an inevitable risk derived from the “tragedy of 
the commons” in China. And according to the unsuccessful existing “local executive chief 
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responsibility system”, it was quite natural that the spearhead of complaints would have 
been firstly pointed to the local government in charge of allocating public goods, with the 
inconvenience brought to residents and the following social stability challenging the local 
officials’ legitimacy. Thus, for the local government, it was quite important to prevent the 
information spread, and moreover, if failed, to reduce the spread of negative information 
and complaints among the citizens, under the name of keeping “social harmony and 
stability” 1 . For this reason, we can see the Yangtze Evening Paper, a highly 
commercialized local paper, despite of its largest circulation in the provincial market, had 
even given 75% of its coverage to official information, with no material investigative 
report or any negative contents.  
However, the center hadn’t chosen to tolerate more in such a shameful case 
symbolizing the failure of the ambitious national pollution management plan for Tai Lake 
area, but the existing rule of “local executive chief responsibility” had prevented the 
central authority from directly intervene in the specific solution. Factually, despite of 
knowing the deficiency of the system, the central authority still depended on the local 
capability of financing and suiting measures to differing conditions to continue the costly 
ambitious pollution management plan. That’s to say, the center couldn’t broke the system 
but had to mobilize some non-institutional resources. In other words, the “public 
opinion” had been taken an important validity to urge the local governmental 
enforcement of the national willingness. Thus, the Party paper of Central CCP, People’s 
Daily, with the central media located in the local place like Xiandai kuaibao, nearly at the 
first time indicated the totally different attitudes from the local media, to deny the 
“natural disaster” and emphasize the risk as the inevitable result of the “South Jiangsu 
Pattern” which had ignored the environmental quality. Such conclusion would be hard to 
taken as just a brainwave of the journalists.  
The issue framing of the mass media, to speak exactly, the remote media had played a 
very active role in criticizing the local authority and transferring a large amount of 
reformatory discourses, looking as if they had been in the developed democracies. But it 
                                                        
1 “The Provincial meeting on Tai Lake water pollution and blue-green algae management was held 
yesterday” <sheng tai hu liu yu shui wu ran fang zhi ji lan zao zhi li xian chang hui zuo zhao kai>, 
Yangtze Evening Post, June 2, 2007. 
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was totally different, as the mass media outcomes heavily depend on the fragmentation 
between the national environmental policy-making and concrete implementation of local 
government. And further, the media supervision – despite of political censorship and 
media-control mechanisms – got power from its political identity and basically reached 
the goals similar to its counterparts in developed democracies. On one hand, the local 
government was forced to admit their mistakes and promise to strengthen environmental 
governance after the Central directives. On the other hand, they transferred some 
suggestions of a democratic nature for the future agenda of environmental governance, 
which was also in concert with the central agendas. After this crisis, the Tai Lake area in 
Jiangsu Province on January 1st of 2008 began to take the “strictest” EP standards 
throughout the country. The defined document named “The Emission Limit of the Water 
Discharge for the Urban Sewage Treatment Works and Main Industries in Tai Lake Area 
<taihu diqu chengzhen wushui chulichang ji zhongdian gongye hangye zhuyao 
shuiwuranwu paifang xianzhi>” upgraded the existing EP standards in the past plans on 
polluting factories management and discharge emission reduction, which had been taken 
as the continuity of the long-term Tai Lake management planning.  
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion:  
De facto embedded mobilization and the implication of Political Modernization 
 
1. Two Dilemmas 
At the beginning of this chapter, just as well as expressed in the introduction, it 
should be made clear that, this research is not designed to deny the potential of China’s 
environmental movements to finanally promote bottom-up and fundamental political 
change. It’s only to demonstrate the subjectiveness of Party-state as adapting to, and 
orienting the changing social situation, rather than simply being a passive responser. 
With paying attention to this point which is easily to be ignored, the observation on 
China’s Party-state-societal relations can be made more comprehensive.  
The cases studied in this thesis cover the typical domains of China’s environmental 
protection realm: wild conservation, urban environmental governance, environmental 
effects of large-scale artificial construction and industrial pollution. These cases are 
well-known for academic study and media discourses globally as they provide the 
interesting point of view to analyze civil societal growth and its potential power to 
democratize the Party-state. However, these well-studied cases can still be dug into more 
intensively. With paying more attention to analyze the “interaction” between political and 
social actors, the conclusion of this thesis doesn’t lead to the attractive prospect of 
vigorous street movements launched by enlightened citizens subverting the 
“communism” which is generally taken as the fundamental political change, but 
demonstrates the more profound changes according to “embedded mobilization”.  
This “embedded mobilization” is not institutionalized but de facto, or we can take it 
as an informal politics, which indicates some kind of flexibility of China’s Party-state 
system and a different development form of civil society, and further, the 
Party-state-societal relations. In this thesis, the de facto embedded mobilization makes 
sense in dealing with two dilemmas for post-economic-reform China. The first dilemma is 
the issue-oriented one that how a developing country like China can deal with universal 
modernity problems at the same when it’s still trying to complete the primary 
industrialization, especially when the two responsibilities inevitably contradict with each 
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other. And, according to the case study, we may conclude that the Chinese authority 
chooses to maintain the existing institutions beneficial for industrialization – for these 
cases, decentralization and strong position of profit-oriented departments – but also 
conducts informal politics to solve environmental problems, which are also highly ranked 
political agendas. To speak specifically, political authority initiatively open access to 
multiple participants, especially social activists, encouraging controversy between them 
and vested interests groups, in order to make a balanced decision with being closer to the 
central orthodoxy (for these cases, “sustainable development). It’s also important that, 
“opening political access to the mass” can be taken as the succession of traditional 
“political mobilization” which pursues to construct direct links between highest authority 
and mass. Thus, it has complete validity in China’s politics although it’s not clearly 
written. However, what political authority does in environmental realm is different from 
tradition is that, the coercive power conducting mainly through administrative 
approaches is replaced by the “embeddedness” when power is conducted through 
activism of selected social units – NGOs and mass media in these cases – with adaption 
to the increasingly pluralistic society and reformative ethics.  
The other dilemma is from the theoretical aspect that how to deal with “political 
modernization” and “democratization”. Generally, while talking about fundamental 
political change in China, researchers incline to care more about the latter, especially 
when research topics are related with Party-state-societal relations. However, we all know 
“political modernization” has more profound contents according to complicated 
economic and social change1. For China’s politics, according to the bad memories of 
totalitarian era, people may easily take power distribution as modernization, and label 
power concentration with autocracy and dictatorship. It may not be academically precise. 
A modern political system must be with two sides: the power distribution institutions to 
guarantee citizen freedom and participation, and decentralization; the power 
concentration institutions to keep social stability and the capability of providing public 
goods, and centralization. In this sense, China’s politics is not special. In fact, there have 
                                                        
1 See: Samuel P. Huntington, “The Change to Change: Modernization, Development and Politics,” 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3, April, 1971.  
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been scholars, with comparative studies on history of developed democracies, to 
emphasize “modern nation construction <xiandai guojia jianshe>” with concerns on 
centralization-decentralization institutions 1 , national financial ability construction 2 , 
social consulting institutions, and so on, rather than the ideologies of “autocracy” and 
“democracy”3. That’s exactly why I pay special attention to “embeddedness”, or “power 
through society” in this thesis. Not only it indicates there’s a large non-institutional space 
in China’s politics for political authority and social players to conduct interaction flexibly 
(as mentioned in the last paragraph), but also it implies the orientation of 
institutionalization in contemporary China: on one hand, political access is limitedly 
opening to public participants and the competition of the limited public resources may 
promote the pluralization of society (this point is most obvious according to the dam 
debate); on the other hand, the national ability both of mobilizing social resources and 
serving the society is being strengthened, with the decay of despotic power.  
 
2. Composition of De Facto Embedded Mobilization in the Field of 
Environmental Governance 
Based on the comparative case study, we have the whole picture of the embedded 
mobilization, which is composed with the four correlative factors: a) the willingness of 
the central authority as the orthodoxy; b) the environmental department and the 
environmental NGOs as the players on stage, and their normalized communication 
channelling politics and society; c) the mass media as the effective approach to take the 
mobilization; d) the external interventions to reduce the effects of the mobilization. The 
synthesis of the factors, which have different extents in issues in different problem 
domains, has led to different media issue framing and policy outcomes, with regard to the 
procedural change and the eventual change. (Table 7.1 - part 1 & part 2).  
 
                                                        
1 Yongnian Zheng, De Facto Federalism in China: Reforms and Dynamics of Central-Local, Singapore; 
Hackensack, N.J.: World Scientific, 2007. 
2 Shaoguang Wang and Angang Hu, Chinese National Ability Report <zhongguo guojia nengli 
baogao>, Shenyang: Liaoning People’s Press, 1993.  
3 The controversy on “democracy” in China is quite easy to be dominated by ideological color. See: 
Gengwu Wang and Yongnian Zheng, The “ism” Controversy in China: from May Fourth Movement to 
Contemporary Era <zhongguo de “zhuyi” zhi zheng: cong wusi yundong dao dangdai>, Singapore: 
Bafang Culture Press, 2009.  
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Table 7.1 (part 1): Comparison with regard to correlative factors and outcomes of embedded mobilization  
Problem 
domain  
(with political 
sensitivity) 
The typical 
case 
Extent of correlative factors (positive) 
involved 
Extent of 
external 
interventions 
(negative 
factors) 
Orthodoxy 
of central 
authority 
Environmental 
department 
Environmental 
NGOs 
Wild conservation 
(weak: with clear 
national 
willingness and 
social resources 
was strongly 
needed) 
Anti-poaching 
of Tibetan 
antelope 
（ 1995 ～
2001） 
Maintained 
at the 
ideology-level 
Enhanced the 
effectiveness of 
civil activism 
Took the 
dominance 
Active against 
environmental 
NGOs without 
challenging the 
orthodoxy 
Urban 
environmental 
management 
(middle: with 
controversy but 
rarely severe riot, 
however, such 
controversy would 
easily become 
linked to topics of 
democracy) 
Yuanmingyuan 
Park 
membrane 
controversy 
（2005） 
Maintained 
at the 
ideology-level 
Took the 
dominance 
Enhanced  
effects of SEPA 
Discontent 
indicated 
without taking 
strong 
Big construction 
item (strong: 
with serious 
conflict among 
multiple interests, 
and involvement 
of international 
civil society) 
Nu River 
hydropower 
development 
controversy 
（ 2003 ～
2008） 
Made the 
turning point 
Made coalition 
with 
environmental 
NGOs  
Made coalition 
with SEPA 
Active within 
both 
institutional 
arrangement 
and the public 
sphere 
Emergency 
countermeasures 
caused by the 
accumulating 
industrial 
pollution (strong: 
with clash 
between central 
and local on 
“development 
mode change” 
Tai lake water 
crisis in Wuxi 
Municipality 
（2007） 
Took the 
dominance 
and 
encouraged 
the remote 
supervision 
by mass 
media 
Followed the 
steps of central 
authority 
Followed the 
steps of central 
authority 
Active local 
control on 
media framing 
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Table 7.1 (part 2): Comparison with regard to correlative factors and outcomes of embedded mobilization 
Problem 
domain  
Issue framing of mass media 
（ “Public sphere” ） 
Effectiveness on the 
policymaking 
Procedural 
outcome 
Eventual   
outcome 
Wild conservation In generally, voices of ENGOs predominated in 
public sphere, but according to the strong 
intervention of local administration in late 
stage, there was also some negative 
information. 
Rearranged the 
Management 
regimes  
Maintained 
original 
national 
directives 
Urban 
environmental 
management 
Environmental priority, advocacy of 
environmental laws and public hearing 
overwhelmingly predominated. 
Applied EIA law 
and public hearing 
into the 
policymaking 
Rectified the 
project 
Big construction 
item 
At former stage, environmental priority, critics 
of hydropower and profit sectors, and advocacy 
of public participation predominated. At later 
stage, with the strong intervention of profit 
sectors, local administration and 
“industrialization-inclined” activists, the issue 
framing became polarized. Lastly, with restart 
of the project, we may say industrialization bias 
and development ethics won.  
Applied EIA law 
into policymaking 
and permitted the 
public discussion 
 
Reduced the 
project scale 
from 13 
stations to 4 
stations 
Emergency 
countermeasures 
caused by the 
accumulating 
industrial pollution 
Clear difference between local media and 
central media (with media from other regions). 
Rearranged the 
Management 
regimes up to the 
highest national 
standards 
Speeded up 
the problem 
solution 
process 
On one hand, the comparison indicates that the eventual outcomes are different, to 
speak specifically, not all the opportunities of embedded mobilization had changed the 
original policies which had been made under the dominance of profit orientation. The 
failure was typical according to the Tibetan antelope protection, as the environmental 
NGOs followed their independent agendas to promote the social mobilization, and on the 
contrary, the “embeddedness” was quite weak as the central orthodoxy hadn’t been 
transformed into material actions and SEPA just took the cameo role. The other cases had 
the eventual change to original policies, with the formation of the coalition between the 
environmental department and environmental NGOs, and the transition of the central 
orthodoxy into actions. 
 262
However, the different outcomes have the common characteristic to indicate the 
“balance”. In other words, the extreme environmental priority has had no chance to 
suppress the orientation of industrialization, which clearly demonstrated the divergence 
between the political authority and civil society in the mobilization. On the other hand, all 
the cases had led to the improvement of related policymaking procedures, especially in 
the application of legal leverages. And we may conclude that, rather than the eventual 
change to certain policies, the promotion of political reform is the core appealing of the 
embedded mobilization. And, the detailed analysis of correlative factors is summed up 
below.  
2.1 The Orthodoxy of Central Authority: “Sustainable Development” 
The national willingness of environmental protection has made the validity of the 
embedded mobilization, despite of its lacking the institutional assurance. To speak more 
accurately, the central authority has elaborately balanced the industrial modernization 
and the extent of environmental deterioration. The former is necessary for maintaining 
the legitimacy of the Party-state, and the “dream” for nationalists of the old country. But 
on the contrary, if the latter, being accompanied with the former, gets out of control, the 
possible damages on people’s living quality will also undermine the political legitimacy, 
and further, natural resources loss followed will influence the sustainability of the 
modernization.  
However, the great challenge to the central authority to balance industrialization and 
environment – as that no industrialized country of our age have truly practiced 
industrialization and environmental recovery at the same time, but generally taken the 
pollute-firstly-manage-later pattern – had become even more difficult according to 
China’s political system arrangement with all the strength on economic growth from the 
economic reform. On one hand, at the national-level, the economic profit-oriented 
departments have just sat on the powerful position with the better financial support and 
elite staffing rather than those nonprofit sectors, like the environmental department. On 
the other hand, the practical decentralization derived from the economic reform – 
although it hadn’t fundamentally shaken the centralized system – has really forced the 
central authority to bind the local officials through encouraging their economic 
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achievements, as the main indicator to reach the greater political career, while offering 
the local more autonomy on certain policy choices to adapt to the de facto federalism and 
the complicated local conditions of the vast country. Thus, the local authority would have 
the natural bias to economic growth rather than the hard and costly environmental 
recovery.  
The systematic contradiction between the imperative “sustainable development” and 
the absolutely mighty profit orientation have brought the central authority into the 
dilemma: even though the centralized system looked as if it authorized the central top 
leaders with the nearly absolute control, the authoritative power had factually been 
balanced by multiple pacts among the Party1, and in addition, the system in favor of profit 
orientation have still seemed to be quite reasonable for the good economic performance 
of China, which makes no political leader chose to subverse it directly. Since that it was 
hard to balance the industrialization and nonprofit environmental management within 
the existing system, it would be quite necessary to utilize something informal to 
supplement the systematic deficiency, especially when the strong profit-oriented 
departments and local officials treated the central EP policies in a cold manner but the 
central authority feared the repercussions of certain actions. And, judging from the 
history of the Party-state, it’s not difficult to notice that the “public opinion” – or “mass 
line” – have been the absolute validity for certain policies, whether just namely or not. It 
means, the application of certain public opinion can reduce the systematic obstacle for 
the central authority to exert the pressure. Even though today’s authoritative leaders 
cannot ever mobilize the “mass” into great political campaign like Mao Zedong had done 
during the totalitarian period, they still keep the modernized mass media channel to 
shape the public opinion legally, and further, the central willingness has been 
comprehended by the environmental watchdog and the rapidly growing environmental 
NGOs, both of who also initiatively try to mobilize social resources for the environmental 
priority in conflict with the strong profit orientation. According to the cases, with the 
                                                        
1 As Mao Zedong described the Party tradition as, “it is the imperial view to have no ‘party’ outside the 
Party, and it will bring all kinds of strange shape to have no multiple pacts inside the Party <dang wai 
wu dang, diwang sixiang, dang nei wu pai, qian qi bai guai>.” And, from the reform beginning, the 
Party leaders have been announcing the resolution of “inner-Party democracy”, including preventing the 
top elites from making arbitrary decisions.  
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difficult balance between the economic development and the “sustainability”, the extent 
of the central authority to transform its orthodoxy into eventual actions have been closely 
related with the problem domains, to speak specifically, with the extent of the 
involvement of the industrialization value and the profit-oriented departments.  
In the earliest case of this thesis, Tibetan antelope protection was firstly a commonly 
accepted environmental agenda by both the state — center and local officials – and the 
civil environmentalists. At the national-level, the central authority had set the agendas 
earlier than the generation of civil consciousness, by establishing the legal assurance and 
taking concrete administrative measures like building reserves and anti poaching. And 
further, since the main protection contents had been targeted at the illegal poachers as 
the marginalized population, whose dynamics had derived from the foreign market 
demand. Thus, there had been no profit-oriented pressure group, bureaucratic 
fragmentation or central-local contradiction to obstruct the main guideline. However, the 
state, especially the local authority had been confronted with the financial problem to 
accomplish the mandatory responsibility, and it had become the original incentive of the 
government to response to the suggestion of environmental activists about the 
cooperation.  
During the 2003 to 2006, the “environmental storm” and other conscious actions had 
concentrated both the political and public concerns on environmental affairs. The 
controversies on Yuanmingyuan membrane project and Nu River hydropower 
construction had drawn the attention from domestic and foreign countries, and had 
become the most precious resources for related researchers, especially from the 
perspectives of China’s public sphere and democratization. However, different from in 
the Nu River construction, the “national willingness” hadn’t been visible in the 
Yuanmingyuan case. That might be that, the factual effects of the anti seepage membrane 
in a park had been too far less than its symbolic meaning. But it should also be admitted 
that the national planning of water resource management had offered the orthodoxy for 
the opponents to the project, and, it seemed that the promotion of policymaking 
democratization procedures on a grand scale hadn’t been challenged the national line.  
However, the implication and conjecture according to the Yuamingyuan membrane 
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case had been proved by the case of Nu River hydropower construction, when the power 
of the national orthodoxy had been indicated its importance. As the hydropower 
construction was designed to solve the serious electricity shortage at the industrialization 
climax, and further under the name of helping the local people shake off poverty. No 
political leaders in China could refuse the industrialization, whether as a nationalist or as 
the key member to maintain the ruling legitimacy of the leading Party. However, they 
couldn’t accept the unlimited environmental damages unconditionally, because the state 
depended on the sustainability of natural resources and it had been still vulnerable to the 
possible social instability — like all other countries in the transformation period, China 
haven’t formed its mature mechanisms to cope with it – derived from the environmental 
deterioration, especially from the massive ecological resettlement, which had already 
troubled the state in the Three Gorgeous Dam construction. Thus, the central authority 
had the clear incentives to take the actual actions to encourage both proponents of and 
opponents to express their ideas and contribute to the policymaking. However, the 
central authority had maintained its balance between the ideas of “development” and the 
“sustainability”, as intercessor of the controversy orienting the process to be favorable for 
the “sustainable development” directive.  
The dynamics of the central authority was further clarified through the quick 
intervention into the Tai Lake urgency management, when the leaders finally giving up 
being the dispassionate observer and intercessor seemingly detached from the conflict 
between the environmental priority and the pursue of economic benefits. This case just 
made clear that the central authority had its defined agendas, rather than only to respond 
to the civil pressure. In other words, when there had been enough ripening of conditions 
– like in the Tai Lake crisis: emergency, advanced industrialized regions, water crisis vital 
to the 5 million urban residents, failure of the long-time costly national management plan 
– the central authority wouldn’t hesitate to go up onto the stage.  
2.2 Channels for Institutional Resources embedded in Society：SEPA-NGO Coalition 
Under the national orthodoxy, SEPA and the well-organized environmental activists 
had become the leading roles in the spotlight at the stage of the embedded mobilization. 
SEPA, as mentioned in the second chapter, had the clear motives to upgrade its position 
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in the bureaucratic system and apply the environmental consideration into policymaking. 
The motives of environmental activists might be more complicated. Besides the 
environmental priority, they have more political appeals to promoting the fundamental 
change of policymaking regimes. To speak specifically, the environmental activism had 
been the test site of the “democratic politics” ideal of the environmental activists: the 
public opinion would compete with the official planning and bureaucratic interests in 
policymaking, or even develop into the decisive factor, and further onwards, change the 
Party-state system into a seemingly universal democratic arrangement. That was also the 
target of the participants in the unsuccessful liberalistic campaign publically confronting 
the authorities in the late 1980s, among which several pioneers of environmental NGOs 
had been involved.  
The common motives of SEPA and environmental NGOs – environmental priority 
and the pursue of continuing influence on policymaking – created conditions for the 
integration of the institutional resources controlled by SEPA and the flexibility of NGOs 
to link social resources, but the coalition hadn’t formed easily at the early stage, when 
the new-born NGOs had originally planned to imitate their counterparts in developed 
democracies to set the subjective social agendas. However, different from those in 
developed democracies, the environmental NGOs in China had been hard to be 
independent not only for the commonly-known and well studied political restrictions, 
but also for their initiative utilization of the institutional resources. As the pioneers of 
China’s green activism, the intellectual elites had the natural relationship with political 
elites according to the networks such as classmates, teacher-student relations, battle 
companions, and so on. And further, some of them even had the formal identity in the 
political system as being the “consultant” to the government. In other words, some 
individuals, especially those key members, of early environmental NGOs had originally 
owned the channels to actually influence the policymaking, although the channels might 
not be formally established or sustainable.  
The success of Yunnan golden monkeys, which gained the Friend of Nature (FON) the 
brilliant fame overnight, was the typical success of utilizing the institutional resources 
through the personal network. The FON leader, Liang Congjie, took his legal 
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responsibility as the CPPCC member to submit the issue to the current State Councilor, 
and the latter responded by publicizing the administrative order to halt the deforestation 
at the county-level, protecting the living conditions of the rare species. This made the 
vague point of the green activism that we could judge the efforts of Liang Congjie as 
representing the NGO he led, or as committing its political role. However, the success had 
greatly encouraged the civil activism, and, the Tibetan antelope issue witted the change of 
the NGO strategy to pursue the independence from the state power to shape the 
subjectivity of the typical “civil society”, according to the ideal image of developed 
democracies. At the early stage, the alliance of NGOs and individual activists had 
achieved great success in shaping the field composed of “civil donation channels”, “public 
opinion framing” and “actions of the Wild Yak Team at the front line” all in integration. 
Under the domination of environmental NGOs, SEPA had been also invited to build up 
the campaign, but at the current time, it seemed to be strong incentives for SEPA to 
mobilize resources outside the system. Besides the absence of an obvious divergence 
among different governmental sections, the new-born environmental watchdog hadn’t 
been legally authorized the role of “department in charge” in the EP area, thus, it might 
be a reasonable conjecture that SEPA hadn’t clearly recognized its predicaments and 
especially had no plan to strengthen their actual influence. However, it still inclined to 
respond to the petition and activism of the civil society, taking it the good opportunity to 
strengthen the social EP consciousness, by commending those who had gained merits in 
the protection.  
However, along with the final failure of NGOs in integrating the local personnel, 
especially when they declared the Wild Yak Team as the symbol of civil activism in a high 
sound, there had become a change to the SEPA-NGO relations in the following campaigns. 
Especially when the reformists being sensitive of political flow took the lead in SEPA, the 
watchdog began to actively control its own agendas and embed in the civil activism. And 
on the other hand, environmental NGOs had changed their strategy to cooperate with the 
reformists who would both strengthen their actual effectiveness and somehow 
comprehend or even promote their political ideal. In the objection to Yuanmingyuan 
membrane project, SEPA indicated its whole initiatives. Firstly, it set the clear target to 
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depend on the authority of the legal leverage, to speak specifically, the Environmental 
Impact Assessment Law. This target had corresponded with the central orthodoxy of 
“ruling by law <fa zhi>”, and, the concept wouldn’t incur the antipathy of NGOs for its 
meaning of limiting the power of the Party organization and the bureaucracy. In other 
words, the environmental department and the civil society had found their mutual target 
without radically challenging the fundamental system, which made the base for the 
embeddedness. And, secondly, SEPA utilized the administrative order – in other words, 
the institutional resources – to set the issue agendas: halting the project to support the 
validity of social questions, holding the public hearing with arranging the details of 
participant choice and the agendas, setting the time table of the environmental impact 
assessment, and interpreting the report to make the final mandatory decision. However, 
along with the every step of SEPA was the “public opinion” and positive response of 
environmental NGOs, which made the whole process seem to be the application of fresh 
“public participation”, rather than the rigid administrative pressure exertion simply 
according to the bureaucratic hierarchy. In other words, the combination of SEPA and the 
public activism had made the change of the original policymaking on the membrane 
project go beyond the confines of the image of inner-bureaucratic contradiction, offering 
the actions more validity in respect the “mass line”, while the environmental NGOs could 
also enforce their effectiveness. And further, by judging from the details of the process, 
we can also find that the combination had been achieved consciously through the 
continuing communication between SEPA officials and NGO members, thus, it wouldn’t 
be exaggerative to conclude that a coalition had been formed between the players.  
And, the “embeddeness” was made more distinct and prominent according to the 
analysis of the Nu River Controversy, or commonly known as the “Nu River Defense 
Battle” from the perspective of opponents to the largest hydropower planning at the 
current time in China. The process was started by the reformists in SEPA1 to leak the 
unpublished policymaking inside the National Development and Reform Committee 
                                                        
1 Factually, the official who leaked the decision of Nu River project to green activists had then gone 
farther on the way to promote the political change. And his name was even listed in a document 
published by the Wikileaks online, said to be owned by intelligence agencies of the United States on the 
political dissidents serving “protection”.  
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(NDRC), participated by related departments of State Council and the electricity goliath. 
As the consensus had earlier been achieved among the profit-oriented departments and 
enterprises, SEPA’s accumulating discontent with being marginalized in the 
policymaking customs was then ignited, and like in the Yuanmingyuan case, SEPA took 
out the EIA Law. However, SEPA had little administrative power to press its 
profit-oriented co-workers in this case, thus, it chose to, utilizing its institutional 
resources, provide the platform for the “public opinion” voicing through environmental 
NGOs and the scholars standing with them. Then, we can see the two “conferences” held 
respectively in the Beijing and Kunming. The two symposiums, although without any 
consensus between opponents and proponents, had actually led the policymaking to 
exceed the control of political elites inside the system, and moreover broadened the space 
for civil activism. At the next stages, only environmental NGOs stood under the spotlight 
and the direct administrative intervention of SEPA had been rarely seen, however, the 
final result came to that the EIA process had been applied into the policymaking, which 
recognized the SEPA examination to be an indispensable factor in the policymaking of 
similar projects. On the other hand, environmental NGOs, after being linked into circle of 
policymaking, had given themselves a good account. They shaped the unprecedentedly 
influential green public sphere in China and even reached the activism to the 
international civil society. However, the inspiring success had again encouraged 
environmental NGOs to pursue the subjectivity – undoubted it was the natural choice 
during the growth of civil society – it then led to the divergence from the mutual 
orientation with SEPA, which put the environmental NGOs into the direct conflict with 
the strong profit-oriented departments, enterprises and the local government. The 
dilemma of environmental NGOs will be discussed in details in the section of analyzing 
the external intervention on the embedded mobilization.  
2.3 The Approach of Mobilization: Media Framing 
The last section discussed the key players of the embedded mobilization in China’s 
environmental governance, and analyzed its dependence on the combination of the 
institutional resources embedded in social activism and the mobilization of social 
resources directly practiced by environmental NGOs, in order to meet the mutual target 
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of the SEPA-NGO coalition as applying the legal leverages into policymaking process to 
break the powerful position of profit-oriented departments who naturally inclined to 
ignore the environmental concern. And, for this combination, the media issue framing 
had played critical role, as the preconditions for the advocacy of public participation and 
the influence on public policymaking1.  
As discussed in the first chapter, mass media has its duality. On one hand, along with 
the marketization and commercial competition, it has been experiencing the pluralization. 
And on the other hand, as the legacy of the communist media system, it still follows the 
political directive and committing the self-censorship as the mouthpiece. However, the 
role as mouthpiece has brought, besides the political limitation, journalists the advantage 
to legally link to the policymaking and governance, since the mass media is theoretically 
part of the political system. Especially, those elite journalists of the central media are just 
like the ears and eyes for the political leaders to collect information from various 
departments and the local government, thus, it’s not unusual that they have the formal 
position in the political hierarchy, sometimes even high enough to prevail over the local 
officials. In other words, mass media in China just stands in the vague position across the 
political and non-state field, as figure 7.1 indicates. And further, the “public opinion” 
mainly transferring by mass media coinstantaneously serves the needs of both SEPA and 
the active environmental NGOs: SEPA needs the public opinion as the absolute validity to 
break the policymaking customs, and influencing the public opinion framing is the most 
realistic approach for the young weak environmental NGOs producing the effects. 
 
Figure 7.1 Factors and formation of mass media issue framing  
 
                                                        
1 Guobin Yang and Craig Calhoun, “Media, civil society, and the rise of a green public sphere in China,” 
in Ho and Edmons, China's Embedded Activism, pp. 69-88. 
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Environmental NGOs’ early reach to the mass media based on the personal network, 
which made its actual ability greater than it theoretically would have been, according to 
the few members, poor resource investment and the external restrictions of the 
Party-state system. There is no doubt that the Chinese environmental NGOs came into 
being as the intellectuals’ response to the import of environmental concern of developed 
democracies, especially the thought of the American conservation. Considering the poor 
education situation about the same time – during the beginning of the reform, there had 
been maintaining only about 0.1 million students enrollment in college. And, the number 
had gradually grown into 3 million in the middle 1990s, with the annual enrollment of 
about 1 million on average, being trivial in comparison with the current population of 1.2 
billion. That means, the higher education resources had been the luxury limited to very 
small population and that was exactly the current strategy to take the higher education as 
the “elite education” 1. In this case, the modern environmental awareness and the 
corresponding appealing of the related influence on policymaking had naturally been the 
consciousness only shared inside the small elite circle, within which, the few 
well-educated intellectuals served as Party celebrities, bureaucrats, think-tankers, 
teachers, writers, journalists, etc., had resonated with each other according to the same 
elite identity. And, further considering the special political ecology in the middle 1990s – 
the liberalists had been strictly suppressed after Tian’anmen movement, however, the 
1992 “South patrol <nan xun>” of Deng Xiaoping had just somehow freed the restrictions 
– the green civil society seemed to be quite a suitable field to integrate the liberalistic 
power, for the sake of its meanings of “public participation” and “democracy” in the 
developed democracies.  
Since that the early green activism had been promoted by the intellectual elites 
concentrated in big cities, especially in Beijing, the political capital, a most economically 
advanced, and a city with multiple information channels, it only deviated from the really 
interested local community2. And, according to the objective political restrictions to any 
                                                        
1 See: Cai Junlan, “The Fundamental Evolution of the Higher Education Scale in China and Analysis on 
the Characteristics <zhongguo gaodeng jiaoyu guimo yanjin de jiben licheng ji qi tedian fenxi>,” paper 
of the Guangdong Provincial Economic Institute, [http://www.gdeco.com.cn/content.asp?id=196] 
2 An important evidence for the deviation is indicated according to the Tibetan antelope protection that, 
when the Wild Yak Team who actually fought at the front-line emphasized their official identity, the 
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organized social campaign, the most realistic action the environmental NGOs could took 
was the “enlightening the people <kaiqi minzhi>” – from the time China opened the door 
to the world in the last years of Qing Dynasty, the liberalistic intellectuals believed in the 
concept as their responsibility – to impart the modern environmental consciousness to 
the common people, making the green public sphere which had the effectiveness on the 
decision-making. Thus, the utilization of mass media had been the crucial connection. 
And moreover, as journalists had been among the easiest to learn related knowledge 
about the modern environmentalism – in the era without enough education resources 
and multiple channels – it would not be strange that they had an important part of the 
pioneer environmental activists, such as Xi Zhinong for the Yunnan Monkey protection, 
Sun Danping for the Tibetan antelope activism. Without the pioneer efforts of these 
journalist activists to explore the first-hand materials from the local place, the media 
resource in advanced regions wouldn’t even have been oriented to the conservation issue 
in the no-man area of the far western area.  
When the pioneer activists utilized the media resources depending on the personal 
friendship, the younger ones began to pursue the more stable regimes to close the 
relations with mass media. The Yuanmingyuan membrane issue witnessed that there had 
already been formed some kind of regular communication regimes between 
environmental NGOs and journalists, reflected by the multiple media channels of the 
Friends of Nature to publicize their information from the very beginning. And, in the Nu 
River defense battle, it even became more prominent of the “Green Earth Village”, the 
environmental NGO sponsored and mainly composed of journalists and former ones, 
which had been the decisive power for framing the issue. In fact, along with the increase 
and spread of educational resources and the industrialization process, the green public 
sphere had gradually gone beyond the elite circle, and the resonation between 
environmental activists and journalists had changed from the emotional sympathy to a 
more reciprocal relations1. To speak specifically, on one hand, utilization of the discourses 
                                                                                                                                                               
green activists still had the preference to frame them as the symbol of the civil activism. Details can be 
seen in the third chapter.  
1 Guobin Yang, “Environmental NGOs and Institutional Dynamics in China”, The China Quarterly, No. 
181 (March), 2005. pp.46-66. pp. 56- 57. And also see: Wen Bo, “Greening the Chinese Media,” China 
Environmental Series, Issue 2, 1998, pp. 39-44.  
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of the environmental NGOs is a most operatable approach for mass media to frame the 
“public opinion”; and on the other hand, environmental NGOs are happy to offer the help 
to journalists on “social relations” and “professional knowledge” 1 , to socialize the 
environmental priority, and the environmental NGOs help themselves to obtain “some 
kind of validity, a creditable reputation” and expand the resources of “volunteers, 
materials and financial support”, and, further to “create the positive social environment 
for the growth of environmental NGOs”2.  
Another power source for the green energy of mass media is in the state. Objective 
data analysis showed that, the attention rate of mass media to environmental issues had 
indicated a positive correlation with the upgrade of EP topics in the political agendas 
from the early 1990s3.  And, even earlier than the birth of Chinese environmental NGOs, 
officials of the environmental department had tried to apply the media framing into the 
EP field. From 1993, there had even been a long-term institutionalized media action 
named “China Trans-Century Environmental Protection Inspection Campaign 
<zhonghua huanbao shiji xing>”, launched by the current State Environmental 
Protection Bureau, under the coordination with the other 13 departments and agencies, 
participated by 25 most influential central media organizations. Every year, under a 
certain annual topic, journalists had been sent to the local place – especially the hot spot 
vulnerable to certain environmental deterioration – to inspect the environmental 
situation and the enforcement of relative national policies. To speak exactly, the 
journalists had taken not only the responsibility of recording and publicizing current 
situations, but also the similar role to “imperial envoy” to supervise on the local officials4. 
However, the earlier official promotion of media mobilization had been still restricted to 
the confined of taking mass media just as a tool of the Party-state. The situation had been 
changed according to the growth of reformists in the environmental department. The 
good media communication of reformists could be cast back to the former Premier, Zhu 
                                                        
1 Chatham House, Strengthening the Cooperation between Chinese Environmental NGOs and the 
Media, pp. 11-12, 13. 
2 Feng Yuan, “NGOs in the contexts of the news media in Chinese mainland <zhongguo dalu xinwen 
meiti zhong de NGO>,” China Development Brief, No. 21, December 2004. 
[http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.org.cn/wzdd/wzdd.jsp?id=337] 
3 Li Ruinong, “Trend and Reporting Approaches of Environmental Journalism <huanjing xinwen de 
zoushi ji baodao lujing>,” Chinese Journalists, Special Issue for Environmental Journalism, April 2008.  
4 See the details of the annual topics in Annex 3.  
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Rongji, in whose period, the Three Gorgeous Dam project had become an open topic in 
the public sphere1. And, in the last chapters, we have been familiar with Pan Yue, the 
deputy general of SEPA. As a well-known reformist, Pan had the long-term experience as 
journalist, serving a reformist magazine and the official paper of national environmental 
department. The practical experiences had offered Pan the good network in the media 
circle and the special knowledge of media operations. In the Yuanmingyuan issue, Pan 
and the SEPA nearly guided the whole process and the orientation, to upgrade the 
seemingly small project into a most splendid symbol of China’s green public sphere and 
even the public participation and democratization. In the Nu River defense battle, SEPA 
initiatively opened the information channel to environmental NGOs and mass media, 
greatly surprised its profit-oriented rivals in the bureaucratic system who had been 
accustomed to keeping the policymaking secret from the public. And, in the Tai Lake 
crisis, even though SEPA hadn’t taken the leading role, it still became the only national 
department to hold press conference to interpret their special opinions, making an 
important information source for the media issue framing.  
Considering the source information from and cooperation with environmental NGOs 
and reformists of the environmental department, it would be easier for us to understand 
the obvious bias of mass media issue framing. Judged from the typical cases, the framing 
had commonly exceeded considering the issue as it originally had stood, or to speak more 
specifically, mass media framing concentrated more on digging up the “systematic” 
deficiency behind the certain issues, whether the issue had seemed to be the wild 
conservation (Tibetan antelope protection), the controversial technique (Yuanmingyuan 
membrane), the large-scale industrialized project (Nu River defense battle), or the urban 
environmental crisis (Tai Lake water crisis). Generally, the bias had been prominent in 
the characteristics: a) the nature of issues had been early determined at the very 
beginning of media reporting, and – except the antelope protection without any 
controversy – the environmental priority and political reformist discourse had commonly 
predominated the public sphere, making the media framing more like the one-side 
                                                        
1 See details in: GØrild Heggelund, Environment and Resettlement Politics in China: The Three Gorges 
Project, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003, pp. 193-222. 
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criticism rather than the “controversy”, which led Liang Congjie to sigh with feelings that 
“China has the greenest media in the world” 1 ; b) the one-side critics had been 
concentrated against “the wrongdoings of local bureaucrats (or root officials)” as a whole 
rather than the scrutiny on defining exactly who would be responsible, the general profit 
orientation, and the defective policymaking regimes lacking the “rule by law” and public 
participation; in other words, the media framing inclined to orient the public to pay 
attention to the original sin of industrialization and the political system imperfection, and 
implying the preferent prospect of the political change under way; c) the media framing 
had elaborated on utilizing the orthodox discourse without challenging the Party-line; 
actually, all the reformist key concepts of “rule by law”, “public participation”, and the 
“public scrutiny” on officials applying to the mainstream media framing could find their 
validity in the direction of the central authority; especially in the Tai Lake crisis, we see 
clearly the accordance of media framing with the upgrade of the central intervention and 
how the media framing depending on the words of top leaders, despite of that there had 
been multiple interpretation of the words according to certain journalists’ positions in the 
political spectrum.  
2.4 External Interventions: Official and Non-official 
According to the analysis above, it’s quite clear that the combination of central 
orthodoxy, environmental department, environmental NGOs and media framing to 
accomplish the “embedded mobilization” has been targeted on deal with the strong 
profit-orientation and the policymaking regimes in favor of the preference of strong 
profit-oriented departments and the local authority. However, while the embedded 
mobilization is exerting the public pressure, it’ll be correspondingly faced with the 
opposition from the economy-oriented departments, the local authority, enterprises, and 
other non-governmental agencies or individuals who had been oriented by the profit 
orientation or paid great attention to the industrialization value. In comparison with the 
environmental priority, the value of profit orientation and industrialization has been 
more beneficial from the systematic arrangement, which sets the validity for the 
opposition. And moreover, despite of the common target to press the profit orientation, 
                                                        
1 Friends of Nature Newsletter, No. 3, 1998.  
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the players integrated in embedded mobilization have their diverse agendas, making 
them possibly choose to respond the opposition with diverse attitudes, in other words, 
the dissolution of the integration of players. This indicates the “external intervention” in 
the embedded mobilization.  
In the wild conservation, the local government had played a complicated role as to the 
mobilization. At the beginning, it had factually been the promoter of the civil activism. 
According to the obedience to the central direction – the legal frameworks and the policy 
demanding local financial responsibility of reserve establishment – the local government 
had applied the channel of the private funding, which offered environmental NGOs the 
opportunity to participate in the issue. During the early stage, the local government just 
had stood with the central authority and the environmental department to encourage the 
civil activism. However, along with the success, the environmental NGOs attempted to 
get independent from the political censorship, in order to build the subjectivity and the 
equal language power of the public sphere with the political sphere in antelope protection, 
and turned their work focus to supporting the Wild Yak Team to compete with the local 
candidates for political legitimacy, according to the mobilization of public opinion to 
shape its social legitimacy. However, meanwhile, the central authority and SEPA had 
achieved the expected goal of inspiring public consciousness, especially orienting the 
surplus social resources in advanced regions to the faraway west, to promote the 
protection. This heterodox action incurred the outcry of the local government and even 
speeded up the official disband of the Wild Yak Team. The environmental NGOs then had 
been forced to seek help, through the personal efforts, from SEPA and even the top 
official –the vice Premier in charge of EP issues Wen Jiabao, the current vice Premier was 
eventually the most potent candidate for the next Premier – but as long as the local 
government hadn’t disobey the central directive of the protection, and further, the local 
interest hadn’t neither conflicted with the environmental preference of SEPA. Therefore, 
the civil mobilization, with its own agendas, couldn’t further obtain the embeddedness of 
institutional resources.  
According to the growth of the green civil society and the development of reformists 
in SEPA, there had become the firmer integration of environmental NGOs and the 
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environmental department. The Yuanmingyuan membrane case had witnessed the firm 
integration and its power. That chapter also mentioned the comparison case of the earlier 
civil opposition to the Kunyu River lining project in Beijing. In that case, the independent 
actions of the environmental NGOs to ask for the right of participation in policymaking 
had been directly refused by the Beijing Municipal Government, and, the government 
even took the administrative power to prevent environmental NGOs’ mobilization of 
media reporting. However, in the Yuanmingyuan case, despite of the recourse of the root 
administration of Yuanmingyuan Park and the district government to the municipal 
government, the municipal government chose to “respect” the decision of SEPA and the 
“public opinion”, even though the environmental department and environmental NGOs 
had gone much further than the appealing with regard to the Kunyu River project. In 
other words, the most potential external intervention in this case hadn’t been exerted, 
which helped the complete success of the embedded mobilization.  
However, the weak external intervention in the Yuanmingyuan case had been owing 
to not only the firm integration, but also the little eventual influence of the membrane 
project on the core interests of the local government and the related departments. 
Therefore, when SEPA and environmental NGOs took the same pattern in opposing the 
Nu River project, which had been an important step of industrialization as the national 
plan and touched the core interests of related departments, the local officials up to the 
provincial level, and the electricity interest group, the embedded mobilization had been 
naturally confronted with the great external interventions, for the project proponents had 
advantages in the legalized policymaking channels – for example, the NDRC, the local 
Party and government, and the People’s Congress at both national and local level – to 
obstruct the opponents. But the embedded mobilization linked to the orthodoxy of the 
central authority to consider the environmental quality in the hydropower project, and 
obtained the staged success in suspending the project construction. However, the success 
also made the turning point of the SEPA-NGO relation – for SEPA had reached its goal of 
applying the legal leverages, leading itself into the circle of decision-making, when 
environmental NGOs targeted on the abolishment of the plan – therefore, SEPA chose to 
“keep silent” and communicate with its bureaucratic co-workers within the institutional 
 278
system, while the environmental NGOs continued their battle to defense the “ecological 
river”. The divergence of the coalition then broke the balance between the power 
proponents and opponents, making the independent mobilization of the civil society 
vulnerable to the attack from the profit-oriented sections. And, more serious for the 
environmental NGOs, the external interventions had been also from the 
non-governmental sector. Some environmental activists had just gone quite far to the 
extreme environmentalism, and incurred the conflict with another pact of public 
intellectuals who preferred the value of industrialization and economic growth rather 
than the environmental priority. The conflict, even without the clear victory or defeat, 
just challenged the identity of environmental NGOs to “represent the whole public”, to 
some extent reducing the validity of their assertions and actions, not to mention the 
deviation of extreme environmentalism from the central orthodoxy of “sustainable 
development” to “balance” the development value and environmental concern.  
In comparison with the cases above, the Tai Lake crisis seemed to indicate a smooth 
process, however, it doesn’t mean the absence of the external interventions, but 
demonstrated the evolution of intervention approach. The peace on the surface is just for 
the reason that the local government, who had been aware of their deficiency in Tai Lake 
governance, “embedded” their institutional resources in the local media framing, in order 
to conflict with the framing of the central and the remote media, whose dynamics and 
power source were rooted in the embeddeness of the active intervention by the central 
authority. In this case, against the local work to frame the crisis as the “natural disaster” 
to dilute the responsibility of local officials, the environmental department and 
environmental NGOs maintained a high degree of unity with the central orthodoxy, 
avoiding the direct conflict with the local government. This phenomenon – let us 
temporarily call it of the “embedded external interventions” – of the local government to 
withdraw the mandatory approaches to suppress the critics might reflect the change of 
the political ecology in China, to speak specifically, the abuse of administrative resources 
in favor of the private interests of officials have gradually quit from the political customs, 
and officials have to response to the public opinion with the more active attitudes and in a 
moderate way. And, it’ll be reasonable for us to believe that the “embedded mobilization” 
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have contributed to the positive change.  
 
3. Political Meaning of “Embedded Mobilization”: Institutionalization and 
Democratization of Political Development 
Although this thesis focuses on the “embedded mobilization” mode limited to the 
environmental realm, the comprehension obtained from the empirical study can help us 
to see some points of the general conditions of the Party-state-societal relations. The 
empirical mode not only demonstrates how political and social resources integrated in 
environmental management, but also – since that study on Party-state-societal relations 
in China is oriented by the perspective of political development – contributes to 
comprehending China’s political institutionalization and democratization. 
Lucian W. Pye, the political scientist and one of the leading China scholars, 
summarized ten aspects of political development as, a) the political prerequisite of 
economic development; b) the political form of industrialized society; c) political 
modernization; d) the operation manner of nation-state; e) the development of 
administration and laws; f) the need of large-scale mass mobilization and participation; g) 
the democratization of political institutions; h) the stable and orderly change; i) the 
political mobilization and political power; j) the social change at the political level1. The 
ten aspects can come down to two dimensions as the institutionalization (construction 
of fundamental modern institutions for a nation-state in terrains of national defense, 
diplomacy, law, finance, central-local relations, bureaucracy, welfare, public services, and 
so on); and the democratization (general election procedures to confer political 
legitimacy, public participation to reflect social pluralism, establishment of good 
environment for community development, and so on). That’s to say, the political 
development should be a comprehensive progress, being integrated with emphases both 
on certain orders and pluralism. But it seems that the “orders” is often absent from 
today’s conversations on political development/modernization, since it may be easy to be 
mistaken as not more than defending the self-interests of authoritarian leadership2. 
                                                        
1 Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development: An Analytic Study, Little Brown & Company, 1966. 
2 The conscious construction of orders is ignored also because the consideration that political 
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However, just as John Rawls points out in the Political Liberalism, even the developed 
democracies have the “fact of oppression”, which realizes the lasting liberal pluralism1. 
And, in reality, most seemingly normative political democratization – based on 
academically favorable economic modernization – led to political decay and anarchy 
disorders at social level2. China’s practices in environmental realm may show us the 
possibility of a stable issue-oriented transformation. 
The Dilemma of the Party-state in environmental management indicates the 
contradiction in dealing with industrialization problems and post-industrialization 
problems during the same historical period. On one hand, the Party-state needs to free up 
space for economic actions and strongly control social orders depending on Party 
authority, which make it dangerous for cursory choice of institutionalization approach. 
But on the other hand, increasing modern problems beyond economic benefits – with 
pressure from international society in addition – needs political institutionalization in 
modern manner and some extent of democratization. The embedded mobilization 
demonstrated in environmental realm, with combining existing institutional resources 
and informal politics applying limited pluralistic participation, can be taken as a balanced 
choice between the two considerations. According to the case study, each problem 
solution resulted in application and popularization of certain governance regimes (the 
government – volunteer cooperation regimes for Tibetan antelope protection), legal 
leverages (EIA Law), stricter environmental standards (Tai Lake management standard 
improvement), and democratic procedures (public hearing procedure and pluralistic 
                                                                                                                                                               
development is the objective outcomes and political contents of economic, social and cultural 
modernization, as political process becomes both systematic and flexible to adapt to the pluralistic 
society and complicated modernity problems; and, social power “tames” political power. 
1 Of cource, Rawls also believes that the “oppression” must be taken by a stable political system 
supported by the majority of politically active citizens. See: John Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York, 
N. Y.: Columbia University Press, 1996.  
2 See: Samuel P. Huntington, “Political Development and Political Decay,” World Politics, No. 3, Vol. 17, 
April, 1965. pp. 393-394. And moreover, the “democratic” revolutions and imitation of modern regimes 
in Europe, Africa and Middle East have showed us some negative instances. It won’t be denied that 
democratization is a universal value, but we can factually see most undeveloped nations throughout the 
world haven’t naturally benefited form the “typical” democratic transformation. According to the 
experiences of developed democracies, commonly accepted democratic rules of general election and 
multipartism have been achieved along with the construction of fundamental institutions – especially 
rules of “rule by law” and public servant system – and the formation of a stable social structure. 
Therefore, in such countries, mostly ranged in West and North Europe, democracy is a best regime to 
integrate society and maintain stability and cultural pluralism. But on the contrary, in many 
undeveloped countries with insufficient legal system and institutions for public goods distribution – 
especially when the society is based on non-modern units like races, tribes, clans and countryside 
network – dogmatic democratization easily leads to social anarchy and political oligarchy. 
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participation in dam projects). Thus, we may conclude that the embedded mobilization in 
environmental realm leads to an issue-oriented political development. 
3.1 The Dilemma of Non-fundamental Institutionalization and the Initiative 
Change of the Party-state 
According to the environmental management predicaments, we see the dilemma of 
decentralization and recentralization, badly-operated bureaucratic coordination and local 
officials’ interest ties with enterprises. These phenomena commonly reflect the 
insufficiency of institution construction to deal with increasing modernity problems. 
China’s institutionalization is generally judged as slow and non-fundamental, and 
democratization topic is discussed with more ideological color. However, besides the 
need to protect ruling position of the Communist Party, the slow process of initiating 
fundamental political change may also indicate considerations of guaranteeing economic 
development, which are reflected in the leadership’s straightway words of “crossing rivers 
via stone tangibility <mo zhe shitou guohe>”, “development is the cardinal principle 
<fazhan caishi ying daoli>”, “not to turn from side to side <bu zheteng>”, “to discourage 
contention <bu zhenglun>”, and so on. To speak specifically, even though ideological 
propaganda and Party-state structure inherited from traditional communist system are 
still operating, and on the contrary, “universal value” to advocate “small government”, 
“general election” and multipartism of developed democracies are disseminating among 
elites and urban middle-class and even seems to be penetrate into political practice 
according to certain agendas, all of them cannot be judged as real “institutions” or 
“institutionalization” of a modern state. If we use the concept of Lucian W. Pye, China is a 
“civilization” rather than a “nation-state”, which implies the low extent of the 
institutionalization1.  
In practice, despite of the intense controversy on institutional choice among elites 
with differentiated views – as we see in university forums, symposiums, closed-door 
conference, academic writings and internet – the legitimacy of the Party-state during the 
                                                        
1 See: Lucian W. Pye, The Dynamics of Chinese Politics, Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 
1981; “China: Erratic Sate, Frustrated Society,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 4, Fall, 1990; and “How 
China’s Nationalism was Shanghaied,” in Jonathan Unger (ed.), Chinese Nationalism, Armonk, NY: M. 
E. Sharpe, 1996, pp. 86-112.  
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recent 30 years are mainly depending on great economic achievements, not communist 
ideology nor general election procedures according to “universal value”. China has 
oriented all its people’s power into struggle for increasing economic opportunities, and, 
the open access with less legal normatives to make money has led to the flexible flow 
among social classes, just like civil service examination system <keju zhidu> during 
ancient dynasties. Therefore, it generates the logical circle to interpret the slow 
institutionalization predicament – if ideological color is deprived – as: a) the 
large population in an instable social structure leads Party-state to create 
economic opportunities according to rapid wealth accumulation;  b) open 
economic accesses to satisfy the large population (or at least not to annoy 
certain populations) leads to the flexible flow among social classes;  c) no 
stable social class structure for institutionalization;  d) no stable modern 
institutions increases governance cost and strengthens Party-state’s 
dependence on rapid economic increase;  back to a). And in addition, the 
possible social instability and serious decay learnt from Soviet Union’s lesson may be also 
an influential variable.  
However, obvious damages of extensive increase pattern on development 
sustainability, global environmental governance, and objective economic cannons make 
China unable to forever enjoy the bonus. And moreover, there is an unwritten but 
commonly accepted saying that if the GDP increase rate becomes lower than 8%, it’ll be 
difficult for the Party-state to keep social stability, with breaking promises of economic 
benefits with the “people” as a whole, rather than certain social classes. Therefore, the 
Party-state is forced to be faced with an unprecedented and risky work: to conduct 
institutionalizationalization without normative social conditions. In other words, on one 
hand, the core responsibility of the Party-state is industrialization which 
needs to avoid influence from controversy on institutionalization 
orientations; on the other hand, to finish the core responsibility needs 
lasting development sustainability, which depends on modernized and 
specific reforms to institutional arrangements beyond pure Party leadership 
authority by coerciveness. That’s why I exactly make clear at the beginning of this 
 283
thesis that environmental agenda is chosen for study according to its political importance 
for Party-state’s legitimacy.  
Thus, the informal politics of “embedded mobilization” – to make big news, draw 
public attention, encourage controversy in public sphere to replace controversy in politics, 
and to utilize the “public opinion” to force bureaucrats again and again to reflect on 
policies they have already made in accordance with customes – makes sense for 
institutionalization. In first place, as the instability of social structure leads to the 
difficulty in achieving consensus, as individuals fighting for “people going up <ren wang 
gaochu zou>” in the great wave of economic increase cannot really find their social class 
identity and define a “real” and “common” appeals. Thus, the Party-state tries to make 
some to orient the “people” as whole. Secondly, although the Party maintains its legal 
legitimacy by pleasing people with economic increase, utilization of coersive power to 
“make” orthodox opinion would still incur strong apathy. Therefore, to encourage certain 
social activism as the embeddeness of power “trough society” will be a better choice, and 
further, encouraging controversy (controllable, since the “social units” are selcted) in 
public sphere is much better than the risky conflict at political-level (in accordance with 
the principle of “not to turn from side to side <bu zheteng>” announced by Hu Jintao). 
That may be the lessons from the political mess of Communism in the late 1980s, both 
domestically and globally. Lastly, public controversies lead to certain policy change and 
new regimes application, whose contents are really needed by the Party-state. We may 
take the practices as “experiemental units <shi dian>”, as Chinese Party-state always 
prefers to take for a new reform idea. And further, they are also the set of examples to 
force offcials not to forget the central authority and learn to change their customs and to 
obey the rules of newly established institutions.  
3.2 Lever for a Complex Democratization: Civil Societal Growth 
Compounded with the Pluralization within Elites 
When the central leadership is attempting to institutionalize the balance of 
centralization and decentralization, bureaucratic contradictions, and, industrialization 
and post-modern issues, the initiatives to open political access to activists and “public 
opinion” also have pluralized the political participation. However, the “environmental 
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democratization” in China may have its different characteristics.  
The Party-state-NGO integration according to the embedded mobilization indicates 
the benign interaction between Party-state and certain social actors, but it doesn’t equal 
to the factual relations between the Party-state and “society”. With the case study, we may 
find that, being compared with the real “common people” under an authoritarian system 
according to our empirical recognition, NGO activists have the much more institutional 
resources to participate in policy process; and moreover, as the social elites, their 
intellectual thinking and connections with political elites or international actors may 
promote them to pay more attention to the “fundamental political transformation” or 
“ideological change” – sometimes they act very emotionally – rather than every concrete 
problems of environmentally interest-related community1. Thus, we may conclude that 
the growth of China’s civil society is also compounded with the pluralistic interactions 
within China’s elite circle, leading to a complex “democratization”. NGOs’ emphasis on 
the “right to know” and public participation indicates the universal meaning of “public 
opinion”. And, the Party-state also finds the NGO activism a chance to alleviate social 
contradictions and improve its governance regime. What’s interesting is, it’ll be difficult 
to clearly differentiate whether a national measure to hear “public opinion” and 
encourage participation is rooted in political modernization or legacy of communist 
system. However, at least, the consideration of communist legacy can give us the 
comprehension that the Party-state strongly understand the importance of adapting to 
public opinion and socializing national directives, and further, the rise of “grass-root 
NGOs” as the indicator of a modern society, adds the orientation of “political 
development” to the self-improvement of the Party-state system. That may be the essence 
of China’s complex environmental democratization. 
The success of China’s “environmental movements” has demonstrated the contents of 
democratization: construction of participation regimes, strengthening of legal balances to 
administrative power, and encouragement of opinion expression. However, the empirical 
study also indicates that the social and economic foundation for the democratization is 
                                                        
1 It’s also argued that NGOs act emotionally, partly because they lack environmental professionals and 
related knowledge, as the participants are more likely to be from humanity social sciences.  
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not enough. Without an instable class structure, NGOs doesn’t really represent appels of 
a certain community or a (middle) class – as mentioned in this thesis, sometimes they 
even aliented from – but they represent certain ethics and a kind of intellectual choice. 
They make the symbolic indicator of “common people” and the bridge for leadership and 
environmental department to connect with more social resources and legitimacy. As 
mentioned in the first chapter, environmental NGO activism is placed high hopes for 
democratization for their indication of the increasing “urban middle class”, whose power 
had been proved according to color revolutions in ex-communist countries in East 
Europe and Soviet Union territory. But are the historical experiences and China’s reality 
simply the same? In those countries – and also other developing countries in Asia, 
Europe North Africa and Latin America – a large population of urban middle class may 
imply finished industrialization, stable social structure and favorable institutional 
seetings for democratization, but, how about in China, the 
more-than-1.3-billion-populated country with the 900-million agricultural population? 
Even though big cities like Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen demonstrate 
their modern prosperity in aspects of economy and idea, no less than those in developed 
countries, the industrialization and modernization process is still expanding to the vast 
inner mainland. Thus, it’ll be unrealistic to expect a fundamental change to national 
agendas or the political system in the near future. The discontent and appeals of the 
urban middle class in big citie – the quantity may be large enough to easily bring 
elementary shift in many developing countries, but not in China – may urge some 
governmental improvement, but it is hard to make the Party-state feel the risk of losing 
legitimacy. But on the contrary, the discontent of large agricultural population in less 
advanced terrain will1. There are also empirical evidences to show that the difference of 
appeals between NGOs located in big cities and interest-related local community has 
reduced NGOs’ effects on “representing common people”2. The most crucial may be that, 
                                                        
1 That’s why issues with regard to agriculture, countryside and farmers <san nong wenti> – in other 
words, the “development” and “modernization of living” – have made the annually top national agendas 
during the recent years. 
2 This phenomenon is especially made clear through the anti-dam movements, analyzed in the fifth 
chapter. In the case of “Nu River defense battle”, nongovernmental intellectuals divided into two pacts 
and both advocated to “represent common people”, when environmentalists emphasized environmental 
priority and “people’s right to know” and their opponents valued the “factual demand” of local 
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in China, the most environmentally vulnerable areas are commonly ranged in less 
advanced areas, where environmental problems are placed importance for their negative 
effects on economic benefits rather than environmental priority1. Thus, besides the fixed 
bureaucracy and the considerations of the Party to maintain power, the targets of 
industrialization2 also make a critical reason that why environmental democratization is 
highly limited in China. 
The empirical study demonstrates that those visibly active NGOs3 may share similar 
values and appeals to reformatist meritocrats, rather than the underdeveloped local 
community, and that’s an important source for NGOs’ effectiveness. There is natural 
networking among NGOs’ leading members and political actors – and some of the leading 
members are formal officials or consultants to the Party-state – in favor of NGOs’ 
utilization of institutional resources4. Thus, it gets more difficult to define the identiy of 
China’s NGOs, which both obtains legitimacy from “public opinion” and official directives. 
Possibly, we may consider it as the split between real appeals (as grass-root organizations) 
and action tactics (to serve the Party-state). To speak specifically, in international arena 
or personal communication, their energetic expectation of environmental 
democratization is clearer to be noticed, while in domestic practice, they commonly avoid 
touch sensitive democratic agendas but follow the central orthodoxy to be 
“de-politicalized” as Peter Ho (2007) claims as, a) potraying themselves as partners; b) 
skirting certain sensitive environmental questions; and c) avoiding any connotation with 
                                                                                                                                                               
community for getting rid of poverty. And, in that chapter, I raise the examples of an environmental 
activist’s interview with local people. According to the interviews, it’s not hard to find the different 
discourse and issue framing. In comparison with the ideological focus of the interviewer, the 
interviewees, local agricultural residents, have demonstrated more practical considerations of benefits 
and losses, and indicated dependence on the administrative power. 
1 For example, the discontent of local community with ecological resettlement according to dam 
construction concentrates on insufficient or disadvantaged compensation distribution; and the several 
examples of social riots of ecological resettlers are mainly caused by conflict between unemployed youth 
and local people. 
2 Of course, it should not be denied that the targets of industrialization is also compounded with the 
Party’s considerations to maintain its power and legitimacy, however, they are also echoed by part of 
common people who take their living quality to be at rising stage, nationalists, and non-Party 
intellectuals who judge industialization a inevitable process for a nation-state in contemporary era.  
3 It may not be directly related with this thesis but needed to be paid further attention is that, during 
recnet years, there is also controversy among non-profit organizations on whether they should 
emphasize on daily services and professional consultation, or gorgeous media media campaigns and 
protests with clear political appeals. And moreover, the writer have also heard some social workers to 
complain about that only gorgeous campaigns can draw media attention and good sponsorship, 
although their daily services are “exactly helping people”.  
4 And further, as mentioned in the case study, we may see several turning points were related with the 
direct petition of elite NGO members with their own accesses. 
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broad and popular movements1. However, how about if it’s not only the tactics but the 
true nature? Especially, without the identity with local community, can NGOs composed 
of “urban middle class” really sponsor broad and popular movements? During economic 
reform, movements that can be judged with “broad and popular” are limited to very few 
kinds as: farmers’ protests, mass disturbances in small towns, unemployed workers’ 
demonstrations during the “laid-off<xiagang>” period, and some demonstrations with 
regard to nationalism. It’s obvious that social environmental activism is different with the 
cases2. More interestingly, the seemingly unclear identity looks to be identical with that of 
a typical confucian intellectual. To put it simply, he/she needs to “civilize <jiaohua>” the 
unknown mass, and, the “civilization <jiaohua>” should be synchronous with a 
monarch’s “good governance <ren zheng>” with the assistance of confucian philosophers, 
while the philosophers are spiritually independent from the poltical power and keeping 
the right of “leaving the sovereignty <qu guo>” if it doesn’t promote “good governance 
<ren zheng>”. According to the case study, on one hand, NGOs’ advocacy of 
environmental priority and “right to know” in local community can be taken as some kind 
of “civilization <jiaohua>”, and thus, the NGO-local community communication may be 
interpreted as the intellectual-mass relations, rather than the modern grass root 
NGO-society ties. And on the other hand, NGO activists – especially the leading members 
– are simultaneously “inside” and “outside” the political system. That’s to say, serving a 
“good <ren>” political power can also be taken as the reflection of the intellectual nature, 
while they maintain their independence by “representing common people”. And, the 
sharing educated background, lving conditions and spiritual world, the corresponding 
communication and mutual actions of activists and meritocrats further fuzz up the 
boundary between political and public field. Thus, the environmental democratization 
under the embedded mobilization is also composed with the increase of both public 
participation and national ability, indicating the “strong Party-state – strong society” 
inclination.  
  
                                                        
1 Ho and Edmons (ed.), China's Embedded Activism: Opportunities and Constraints of A Social 
Movement, p. 8. 
2 The comparison and analysis can be expected in further study. 
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Glossary of Chinese Media in the Thesis1 
 
Asian Weekly 亚洲周刊 
Beijing Evening 北京晚报 
Beijing News 新京报 
Business Paper 商报 
Business Weekly 商务周刊 
Chengdu Business News 成都商报 
China Central Television (CCTV): 中国中央电视台 
China Environment News 中国环境报 
China News Weekly 中国新闻周刊 
China Social Science Quarterly 中国社会科学季刊 
China Water 中国水利 
Chongqing Shangbao (Chongqing Economic Daily): 重庆商报 
Dagong Bao 大公报 
Diyi Caijing Daily (First Financial Daily): 第一财经日报 
East Morning 东方早报 
Economic Guide 经济导报 
Economic Observation 经济观察报 
Economic Observation 经济观察报 
Economic Reference 经济参考报 
Economics 经济杂志 
Front Line 理论前沿 
Globe 环球 
Guangzhou Daily 广州日报 
Huaxia Times 华夏时报 
Jinghua Times 京华时报 
Journal of International Communication 国际新闻界 
                                                        
1 Some media have commonly accepted English titles, while some others do not have formal translations. 
For the latter, the paper used Pinyin (Chinese pronunciations), with simple explanations in English 
added. 
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Legal Daily 法制日报 
Lianhe Zaobao (United Morning News, Singapore): 联合早报 
Liaowang News Weekly 瞭望新闻周刊 
Liaowang 瞭望杂志 
Ming Bao 明报 
Nangfang Dushi Bao (Nanfang Metropolis Paper): 南方都市报 
Nanhua Morning 南华早报 
New Youth – Balance Magazine 新青年.权衡 
News Evening 新闻晚报 
News Morning 新闻晨报 
People’s Daily 人民日报 
People’s Daily, Overseas Version 人民日报海外版 
People’s Yangtze Paper 人民长江报 
Radio Hong Kong 香港电台 
Sanlian Life Weekly 三联生活周刊 
Science Times 科学时报 
Science Times 科学时报 
Social Science Weekly 社会科学报 
South News Group 南方报业集团 
South Weekend 南方周末 
Southwind Window Magazine 南风窗 
The Journalist Monthly 新闻记者杂志 
TVB 香港无线电视台 
Waitan Pictorial 外滩画报 
Wenhui Bao 文汇报 
Wuxi Daily: 无锡日报 
Xiandai Kuaibao (Modern Flash Report) 现代快报 
Xihua Daily, Jiangsu Province 新华日报 
Xin Evening 新晚报 
Xinhua News Agency (New China News Agency) 新华社 
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Xinxi Shibao (Information Times) 信息时报 
Yangcheng Wanbao (Yangcheng Evening News) 羊城晚报 
Yangtze Evening Post 杨子晚报 
Yanzhao Dushi Bao (Yanzhao Metropolis Paper) 燕赵都市报 
Youth Reference 青年参考 
Yunnan Daily 云南日报 
Yunnan Hydropower Paper y 云南电力报 
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